The Charge of the Light Brigade, by Clifford Berryman
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The title of this memorandum might well be "The Politics of 1948". The aim of the memorandum is to outline a course of political conduct for the Administration extending from November, 1947 to November, 1948. It is obvious that such an outline cannot encompass the details of a political course because they will depend upon interim developments. However, it is my conviction that we must chart a course at this time which will contain the basic elements of our policy.

Comments that are presented here are based solely on an appraisal of the politically advantageous course to follow. In a democracy, action that is politically advisable may often accord with the merits of a particular policy. Sometimes it does not. It may generally be assumed that the policy that is politically wise is also the best policy for this country.

An old axiom claims that politics is no more than a study of the probabilities. If that is so, there can be no original or unusual thinking in such a survey as this; it must, rather, be devoted to a review of the usual. Most of the comments to be made on modern American politics have already been said and are constantly being restated.

For instance, the basic premise of this memorandum -- that the Democratic Party is an unhappy alliance of Southern conservatives, Western progressives and Big City labor -- is very trite, but it is also very true. And it is equally true that the success or failure of the Democratic leadership can be precisely measured by its ability to lead enough members of these three misfit groups to the polls on the first Tuesday after the first November of each year.
the Administration should now initiate so that it, rather than the opposition party, will direct (insofar as direction is humanly possible), the decision of the American people on Election Day.

As of today some probabilities are apparent. These should determine the Administration's political course and bearing for the next few months and preferably until the Democratic Convention in July. Some of these probabilities appear almost certainties; others, to say the least, are extremely arguable. Taken together, however, they may afford the Administration a working hypothesis on which to base its political actions.

A. The Probabilities.

1. Governor Dewey will be the nominee of the Republican Party. This tentative conclusion is, of course, based on the usual factors. Among these is the fact that a strong candidate is required to defeat President Truman, as the recent Gallup Poll shows. Just as a year ago the probability was that any Republican could be elected, so the swiftly fluctuating currents of American opinion may again destroy the President's strong popularity a few months hence if "the breaks" — such as an imminent European crisis which the American government fails to handle smoothly — are against his Administration. But as of November, 1947, it takes a strong candidate to defeat him. The policies of Senator Taft, for example, have probably so
The policies of Senator Taft, for example, have probably so alienated large blocs of voters (viz, AFL President William Green's recent "dare" to the Republican Party to nominate Taft) that he permanently ruptured his chances for nomination. Although he may still be in a position to dictate the nominee, or in the alternative, there may be a deadlock between Dewey and Taft and the choice will fall on someone such as Eisenhower, Vandenberg or Warren, these possibilities are at this time so speculative it would be quite inadvisable to formulate a political program on them.

It should be assumed, therefore, that the candidate is Dewey (the only man to lead the President in the Fortune Poll); and that, because of his 1944 experience and because of the extremely efficient group of men he has drawn around him, he will be a resourceful, intelligent and highly dangerous candidate, even more difficult to defeat than in 1944.

2. President Truman will be elected if the Administration will successfully concentrate on the traditional Democratic alliance between the South and West. It is inconceivable that any policies initiated by the Truman Administration no matter how "liberal" could so alienate the South in the next year that it would revolt. As always, the South can be considered safely Democratic. And in formulating national policy, it can be safely ignored.

The only pragmatic reason for conciliating the South in normal times is because of its tremendous strength in the Congress. Since the Congress is Republican and the Democratic President has, therefore, no real chance to get his own program approved by it, particularly in an election year, he has no real necessity for "getting along" with the Southern conservatives. He must, however, get along with the Westerners and with labor if he is to be reelected.
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The Administration is, for practical purposes, politically free to concentrate on the Winning of the West. If the Democrats carry the solid South and also those Western states carried in 1944, they will have 216 of the required 266 electoral votes. And if the Democratic Party is powerful enough to capture the West, it will almost certainly pick up enough of the doubtful Middlewestern and Eastern states to get 50 more votes (e.g. Missouri's 14 votes). We could lose New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Massachusetts — all the "big" states — and still win.

Therefore, political and program planning demands concentration upon the West and its problems, including reclamation, floods, and agriculture. It is the Number One Priority for the 1948 campaign. The Republican Congress has already done its share to give the West to the Administration.

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3. **Henry Wallace will be the candidate of a third party.** As of November, 1947, the majority of informed opinion does not favor this particular hypothesis. Nevertheless, the factors which impel Wallace toward a third party clearly outweigh those which do not.

For one thing, the men around Wallace are motivated by the Communist Party line. The First Lord of the Kremlin who determines the Party line is still Karl Marx. The Marxists emphasize that the capitalist economy holds within itself the seeds of its own destruction; that it must inevitably destroy itself by depression and collapse. But within this rigid ideology is the directive that when and where possible the Party must hasten the process. Moscow is sufficiently aware of American politics to
perceive that a Republican administration would be rigid and reactionary, and would fail to take those governmental steps necessary to bolster the capitalist economy in time of crisis. It is also convinced there is no longer any hope that the Truman Administration will submit to the Russian program of world conquest and expansion. From the Communist long-range point of view, there is nothing to lose and much to gain if a Republican becomes the next President. The best way it can help achieve that result, and hasten the disintegration of the American economy, is to split the Independent and labor union vote between President Truman and Wallace — and thus insure the Republican candidate's election.

The best evidence supporting this probability is that the men who surround Wallace today are Party-liners such as C. B. Baldwin, political opportunists such as Harold Young, and gullible idealists like Michael Straight. These men will persuade Wallace it is his duty to his country to run, as they have persuaded him to do everything else they ever wanted him to do. The most recent reports on Wallace's personality by men who know him well are that while his mysticism increases, the humility which was once his dominant characteristic has decreased to the vanishing point; there is something almost Messianic in his belief today that he is the Indispensable Man.

There is some evidence to the contrary. Wallace has been silent since the announcement of the Marshall Plan, except to claim that the idea was originally his. Within the last few weeks an American Communist Party manifesto which restated the Party line told the faithful that the American Communists are no longer interested in a third party. And Senator Claude Pepper, a devout if cynical follower of the Party line, said on the White House steps that a third party was impractical, and that Wallace
White House steps that a third party was impracticable and that Wallace could serve his country best as a private citizen.

But these are merely surface phenomena. A more accurate impression is that the Comrades are making a strategic withdrawal for the moment. Tactical considerations, brought about by the refusal of Hillman's old union to back a third party and thus threatening a possible split in the New York American Labor Party which the Communists only barely control, have caused a temporary soft pedal. The Party line can change swiftly with events. Recent events, both international and domestic, (such as the Presidential veto of the Taft-Hartley Act and the Marshall Plan) do not favor preaching a third party for the moment.

The speech made by Vishinsky at the United Nations is surely proving embarrassing to Henry Wallace. The motives of this country in attempting the economic rehabilitation of Western Europe were attacked in vitriolic phrases which were glaringly inaccurate and unfair. The speech outraged the American people and Wallace surely knows this.

November and December may well show the Communist Party again moving toward the third party. On Labor Day Wallace broke his long silence to address the Wayne County CIO Council in Detroit. This labor council was recently captured by the Communists. His speech before 65,000 persons again threatened a third party. Reid Robinson and Lee Pressman, both party-liners, called for a third party at the August convention of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, a Communist-dominated union. The New York State CIO Council at its annual convention on September 6th rejected a resolution against a third party.

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The casual comment by the professional politicians on third party talk is that it is futile since a third party cannot get on enough
state ballots. This is dangerously unrealistic. Wallace is gambling for high stakes. He hopes to defeat President Truman by splitting the Democratic Party and then inherit its leadership so he can be the candidate of 1952. If Wallace can get on the ballots of only a few states and can then draw five or ten per cent of the vote, that vote alone taken from the Democrats in a close election is enough to give the Republicans the electoral vote of those states and therefore national victory. And Wallace can get on the ballot of New York (American Labor Party) and California and other states.

It is also very dangerous to assume that the only supporters of Wallace are the Communists. True enough, they give him a disciplined hard-working organization and collect the money to run his campaign. But he also has a large following throughout the country, particularly of the young voters who are attracted by the idealism that he — and he alone — is talking and who regard war as the one evil greater than any other. He will also derive support from the pacifists, which means a great number of organized women and from whatever irreconcilable and die-hard isolationists remain. He will attract votes — and money — from the "lunatic fringe." The California Townsendites are already pledged to him.

In a close election, no votes can be ignored. The only safe working hypothesis is to assume now that Wallace will run on a third party ticket. Every effort must be made now jointly and at one and the same time — although, of course, by different groups — to dissuade him and also to identify him and isolate him in the public mind with the Communists.

4. The independent and progressive voter will hold the balance of power in 1948; he will not actively support President Truman unless a great effort is made. The Democratic and Republican Parties each have a minimum, a residue, of voters whose loyalty almost nothing can shake. The
independent voter who shifts on the issues comprises a group which today is probably larger than both.

The truth is that the old "party organization" control is gone forever. Better education, the rise of the mass pressure group, the economic depression of the 30's, the growth of government functions—all these have contributed to the downfall of "the organization." Tammany, Hague, Kelley and the rest of the straight party leaders, while still important, are no longer omnipotent, no longer able to determine the issues. For practical political purposes, they are moribund; they cannot be relied on to do the job alone.

They have been supplanted in large measure by the pressure groups. In these pressure groups are the farmers, still traditionally Republican, and organized labor which became "traditionally Democratic" under Roosevelt. Another loosely organized group are the progressives who followed Roosevelt for four elections but are increasingly restive under President Truman, mostly because of the reactionary domination exercised over the Democratic Party by the Congressional Southerners who, although a minority of the Democratic Party, are a majority of the Party-in-Congress and are assuming control of the Party organization councils. And also among these groups are the racial groups who have learned to use the vote as an economic weapon and who can no longer be satisfied with a Tammany turkey on Thanksgiving.

(a) The Farmer. The farm vote is in most ways identical with the Winning of the West -- the Number One Priority. The farmer is at least at present favorably inclined toward the Truman Administration. His crops are good. However, the high prices may be affecting the rest of the people, they help him more than hurt him. Parity will protect him -- and the Marshall Plan will aid him. The economic and political trend of the Administration (except its tax program) is going his way. Whether prosperity makes him the conservative he usually becomes in good times remains to be seen.
seen - but, if it does, nothing much can be done about it in terms of more political or economic favors to woo him back to the Democratic banner.

(b) **Labor.** President Truman and the Democratic Party cannot win without the **active** support of organized labor. It is dangerous to assume that labor now has nowhere else to go in 1948. **Labor can stay home.**

The rank and file of the workers are not yet politically minded; they will not, therefore, vote or work actively unless they are inspired to do so. They were so inspired by Roosevelt. They were **not** so inspired in the 1946 Congressional elections. In those elections they did not vote Republican but they **did** stay home. The labor group has always been politically inactive during prosperity. When they are well fed they are not interested. They will probably be well fed in 1948. The effort to get out the labor vote will thus have to be even more strenuous than in 1944.

The President's veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill, coupled with vehement dislike of the Republicans because they passed it over his veto, does indicate that as of today Labor is friendly to the President. But to assume that it will remain so throughout 1948 is to assume that labor leaders are logical men. They are as deficient in that quality as other men.

The situation in the two major Labor organizations presents a number of curious factors.

