MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Nelson Mandela, Deputy President African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa

PARTICIPANTS: The President
               David C. Miller, Jr., Senior Director, African Affairs (Notetaker)
               Nelson Mandela, Deputy President ANC
               Thabo Mbeki, Director, International Affairs (Notetaker)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 25, 1990, 10:30 - 11:50 A.M. EST
                       Oval Office

The President received Nelson Mandela in the Oval Office at 10:30 A.M. (U)

The President: Welcome to the Oval Office. Congratulations on the success of the visit and the warmth with which you have been received by the American people. (U)

Nelson Mandela: It is an honor and pleasure to be here. (U)

The President: I hope you are not too tired. (U)

Nelson Mandela: How could I be tired when I am meeting with you? (U)

The President: Let me introduce Secretary Baker, General Scowcroft, Governor Sununu and Bob Gates. You know there is a lot of interest in this visit. I thought you might arrive here today wearing your Yankee baseball cap. (U)

Nelson Mandela: I wanted to wear it this morning but I got up too late for my walk. (U)

The President: You look good [Mrs. Mandela entered] Welcome to the Oval Office. We are very pleased to have you here. [introductions to all] [Mrs. Bush entered] (U)

Mrs. Bush: I am sorry I was a little late. It is a pleasure and honor to meet you. (U)
The President: Your visit has been very good emotionally for the States. (U)

[10:40 A.M. -- Walked to South Lawn for arrival remarks.]

At 11:00 A.M. the President and Mr. Mandela returned to the Oval Office and continued with the one-on-one.

The President: Welcome. What I want to do in the spirit of frankness is to get out all of the difficult issues we face. Then I want to get some guidance from you on what issues we should discuss in the larger meeting. We need to level with each other for this visit to be productive. (✓)

I want to assure you of my deep personal respect. Because of who you are and how you have conducted yourself after 10,000 days in captivity there is a real chance for peace in South Africa. The United States, more than any other country, can be a contributor to that process. We have a strong African-American population, we have no colonial history, and we inherently favor democratic institutions. You have an historic opportunity, but we do understand the pressures on you. (✓)

So, with your permission, I would like to raise an issue on which we disagree, not to be contentious, but to work in a spirit of candor. There are some points that we feel strongly about. (U)

First, I think that de Klerk represents an historic opportunity. I worry about his survival and the threats to him from the right. It would be terrible if he were to be taken out of the picture by some nut from the right wing. I know that we got the visit of President de Klerk all fouled up. Indirectly we must have put him in a difficult position. There was no intention to do that and we certainly assume he will be coming. (✓)

Second, I never have felt that sanctions have been as productive as you feel. But when Congressmen Gray and Dellums came back from South Africa they told me that sanctions had been productive and that we should leave them in place. I want to assure you that I will comply with the law and will not change any of our sanctions unless we see real progress. I want to see what the South African Government does. (✓)

Third, and I know this is a contentious item, is your relationship with people who have a long history of antagonism with the United States. For example, the Soviets want us to talk to Castro, but because they won’t change, we’re not going to do that. Castro shows no signs of democratizing Cuba and in fact is critical of what Gorbachev has allowed in Eastern Europe.
When Gorbachev was here I asked him why the Soviet Union gave $5 billion a year to support that regime. And, of course, as you know, we have differences with Qadhafi. 

Fourth, maybe we have a difference on Angola. We want elections which would allow both sides an opportunity to end the violence. We want to get talks stated between the sides that will lead to free elections. 

Perhaps we have a different historic view of communism. We simply have a different philosophy and as you can see things are changing dramatically in Eastern Europe. I wanted to get these issues on the table, but it isn’t going to overshadow what I am certain will be a very successful visit. I invite your frank commentary but felt that I had to raise these issues with you at the start. 

Nelson Mandela: I welcome the opportunity to talk to you. I must assure you at the outset that "we sincerely regard you as one of us." 

The President: I appreciate that very much. I’m not sure that I have earned it but I deeply appreciate it. 

Nelson Mandela: With trust we can discuss what seem to be very difficult issues. The position of de Klerk is of great concern to us. We are convinced of his honesty. When he says he wants a South Africa where people can determine their own affairs we believe him. We are aware of the risk he faces from his own people and of his losing their support. We knew this when we started. We knew the process would have this effect. 

For example, the Orange Free State used to have 14 Nationalists Party seats. In 1989, the Conservative Party took 6 of those seats. In two recent by-elections in safe seats for the Nationalist Party, the Conservatives won by a very narrow margin. Just this Fall in Umlazi a Nationalist led by only 500 votes in what had been a very safe seat. This shows the strength of the right wing. 

