Source 1

Source Information: "Personal Comments and Observations of Roger D. Lapham On "The China Problem;", July 13, 1949; China (Taiwan) Asia File; Economic Cooperation Files; Papers of John D Sumner.

Note: Roger D. Lapham was a Chief administrator for the Economic Cooperation Administration, which was created by Congress to provide aid to Europe after World War II. Although not officially included in the program, China received economic aid from the United States through this agency.

- 1. In June 1937, I visited China for the first time, spending three weeks in Shanghai and Peiping. Conditions were generally good. The Chinese dollar was well stabilized and the exchange rate, Chinese \$3 to US\$1. Shanghai was then an international settlement, trade was flourishing, and everything was high, wide, and handsome save for one cloud on the horizon. Everyone expected Japan to move in. The hope was constantly expressed, "Give us a few years more to get ready". Chiang Kai-chek was at the height of his popularity, and was working hard to unify his country.
- 2. On July 7, 1937 came the incident of the Marco Polo Bridge at Peiping; followed by another in Shanghai. The Japanese invaded North China and moved toward the Yangtze. In a separate operation, Shanghai was occupied; Nanking was soon taken; and the Nationalist Government moved west to Hangkow, and later to Szechuan. Meanwhile Japan rushed preparations for a greater war; and the United States did little or nothing to check her. We refused to embargo shipments of scrap iron and other strategic materials destined Japan.
- 3. In September 1939 war broke out in Europe. Charles Lindbergh and others, including many prominent business men, preached isolationism, believing that this country did not have to become involved in a world conflict; and that whatever Hitler and Mussolini did in Europe, or Japan in Asia, was no threat to our national security. President Roosevelt knew we could not remain aloof; and much credit is due him for what he did in preparing us for the inevitable clash.

- 4. Came Pearl Harbor and the show-down. Our war efforts were concentrated on the European front and the Far East theatre necessarily took second place -- and, except at sea, a very poor second place -- during the first years of the second world conflict. China, under the Generalissimo, resisted the Japanese as best it could, with such limited help as we could give her. Germany fell in April 1945. From then on, all our resources were directed toward winning the Pacific War. Japan collapsed a few months later; and we made it easy for the Chinese to re-occupy their homeland including Manchuria and Formosa. Millions of dollars' worth of United States materials were poured into China and distributed through UNRRA, both in Chinese-Nationalist held territories and the areas held by the Chinese Communists.
- Then came 1946 with General Marshall's unsuccessful efforts to establish a coalition government in China.
- Then came 1946 with General Marshall's unsuccessful efforts to establish a coalition government in China.
- 6. I visited China again on a trip around the world in June 1947, spending two days in Shanghai. I recall an afternoon with three American business men, all of whom had been in China many years, and their pessimism with respect to China's future. At that time, US\$1 could purchase Chinese \$50,000 (a year previous, the exchange was Chinese \$2,000 to US\$1). They dwelt at great length on the many obstacles put in the way of legitimate trade by the government of Chiang Kai-chek. They thought that the only chance the Nationalist Government had to survive was temporarily to abandon North China and Manchuria, concentrate on Central and
- 6. (concluded) South China, institute immediate reforms, and build up a sound economy. When I asked what would happen if the Generalissimo died that night, their answer was, "That would make no difference. This government cannot last another six months unless aggressive and affirmative steps are taken to clean house, start reforms, and establish a sound currency. Once having established itself in Central and South China, steps could be taken to regain North China and Manchuria."

Using Source 1

Sourcing Questions	What does the title of this source reveal about its purpose? What clues in this source might lend credibility to the perspective of the author?
Contextualization Questions	What historical events are mentioned in this source? At the time of the creation of this source, what was the situation in China? This source mentions General Marshall's visit to China. Who is General Marshall and why did he visit China? Who is the Generalissimo?
Corroboration Tasks	
Close Reading Questions	What does the author say about the economic situation in China in 1949? What is the purpose of including the question: "When I asked, 'What would happen in the Generalissimo died that night?"

Source 2

Source Information: Speech by Mao Tse-tung: Our Task in 1945, Recorded in the Publication: News from Liberated China, Chinese Communist Publications file, Papers of John Patton Davies.

Note: News from Liberated China was a English-language newscast sent daily from China via morse code.