The AFL always looks for a bargain. It will want a new one in 1948. The veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill was in 1947. In 1948 it is entirely possible that the attitude will be - "You haven't done anything for me lately." The rising leader of the AFL is George Meany who heads the CIO. He is a powerful man with considerable economic clout. The CIO can represent a powerful force in the election of 1948.
The rising leader of the AFL is George Meany who heads the New York AFL Council. By his direction, and for the first time in many years, the AFL in 1946 refused to endorse the Democratic candidates for Governor and Senator in New York. In a radio speech in September, 1947, Meany used some exceedingly significant language. Assailing the Taft-Hartley Act, he deliberately, and time after time, confined his attack to "Congressional Republicans." He carefully said nothing against the Party as a whole or against such non-Congressional Republicans as Governor Dewey with whom he is friendly. It is entirely possible that the Republican Congress in the regular session in 1948 will pass minor amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act, will pass an increased minimum wage bill and a health and housing program. This could be sufficient to cause the AFL to support the Republican Party if the candidate were someone other than Taft.

Apparently William Green remains enthusiastic about the President. You will recall that after the veto of the Taft-Hartley Bill he told the writer that it was a great decision on the part of the President and showed that he was on the side of the common man. Since that time he has had no personal contact with the President and it is for this reason that it is most important that the President see him on a subject unrelated to the Labor controversy. A conference between the President and Green on the Marshall Plan will give Green greater standing with his own men and will assist in formulating in Green's mind the attitude that he and the President are co-workers in striving toward the same goal.
The CIO is badly split between the Right Wing, who are trying to drive the Communists out, and the Left Wing who are constantly attempting to increase their influence in the organization. Phillip Murray's past course of conduct indicates that he will probably continue to do everything in his power to hold the CIO together even though it means a form of involuntary cooperation with the Communists inside the organization. It is doubtful, at the present time, if Murray has much control over the CIO. If future developments, however, weaken the position of the Communists in the CIO, Murray may emerge with greater strength. It is also felt that it is an extremely wise decision for the President also to see Murray with reference to the Marshall Plan.

Of all Labor, only the Railroad Brotherhood seems at this stage to be completely friendly to the Democrats. The "flip-flop" of A. F. Whitney, who once swore a bitter oath that he would defeat the President if it took thirty million dollars, is a surprising, but nonetheless encouraging, trend.

The moral is plain. Much work needs to be done with organized Labor. The moment will never be as propitious again. It is not suggested that the President must carry this load personally but the National Committee and certain Cabinet Members can render a real service in this field. We can expect that the Dewey forces will increase their efforts to cultivate Labor and the greatest progress in this direction can be made by our side if we make the effort now.

(c) The "Liberals". The liberal and progressive leaders are not overly enthusiastic about the Administration. Foreign policy has forced the large bulk to break sharply with Wallace and the fellow-travelers.
And, of course, they find no hope in Republican activities as evidenced by the recent Congress. Fear of the Republicans may drive them to activity for President Truman, but at present there is no disposition to do much more than stay home on election day. Whether their reasons are valid or otherwise, many of them feel that the progressive wing has been cut off by the Southerners and the "organization" leaders from any say in the Democratic Party. This is particularly true of such organizations as Americans for Democratic Action where most of the Roosevelt New Dealers have found haven. When Adolf Berle, after calling on the President as chairman of the New York Liberal Party, announced he was against Wallace and a third party and that the New York Liberal Party would support President Truman, an almost universal criticism among the progressive groups of this statement was that Berle acted unintelligently — he had thrown away the bargaining power of his group a year before the election and had received nothing in return.

The liberals are numerically small. But, similar to manufacturers and financiers of the Republican Party, they are far more influential than mere numbers entitle them to be. The businessman has influence because he contributes his money. The liberal exerts unusual influence because he is articulate. The "right" may have the money, but the "left" has always had the pen. If the "intellectual" can be induced to back the President, he will do so in the press, on the radio, and in the movies. He is the artist of propaganda. He is the "idea man" for the people. Since the rise of the pressure groups, the men of ideas who can appeal to them on their own ground, in their own words, have become an essential ally to the alert candidate in modern American politics.

(d) The Negro. Since 1932 when, after intensive work by
President Roosevelt, their leaders swung the Pennsylvania Negro bloc into the Democratic column with the classic remark, "Turn your picture of Abraham Lincoln to the wall — we have paid that debt", the northern Negro has voted Democratic (with the exception of 1946 in New York). A theory of many professional politicians is that the northern Negro voter today holds the balance of power in Presidential elections for the simple arithmetical reason that the Negroes not only vote in a bloc but are geographically concentrated in the pivotal, large and closely contested electoral states such as New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan. This theory may or may not be absolutely true, but it is certainly close enough to the truth to be extremely arguable.

In great measure, this explains the assiduous and continuous cultivation of the New York Negro vote by Governor Dewey and his insistence that his controllable legislature pass a state anti-discrimination act. No less an authority than Ed Flynn has said privately that Dewey will take New York from President Truman in 1948 because he controls the Negro and Italian blocs. This explains the strenuous efforts made by Wilkie in the 1940 campaign to get the Negro vote and it, of course, explains the long continuing solicitude of the New Deal wing of the Democratic Party toward the Negro.

There are several straws, aside from the loyalty of his leaders to Dewey, that the northern Negro is today ready to swing back to his traditional moorings — the Republican Party. Under the tutelage of Walter White, of the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People, and other intelligent, educated and sophisticated leaders,
the Negro voter has become a cynical, hardboiled trader. He is just about convinced today that he can better his present economic lot by swinging his vote in a solid bloc to the Republicans. He believes the rising dominance of the Southern conservatives in the Democratic councils of the Congress and of the Party makes it only too clear that he can go no further by supporting the present Administration. Whether his interest lies in a Federal Anti-Poll Tax Statute, in the protection of his civil liberties, or in a permanent federal FEPC, he understands clearly that he now has no chance of success with any of these because of the Southern Senators of the Democratic Party.

As well aware of this Democratic chink in the armour as the Negro are the Republican politicians. They make no great secret of their intent to try to pass a FEPC Act and anti-poll tax statute in the next Congress. Whether they are successful -- or whether Democratic filibusters will block them -- they can't see how they can lose in such a situation either way. The Negro press, often venal, is already strongly Republican.

To counteract this trend, the Democratic Party can point only to the obvious -- that the really great improvement in the economic lot of the Negro of the North has come in the last sixteen years only because of the sympathy and policies of a Democratic Administration. The trouble is that this has worn a bit thin with the passage of the years. Unless the Administration makes a determined campaign to help the Negro (and everybody else) on the problems of high prices and housing—and capitalized politically on its efforts—the Negro vote is already lost. Unless there are new and real efforts (as distinguished from mere political gestures which are today thoroughly understood and strongly resented by sophisticated Negro leaders),
The Negro bloc, which, certainly in Illinois and probably in New York and Ohio, does hold the balance of power, will go Republican.

The Jewish vote, insofar as it can be thought of as a bloc, is important only in New York. But (except for Wilson in 1916) no candidate since 1876 has lost New York and won the Presidency, and its 47 votes are naturally the first prize in any election. Centered in New York City, that vote is normally Democratic and, if large enough, is sufficient to counteract the upstate vote and deliver the state to President Truman. Today the Jewish bloc is interested primarily in Palestine and will continue to be an uncertain quantity right up to the time of election. Even though there is general approval among the Jewish people regarding the United Nations report on Palestine, the group is still torn with conflicting views and dissension. It will be extremely difficult to decide some of the vexing questions which will arise in the months to come on the basis of political expediency. In the long run, there is likely to be greater gain if the Palestine problem is approached on the basis of reaching decisions founded upon intrinsic merit.

The Catholic vote is traditionally Democratic. The controlling element in this group today from a political standpoint is the distrust and fear of Communism. It is reported that Senator Mead, in his candidacy for Governor of New York, lost Catholic votes because he tolerated a loose alliance with the American Labor Party which is controlled by the Communists. The attitude of the President and the Administration toward Communism should exert a definite appeal to this group but it is entirely possible that closer liaison should be established.

The Italian vote—which has weight in New York, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, California and several minor states because it almost always votes as a solid bloc—is notoriously volatile, swinging easily from party to party. Roosevelt came perilously close to losing it with his offhand remark in 1940 about Mussolini's "stab in the back" of France. But
he regained it, and in fact almost made it Democratic forever in 1943 when he formally declared Italian aliens were no longer classified as alien enemies for the rest of the war. Today the Italian racial leaders are again somewhat unhappy—this time because they regard the peace treaty for Italy as unnecessarily harsh.

(h) The Alien Group. As of today, the Administration enjoys good standing with the Harrison group interested in expanded immigration quotas. This is a result of the President's forthright fight for the Stratton Bill. But the leaders of this organization have learned "the hard way" to be politically sophisticated over the last few years. They deliberately plan to make the best trade they can for the DP's and the other alien groups they represent and have no interest in whether it is to be made with Democrats, Republicans or Hottentots. They are convinced that both parties are primarily interested only for the votes involved; they are ready to act accordingly. On this issue, too, the Administration must carry as its handicap the fact that the major opposition to lowering the immigration barriers comes from its own Southern conservatives. Although not as severely, the Republicans are similarly obstructed here because so many of their Congressmen are residents of small towns and rural areas whose people are bitterly opposed to further immigration. The labor organizations, which originally caused the passage of the immigration laws, have publicly changed their minds and endorsed the Stratton Bill.

The immigration leaders today lean to the belief the Democrats are more sympathetic, but they maintain a flexible position.

5. The foreign policy issues of the 1948 campaign will be our relations with the USSR and the Administration's handling of foreign recon-struction and relief. The probable fact that the German economic...
struction and relief. The probability that the foreign affairs of the United States will remain on a basis of "bi-partisan cooperation" is unfortunately remote. The stakes in a Presidential contest are so huge that the temptation to make an issue of anything on which there is any segment or

group of dissatisfied voters is too irresistible.

There is considerable political advantage to the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin. The best guess today is that our poor relations with Russia will intensify. The nation is already united behind the President on this issue. The worse matters get, up to a fairly certain point — real danger of imminent war — the more is there a sense of crisis. In times of crisis the American citizen tends to back up his President. And on the issue of policy toward Russia, President Truman is comparatively invulnerable to attack because of his brilliant appointment of General Marshall who has convinced the public that as Secretary of State he is non-partisan and above politics.

In a flank attack tied up with foreign policy, the Republicans have tried to identify the Administration with the domestic Communists. The President adroitly stole their thunder by initiating his own Government employee loyalty investigation procedure and the more frank Republicans admit it. But their efforts will intensify as the election approaches, particularly when the meagre results of the civil service investigations are made public by the Republican Congress.

If the third party effort fizzes, it is quite possible the Communists will try to deliver the unions they dominate to the Republicans. The shoe may conceivably be on the Republican foot by election time — and it will be the Democrats' turn to emphasize the red lining on the opposition banner. When Bridges, Curran and Mike Quill "went down the line" for,
But domestic Communism is merely a sideshow to the "Big Tent." On the main issues, the Republican strategy on foreign policy as it appears to be developing is a very effective one. It is effective because of its simplicity — "everything that is good about American foreign policy is Marshall; everything that is bad is Truman." In addition, there is increasing evidence that the Republicans are taking the line that they have played an important part in the determination of the successful phases of our foreign policy. Vandenberg is used as the symbol of Republican participation in foreign policy, always to the credit of the Republican Party and to the discredit of the Administration.