The President: Does the right wing concentrate any attacks on you? 

Nelson Mandela: No, they center their attack on the ANC. They are presuming the objective of crushing the ANC. Thus we are trying to protect de Klerk. 

With regard to the right wing, just this month Thabo Mbeki met with Professor Boshoff who is a lecturer at the University of Pretoria. They talked almost all night about the future of
South Africa. The University of Pretoria is one of the most conservative institutions in the country. In addition, Boshoff is very important because he is the son-in-law of a former Prime Minister, Hendrik Verwoerd. The essence of our message to Professor Boshoff is, why should we continue to prepare for mutual slaughter when, if we plan together, we can have a bright future. We propose to continue this dialogue with the right wing. We are telling the right wing that de Klerk is on the correct track. After 42 years of coercion with the world clamoring for peace, why should we be planning to attack each other? We are also giving this message about de Klerk to blacks in South Africa. We are the only people who can do so. We are successful. (☞)

Thus we are very concerned with the position of de Klerk. The outside world can do nothing to help him. Talks about lifting the sanctions play exactly the wrong way. (☞)

The President: Why is that? (U)

Nelson Mandela: The point that the right wing is explicitly making is that de Klerk is a tool of the United States and UK. The changes he is calling for are coming at the instructions of these two countries. To illustrate this, you should know that the British Embassy in South Africa was attacked... shots were fired at the building. This was because Prime Minister Thatcher issued a statement that I had been released because of her pressure. She never should have said this. You must remember, Mr. President, that we are still fighting the Boer War in South Africa. Thus, any time that the British say they are helping de Klerk, opponents say that he is selling us out. (☞)

It is interesting that when our delegations met for negotiations for the first time last month, we had two whites, two coloreds, one Indian and number of Africans. We were mixed. The Government delegation was all white, but more important, they were all Afrikaners. There were no whites of British decent. So, if there is anything you can do to damage de Klerk the most, it is to help him out. Only the ANC can help him out. The right wing has a lot of respect for the ANC. Just recently I met with the deputy leader of the Conservative Party. He gave me a lot of respect. Leave the question of helping de Klerk up to us. We are in constant touch with him. In fact, we have a hot line which allows us to discuss sensitive measures in preparation for meetings or to handle unforeseen events. (☞)

The President: What about my seeing de Klerk? (☞)

Nelson Mandela: I would like him to see you. Any time is fine with us. In fact, we have encouraged him to come to the
United States. He will ask you to remove some sanctions but you should stand fast. Any relaxations of sanctions will slow the negotiating process. There was a real sense of urgency at our first meeting. Let us go on with this process. Don’t take any measures that would derail these peace talks. If you take any steps now to derail this process the blacks will be very upset. During the times of your predecessor, we took no money from the United States. In fact, my wife needed money badly when her house was burned, but she refused to take money from the United States. Your support of sanctions has made a tremendous impression and has removed the difficulties cause by constructive engagement.

The President: What is your view of a peaceful negotiation process versus a non-peaceful one? I need to understand this better.

Nelson Mandela: We have scaled down already on the question of the armed struggle. Since 1986 we have urged the Government to talk with us. In 1986 we refused humiliating conditions for these talks. We told them that they have killed our people and committed crimes but that we were willing to forget about that and look to at a peaceful solution. We decided in 1986 on our own that if we were to pursue talks we should scale down violence.

In the Harare declaration we said that as soon as the obstacles to negotiation were removed we would cease hostilities. It is important to have the proper atmosphere. When we first met with de Klerk, he asked us the same question. We said that we would consider renouncing violence completely once negotiations began. He agreed with us on this issue.

Thus we are in agreement to create an atmosphere. We proposed to call off the armed struggle. In fact, we proposed that our military forces meet with the Government’s military forces to talk about ending the violence. They refused.

We are committed to a peaceful resolution, that is why we have scaled down. Our position has been accepted by the Front Line States, the OAU, and the UN. Once the conditions have been met for negotiations we will renounce violence.

The President: These would be the test that we find in our sanctions legislation. As I understand it, the five conditions are:
-- Release of all political prisoners, and Nelson Mandela.
-- Repeal the state of emergency and release all detainees.
-- Unban political parties and permit free political activity.
-- Repeal the group areas act and the population registration act.
-- Agree to enter into good faith negotiations with truly representative members of the black majority without preconditions.

