Notes on Meeting of Secretary Acheson, with Fisher & Battle on MacArthur hearing testimony 5/25/51
Formosa
Let me state in two minutes exactly what Formosan policy was, because it was simple and clear.
From the fall of 1948, before I came to the State Department, until the day the Korean War started the policy of the entire Government, agreed in by everybody, was that Formosa had strategic importance for the United States. That importance lay in the danger which it would present if occupied by hostile parties, rather than in any need for it to belong to or be occupied by the United States. Also it was the fundamental policy agreed in by all parties that no armed forces of the United States could be committed or used in the defense of Formosa because of the limited amount of our forces and other positions of greater strategic importance which had to be the first concern of those forces.
On those principles, there was never any change from the time the matter was first considered until June, 1950. It was unanimous and complete on all sides.
(Next possible approach)
In the very closing days of 1949 the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended sending limited amounts of aid in addition to what was being furnished under the $125 million and sending a military mission. That question came up for discussion at the end of 1949 and opening days of 1950. At that time it was decided not to do this. I was opposed to doing it and so were the others for the reason that the fundamental decisions, being as we have stated, that we could not and would not use US forces to defend Formosa, and, since it could not be held indefinitely without those forces, to commit US prestige through renewal of aid and renewal of a mission was to court disaster. That was the view I expressed at the time and the view I still think was right. After considering all aspects the President decided that was the way it was going to be and that led to the statement of January 5.
(Next Possible approach)
Not only was the policy as stated, but also all Departments agreed that the chances of Formosa surviving very long if there was an attack on it were not good. In the middle or late summer of 1949 the Department of the Army drew our attention to the fact that the fall of Formosa would have an unfortunate effect on other areas and we should consider how its fall should be treated on the Voice of America.
A directive was prepared and it stated our position as to how to handle the situation if it came about. It must be clear to the Committee that we must anticipate all kinds of events - happy and unhappy. And this directive was one of a number of others.
If we are going to discuss this paper further, I would like to indicate to Col. Davis that my next remarks should be censored.
If you look at this paper, you will see that it falls into three parts: (1) An analysis that the island may fall and what that is going to mean and why the Voice of America should address itself to the problem; (2) what line to take; (3) what lines to avoid.
If you read this paper, you will see that that it does not mean we indicate that the fall is wished for or would be happy. But it takes the line, that line which all of these documents must, that something unhappy may happen and we want to minimize importance of certain things and maximize importance of other things. That is what we are doing here.