Republican propaganda is repetitious on the theme that Soviet expansion in Europe could and should have been stopped long ago and that only Roosevelt's bungling at Yalta and President Truman's actions at Potsdam prevented this from happening; that the money spent, $23 billion, for foreign relief seems to have done no good whatsoever; and that the occupation of Germany is a costly failure. This strategy was sharpened by Senator Taft in his Ohio speech when he very carefully emphasized that these weaknesses could not be blamed on the Republican Congress — only a
strong Executive, said he, can give the nation a sound foreign policy. Congressman Bender of Ohio, a Taft spokesman, in early September urged that we abandon Europe since all the money poured in since VE-Day had been wasted.

The situation in Greece may become a political issue in 1948. Secret reports from the State Department indicate that the situation is worsening in Greece and the Communists are growing stronger and bolder. By the summer of 1948 the Truman Doctrine will have been on trial in Greece for a full year and, if conditions there have failed to improve, the Administration will be charged with having blundered. Every effort must be made to insure the success of our efforts in Greece.

6. The domestic issues of the campaign will be high prices and housing. The High Cost of Living will be the most controversial issue of the 1948 campaign — indeed the only domestic issue. Whichever Party is adjudged guilty of causing it will lose the election. For that reason, the presentation of its case by the Democratic Party — the manner, the substance and the effectiveness of its evidence — is of crucial importance.

In a sense, Housing is a part of the larger price issue. Yet it has its own separate dramatic possibilities and for most purposes can be treated as separate. For instance, the World War II Veteran, not yet as politically conscious as prices may force him to be next year, has been led to believe (whether rightly or wrongly) that he has a vested interest in adequate housing. This alone is enough to cause concentration on who is...
adequate housing. This alone is enough to cause concentration on who is responsible for the lack of housing -- the Democratic President or the Republican Congress. But the pressures on both landlord and tenant, on builder and buyer, will also result in expanding the issue so that almost every voter will be affected.

As part of the general strategy of their high command to move somewhat more to the "left" in the second session of Congress, the Republicans will push some sort of a housing bill. Whatever they do sponsor, in all probability a "watered-down" version of the Taft-Wagner-Ellender bill, will be an anathema to their financial backers but they know they must make a real attempt on housing to hold the so-called "middle class vote" which in 1946 gave them control of the Congress.

The high cost of living will clearly be the main issue in 1948. The Republicans have already begun their attack upon the Administration in this regard and have attempted to place the blame upon the President for high prices. They contend that the President is responsible because he encouraged wage increases for labor and because he, in the last analysis, removed price controls.

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It is extremely doubtful if the Republicans have made any progress in their effort to sell this package to the American people. The people remember the President's plea for continuation of controls and the Republican refusal to acquiesce in his request. When the right time comes, the President can clarify this issue greatly by reading the record to the people.

This will not be sufficient, however. The present price problem is so acute to the American people that they don't have nearly so much room to maneuver as they did in 1938.
is of little interest to the individual people that they don't have nearly so much
interest in who caused it in 1946 as in who is going to do something about
it in 1947 and 1948. The President must present to the Congress a program
for the control of prices that, if enacted by the Congress, will actually
prove to be effective. If the President recommends a bold program and the
Congress refuses to go along with him, then we will be storing up valuable
ammunition to use at a later time - for we must face the fact that without
some form of controls prices are not only not going to come down but they
are going to continue to go up.

Our record on prices must be crystal clear because there is the
ever present danger that if prices continue to go up, the people may be so
irritable and irrational about the problem that they will vote the "ins" out
and the "outs" in.

The manner in which the Administration dramatizes the high cost
of living and the effectiveness with which it can present its story to the
people can largely determine the next incumbent of the White House.

7. The conflict between the President and the Congress will
increase during the 1948 session. With both major parties making their
records for the campaign, and with each trying to claim credit for popular
issues and to place the blame for the unpopular ones on the opposition, the
political atmosphere will be so pervading that little real "business" will
be done. The mutual distrust which such conduct necessarily engenders must
result in a continual conflict almost from the beginning of the session.

This may mean the end of "bipartisan cooperation" on
foreign policy. In the election year atmosphere, it is quite difficult
to "compartmentalize" issues. To expect reasonableness and partnership
in foreign policy is unrealistic.
on foreign affairs while guerrilla warfare is going on in domestic matters is to expect that politicians overnight have become more than the mere mortal beings they are.

Insofar as it has control of the situation, the Administration should select the issues upon which there will be conflict with the majority in Congress. It can assume it will get no major part of its own program approved. Its tactics must, therefore, be entirely different than if there were any real point to bargaining and compromise. Its recommendations -- in the State of the Union message and elsewhere -- must be tailored for the voter, not the Congressman; they must display a label which reads "no compromises." The strategy on the Taft-Hartley Bill -- refusal to bargain with the Republicans and to accept any compromises -- paid big political dividends. That strategy should be expanded in the next session to include all the domestic issues.

B. The Course of Action.

If the "Probabilities" (as discussed above), or most of them, are correct, there remain the twin problems of how to take advantage of those which are favorable and how to effect changes in those unfavorable.

The action required to achieve this should take place on two levels -- the political level and what can be called "the program" level.

1. The Political level.

(a) "The Party Organization." The one particular upon which all politicians agree is that the leadership of the Democratic organization is moribund. It is hardly important on this late day whether this is anyone's fault. The blunt facts seem to be that the Party has been so long in power it is fat, tired, and even a bit senile. Those alert party machines which,
beginning with 1932, turned out such huge majorities in the big cities for the Democratic ticket have all through the years of their victories been steadily deteriorating underneath — until in 1944 the Democratic organization found itself rivaled, in terms of money and workers, and exceeded in alertness and enthusiasm by the PAC.

Everywhere the professionals are in profound collapse.

Hague and Kelley admit publicly they are through as political bosses of the first magnitude. They have left no one in their places; their organizations are shot through with incompetence. There are a few signs of revival in New York under Mayor O'Dwyer but hardly enough to justify any optimism. In Ohio the regular organization wars with former Governor Lausche. Jim Curley, still Boston's great vote getter, fills his cell with threats of smashing the party in Massachusetts — and no one doubts for a minute that he can do it. Pennsylvania is torn between Lawrence and Joe Guffey and every time Lawrence gets some Federal patronage to dispense, Guffey sings the praises of Henry Wallace as publicly as possible. The California quarrel is so dramatic it needs no comment. In worse or less degree, the situation is the same in most of the states.

The present "organization" pours out reams of publicity; it is dispatched by mail, by press and by radio but there seems to be hardly anyone out "beating the bushes" to harmonize where possible and desirable, to reconstruct where necessary, the leadership in the states and the cities, the towns and the counties.

The one essential is to have the new Chairman of the National Democratic Committee, as soon as possible—working to rebuild the Party organization from the ground up and trying to harmonize such appalling feuds as that in California. The practice of today's Democratic organization in spending almost all its time in raising money and doing favors for "the faithful" may be useful but it does little to rebuild the Democratic Party — and that is what it needs.

(b) Liaisons with Labor and Independents. Just as vital as the city work is the labor work and the work with Independents.
to eventual political success is the renewal of the Administration's working relationship with progressive and labor leaders. Whatever may be the reasons, these seem to have entirely ceased except on a perfunctory basis in the past year. No moment will ever be better for the President to make political capital out of the present frustration of the labor movement.

The leaders of labor must be given the impression that they are once more welcome in the councils of the Administration. Much of this cultivation can be done only by President Truman himself. Immersed in the staggering burden of his work and preoccupied with his day-to-day problems, it is easy for the incumbent of the White House to forget the "magic" of his office. The mere extension of an invitation to William Green, Dan Tobin, Philip Murray, Dubinsky or any of the prominent leaders to "come in and talk with me" has a stupendous effect on them and their followers.

One by one they should be asked to "come by" and the President should ask them for their advice on matters in general. (This is a question of delicate "timing" -- it is dangerous to ask a labor leader for advice on a specific matter and then ignore that advice). No human being -- as every President from Washington on has ruefully learned -- can resist the glamour, the self-important feeling of "advising" a President on anything.

Thus the relationship looking toward 1948, which is after all a common goal for Democrats and organized Labor, can begin to function. But more than that is needed. The President should select a lieutenant, or lieutenants, whom he personally trusts who would continue to "make hay" for him. A fresh "face" is desirable. He should have, besides the President's ear, the confidence of the labor leaders. There are several such men.
vigor and intelligence -- and a good sense of how far to go and when -- should start immediately.

In this way perhaps the mistakes of the Pennsylvania Congressional by-election on September 19th, which proved so disastrous to Labor, might be avoided in the future. Experienced politicians saw the pitfalls of such a test and disapproved the amateur methods of the CIO, including "outside interference", emphasis on the labor issue in the worst kind of district for it, and so on, almost through the Book.

But, if the Administration's labor lieutenant (never appearing publicly in the campaign) could have worked out the general strategy in concert with the AFL, the CIO and the progressives, and coordinated them with the local Democratic machine, the harmful effect of the Pennsylvania election could have been avoided. It must be avoided in the pre-convention tests remaining.

A program of cultivation should also be carried on with the progressive and independent leaders around the country. Again some one lieutenant -- personally selected by the President -- should be entrusted with this campaign.

By such mechanisms as these, the complaints, the attitudes and the points of view of these two vote-getting groups can be funneled into the 1940 election. The U.S. labor problem comes out on the right.
the White House so it will be really informed about just what is going on. These regular reports added to those made by a revitalized party organization will increase the Administration's political intelligence, today sadly atrophied.

And by election time, the Administration, Labor and the progressives will have built a mechanism of coordination with one another equipped to function throughout the storm and stress of a Presidential campaign.

(c) The Insulation of Henry Wallace. Wallace should be put under attack whenever the moment is psychologically correct. If it is clear that organizational work is being undertaken by his men in the West, either for a third party or for delegates to the Democratic Convention -- and that

work seems to be taking effect -- the Administration must persuade prominent liberals and progressives -- and no one else -- to move publicly into the fray. They must point out that the core of the Wallace backing is made up of Communists and the fellow-travelers. At the same time, some lines should be kept out so that if the unpredictable Henry finally sees the light and can be talked into supporting the Administration, he will have a handy rope to climb back on the bandwagon -- if he is wanted.

But there is only futility in the delusion that Wallace can be insulated merely by yelling at him. As his own lieutenants say, and accurately, in their private conversation, "Henry can be stopped quite easily; all President Truman has to do is move to the left and our ground is cut out from under us; but we are quite sure he won't do it." How the Administration can move "left" belongs in the discussion of the "program" (below).

But along with programs there are the men who execute these programs. And here is the strong weapon of the President's arsenal -- his
programs. And here is the strong weapon of the President's arsenal — his appointing power. Politicians, like most other people, think of issues in terms of men, not statistics. When the President moves "left" in his appointments, he is putting political money in his bank.

The September 11th speech by Wallace was his first really adroit one. It was a bid to the discontented liberals wavering behind President Truman. What he said publicly they have been saying privately with increasing bitterness — even those who support the President. Henry Wallace appealed to the atavistic fear of all progressives — the fear of "Wall Street". This fear is not the sole property of the progressives. It belongs traditionally to the Democratic Party. It began with the agrarian Jefferson's battle against Hamilton, it continued with Jackson's fight against Nicholas Biddle's bank, it found its silver tongue in the crusades of William Jennings Bryan, and it came to full flower under Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt. In a very important sense, it is the reason for the Democratic Party — because the only way to explain the lasting alliance between the South and the West

is their mutual fear of domination by the industrial East. Today the South can agree on no issue with the West — except "Wall Street."

