FROM: [Redacted]

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF IRANIAN POLITICAL SITUATION

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1. BACKGROUND


2. MOSSADEQ'S GOVERNMENT HAS POWERFUL POPULAR SUPPORT.

A. MAJLIS OPPOSITION TO MOSSADEQ COLLAPSED ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1951. ABDOL RAHMAN PARMAZI ANNOUNCED THAT THE OPPOSITION WOULD CEASE TO ATTACK THE GOVERNMENT AS LONG AS THE OIL DISPUTE WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. SOURCES BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THE COLLAPSE OF THIS OPPOSITION IS FINAL. THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IS A FACE-SAVING EXCUSE. THE OPPOSITION HAS GOTTEN "OUT ON A LIMB," DEPENDING UPON BRITISH POWER AND ROYAL COURT SUPPORT. BOTH FAILED TO COME THROUGH WITH THEIR SUPPORT AND THE OPPOSITION DEPUTIES FEAR FOR THEIR VERY LIVES.
B. MOSLEM RELIGIOUS GROUPS, WHO AT ONE TIME MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIVERTED FROM KASHANI AND FROM HIS PRO-MOSSADEQ STAND, HAVE NOW RALLIED TO THE NATIONAL FRONT BANNER. IN A LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 1951 HABIB SAPI, LEADER OF THE FEDAYIN-I-ISLAM, MADE PEACE WITH KASHANI; A LETTER FROM BIRJUJUROJ OF QUM (THE OUTSTANDING SPIRITUAL LEADER OF IRAN) TO THE SHAH URGED HIM TO SUPPORT MOSSADEQ.

C. KASHANI'S ENORMOUS INFLUENCE IN SUPPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS DEMONSTRATED ON 3 SEPTEMBER 1951 BY THE GENERAL CLOSING OF THE BAZAARS THROUGHOUT THE NATION AT HIS REQUEST AND BY THE ORDERLINESS OF THE PARADES HE SPONSORED IN FAVOR OF THE GOVERNMENT ON THE SAME DAY.

D. THE SHAH HAS TAKEN A STAND IN FAVOR OF MOSSADEQ AND AT LEAST SINCE 17 SEPTEMBER HAS REFUSED TO LISTEN TO BRITISH ENTREATIES TO RALLY OPPOSITION IN FAVOR OF SETYED ZIA TARAFAI. AT MOSSADEQ'S REQUEST THE SHAH HAS ORDERED THE PRINCESS ASHRAF OUT OF THE COUNTRY (SHE LEFT IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1951), THEREBY SHOWING THAT HE WOULD NO LONGER (THAT IS, FOR THE TIME BEING) CONDONE COURT INTRIGUES IN POLITICAL MATTERS.


3. THE BRITISH POSITION IN IRAN HAS COLLAPSED.

A.

B. THE INFLUENCE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY UPON THE SHAH AND HIS COURTIES HAS PRACTICALLY CEASED TO EXIST; MAINLY BECAUSE THE SHAH IS INCREASINGLY AWARE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE "STREETS", AND FEARS THE "STREETS" AT PRESENT MORE THAN HE FEARS THE BRITISH. NO OTHER PRIME MINISTER PRIOR TO MOSSADEQ COULD CLAIM SUCH SPONSORSHIP. THE SHAH DARES NOT TALK BACK OR STEP OUT OF LINE. HE IS FULLY AWARE NOW THAT THE POLITICAL WAVE WHICH BROUGHT MOSSADEQ INTO POWER WAS IN GREAT PART AN ANTI-COURT WAVE.
C. The campaign of intimidation supported by certain elements of the
National Front and condoned by Mullah Kashani (but not condoned by Mossadeq)
has contributed toward current elimination of British-sponsored opposition.
(See also paragraph 2 a above).

4. The Soviet Union is in a relatively strong position to reap advantages.

A. The Tudeh Party has great potentialities. Although inside information
is inadequate, the following clues are important:

(1) As early as 1946 the Tudeh had organized workers in Abadan to a
point where they successfully staged a general strike.

(2) Since the Razmara Cabinet, the Tudeh has enjoyed greater freedom
of action with correspondingly increased efficiency.

(3) In 1950 the Tudeh organized Peace Front groups.

(4) In December 1950 the Tudeh was in a position to stage the escape
of ten of its leaders from the Tehran jail.

(5) In April 1951 the Tudeh quickly took advantage of the ineptitude
of British labor relations in Abadan to stage another successful general strike.

(6) In July 1951 the Tudeh was able to mass ten thousand demonstrators
in the streets of Tehran and organize them in semi-military order.

(7) In the past year the Tudeh has been signally successful in conducting
larger scale propaganda.

(8) An estimate of Tudeh and front groups for the Tehran area in
September 1951 was a maximum of thirty-five thousand, which appears to be a
considerable increase over a year ago.

(9) The economic situation stands to deteriorate further, which paves
the way for further increase in the power of the Tudeh Party.

B. The policy of the National Front at this time plays directly into
Soviet hands.

(1) It has caused misunderstandings between London and Washington.
The breach could be made to widen further.

(2) It calls for the physical expulsion of the British from Iran.

(3) It has undermined the prestige of the Anglo-Saxon powers in the
near East.
(1) IT LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A COMMON FRONT OF NATIONALISTS IN THE NEAR EAST AGAINST ANGLO-SAXON "IMPERIALISTS." (THIS POLICY, FAVORABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION, CAN BE CARRIED OUT MUCH MORE SMOOTHLY BY THE MOSSADEQ GOVERNMENT, A BOURGEOIS GOVERNMENT, THAN BY A TUIDEH GOVERNMENT.)

(5) THE SOVIET "SIDING" WITH IRAN AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN EARLY OCTOBER 1951 HAS INCREASED SYMPATHY FOR THE SOVIETS EVEN IN THE RANKS OF THE NATIONAL FRONT.

C. NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN HAS TO CONTEND WITH:

(1) THE ARMY, POLICE, AND GENDARMERIE WHICH REPRESENT IN THE HANDS OF THE SHAH AND THE GOVERNMENT COMPARATIVELY WELL-ORGANIZED, CENTRALIZED, AND MASSIVE REPRESSIVE FORCES, WITH NOTEWORTHY SHORTCOMING SUCH AS PENETRATION IN CERTAIN QUARTERS, CORRUPTION, AND SO FORTH.

(2) POPULAR RESISTANCE TO COMMUNISM WHICH STEMS FROM RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS AND A REVIVAL OF NATIONALISM.