Nelson Mandela: Yes, once these have been met there would be a cessation of hostilities.

The President: Which have been met? (U)

Ambassador Miller: Conditions 3 and 5 and there has been progress on all the others.

Nelson Mandela: We are now going through the statute books in South Africa to remove repressive legislation. We believe that will occur in the next session of Parliament.

The President: Even with the right wing? (U)

Nelson Mandela: Yes. Touching on the questions of violence in Natal, indeed the violence started as a struggle with the ANC and Inaktha. In my speeches I have stated that we must cooperate with Buthelezi. In fact, I have urged that we give joint speeches.

The President: Buthelezi has told me that he would like to meet in private with you and if we can be of help we would like to do so.

Nelson Mandela: There is no need for you to do this. He has created conditions which I do not wish to discuss. The Government has used Inaktha to crush the ANC. The police are now agreeing that Inaktha are killing our people in Natal. No government should allow 4,000 people to be killed without intervening. Why can't the Government crush the violence there? That is our problem, Mr. President. The very training of the police makes this hard. They have been trained to protect only whites for so long that it is hard for them to defend black people.

The President: The image of blacks killing blacks in South Africa hurts your cause here.

Nelson Mandela: Let me assure that we would have settled this long ago without the involvement of the police and the army. The same men who shot at the British Embassy were just apprehended for trying to steal weapons from a South African army depot.
The President: This is almost like a renegade police force.

Nelson Mandela: I talked with de Klerk just before leaving and I made the point to him that the violence in Natal must be solved.

The President: Can you talk with him just the way we are talking, with this level of candor?

Nelson Mandela: Yes, he is a strong leader. We would welcome his coming to the United States.

The last point you made concerning Cuba and Communism -- you must understand that we are a liberation movement struggling against an authoritarian government. They are out to crush us. In this fight we came to the United States first, asking you to help us with money and arms. We asked you to give us the weapons. We could not even see the United States. No one would talk to us. We went to Cuba and on the spot they gave us support. They gave us the means to carry on the armed struggle. The Soviets did likewise. Thus, it is very difficult to criticize them now. Likewise we asked Qadhafi for financial assistance. We mentioned a very big figure and he gave it to us. Thus, it is impossible for us to criticize them. As a matter of principle, I don't think we should criticize the internal affairs of others. Thus, when I have been asked about discrimination of blacks in America, I won't comment on it.

The President: Let me make a suggestion, when you answer these questions, point out that you have accepted their support but not their principles. This will help make your trip more productive. Castro and Qadhafi are whipping a dead horse. They are fighting for an idea that everybody else is rejecting. If you could just say "Look, please understand that these people helped us in your hour of need," not that you identify with the heartbeat of their movement. This is just a suggestion.

Nelson Mandela: You see, Mr. President, the ANC is not a party. It is a congress of fine people of all views, conservative and liberals. We have refused to be drawn into ideology. All we really agree on is the fight against racism.

The President: By taking this stand, the trip is going well, the people think here is a reasonable guy not full of bitterness. It is going well. Well, we should probably move into the larger meeting where I invite you to speak on any subject you want.

Thabo Mbeki: Shouldn't you raise the last point? (U)
Nelson Mandela: Yes, it is very important for our struggle that you be kept informed of developments. I would like to establish a hot line between us. It is the best way to get you to lend support on a daily basis. I promise I won't abuse it, but I would like to be able to reach you when I need you. (E)

The President: Well, I think that is a good idea. Why don't you work with our people to develop the best channel. It is a good idea. (E)

Nelson Mandela: I would like to take just a moment to tell you that Ambassador Swing is doing a wonderful job. (U)

The President: Thank you. I like the idea of a line between us. (E)

-- End of Conversation --
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Robert M. Gates, Assistant to the President and Deputy for National Security Affairs
Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs
William L. Swing, U.S. Ambassador to South Africa
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Nelson Mandela, Deputy President ANC
Winnie Mandela, Wife
Thabo Mbeki, ANC Director for International Affairs
Thomas Nhobi, ANC Treasurer General
Zwelakehle Sisulu, Scheduler and Journalist
Chris Dlamini, Vice President, Congress of South African Trade Unions
Lindwe Mabuza, ANC Chief Representative in Washington
Nekie Zellie Ncube (Sister Bernard)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 25, 1990, 11:50 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. EST
Cabinet Room

An expanded meeting was held in the Cabinet Room with the President and Nelson Mandela’s delegation.