Wallace's men went to Machiavelli and to American history when they put his September 11th speech together. Its appeal is devastating. In effect, all he had to do was call the roll — Harriman, Forrestal and Lovett, Wall Street investment bankers; William Draper and Saltzman, investment bankers; Jack McCloy, Wall Street lawyer, and so forth. And to cap his climax, Wallace reminded his listeners of the White House visits by Herbert Hoover, the man against whom Roosevelt ran four times no matter whom the Republicans nominated.

The Wallace plan is simplicity itself. It should be — because
The name and theme of the new Progressive party were not new; it has been used before. He merely borrowed it from Fighting Bob LaFollette who received five million votes in 1924 by attacking Coolidge and John W. Davis as "Tweedledum and Tweedledee, the messenger boys of Wall Street." And the significance of the LaFollette third party was not its total vote but that the Progressives ran ahead of the Democrats in eleven Western states. The combined Democratic-Progressive vote was larger than the Republican vote in thirteen states, including President Truman's own state of Missouri. Democrats who voted for Davis would have voted for any Democrat and the LaFollette Progressives would have voted for any liberal Democrat. In effect, then, this was a present of 86 electoral votes to the Republicans, not enough to change the 1924 election (382 minus 86 equals 292 votes; 136 plus 86 equals 222); but it is more than enough to raise havoc for a close election. Henry Wallace may be fuzzy-minded on many matters, but his mathematics is all right.

President Truman must carry the West to win. To carry the West, he must be "liberal"; he cannot afford to be shackled with the Wall Street label by any so-called progressive movement. And Wallace recalls only too well that the spiritual father of the New Deal was not John W. Davis but Bob LaFollette, and that the New Deal came only eight years later.

A President -- harassed by the mounting problems of Europe and by

the numerous resignations of men who can no longer afford to work for the Government, and also by the desirability of selecting men who can be confirmed -- may justifiably be strongly tempted to reply: "Demagoguery!" to the Wall Street charge. True as this may be, and unfair as such labelling is to the persons attacked, who are doing what they can for their country, the charge is nonetheless filled with too much political dynamite. In
The man-in-the-street understands little and cares less about the personnel difficulties of public administration. These difficulties have no glamour, they are too complex — and so they just don't get across. The Wallace attack does. In the blunt words of the ILGWU (Dubinsky) Union Convention:

"Foreign policy is not the private property of... retired financiers. Foreign policy is the burning concern of the great mass of the people."

And that is all that the working man will remember of that issue.

It is imperative that the President make some top level appointments from the ranks of the progressives — in foreign as well as domestic affairs. His fight for Lilienthal made him the hero of the independent voter. His refusal to withdraw the name of Francis Biddle as American delegate to the Economic and Social Council until Biddle requested it made him many friends among the liberals. Top ranking appointments of men like young Bob LaFollette are needed. The pattern must be repeated even if some of them are not confirmed. Under their impact, Wallace will fade away.

(d) Portrait of a President. A crucial — but easy — step forward to November 1948 is to create in the public mind a vote-getting picture of President Truman. From as objective a perspective as possible, I submit that the present public attitude toward the President is about as follows:

Both the original "honeymoon" and the later violently critical period of public opinion toward the President seem to be over. Emerging

instead is the picture of a man the American people like. They know now that he is a sincere, consecrated public servant who cares more for the public than for the public image.
now that he is a sincere, courageous and able man and, in the cliche so often heard, that he is a man "trying to do his best."

Members of the President's Cabinet can render valuable service to the Party by pointing out these qualities of the President as they observe them in their working contacts with the President. They can help give a varied picture to the people.

It is said invariably, and always without analysis, that the President is the Chief of the State, the Symbol of Government. What the theorists as well as the politicians do not observe is that the public gets its impression of its President mostly from the actions he takes when performing as Chief of State -- as the Head of Government. The masses of the people rarely if ever think of him in his role of Government administrator, or as the responsible policy maker on our national economic problems.

They really form their lasting impressions from watching his incidental gestures -- when he appears as the representative of all the American people.

An apt illustration is the contrast between his Mexican trip and later Canadian trip. The Canadian trip might have been, so far as anyone knows, more important for the United States than his visit to Mexico. It is a reasonable guess, however, that today few American citizens even remember he went to Canada. But almost everyone remembers his graceful gesture about the Mexican cadets. Whether it was planned deliberately or was a last-minute improvisation is unimportant. In the future, such gestures should be more numerous and should be planned deliberately; that is the way the public should remember its President.

The trip to the Rio Conference will be recalled not because of the success of the conference but because of the Brazilian ovation to "our" President, because he went orchid hunting and was changed from a pollywog into a shellback. He is at his best when an Ambassador of Good Will. And he gets more newspaper attention and much more interest from the American people.
than do the transparent journeyings of Messrs. Dewey and Taft.

But at home the American people are daily forced to think of their President as a politician for the good reason that the news stories deal only with his activities as a politician -- because that is what he is engaged in doing. His calling lists, week in and week out, are filled almost entirely with Government and Congressmen with whom he consults on problems that are important to the nation, but appear to the average reader complicated and dull.

The public has a tremendous interest in its Chief Executive and is invariably hungry for news about him. It does not want those stereotyped gestures, so done to death in past years that they are routine. No one really cares any more about a round-the-world flyer, or the little girl with the first poppy of the Disabled Veterans, or the Eagle Scout from Idaho. Granted that such appointments often cannot be avoided and must be borne with fortitude, they have long since reached the stage of diminishing returns.

The kind of gestures desired are those which, taken altogether and repeated again and again, will form a carefully drawn picture of the President as a broad-gauged citizen with tremendously varied interests. If well done, there will be countless variations on this theme. This does not mean he should do anything which puts him in a false or unnatural light. These artificialities contain within themselves too much political danger (viz, Calvin Coolidge wearing his Indian bonnet or Senator Taft catching his fish).

But there are many gestures of substance to be made. Solely for purposes of illustration, several are here suggested (these particular ones revolve around the most superb of all backdrops -- the White House itself):

(i) The President could lunch with Albert Einstein. It will be remembered he was the man who prevailed upon Roosevelt to start
will be remembered he was the man who prevailed upon Roosevelt to start the atomic bomb project. At his next press conference, he can explain that they talked, in general, about the peacetime uses of atomic

energy and its potentialities for our civilization. He can then casually mention that he has been spending some of his leisure time getting caught up on atomic energy; he has been having "briefing sessions" with the Atomic Energy Commission; and has also been doing some reading purely from the layman's point of view. He suggests to the newsmen that it would do them no harm at all to read such and such a book (as long as he picks the right one) which he has just read. In another connection (The "Winning of the West"), this memorandum suggests later that he visit Los Alamos and Oak Ridge, but in point of "timing", the Einstein visit and the New Mexico visit could be done together.

(ii) Henry Ford II is often in Washington these days. The President should casually invite him to lunch just to talk over matters "generally". This picture of the American President and the Young Business Man together has appeal for the average reader. Many other business leaders should be called in occasionally.

The press must print news of the President - so he controls his publicity by his own whim. One or two non-political personages a week should be the target. The need for conferences with labor leaders has already been emphasized for other reasons. This technique of summons to the White House has the added virtue, besides publicity, of building good will. An organization is flattered that its leader is considered important enough to be consulted. This takes that most important of commodities - Presidential Time -- but it is well worth its expenditure. It is worth it because of the American's inordinate curiosity -- he will watch that lunch with a new
interest, even a sense of personal participation, if the other participant is someone other than a Government administrator or Congressman.

The President will have more than enough on his mind in the coming months; he cannot be expected to think much about this sort of thing. But it is intrinsically important. Someone with imagination should be delegated to draw up this type of agenda and present several alternatives weekly to him. His own good sense of political judgment will accept or reject these suggestions if all he is required to do is check the ones he prefers.

But he will need to do something of this nature for an entirely extraneous — and much more valid — reason: Since he is President, he cannot be politically active until well after the July Convention. The people are inconsistent and capricious but there is no argument that they feel deeply on this —: He must be President of all the people and not merely the leader of a party, until the very last minute. Therefore, he must act as a President almost up to Election Day. Lincoln set the pattern by remaining "judiciously aloof" (to use his own phrase) in Illinois while his henchmen carried on the political war for him. Dewey, Taft, Stassen and Wallace are free as birds to attack him but once he stoops to answer them on their level, he has done himself severe damage. Only Wilson broke this rule of being President of all the people — in 1918 by asking for a Democratic Congress — and the people punished him for it by returning a Republican one.

So a President who is also a candidate must resort to subterfuge — for he cannot sit silent. He must be in the limelight. He must do the
kind of thing suggested above to stay in the limelight and he must also
resort to the kind of trip which Roosevelt made famous in the 1940 campaign --
the "inspection tour." No matter how much the opposition and the press
pointed out the political overtones of those trips, the people paid little
attention because what they saw was the Head of State performing his duties.

These few comments on "The Portrait of a President" are meant to
be no more than illustrative of the careful thought which must be devoted
to presenting a well-rounded broad-gauged and versatile candidate to the
American people.

(e) Foreign Policy. Since the general strategy of the
opposition in the field of foreign affairs is their claim that "what is good

is Marshall, what is bad is Truman", the portrait the public sees must
also undergo alterations. President Truman must assume before the eyes
of the people the leadership on foreign policy. Today the American people
identify Secretary Marshall, and not the President, as our spokesman. This
may have substantive advantages because of its non-partisan aura -- but
unhappily it is bad politics for 1948. For example, one of the reasons
privately circulated by the men promoting today's tentative boomlet for
Eisenhower is that the General knows foreign policy much more than
theoretically; that he is accustomed to dealing directly with British,
Russians, French and Germans. Unless clumsier than usual, the Republicans
will be cautious that they do not provoke Marshall into such a defensive
attitude that he will be forced to attack their obstructionism. Indeed
Governor Dewey may go so far as to say that if elected he will keep
Marshall as Secretary of State.
But if the President is to be attacked on what his opponents believe are the vulnerable aspects of our conduct on foreign policy, he must allow himself to be in a position where he can take credit for those aspects the public regards as the virtues of that policy. He cannot afford to continue allowing them to go by default to Marshall.

Marshall is a soldier and trained to be loyal to his Commander-in-Chief. In the American Republic, the President is responsible for foreign policy. He cannot be responsible in fact if he cannot use his authority. It is on his record, not that of Marshall, that the people will make their judgment in 1948, and he must be given the credit if he is subject to the blame. Democratic Government means no less and no more than that.

In terms of technique, this means he must use his authority publicly (as well as the private way he does exercise it); that he must speak out more often on specific matters of foreign policy, with prepared statements at press conferences — his great and useful sounding board.

The dangers of speaking "off the cuff" on foreign policy are obvious. But there is no reason why, after a detailed "briefing", many announcements today being made constantly in the State Department (and many of those by subordinate officials) should not come from the White House.

(f) The Commander-in-Chief. World War II taught the American people something they too easily forget — our President is also the Commander-in-Chief. They are forgetting it again, and ironically enough, one of the reasons is a pet project of the President — Unification. There is now a "Super-Cabinet Officer", — the Secretary of Defense.

