

Source 1

Source Information: Telegram from Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, April 17, 1941 (2 pages)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of State letter, Aug. 10, 1972
By ANTAC, NARS Date 6-25-75

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

ADVISED ON POLITICAL RELATIONS
MR. HORNBECK
APR 23 1941
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JR
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (..)

Chungking via N. R.

Dated April 17, 1941

Rec'd 10:55 a.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 19 1941
NOTED

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
APR 19 1941

Secretary of State,

Washington. APR 26 1941

140, April 17, 11 a.m. (SECTION ONE)

CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

Division of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
APR 22 1941
Department of State

Generalissimo asked me and McHugh to visit him last evening and during long conversation asked me to communicate to you and to the President the following as his comments on developments in relation to American aid to China. He began by remarking that a month and a half had passed since Mr. Currie's ^{visit} ~~article~~ without concrete results and that while China was grateful for the friendly attitude and sympathy of the United States he had suffered no little embarrassment due to constant inquiries from Chinese press for details aid to be granted. He remarked that Russian Ambassador frequently inquire as to what materials were being made available and said that his officers reported sarcastic remarks made by Russian advisers to the effect that when the war was over supplies would be available from the United States. He stated that he had been reluctant to discuss these matters with me except that the understanding that signing

of

1/ Major James M. McHugh, Naval Attaché and Naval Attaché for Air in China.

893.24/1047

FILED

PS/LB

Confidential File

93-24
13-51

Using Source 1

Sourcing Questions	When was this written? What was its purpose? Who saw/used this source? Why might it have been important?
Contextualization Questions	What is going on in China in 1941? Why would Russia be interested in American aid to China?
Corroboration Tasks	
Close Reading Questions	According to the source, what did Russian advisors say about American aid to China? What conclusions could be made about international influence in China during WWII based on this source?

Source 2

Source Information: "Personal Comments and Observations of Roger D. Lapham On "The China Problem,"; July 13, 1949; China (Taiwan) Asia File; Economic Cooperation Files; Papers of John D Sumner.

Note: Roger D. Lapham was a Chief administrator for the Economic Cooperation Administration which was created by Congress to provide aid to Europe after World War II. Although not officially included in program, China received economic aid from the United States through this agency.

9. When Secretary Marshall submitted his recommendation for economic aid to China -- \$550,000,000 -- in February 1948, my guess is that he did so mainly for political expediency. He knew that many in the Congress wanted to aid China. Perhaps he felt it wise to advocate something for China, if only to grease the ways for Congressional approval of the European Recovery Plan. Maybe I am wrong -- but it is hard not to believe that the policy "Let the fires burn out and the dust settle" has been our real policy toward China since General Marshall left there (Jan.6,1947).
10. Marshall did everything possible to effect a Nationalist-Communist Coalition Government in China during the year he spent there - 1946. In the light of these efforts, the action of the Congress two years later, in appropriating \$400,000,000 military and economic aid to help the Nationalists attempt to defeat the Communists was an about-face.
11. I have no wish to take sides in a Democratic-Republican political fight about our foreign policy toward China. I hope that this country can develop a real bipartisan policy toward China, as well as toward every other country we have relations with. On the other hand, any Administration is responsible under the Constitution for the direction of foreign policy -- and can be and should be called upon by interested citizens to explain its motives and actions.
12. One thing stands out today -- American influence in China is far, far less than it was on VJ Day. Who is responsible for that loss of influence, and what might have been done which wasn't done can be debated indefinitely. The fact is that the United States has taken sides in a Chinese Civil War, and the side we backed has lost every round to date, both on the military and the economic fronts.

13. It seems almost incredible that the Nationalist Government could have suffered such complete deterioration during my year in China. Nationalist armies well equipped and backed by air forces lost out to armies which had no air force whatsoever. Those who hold that defense is the best offense might well study this Civil War. While the Nationalists did take the offensive following VJ Day, their offensive front was so widely extended that eventually it broke down. It was then that they chose to defend themselves within confined or walled areas. As a result, they were defeated in every instance. After losing Manchuria, North China, and the lands North of the Yangtze, they chose to repel the Communist advances from the South bank of the Yangtze. Notwithstanding that they had a navy capable of operating along the River, and an airforce based South of the River, they withdrew voluntarily to make a weak defense of Shanghai and the other areas South of the Yangtze, instead of taking advantage of the Yangtze itself, a great natural water defense barrier.