The President: I am determined to do everything I can to make this a successful visit. While we have a few differences or nuances between us, this shouldn’t detract from a very successful visit. We just had a good, frank talk. I don’t know what it is, but as soon as I saw this man I knew I could talk to him. So, let me turn the floor over to our guest. (U)
Nelson Mandela: Mr. President, I have been very encouraged by your remarks outside, as well as our conversation. These have confirmed our impression that you are fully behind us in our struggle against apartheid and the peace process. We want your support, moral and material. We need your resources and support. (U)

We would like you to consider that the ANC has never been a political party. It is a parliament of African people of different views. Some favor free enterprise, some socialism, some are conservative and some are liberal -- we have scrupulously avoided labels. The only thing that unites us is the struggle against racism. We are playing a very broad role, we are not simply a political organization. We propose a democratic government elected by all the citizens of South Africa. To do this, we require your assistance. We are trying to mobilize the entire country so that we can be the architects of a peaceful solution. Since 1986 we have been urging the Government to sit down and talk with us. In 1986 they attempted to impose humiliating conditions. We refused. But you must remember at all times that we are the people who started this process. (O)

But the role of de Klerk cannot be underestimated. We compliment him for the talks and believe he is honest and sincere. When he says he wants a non-racial South Africa, we believe him. We have made progress in the first meetings. We are removing obstacles. But you must remember that only the ANC can mobilize the entire country, even the Conservatives. The only organization that can help de Klerk is the ANC, not the international community. When the international community says they are trying to help de Klerk it hurts him with his right wing. The right wing capitalizes on this saying that he is acting on the instructions of the United States or the UK. This is a very sensitive issue with the Afrikaners. If anything is done by the outside world you damage his standing. We do believe that success requires de Klerk to be strengthened. We can mobilize to support de Klerk. We are the only organization that can do that. We are mobilizing all the black organizations and also going to the right-wing whites with this message of why slaughter each other. Why advocate racialism when we need peace? (O)

From the first meetings we had with the right wing, we believe they can’t answer that question. We occupy the center stage. We are making it clear to African leaders that de Klerk is indeed a new leader who needs and deserves our support. Thus, Mr. President, if you wish to strengthen de Klerk you have to strengthen the ANC. The peace process can only succeed if the ANC succeeds. We may need resources. (O)
The second point which has been a source of some concern is the justification of violence. People are keen that we renounce violence. We have already attended to this matter. When we began our strategy of talks we recognized that we must scale down violence. We have deliberately scaled it down. As we stated in the Harare declaration, if the Government removes all the obstacles that are inhibiting the negotiations, then we will call for a cessation of hostilities.

When we first met with de Klerk, he asked us about this issue. We said that what we would do is up to the Government. If we can negotiate, we will stop the struggle. If you want us to move away from the armed struggle, create the proper environment. As I mentioned to you before, we proposed that our military wing meet with the South African military but they refused. We are happy that we have scaled down the violence. Thus, you don’t need to worry. We are an organization committed to peace. We are confident that the government will remove the remaining obstacles to the negotiations.

But we will not call off the armed struggle as such. Because of conditions in the country, the army still killing our people, with growing vigilante groups, and the right wing arming itself with the stated objective of attacking the ANC, we must maintain a military capability. In that atmosphere, how do we call off the armed struggle? That is why we are talking to the right wing and making the argument that violence is senseless. Thus, violence should not be a major issue. Once the obstacles for negotiations are removed, we are prepared for a cessation of violence.

Now, Mr. President, we need financial help. We understand your position. We have learned of the $32 million to help development in South Africa and of the new $10 million fund just approved by the Congress, but these monies are inadequate for mobilizing for peace, and rehabilitation of the 20,000 ANC returnees and the 10,000 political prisoners. We need to have jobs and housing and educational facilities. The $32 million and $10 million are not correct. The ANC needs monies that we control. We need money that we can control. We understand your concerns about assisting us as a political party because there are others. But now we are playing a special role. I know you want us to succeed but to succeed we need funds.