It is a commonplace that one of the great difficulties...
It is a commonplace that one of the great difficulties of our Government is that Cabinet Officers, in contrast with the British system, are not as amenable to Presidential discipline as they ought to be. Lincoln suffered as greatly as any President from the vagaries and personal ambitions of his Cabinet, and even Franklin Roosevelt, never inclined to take too high a view of Cabinet Officers, suffered the disloyalty of Jessie Jones far longer than any President should have. There are some indications today that several of the incumbent Cabinet Officers tend to regard themselves as the rulers of independent baronies. This is always true in some measure but there is no good reason why it should be so (except that the Presidency has never properly been staffed). There is serious danger — irrespective of the personality or talents of whoever happens to have the job at any moment — that this tendency will become really exaggerated in the Department of National Defense. This is particularly so in the world we live in today.

Military affairs, whether we like it or not, will be a leading preoccupation of the average American citizen for the next year. If nothing else, he feels it in his pocketbook — 74 cents of the Budget Dollar. Again the White House can be the scene of many announcements on military affairs; and the Commander-in-Chief, not the Secretary of Defense, should make them. The President, as soon as he can arrange a schedule, should appear on the scenes of important military projects.

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2. The Program Level.

The suggestions made on the political level go almost wholly to "form", the manner and method with which things that need doing are to be done. But it is the things that are to be done — the "substance" — that determines the outcome of elections.
The issues are there for anyone to see. What remains is only the decision how and when they are to be handled, so their advantages are politically exploited to the utmost, their disadvantages politically minimized as much as possible.

How does the opposition plan to handle them? It is hardly a secret.

Having performed yeoman service for those interests (e.g., the "Real Estate Lobby") which provide the financial sinews for political warfare, the Republican strategists proclaimed their intentions to swing "left" in the next session.

Senator Taft, their leader on domestic policy, has three strings to his bow: Housing, Education (relief for teachers) and Health. The people, including the veterans, are stirred up about housing and rents, and the teachers have votes. The Republicans plan to raise the minimum wage level, do what they can for the DP's, and give the Negro his FEPC and civil rights legislation, or try to.

All this means they are chasing votes in earnest. And it emphasizes the only tenable Democratic strategy, which is to continue to stay to the "left" of them.

The Democrats hold the Presidency. The Presidency is vastly more flexible than the Congress, which means merely that a President can always act much faster -- and more often -- than can any group of Senators or Congressmen.

The President has a great opportunity of presenting his program to the American people in his message on the State of the Union.
He can present his recommendations simply and clearly to the Congress so that the people will know what the President is asking the Congress to do. There is little possibility that he will get much cooperation from the Congress but we want the President to be in position to receive the credit for whatever they do accomplish while also being in position to criticize the Congress for being obstructionists in failing to comply with other recommendations. This will be a fertile field for the development of campaign issues.

There are certain issues that already stand out as the major points of conflict in 1948. They are: (1) High Prices; (2) Housing; (3) The Marshall Plan; (4) Tax Revision; (5) Conservation of Natural Resources in the West; and (6) Civil Rights.

(1) High Prices.

We are off to a good start on the exceedingly important issue of High Prices. The President has recommended a bold program that should present increasingly great appeal to the American people. At present it appears that the Congress will not give the President price control, rationing, or wage control. They will attempt to build up the importance of the other seven points of his program, add some minor trimmings of their own, give it to the American people under some fancy name, and hope it will get them by. We must expect to receive a good deal of criticism now on the program. The farm organizations, labor leaders and industrial organizations will find much to object to in the program. From the standpoint of the long-range view, however, the prophecy could well be made that the few people who will be attacking the President’s program today are those who, in April 1948, will be condemning the Congress for failure to pass this program. Because of the probability of increasingly high prices in 1948, it is possible that this issue will reach a climax in the summer of 1948. This would come at a highly propitious time for the President and the Democratic Administration.
(2) **Housing.**

Senator Taft, despite the well-organized lobby fighting any governmental action on Housing, knows his party must make a real effort next year to pass his bill. He understands that, with the exception of food prices, Housing has a more direct impact on "the greatest number" than any other of today's issues. The latest misnamed Rent Control Act has made the man-in-the-street conscious of the economic and political power of the real estate interests which, unlike most lobbies, takes the money directly out of the people's pockets. Although the public reaction has been slow in starting, it is now steadily building up. For instance, there are persistent signs of a revolt by the young veterans against the conservative American Legion policy on Housing which has been dictated in toto by the Real Estate Lobby.

Another example was the success of the President's attack on the Real Estate Lobby in his message approving the Rent Control Bill. It has already had effect in the spontaneous manner it was taken up by different groups. It is the essence of politics to wage an attack against a personal devil; the Real Estate Lobby should be built into the dramatic equivalent of the Public Utility Lobby of 1935. Purely on the merits, the performance of the real estate interests in their post-war gouging fully deserves everything they get in the way of retaliation. There can be no possible compunction about using such a tactic against them.

If there is any way of doing it, the Congress should be made to investigate the lobby. But it is hard to see how a Republican-controlled Congress will touch it. Even if the pressure of public opinion forces them to go through the motions and there is an alert and aggressive Democratic minority appointed, the cloak-room maneuvers will stifle any effective expose.
all, there is already a widespread suspicion that the Department's motivation was purely political. And since it is an anti-trust investigation, probably nothing new will be found in the housing field that is not already known. The Administration cannot afford to lose a housing case before the campaign is over. However, the useful material already gathered by the Department's investigators should be made available to those who can make propaganda use of that material.

Attack on the Lobby is negative. The other approach must be affirmative. The Administration is itself vulnerable on Housing. It is vulnerable because it has fallen over the same stumbling block for the past fifteen years.

The Administration must take an affirmative position on Housing. Valuable time has already been lost because of the difficulty in the problem and the disinclination on the part of persons having responsibility in this field to come up with a program that the President could recommend. Housing should be stressed in the State of the Union Message but its importance is such that a special message should go to the Congress on Housing shortly after the State of the Union Message has been delivered.

If the President offers a sound, strong Housing program, then he will be in position to share the credit for Housing legislation with the Republican Congress. If he sends up such a message on Housing and the Congress fails to take action, we can point the finger of blame toward the Republicans for failure to solve this pressing problem. If, on the
the Republicans for failure to solve this pressing problem. If, on the other hand, the President fails to send up a message on Housing, and the Republicans pass a Housing bill, then the President will be in the exceedingly unfortunate position of having done nothing about Housing and the Republicans will get the credit for meeting the issue head on.

The best estimate of the present situation is that the Congress will go along with the President on the Marshall Plan. There is likely to be lengthy debate on the subject but the need for it is so obvious and the fear of Communism in this country is such that Congress will probably have to heed the wish of the people.

One of the important points of controversy will center around the type of organization that is set up to administer the program. There is a great deal of merit to the recommendation of the Budget Bureau that the responsibility for implementing the Plan be given to the Secretary of State and that the work be carried on by an organization operating within the State Department. In all probability this would be the most successful operation because the State Department experts are available and more experienced people can take part in the planning and operation.

This suggestion has an element of political benefit also. If the President recommends that the Plan be administered by the Secretary of State and the Congress refuses this recommendation and sets up a separate corporation or a commission to implement the Plan, and should the job be done poorly, the President can point out that the Congress refused to follow his recommendation and confusion, inefficiency and waste followed.
(4) **Tax Revision.**

Although not as inevitable as death and taxes, it is almost certain that in the election year of 1948 -- whether the Administration likes it or not -- taxes will be reduced. The Republicans plan to cut them, and Democratic Congressmen in sufficient numbers simply cannot stand up in a campaign year against the pressure to support tax reduction and to override the President's third veto if it comes.

His two vetoes of the first session have enhanced his prestige in the eyes of the disinterested and thoughtful few. If the huge surplus now estimated is correct, however, there is no possibility of stemming the tide in the next Congress despite the foreign aid requirements. The inflationary pressures on the people will make them think they need more "take home" money in their pockets; the quickest way to put it there is a tax cut.

So if there is to be one, the Administration might as well get the credit for it and save what it can of its taxation principles. But whatever compromise is made must be done without obvious political intent. The Republicans have cleverly publicized their suspicions that there were vetoes in 1947 only so a Democratic President could reap the credit in 1948.

These cries for tax reduction can be turned to an economically sound and useful purpose and remove the political suspicion at the same time. The perennial outcries for revision of our entire tax structure are even more strident than usual. Such requests are always with us, are invariably justified, yet nothing is ever done about them.
To revise the entire federal structure is not the appallingly difficult matter so many "experts" pretend it to be, because the necessary studies have been made time and time again. In fact, the Treasury is revising its studies right now. Only the areas of disagreement on policy are causing the trouble that goes on year after year. Discussions with the Secretary of the Treasury indicate that revision of the tax structure could be accomplished in such a manner as to eliminate many of the existing inequities. The elimination of such inequities, however, will cut into the tax revenue.

It should be perfectly possible, and could be exceedingly helpful politically, for the President to deliver a message to the Congress sometime in January, 1948 setting forth his recommendations as to the revision of our tax structure. Such a message could recommend elimination of obvious inequities in our tax system and an increase in personal exemptions so as to benefit those in the lowest income brackets. If such a program resulted in a loss of revenue of approximately two billion dollars, it could be easily justified because of the tremendous surplus that is anticipated for the next fiscal year. If the Congress accepted the President's recommendations and passed such a tax bill, then there would be a division of credit. If the Congress refused to heed the President's suggestions and passed a bill allowing a much larger tax reduction, particularly for the higher income groups, then the administration would have another valuable issue to present in November of 1948.

(5) Conservation of Natural Resources in the West.
In the Land of Electoral Votes, the West is the "Number One Priority" for the Democrats. Its people are more liberal because they need the economic help of government and in the years of the New Deal have come to understand how it functions. Even the Chambers of Commerce of the West rarely prate of governmental economy; they learned better long ago.

There is no need for an extended discussion here about what should be done politically for the Western States. They know their needs—less discrimination in freight rates, reclamation projects and lots of them, better roads (their road system suffered from lack of maintenance in the war years), public power, help in the development and protection of their resources, and so forth. Their needs are not hard to understand. The Administration, which in the last year or two has at least budget-wise not shown much sympathy (although far more than the Republicans), must display a constant and increasing interest in these Western needs.

Although it would be inadvisable for the President to make a political tour at any time in the reasonably near future, yet he could find occasion to visit the West on business. There are two large atomic energy plants in the West and these could be used as an excuse.

But he can go much farther and demonstrate again that he is an imaginative leader. In a world of fear and of accelerating despair, the people need a strong voice talking about the America of the Future. The appeal of Wallace to the young voters during his western swing several months ago was because he dared to talk in an idealistic strain. No other American figure (not even Stassen, who leads President Truman almost 2-1 among the independent and western voters, according to the Fortune poll) has had the imagination to "pitch" his arguments at that
Yet it is just that level, other things being equal, that has always had more appeal to the American people than any other. A planning program for the United States, with 1960 as the target-date, may well have that kind of political glamour. It might catch on.

If there is a world in 1960, the United States will unquestionably be the leader of its age. And our domestic economy -- what it has done for our own people in every field of endeavor, security, recreation and worldly goods -- will be the measure of our greatness for all the world. Twelve years before the event is just about right to start estimating those needs and expanding our resources, all within the framework of free enterprise. A recent Twentieth Century Fund study, "America's Needs and Resources", could be taken as a convenient starting place. If the Administration will have the imagination to talk and act in such terms, despite the screams of the conservative part of the press and the "practical men", (who are all Republicans anyway) it can effectively kill off the Wallaces and the demagogues who will come after him. More practically, it will mean money in the political bank in November 1948.

(6) Civil Rights.