14. Unquestionably history will place the blame of the Nationalist downfall on the Generalissimo, who not only as President but as Commanding General directed overall strategy and tactics -- a stubborn, obstinate man, who refused to delegate authority, who relied on incompetent favorites for many of his subordinates, and who put on the shelf competent military men who could have helped him. Not only is he responsible for the defeat on the Nationalist military front but he can be largely blamed for the failure behind the lines on the economic front. Lacking first-hand knowledge in this field, he did little or nothing to establish civil reforms or to take effective steps to offset the well-planned operations and propaganda of the Communists. He made little effort to find the right people who could have helped in this field; and those he did use were largely yes-men, unwilling to assert themselves or do anything but take orders.

15. The long and short of it is that the Nationalist collapse can be attributed mainly to the utter incompetency of their government. The Communist successes can be attributed mainly to the weakness of the government which opposed them. No government can last without the confidence of its people; and no steps were overlooked by the Generalissimo's government to insure the break-down of confidence.

Using Source 2

Sourcing Questions	What does the title of this source reveal about its purpose? What clues in this source might lend credibility to the perspective of the author?
Contextualization Questions	What historical events are mentioned in this source? At the time of the creation of this source, what was the situation in China?
Corroboration Tasks	
Close Reading Questions	What is meant by the author's reference to : "let the fires burn and the dust settle." Where does the author place blame for the fall of China to communism? What kind of aid to China is mentioned by this source? How does the author characterize this aid? What does the author say about the United States "picking sides"?

Source #3

Source: Cables between Mao Zedong and Stalin, 1949. Links from Article: [How Stalin Elevated the Communist Party to Power in Xinjiang in 1949.](#)

Note: Cables were held by the Russian archives, translated by the [Wilson Center.](#)

[handwritten: to Cde. Stalin]

SECOND DIRECTORATE OF THE USSR ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF

[CABLE N° 58458](#)

TOP SECRET

Copy N° 1 to Cde. Stalin

Copy N° 2 to Cde. Stalin

Copy N° 3 to Cde. Molotov

Copy N° 4 to Cde. Malenkov

from BEIJING received at 07:45 27 September 1949 Copy N° 2

MOLNIYA EH

to FILIPPOV

I am sending you a telegram of Cde. MAO ZEDONG about the Lanzhou-Xi'an air route.

"To Cde. FILIPPOV

We agree to create air routes of a Soviet-Chinese civil aviation company, which have already been arranged, from CHITA to MUKDEN and through ULAN BATOR-KALGAN to BEIJING.

But besides these air routes today the most important and necessary one for us is a route from URUMCHI-LANZHOU to XI'AN which we hope you will help us create.

Our 500,000 troops intend to enter the province of XINJIANG via LANZHOU or GANGZHOU [SIC] in the first days or the middle of November. But the railroads in this region are poor, the conditions difficult, there are few people, and there is no food – therefore we acutely need and hope that you will help us with 30-50 transport aircraft to ship food, clothing, key personnel, and some of the troops. It is necessary for all the preparation work of the air route in this sector to be completed during October for this purpose, and Cde. PENG DEHUAI, our Commanding General of the First PLA Front, could already use this route in November.

У ЧЕРЕДЪ СЪУЖЪ ВЪ ОТДЕЛЪ ВТОРОГО СЛЪЖЪ УПРАВЛЕННЯ ГЕНШТАБА ВЪ СССР

ВТОРОЕ ГЛАВНОЕ УПРАВЛЕНИЕ ГЕНШТАБА ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ СССР 51

ШИФРТЕЛЕГРАММА № 58458

СОВЕРШЕННО СЕКРЕТНО
Содержание строго засекречено

Экз. № 1	Тов. Сталину	Экз. № 7	Экз. № 13
№ 2	Тов. Сталину	№ 8	№ 14
№ 3	Тов. Молотову	№ 9	№ 15
№ 4	Тов. Маленкову	№ 10	№ 16
№ 5	В отдел	№ 11	№ 17
№ 6		№ 12	№ 18

№ в. БОЛШИНА получено 07 ч. 45 м. 27 с. 9 1949 г. Экз. № 51

Два экземпляра
в
результат

МОЛНИЯ Э

ФИЛИППОВУ

Передать Вам телеграмму тов. МАО ПСЕ-ДУНА о воздушной трассе ЛАНЬЧОУ-СИАНЬ.
*Товарищу Филиппову!