We have established a charitable trust "The Matla Charitable Trust". The trustees include Van Zyl Slabbert, Franklin Sonn, Sam Motsenyane, J.N. Singh, Richard Maponya, and Mandela. These are all national leaders who have been involved in education and technical training and they represent a wide variety of education and technical leaders. We would suggest that if the President gives us financial assistance it could be paid into this trust. We could visualize progress of moving toward peace.
And now to our relations with Chief Buthelezi. He has made quite an impact on the outside world. In my speeches I have made it clear that to solve the problem of violence we must work together. Perhaps we could speak together. But it is no longer the ANC and Inkatha. In my private meetings with de Klerk I have asked him why he has failed for four and a half years to suppress this violence that has cost 4,000 lives. He has a strong, efficient and well-equipped army. I have said to him, why are you allowing this to continue. He has given me no answer either in private or in a big meeting. I have answered it for him. He is taking advantage of the difference between the ANC and the Inkatha, trying to destroy the ANC. Just the day before I left on this trip, I met with de Klerk. He told me of his trip to Europe and I told him of my plans for my trip to the United States. I told him he had to do something about the violence in Natal.

The President: Did he say anything? (U)

Nelson Mandela: Yes, he said he was going to look into it but I don’t think it was a very serious answer. The problem of violence among blacks is serious, but now de Klerk has created a monster which is hard to control. The police are trained to protect only whites and they think all blacks are targets -- men, women and children. This started four and a half years ago and I’m not sure that it is really feasible for them to handle Natal.

The President: It’s time to freshen up for lunch. If we don’t leave the cooks will get upset. We can continue our discussions over food. (U)

-- End of Conversation --
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Chris Dlamini, Vice President, Congress of South African Trade Unions
Lindiwe Mabuza, ANC Chief Representative in Washington
Nekie Zellie Ncube (Sister Bernard)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: June 25, 1990, 12:35 - 1:35 P.M. EST
Old Family Dining Room

A working lunch was held in the Old Family Dining Room for Nelson Mandela and his delegation. (U)

The President: I hate to make you work over lunch but are there any other subjects you'd like to cover? (U)

Nelson Mandela: Before I go ahead, let me introduce my colleagues and the roles they are going to play. First let me introduce Mr. Thomas Nkobi. He is the treasurer of the
organization and a member of the National Executive. Nkobi in on
the youthful end of our leadership and sitting next to him is
Zwelakhe Sisulu. I am clearly aware of the problems of a
dynasty. Thabo is the son of Govan Mbeki, who was sentenced to
life in prison with me. Thabo is the head of our Department of
International Affairs. Mr. Sisulu is also the son of one of our
famous leaders, Walter Sisulu. (U)

The President: Are you all located in the same place now? (U)

Nelson Mandela: No, we are located in different places. I would
also like to introduce Chris Dlamini, who is the Vice President
of the Congress of South African Trade Unions. (U)

Secretary Baker: Yes, on my recent trip to South Africa I met
with both Mr. Mbeki and Mr. Sisulu’s parents. (U)

The President: I understand these problems of age. The joke in
the old days was that the Kremlin was led by all these old men,
but now Gorbachev is younger than I am. (U)

Nelson Mandela: Mr. President, do you have any specific
questions? When we were together we did cover the questions of
sanctions and violence versus non-violence. I did emphasize our
strong preference for a peaceful resolution and I wanted our side
to know that we had a good discussion on sanctions. (U)

The President: I have a question -- you assert that if we lift
sanctions we will hurt de Klerk. But won’t he be asking us to
lift sanctions when he visits? (☞)

Nelson Mandela: We may not agree on this. The image he would
like to convey is that he is capable of dealing with the right
wing, but if you look at the numbers, you can see that right-wing
support is increasing. In the last election, de Klerk got
500,000 Afrikaners and Treurnicht got 400,000. Thus the
Afrikaners vote is split almost evenly. It is only South
Africans of English descent that strongly support de Klerk. The
need for a political solution is because of a host of economic
problems caused by sanctions. Thus, relaxation of sanctions may
really slow the process down. (☞)

General Scowcroft: Thus, you believe that it is the sanctions
and not the change in national leadership that has caused the
negotiations. (☞)

Nelson Mandela: Yes, that is what they say themselves. The
Government themselves say that they are unable to help the ANC
returnees because of economic problems. De Klerk showed charts
of how the sanctions have hurt the economy. Both of us see a
final settlement as the only way to get the economy going again.