The Republicans know how vulnerable the Democratic Party is insofar as the negro vote is concerned. They have been bending every effort to woo the negroes away from the Administration's fold. In all probability, Republican strategy at the next session will be to offer an FEPC, an anti-poll tax bill, and an anti-lynching bill. This will be accompanied by a flourish of oratory devoted to the Civil Rights of various groups of our citizens.
The Administration would make a grave error if we permitted the Republicans to get away with this. It would appear to be sound strategy to have the President go as far as he feels he possibly could go in recommending measures to protect the rights of minority groups. This course of action would obviously cause difficulty with our Southern friends but that is the lesser of two evils.


This memorandum has made two points: (A) It is "probable" certain things will happen in 1948; and (B) A certain "course of action" must be followed to shape those probabilities to bring about the President's election.

The question remains how to create the necessary machinery.

For without intelligent, and even devoted, execution of such a program as outlined here is nothing more than a conversation piece—a pleasant finger-exercise. Much of the Democratic "politicking" is just that. The Chairman of the Illinois Democratic Committee may brag that his committee has no financial worries and in fact has more money in the till than ever in its history, and the Democratic National Committee may have relaxed in the assurance it can get sufficient funds to finance the 1948 campaign. Both organizations seem to have forgotten that the money-raising is after all only the means for a desirable end.

What kind of a mechanism will work?

Some sort of a small "working committee" (or "think" group) should be set up. Its function would be to coordinate the political program in and out of the Administration. (This does not mean it would run all over the departments; indeed, if it works right, no one in any of the agencies will ever hear of it).

The members of such a committee would be imaginative men with understanding of and experience in government, and with some knowledge, even if only a theoretical one of the folkways, the give-and-take of politics. To put it bluntly (although it is poor semantics to do so) they
would be the counterpart of "The Team" of Dewey.

They would be close-mouthed (the hardest requisite of all!)

Although its makeup must be flexible, in general they should not
be active government administrators. This is so for two reasons: (1) The
administrator is too overworked already and preoccupied with his own
problems; and (2) he is invariably cursed with "the Departmental view";
his problems are vital, the most important of all, and no one else's are.
The curse of our government is that with few exceptions only the President
has the overall Administration point of view. The men on the committee
must be "Truman men", thinking for the President and how the President
can take political advantage of this or that program. The head of
X Agency invariably tries to get everyone else immersed in X.

Consideration will have to be given as to the manner in which
such a committee could be set up. It is possible that it could be set up
within the frame-work of the National Democratic Committee but it is
doubtful if the professional politicians could recognize the absolute
need that exists for the performance of such a function. It could be set
up quietly, given space in the old State Department Building and put to
work. The question of financing the operation would, of course, have to
be discussed with the Chairman of the National Democratic Committee.

What sort of work would the "working Committee" do?

It would, even at this early date, start the preparation of memoranda
looking toward the drafting of the 1948 Platform. It would begin assembling
material for approximately ten major political speeches -- the campaign
speechs after the Convention.

It would present to the President a "Monthly Estimate of the
"Estimate" could include suggestions as to topics that the President might refer to for the coming months. In short, it could well replace the present haphazard, hit or miss system with a functioning political intelligence method which could enable the President to stay out in front and anticipate political problems.

It would do research on the various personalities to be involved in the campaign. There would be a Dewey expert. Everything that Dewey ever said or did, beginning with his college speeches, and continuing through his career as prosecutor, as Governor and as Presidential candidate, would be carefully reviewed to determine his inconsistencies, his mistakes and his bad guesses, as weighed in unfriendly fashion by the hindsight of 1948. There should also be a Taft expert. The President is running against the Taft record no matter who his opponent is. To play safe there must also be a Truman expert -- a Devil's Advocate. The President was a Senator for a long time and he has been in the White House for two and a half years.

Another badly neglected function the "working committee" would take on is preparing answers to Republican charges. Its performance must be efficient enough so the answer will be carried in newspaper stories the same day, and not on the back pages a week or so later. This requires a precise coordination, long absent, between the government agencies which
have the information, the Democratic Committee, the White House, and such Administration congressional lieutenants as Leslie Biffle, Senator Barkley and former Speaker Rayburn.

When, for instance, the Administration is attacked on the floor, a Democratic Congressman should be able to answer with facts and figures within the next few hours. And when the Republican leaders put their foot in their mouth, as they often enough did in the last session, they should be "put on the spot" within the hour.

These are illustrative of what a good "working committee" can do. Someone must do them if there is to be success in 1948. The Presidential election is being determined now by the day-to-day events of 1947.

The Campaign of 1948 will be a tough, bitterly fought struggle. The issues will be close and the ultimate determination of the winner may very well depend upon the type of staff work furnished to the two contenders.

No effort must be overlooked or left undone to furnish President Truman with the greatest possible assistance because the future of this country and the future of the world are linked inextricably with his reelection.

In national politics, the American people normally make up their minds definitely about the two Presidential candidates by the end of July.

If the program discussed here can be put into operation soon and executed properly, it can help in persuading the American people to make up their minds the right way.
November 19, 1947
MEMORANDUM

Subject: Should the President call Congress back?

This election can only be won by bold and daring steps, calculated to reverse the powerful trend now running against us. The boldest and most popular step the President could possibly take would be to call a special session of Congress early in August. We make the following points:

1. This would focus attention on the rotten record of the 80th Congress, which Dewey, Warren and the press will try to make the country forget.
2. It would force Dewey and Warren to defend the actions of Congress, and make them accept the Congress as a basic issue.
3. It would keep a steady glare of publicity on the Neanderthal men of the Republican party, the reactionary men such as Martin, Halleck, Worlcott, Allen, who will embarrass Dewey and Warren. The press is with us on the 80th Congress issue, and the Martinas, Hallescos, Wolcotts, Fubers are bound to stir up severe criticism.
4. It would split the Republican Party on the major questions of how to deal with housing, inflation, foreign policy, social security, etc.
5. It would give President Truman a chance to follow through on the fighting start he made on his Western tour. It would show the President in action at Capitol Hill, fighting for the people, delivering messages to Congress at joint sessions in person, broadcasting his messages, leading his party in a crusade for the millions of Americans ignored by the "rich man's Congress."

This course may be hazardous politically, but we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that President Truman faces an uphill fight to win the coming election—and the American people love a fighting leader who takes bold action to help the ordinary citizens against the lobbies and the corporations.

Here are the objections to the special-session plan, and the answers as we see them:

1. **The Danger:**
   - Republicans may invite a Southern filibuster by introducing strong civil rights legislation.
   - **The Answer:**
     - The President or Senator Barkley, after the President's nomination, could call in the Southern members of Congress and make it plain to them that they stand in extreme danger of losing their patronage, their positions of power in the party, and their prestige in the event of a Republican victory.

   If the Southerners are recalcitrant at this meeting, the President might announce that he will call for a coalition of liberal Democrats and liberal Republicans to pass moderate civil rights legislation, and that he will ask Senator O'Hanlon to introduce a bill embodying his recommendations to the Congress. He might tell the Southerners that he will go on the radio to announce his position, to explain that he feels that the majority of Democrats and the majority of Americans support his position against a stubborn few.

   The chances are that the President will never have to take these
extreme measures. The Republicans may have to go easy on civil rights bills. Joe Grundy and other powerful Republicans are opposed to such legislation.

The election will be won or lost in the Northern, Midwestern and Western states. The South cannot win or lose the election for the Democratic Party. If the President supports the introduction of moderate legislation, beating the Republicans to the punch, the credit would go to Mr. Truman and the Democratic Party even if a few disreputable senators try to start a filibuster. Filibusters can be broken.

2. **The Danger:**
   In spite of the Martins, the Tabors, and the Welcotts, Congress may pass some genuinely good legislation, for which Dewey and Warren would seize credit.

   **The Answer:**
   This Congress is so closely controlled by reactionaries and lobbyists that it cannot pass satisfactory bills to stop the disastrous inflation which is frightening the people, or to start construction of the millions of homes needed, or to initiate a more enlightened policy on NRA, or to extend social security.

   If one or two good bills are passed under the President's personal prodding, it will be up to the Democratic Publicity Department and campaign speakers to pound it home to the people that the President deserves credit. The President would be leading the fight. Dewey would be standing in the wings, saying: "Yes, we should have some housing legislation. Yes, we should stop inflation. Yes, we should extend social security. Me, too. Me, too!"

3. **The Danger:**
   Congress might pass phony bills on housing, price control, aid to education, national health, etc., which might fool the people.

   **The Answer:**
   On the issue of price control, which will be the hottest issue of this campaign, the Congress cannot possibly act. The present Congress cannot take any steps to curb prices or to prevent the people from watching the cost of living go higher and higher and higher. This Congress is run by men who cannot pass price-control legislation without losing their financial backers and incurring the wrath of the N.A.M., the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and other such groups.

   On housing, education, social security, health—the answer is the same. This Congress cannot meet the critical needs of the country. It is tied up by the rich interests which expect to make a killing after the Republican victory in November—if they get that victory.
The Campaign and Election of 1948:

The Democratic Party’s poor showing in the 1946 mid-term congressional elections—in which the Republican Party took control of both the Senate and the House of Representatives for the first time since 1928—considerably dimmed Truman’s prospects for re-election in 1948. Indeed, a public opinion poll taken in December 1946 revealed that only 35 percent of those surveyed supported his handling of the presidency.

Beginning in 1947, Truman worked assiduously to build support for his candidacy among key segments of the Democratic Party. He repaired his relationship with labor by vetoing the Taft-Hartley bill, courted black Americans by coming out in favor of civil rights, and continued to embrace programs (like national health insurance, a higher minimum wage, and a federal housing measure) dear to party liberals. Truman's anti-Soviet foreign policy won him support among Americans with roots in Eastern Europe and among anti-communist liberals. His decision in May 1948 to recognize the new state of Israel further solidified his relationship with American Jews. Just as important, by 1948, Truman had begun to employ a more relaxed, folksy, and sometimes fiery speaking technique. He combined both style and substance in launching effective attacks against the Republicans. Midway through 1948, however, Truman's popularity among American voters still languished.

Truman and the Democrats

Divisions within the Democratic Party hurt Truman's chances for re-election in 1948. Truman's weakness as a candidate led some Democrats to consider offering the party's nomination to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, whom they (incorrectly) believed to be a Democrat. On the eve of the Democratic convention, Eisenhower strongly denied any interest in the nomination, much to Truman's relief.

Two other challenges would prove more troubling to Truman's candidacy. In January 1948, Truman's former secretary of commerce (and vice president during Roosevelt's third term), Henry Wallace, announced his intention to run for President as a member of the Progressive Party. In September 1946, Secretary Wallace had delivered a speech critical of the
administration's increasingly hard-line foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Truman asked for Wallace's resignation, which he received. As a third-party candidate, Wallace, who for many years had been darling of the left-wing of the Democratic Party, threatened to rob Truman of the progressive vote.

Truman also faced the prospect of losing the votes of the conservative, southern wing of the Democratic Party, which threatened to bolt over the President's public embrace of African-American civil rights. He hoped he could keep southerners in the Party by making his support for civil rights more rhetorical than substantive, a strategy similar to that employed by President Roosevelt. At the Democratic National Convention in July 1948, however, Truman's approach collapsed after pro-civil rights Democrats—led by Minnesota's Hubert Humphrey and anti-communist liberals from the organization Americans for Democratic Action (ADA)—won a strong civil rights plank for the party's platform.