Мы согласны создать воздушные трассы советско-китайской гражданской авиационной компании, о которых уже договорено, от ЧИТЫ до МУКДЕНА и через УЛАН-БАТОР-КАЛГАН до БОЛШИНА.

Но кроме этих двух трасс на сегодняшний день самая важная и необходимая для нас - это трасса от УРУМЧИ-ЛАНЬЧОУ до СИАНЬ, которую мы надеемся Вы можете нам создать.

Ваши войска численностью 500 тысяч человек направлены в первые или средние числа ноября сего года через ЛАНЬЧОУ и ГАНЧОУ войти в провинцию СИНЬЦЗЯНЬ. Но пути сообщения в этом районе плохие, условия тяжелые, населения мало, отсутствует продовольствие - поэтому мы остро нуждаемся и надеемся, что Вы помо-

USSR MFA

10th Department

Outgoing N° 21039

Received at 0105 16 November 1949

Sent at 0230 16 November 1949

Top Secret

Spets. N° 234

Cable

from PEKING

to Cde. KOVALEV

Copy N° 1

PRIORITY

In connection with the appeal of the Chinese Government to deliver 10,000 tons of grain from the Soviet Union to supply Chinese soldiers of the PLA in Xinjiang inform the Chinese Government that the Soviet Government agrees to grant its request, delivering 10,000 tons of wheat, handing it over at the Soviet-Xinjiang border by 1 April 1950 with payment against the value of Chinese millet seed due for delivery to the USSR from China.

GROMYKO

Five copies printed. Yan

16 November 1949

145

Исход. № 21039

Минд СССР
Десятый отдел

Форма № 17
СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
Снятие копий воспрещается
Спец. № 234

Получена 1 час. 05 мин. 16.XI 49 г.
Отправлена 2 час. 30 мин. 16.XI 49 г.

Шифрованная телеграмма

Куда ПЕКИН Кому тов. КОВАЛЕВУ Экз. №

ВНЕ ОЧЕРЕДИ

В связи с обращением Китайского Правительства о поставке из Советского Союза 10.000 тонн зерна для снабжения китайских солдат НОА в Синьцзяне сообщите Китайскому Правительству, что Советское Правительство согласно удовлетворить его просьбу, поставив 10.000 тонн пшеницы со сдачей на советско-синьцзянской границе до 1-го апреля 1950 года и оплатой в счет стоимости семян китайской чумизы, подлежащей поставке из Китая в СССР.

Г Р О М Ы К О

отп. 5 экз. ян.
16.XI.49г.

верно: *Wan*

44


Using Source 3

Sourcing Questions	What is the purpose of a <i>cable</i> between two countries?
Contextualization Questions	What was happening in China as these cables were being sent? What is the geographic connection between the Soviet Union and China?
Corroboration Tasks	How does this information connect or conflict with Source #4?
Close Reading Questions	What does Mao request from the Soviet Union in these cables? What was the purpose of those requests?

Source #4

Source: Memorandum to President Harry S. Truman from Secretary of State George Marshall: March 4, 1947. President's Secretary's Files - Subject File.

Note: The text below was attached to Marshall's memo and is an excerpt of a report by Secretary of War Robert Patterson to Secretary of State Marshall.



Using Source 4

Sourcing Questions	
Contextualization Questions	
Corroboration Tasks	How does this document connect with or conflict with the information in source #3?
Close Reading Questions	What does this source say about connections between China and the USSR during the Communist Revolution? What does the source mean by, “there is obviously a continuing community of interest and identify of aims between the Chinese communist forces and the Soviets.”?