Secretary Baker: You’re not asking for increased sanctions? (U)

Nelson Mandela: Absolutely not, just keep the same package. (U)

Ambassador Cohen: Sanctions should be maintained until the
process is irreversible? When will that be? (C)

Nelson Mandela: Maybe that will be a stage when we have agreed
on a non-racial constitution or maybe earlier when we get a
commitment of the Government to this process. We are working
with them on the basis that they are honest, so it may be that we
will reach a stage where a declaration of intent is adequate.
But we cannot decide it now. (C)

Governor Sununu: What is the timetable for the sequence of
events? (U)

Nelson Mandela: We believe that the obstacles for negotiations
will be removed. However, the point of which people will be
identified to negotiate is very difficult. The Government says
that the leaders who have worked in government positions should
take part, including leaders of homelands and mayors. And now we
have lots of new organizations, church boards and others who are
supposed to be very large. The Government says all must be given
places at the table. Thus, right from the beginning we will be a
minority. (C)

Now, our position is a simple one. The people who should sit at
the table should have received a mandate in non-racial,
democratic elections. They must be given this legitimacy and
respect by the entire community. They must be elected in free,
democratic elections. We are confident that the international
community will support this. The homeland leaders and mayors are
not elected as the Government asserts. The ANC could not have
run. Our leaders were banned or in jail. Thus the elections
were not really free. That is our position. (C)

Governor Sununu: Could they be elected regionally? (U)

Nelson Mandela: No, we believe they should be elected just like
the parliamentary elections. But all the people in the
parliamentary district will be permitted to vote. But we are
addressing the question of black unity. There are six self-
governing homelands. We are working with five of the homelands’
leaders. Only Buthelezi is not working with us. In fact, some
of the leaders of the homelands are very prominent and accomplished people. (C)

Just to illustrate the difference in support for our organization versus the PAC and Azapo, on June 16 we celebrated the anniversary of a student protest against the mandatory teaching of Afrikaans in the black school system. On that day the press reported that 2,500 people attended the Azapo rally, 3,000 attended the PAC rally, and the police estimate that 50,000 attended our rally in Soweto. (C)

Ambassador Cohen: In terms of the negotiations, can we assume that the Government itself will be represented in the negotiations? (U)

Thabo Mbeki: No, the problem is that perpetuates the racial government. We believe that the ANC has a good standing among many whites. For example, we would like to run somebody in Stellenbosch. We do not want to have racial groups represented to draft a non-racial constitution. (C)

Secretary Baker: But I asked about the elections to negotiate with the Government? Did I misunderstand? (U)

Thabo Mbeki: We are going to propose that we elect from scratch an elected constituent assembly like Namibia. This is an important point -- who holds the power. If you elect a new constitutional assembly, can you lead the existing government? No, you need an interim government to hold power while the constitutional assembly works. For example, SABC's board is picked exclusively by the Government party. But during negotiations the board would have to be appointed by all. The Government now recognizes this. If you have an interim you are thus not negotiating with the existing government. (C)

Secretary Baker: But I thought the purpose of the assembly would be to have an elected body to negotiate with the Government to get to a non-racial democracy. If you start with a position that the Government must dissolve, there's little chance for minorities. There is little chance that the Government will move down this path. (C)

Thabo Mbeki: No, Mr. Secretary. Next month we must meet with de Klerk. We are now negotiating with the Government. Now is the point we must decide who governs the country while the constituent assembly is meeting. The challenge is who will monitor and enforce our agreement with the Government once we reach them. The problem we face is that nobody has the standing to act as an interim power as Lord Soames did for Zimbabwe or Martti Ahtisaari did for Namibia. (C)
Secretary Baker: The real problem is assurance that the new elections and constitution will be carried out in a free and fair manner. Eastern Europe and Nicaragua have both done this recently by using outside observers.

Thabo Mbeki: Maybe, but the South African Government is very sensitive to outside observers. The return of the exiles is illustrative of their sensitivity. They don’t want observers monitoring this process.

Ambassador Swing: They are really worried about something like the 435 process being imposed on them.

Governor Sununu: Why would the Government agree to hold elections if they have no place at the table?

Thabo Mbeki: We negotiate with the Government now on who sits at the table.

Governor Sununu: Why won’t they insist on the Government being at the table?

Thabo Mbeki: It comes back to the position on groups being represented. They now say that they don’t believe in groups and thus they have a logical problem in arguing for the Government being at the table.

Secretary Baker: Yes, this is technically a logically correct argument but totally impractical. They will say that they are willing to negotiate with the majority but they will insist that the white minority be protected. This is like the United States, we have a Senate to protect against the tyranny of one-man-one-vote House of Representatives.

Nelson Mandela: No, I don’t think we have explained this right. The Government will stay in power until we all have agreed on a new structure.

The President: The time has come to face the White House press corps. As you know, they will all be looking for the differences that may have come up in the talks. We’re not going to tell you what to say, but I want to warn you they are always looking for differences.

Nelson Mandela: Our position is that we will not discuss with the press what we discussed with the President of the United States.

-- End of Conversation --