Truman was willing to accept the plank, holding out hope that southerners would stay in the party. He was wrong; the entire Mississippi delegation and half of the Alabama delegation walked out of the convention. The southerners that remained did so only to vote against Truman's nomination. By the end of July, southern Democrats had formed the States Rights' Party (also known as the Dixiecrats). It nominated Governor J. Strom Thurmond (SC) and Governor Fielding Wright (MS) for President and vice president.

Truman easily won the nomination at the Democratic National Convention in July, choosing liberal Kentucky senator Alben Barkley—after Supreme Court justice William O. Douglas turned down the vice presidential slot—as his running mate. In a fiery speech accepting the nomination, Truman declared "Senator Barkley and I will win this election and make these Republicans like it—don't you forget that!" Truman then played his trump card: he announced his plan to call the Republican-led Congress back into session to pass his legislative program—an invitation to refute charges that it was a "do-nothing" Congress. Of course, Truman did not expect the Republicans to pass his program, nor should they have done so. But Truman's challenge did energize his fellow Democrats, putting the Republicans on the defensive and highlighting Truman's campaign strategy—to run against the Republican Congress.

The Republican Opposition
The Republicans in 1948 nominated New York governor Thomas Dewey for President and California governor Earl Warren for vice president. It was a strong ticket. Dewey had run in 1944 against FDR and lost a close race; he remained young, popular, and progressive. Strongly anti-communist, he was an internationalist in foreign affairs. On domestic issues, Dewey was a moderate critic of the New Deal, which he disliked more for its means than its ends. His main drawback was an aloof, icy, and bland personality; Alice Roosevelt Longworth described him as the "little man on the wedding cake." In spite of this defect, Republicans looked forward to the 1948 campaign, pointing to the GOP's victories in 1946 and Dewey's solid record.

**Truman versus Dewey**

Truman brought the Republican-controlled 80th Congress back to Washington in late July and presented it with his list of desired legislation. Congress met for two weeks, failed to pass any of Truman's proposals, and adjourned. Truman could now point to yet another example of the "do-nothing" Republican Congress and warn the electorate that a Republican presidential victory would bring only further neglect to the issues he believed important. On civil rights, Truman issued executive orders desegregating the military and ending discrimination in the civil service. No longer beholden to southern Democrats (who supported Strom Thurmond's Dixiecrat candidacy), Truman could finally issue these long-promised initiatives that doubtlessly pleased blacks and liberals, two important segments of the Democratic Party.

Truman began the presidential campaign in earnest with a Labor Day speech to a large union crowd in Detroit. He stumped energetically throughout the fall, making several train tours across the country. These trips allowed him to take his case for re-election to voters in what leading Republican Senator Robert Taft had earlier derided as "whistle stop" speeches delivered from the rear of the presidential train. The longest trip was fifteen days, covered 8,300 miles, and took Truman from Pennsylvania to California.

Truman's "whistle-stops" were a combination of great politics and great theatre. He shook hands with voters, signed autographs, and made wise-cracks about his opponents. With some exaggeration and much fervor, he attacked the Republican Congress, warned that a Republicans White House would repeal the New Deal, and reminded voters that the Democrats had saved the country from the depression. Truman also tailored his message to his audience; farmers in Iowa, for example, heard the President claim, "This Republican Congress has already stuck a pitchfork
Dewey embarked on several train trips of his own, speaking to large crowds. Unlike Truman, however, he campaigned much more cautiously. For starters, the polls indicated that he held a comfortable lead over Truman. Moreover, Dewey believed that his earlier run for the presidency, against Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944, had suffered from his combative style and attacks on the incumbent. He resolved in 1948, then, to speak mostly in generalities and to refrain from using invective. While he appeared "presidential" during the campaign, Dewey's bland campaign speeches only reinforced his milquetoast image among much of the electorate. Nonetheless, the final pre-election Gallup poll—taken in mid-October—became public the day before the election itself, giving Dewey a solid lead of 49.5 percent to Truman's 44.5 percent of the total vote.

The Election of 1948

On election day, November 2, Truman, along with Bess and Margaret, voted in their hometown of Independence, Missouri. Truman had lunch with several old friends and repaired alone to a local hotel to await the returns. At midnight, Truman heard NBC report that while he was ahead by more than one million votes, Dewey was still expected to win. At four in the morning, his secret service agents woke him and told him to turn on the radio: he was ahead by two million votes—and would maintain the lead. With victory in hand, Truman went to Kansas City, where he awaited Dewey's concession, which came by mid-morning. Two days after the election, as the Trumans returned to Washington via St. Louis, reporters snapped the most famous photo of Truman's career: an image of the President holding aloft a copy of the Chicago Tribune with the headline "Dewey Defeats Truman."Truman had confounded the pundits. He won 49.5 percent of the vote to Dewey's 45.1 percent; 303 electoral college votes to 189 for Dewey. Thurmond and Wallace trailed miserably, each with 2.4 percent of the vote, although Thurmond took four southern states and their 39 electoral votes. Truman's victory came about because he won the support of most of Roosevelt's "New Deal" coalition: labor, Blacks, Jews, farmers from the midwest, and a number of southern states. Truman's victory, however, was far from overwhelming. He barely won California, Illinois, and Ohio, and lost the Democratic strongholds Pennsylvania, New York, Michigan, and New Jersey. In fact, more Americans voted for other candidates than voted for him—far from the popular mandate Truman would have liked.
October 5, 1948.

Honorable Clark Clifford,
Special Counsel to the President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Clark:

In response to your request of yesterday, I suggest that the following points be increasingly emphasized in the campaign, particularly in New York State and other populous areas, especially where there is a general radio audience:

(1) The widespread propaganda, through the press, the radio and independent commentators, to the effect that the result of the election is a foregone conclusion is part of a highly organized and richly financed campaign against the President. This campaign is under-handed, vicious and effective. It seeks to undermine the American principle that elections should be decided by everybody voting secretly at the same time on election day, under a publicly supervised election machinery; elections should not be decided by a lot of spurious private elections held at random in advance by those who want to influence the result. All this propaganda reflects where the money is flowing in this campaign no less clearly than the division of radio time. The people should be warned against being influenced by this, which tends to deprive them of their most precious right as citizens by leading them to believe that the exercise of that right is a futility. The people should be aroused by such tactics to show on election day that they and not the poll takers and propagandists for special interests are going to determine in whose hands their Government will be placed.

(2) The "hands-off policy" on the Republican candidates is fatal. The case against the 30th Republican Congress has been made, and should be repeated, but it is meaningless until it is accompanied by a demonstration (a) that Mr. Dewey could not depart from the programs and principles of the Republican Party and its leadership even if he wanted to, and (b) that his whole record shows that he would not want to depart from these principles and programs even if he could. There is plenty of proof of this in his behavior during the Special Session, and in what he has said in his talks since then. Another source of weakness in Mr. Dewey is the fact that he has always been wrong in advance of the event, has shown no foresight, and has adopted principles and programs only after the event. Before the war, he was an isolationist; and many of the things that he said in his 1944 speeches as a candidate sound ludicrous today. Much can
be made of the extent to which Mr. Dewey has extended himself in aid of those senatorial candidates who have the most reactionary records, and particularly in New York State – much can be made of the bad record of his own Senator Ives in voting for the Taft-Hartley Bill, against the housing bill, and against strong anti-inflation measures.

(3) More and more needs to be said to tear down the "unity" theme. This theme is making headway, although it is highly vulnerable to a sustained attack. The only kind of unity that is worthwhile is the unity which results from the people's overwhelming approval of programs and principles which have been clearly defined. A unity based upon hiding the issues behind a screen of platitudes can result only in the unification of the executive and legislative branches of the Government into the most powerful striking force for reaction that we have ever had. There are innumerable ways of developing this theme, and I think that it should be treated significantly in every speech.

(4) The speech of Senator Vandenberg yesterday on the bipartisan foreign policy demonstrates beyond any question, if it were not abundantly clear before, that the President cannot afford to throw away the vital asset contained in the fact that when all is said and done the initiative in formulating a foreign policy which has the overwhelming approval of the American people came from a Democratic President and a Democratic Administration. Senator Vandenberg does not hesitate to blame the Administration for all kinds of mistakes in foreign policy, and to enumerate a large number of fine acts of foreign policy in which the initiative was taken by the Republicans. Without abandoning or jeopardizing the bipartisan foreign policy, the President can and should emphasize (a) that our unity in foreign policy would have been impossible without leadership and initiative, which were provided by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan; (b) that our unity in foreign policy did not come until the people showed that they overwhelmingly approved a specific course of action which had been made clear to them through definition and debate, and not hidden from them by platitudes about "unity"; (c) that the Republican leadership demonstrated no unity in foreign policy during the 1920's, or the 1930's, or in 1940, or in 1944, but only came to accept the program advanced by the Administration after the Administration has won assent to it by the people. And by the same token, there can be no unity in domestic policy for any worthwhile program until that program is sharply and clearly defined in nationwide debate and until the people approve it so overwhelmingly that no one will dare to oppose it. That is the real issue in this campaign.

(5) Much stronger and more repeated attacks need to be made against the third party, not by attacking individuals, but by attacking the whole idea. This attack can be along two lines: (a) that it is dividing the liberal vote on vital domestic issues, and (b) that it is giving aid and comfort to Russia by saying the very same things about those who will control our
National Government after the election (whether Democrats or Republicans) that the Soviet dictators are telling the Russian people, namely, that the United States is in the control of groups who are utterly bent upon an imperialistic war against Russia and who are utterly incompetent to prevent a depression in America. Consequently, the Russian people are being told by a former American Vice President that the United States now is and will continue to be controlled by those who want to make war for their private profit. What could be more hurtful to the cause of peace than that?

(5) I think that, particularly for addresses reaching the whole public over the radio, or even through the press, without reducing the vigor of the attack, there should be more of a highly moral note illustrated by well known examples from American history.

* * * * * * *

It is not enough to make the foregoing points a few times. They all need to be made over and over again so that they reach everybody several times. Toward this end I suggest that every major speech cover these enumerated points in one way or another. This will not prevent each speech from being different, any more than the fact that so many of the speeches have been about the record of the 80th Republican Congress has prevented them from being different. The differences in the speeches can come in the variety of the factual examples used to illustrate the various points. It is through this variety of factual examples that one speech can place more emphasis upon inflation, another upon housing, etc. The campaign has now settled to the point where the foregoing issues cover 95 percent of what is on everybody's mind, and therefore single-theme speeches are a waste of very limited opportunities to get a message to the public.

I am attaching drafts of three speeches, numbered One, Two, and Three.

The speech numbered One, which might be called "unity" speech, begins on the first three pages by pointing out what we in America have really learned about "unity" with some examples drawn from American history. The next few pages, to the middle of page 6, discusses foreign policy as an illustration of what real "unity" means, and points out how this unity in foreign policy can be achieved and who has taken the initiative and leadership toward this end. The next few pages, running to page 11, shift over to domestic policy and show how hard the President has tried to get unity and cooperation on such matters as inflation control, housing, and labor relations, which incidentally illustrates how hard the President has tried to work with a Republican Congress - but how the Republicans have frustrated all these programs and made unity or cooperation impossible except on terms of selling out the interests of the American people. Beginning with the
middle of page 11, the speech then defines the kind of unity in which the President and the Democratic Party really believe. This phase of the discussion runs through the end of page 13, and poses the question of what kind of unity the Republican candidate wants. That question is answered in the concluding phases of the speech.

The speech numbered Two begins by attacking the idea that the two major parties are really the same, that the Republican candidates are just as liberal as the Democrats, and that it is simply a matter of bringing in new people who will "do the job better". The attack upon this idea, which is really the central theme of the Republican campaign, is introduced in the first three pages of the speech, giving historical illustrations of what happened to the people when they fell for this idea. The next few pages, running through page 10, uses the record on high prices and inflation to illustrate the real nature of the Republican Party and its leadership. Pages 12 and 13 briefly review the contrast between this Republican record and the record made by the Democrats over 14 years. Pages 14, 15, and the beginning of page 16 are devoted to driving home the point that the Republican candidates, Dewey and Warren, are not something separate and apart from the Republican record but must necessarily be a part of it because they could not be effective in the Republican Party or even stay in that Party if they were not a part of it. Pages 16, 17, 18 and 19 move over to the theme of reaction on the left as distinguished from reaction on the right and make two very important arguments against the third party which I think would carry great weight and which have been practically neglected thus far in the campaign. Pages 20 and 21 summarizes the argument.

In the speech numbered Three, the first three pages combine a sharp indictment of the Republican 80th Congress with an explanation of why the Republican candidates want to run away from the record of that Congress and are thus indulging in a campaign of evasion which indicates their true intent. This links the candidates with the Party. The next three pages review in brief the record made by the Democrats over 14 years, and introduce the theme of what happened when the Republicans took over the Congress. The pages from 7 through 11 are designed to illustrate by specific example how ridiculous it is to suppose that a Republican President would follow a different course from that of a Republican Congress, drawing examples not only from what has happened in Congress but also from what the Republican candidate has said. Pages 12 through 16 are a full discussion, from a novel viewpoint, of the significance of the third party movement at this time and the distinction between it and earlier third party movements. This kind of argument, which has not yet been made, is very necessary, particularly in States like New York but also for nationwide consumption.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]
THE TRIALS OF ELECTION POLLING:
ELECTION POLLS—1948 AND TODAY

By Everett C. Ladd

Robert Waller of the Harris Research Center in London assesses for us the sources of the extraordinary failure of the polls in Britain last month to read correctly where the electorate was headed in its April 9 vote. The composite picture provided by the 5 major national polls conducted and published just prior to the balloting showed the Labour party narrowly ahead—but in fact the Conservatives compiled a margin of nearly 8 percentage points over Labour. It’s arguable that systematically conducted surveys had never before missed the mark so badly in a major national election.

Drawing on the survey findings, most British analysts had predicted a “hung Parliament” with Labour putting together a coalition government. Instead, the Conservatives not only won a comfortable absolute majority in the House of Commons, but they did so by getting a popular vote plurality which stands on the high side in modern British experience. Their margin over their principal opposition this time was the fourth largest compiled by the winning party in the 14 British general elections since World War II. It was surpassed only in the Labour victory of 1945 and in the Thatcher landslides of 1983 and 1987.

If the big failure of polls in the UK last month was a one-of-a-kind happening, it should prompt curiosity, perhaps some amusement, and little more. But while it was more spectacular, the 1992 British miss is only the latest in a stream of election polling “errors.” Just last February, the Republican primary exit polls badly underestimated George Bush’s vote and suggested that the President and Patrick Buchanan were closely splitting the vote in New Hampshire, when in fact Bush won comfortably. In the last issue of Public Perspective, Warren Mitofsky, executive director of Voter Research & Surveys, the four-network consortium which is the leading exit poller, described the New Hampshire performance as, in the history of the election day surveys, unusually wide of the mark.

Two years ago, the polls taken in the New York City mayoralty race and the Virginia gubernatorial contest—both the late pre-election surveys and the exit polls—misread where voters were headed. They showed Democrat David Dinkins winning handily in New York; he actually bested Republican Rudolph Giuliani by just two percentage points. Similarly, late polls put Democrat Douglas Wilder well ahead of Republican Marshall Coleman in Virginia. In fact, the race ended as a virtual dead heat.

Continued on p. 27

Questions: If a presidential election were being held today, and Harry Truman were running for President on the Democratic ticket against Thomas Dewey on the Republican ticket and against Henry Wallace on a third party ticket, how would you vote? If the presidential election were being held today, how would you vote— for Harry Truman, Thomas Dewey, Henry Wallace, or for J. Strom Thurmond?

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, 1948.

Question: If the presidential election were being held today, which candidate would you vote for—Nixon, the Republican; Humphrey, the Democrat; or Wallace, the candidate of the American Independent Party?

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, 1968.
Ladd-Election Polls—1948 and Today-Continued from page 24.

It may be that in each of these instances some special circumstance intruded to make the polling problem unusually difficult. I suspect, though, that there are underlying commonalities in the troubles election polls have been having; and that for all the improvements in methods the general environment for election polling now makes the enterprise far more difficult and demanding than it was in the past, in, say, 1948.

I mention 1948 specifically because the polling failure that year has entered popular mythology as the greatest ever. It wasn’t, in fact, and what went wrong that year was easy to correct. Our present problems are, I believe, vastly more challenging.

It is true, of course, that all the polls taken in 1948 put Thomas Dewey ahead of Harry Truman. But as the data on the 1948 poll performance which we bring together here (pp. 24, 27-28) attest, their findings never justified proclamations of a Dewey victory. Gallup and Crossley both underestimated Truman’s percentage of the popular vote by about 5 points. But Crossley did his final interviewing in mid October! Gallup concluded just a bit two weeks before the election. Had Gallup stopped polling in 1968 at the same point he did in 1948, his 1968 “prediction” would have been far off.

In 1948 Gallup found Dewey’s margin declining—from 12 points to just 5—from August to October. Any reasonable interpretation would have considered the possibility that the Democrat—whose party had the White House since the depths of the Great Depression—might have gained further strength as election day approached and the vote became a real “priced” choice. Surely some voters, while dissatisfied with Truman and ready for a change after sixteen years of Democratic rule, must have wondered whether they dared take a chance on “those Republicans.” Survey findings available before the election made abundantly clear that the country was still in a policy era favorable to the Democratic party: The New Deal was broadly viewed as a success; a majority of Americans still favored more government (p. 28).

The “polling error” in 1948 of which we can be certain was one of judgment and interpretation: Failing to take into account what I think should have seemed obvious even without 20-20 hindsight, that a 5-point or so Dewey lead in mid-October in a poll trial heat could not be projected to a Dewey victory in the actual balloting November 2.

Today, much more than naive misinterpretation of poll findings lies at the root of the election polls’ problems. My colleagues and I at the Public Perspective intend to keep revisiting these challenges in the contemporary environment, and we encourage further research and analysis.

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WHAT THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE SAID ABOUT THE 1948 POLL FAILURE

[Excerpts from Frederick Mosteller, et al., The Pre-Election Polls of 1948 (New York: The Social Science Research Council, 1949), Bulletin 60, pp. 290, 301.]

The committee has made a study of available data on the 1948 election forecasts and has come to the following conclusions:

1. The pollsters overreached the capabilities of public opinion polls as a predicting device in attempting to pick, without qualification, the winner of the 1948 presidential election. They had been led by false assumptions into believing their methods were much more accurate than in fact they are. The election was close. Dewey could have won by carrying Ohio, California, and Illinois, which he lost by less than 1 percent of the vote. In such a close election no polls, no advance information of any kind, could have predicted a Truman or Dewey victory with confidence. The failure of the polls was due to neglecting the possibility of a close election and the necessity of measuring preferences very accurately just before the election to determine whether a flat forecast could be made with confidence.

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A...major source of errors in the 1948 election forecasts is to be found in the failure of the polls to detect shifts in voting intentions during the later stages of the campaign. Roper erred by assuming that voting intentions would not change during the campaign, as evidenced by his announcement of September 9. Crossley and Gallup made no attempt to detect the shift in voting intentions in the last two weeks of the campaign. Post-election polls report that about 1 voter in 7 said he made his decision on how to vote within the two weeks preceding the election, and that about 3 out of 4 of these voters said they voted for Truman. Even if one makes allowance for errors in such reports, one must conclude that failure to detect and measure changes of mind about voting during the closing days of the campaign accounts for a considerable part of the total error of the prediction.

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One October 1948 Poll Showed the Election Close Indeed

A diagram showing poll results:

- Don't Know: 13%
- Other: 9%
- Truman: 38%
- Dewey: 40%

**Question:** Which candidate would you like to see elected President next month (November 1948)—Dewey, Truman, Wallace, or Thurmond?

**Source:** Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, October 14-23, 1948.
THE 1948 POLITICAL CLIMATE

Truman's Popularity Low

- No Opinion: 14%
- Approve: 39%
- Disapprove: 47%

Some Inclination to Change Horses

**Question:** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Harry Truman is handling his job as president?

**Source:** Survey by the Gallup Organization, May 28-June 2, 1948.

But Overall, A Democratic Policy Era

**Question:** Thinking back to the last depression, would you say that the New Deal measures under Roosevelt...on the whole did more good than harm or more harm than good?

**Source:** Survey by the Roper Organization, September 13-20, 1948.

**Question:** Thinking back to the last depression, would you say that the New Deal measures under Roosevelt...lessened the severity of the depression on the people considerably, lessened it a little or didn't lessen it at all?

**Source:** Survey by the Roper Organization, September 13-20, 1948.

**Question:** ...Do you think the government should do more to improve the conditions of the poor people or that the government is doing just about the right amount of things now, or that the government has already done more for the poor people than is good for them?

**Source:** Survey by the Roper Organization, September 13-20, 1948.

**Question:** Do you think it is a good thing this country is playing a bigger part in world affairs now than we did after the first world war, or do you think that it would be better if we stopped concerning ourselves with foreign countries and paid more attention to our problems here at home?

**Source:** Survey by the Roper Organization, September 13-20, 1948.
United States presidential election, 1948

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Harry Truman (D) %</th>
<th>Thomas Dewey (R) %</th>
<th>Henry Wallace (Progressive) %</th>
<th>Strom Thurmond (Dixiecrat) %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1947/January 1948</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February/March</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>7%</td>
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<td>April/May</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>June/July</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June/July</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August/September</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August/September</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August/September</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August/September</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October/November</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual result</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Incumbent President Harry Truman's popularity was low at the end of 1946. However, he was able to regain his popularity by attacking the “Do-Nothing” Republican Congress of 1947-1948 and tying Dewey to it, and by energizing certain segments of the Democratic base through various actions such as ending segregation in the U.S. military and recognizing Israel. Gallup, and other polling organizations, failed to identify Truman's comeback and to predict his victory in the 1948 election.
File: OF 596-A. President's Committee on Civil Rights.


J. Strom Thummond States Rights Democratic Presidential Nominee.

The time and place suggested to be debate is in Virginia, Texas, or Missouri; stop you again renew my challenge to debate you face to face on the

The White House

Richard Vin Oct 10 935

WBC B 4}

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Elected to Congress

Although relatively progressive as a governor, with a platform that included aid to black educational institutions, fair wages for women and rent control, he was opposed to his party's Civil Rights program and led the walkout of the Southern Democrats at the 1948 convention. He campaigned for the presidency that year under the States' Right Democratic (aka "Dixiecrat") Party, ultimately losing by a large margin to President Harry S. Truman.

Originally appointed a Democrat to the U.S. Senate in 1954 under a write-in campaign, he was elected again in 1956; switching to the Republican Party in 1964, he continued to be re-elected for decades, and became a prominent force in the emergence of a conservative Republican Party in the South.