Our Task In 1945 VICE A Speech given by Mao Tao-tung before the People's Congress of the Shan-Kan-King Border Region on December 15; 1914. if if the The year 1944 will soon end, what then should be our took for 1945? What kind of work requires our special attention next year? The whole anti-fascist war has guined great victory. and the overthrow of Hitler can be achieved next year, Our sole fask is to cooperate with the Allies to overthrow the Japanese invadors. At present, the U.S. Army has already reached Loyte Island and may land in China. In the meantimes. the Japanese invaders have made through continental line front Tokio to Singapore and China's occupied territory has expanded: Will our enemy stop their offensive? I think they will still not stop. They still have the possibility of further attacking the southwest and northwart portion of our country. During this period; the Japanese invaders will certainly resort to strategemen co induce the capitulation of the Chinese government through China's capitulators. The internal state of China is still mal unified, the Kuominteng-Communist negotiations have hot atfained the least result, and the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people have been artificially split by China's reactionary group, Defeat follows defeat on regular front, but the Knomintong authorities still obstinately hold to one-party dictatorship and their defeatist policy which has aroused disasteraction of the entire nation. They reject all suggestions that are beneficial to the war of rechange, to unity and to democracy of Only the vast ardnowly created liberated areas have carried out Dr. Sun Mat-sen's revolutionary. Three Paople's Principles i.e. new damocracy, united the people of all walks, built a heroic army, and shatters! all enemy oftensives in addition to being able to

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Youths and members of verious circles should take part in goesrille warfore in the enemy occupied territory, while the broad marses should prepare to offer resistance anywhere the enemy penetrates. At the same time, liberated areas should give powerful aid to Chungking areas with their gallant fighting and through launching pertisen werlane in new territory. Every person, every patriotic party and group in Chungking controlled areas have the duty to strive for the establishment of a demy peratic coalities government. There are plready many parties and groups, industrialists, projessors, students and even Knomintang members who endorse proposal for a coelition government and consider it the only correct way at present to fight against Japanese and save Chino. But at present, the torce is not great enough, and the broad masses must be aroused to fight for this.

In occupied territories, the broad masses of people have met with ruthless oppression of the enemy and are longing for liberation. We must help them to or mise and to prepare for the ripe moment when they can rive up in arms to cooperate with the offentive of the army, and through attrak from without and support from within, drive away, the Japanese invalors and liberate our brothers and sisters. At present this task must be raised to position of equal importance as that of liberated area work. This is an extremely urgent work, and no metter how difficult, it should be done. In such work, the French Communist Party and the French people have set glorious example and we should learn from their experience. Amongst the people in occupied territory, we must explain the necessity for a democratic coalition government, so that they may know that only with the appearance of such a government will they soon be liberated, and rally them to right for such a goal.

The liberated areas have already become the centre of

Using Source 2

Sourcing Questions	Who is Mao Tse-tung? What perspective in China does he represent? What does the title of the speech reveal about its purpose? What words might describe the tone of the speech?
Contextualization Questions	By the end of 1944, what was the status of WWII in Europe? In Asia? What had World War II been like for China? Who are the Kuomintang? How are they different than the Communists?
Corroboration Tasks	What does this source reveal about the conflict in China that is not mentioned in Roger Lapham's account? Would Mao agree that China has "resisted the Japanese as best it could?"
Close Reading Questions	What does Mao say about cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communists? What does Mao say is the task of China in 1945? What words does Mao use to describe the Kuomintang in this source?

Source 3

Source Information: Memorandum from Secretary of State George Marshall to President Harry S. Truman: Attached Cable from General Wedemeyer, July 29, 1947. President's Secretary's Files - Subject File.

Note: Harry Truman dispatched General George Marshall to China in December 1945. Marshall was recalled from China in January 1947. Truman sent General A.C. Wedemeyer to China in the summer of 1947 to gather information to guide his decision-making on actions the US might take in China.

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Den of Since letter, 2/2, 7/3

By NLT-1/4C • NARS Date 6-24-75

JADE 34 July 29, 1947

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Mission arrived in China one week ago. Current conditions in the area are strikingly similar to the confused situation you depicted in your report upon departure from China last January, although unquestionably there has been serious deterioration, since, both economically and militarily. Confidence in the Government has been severely shaken due to its inability to cope with the Communist situation and to economic problems. Uniformly, we are impressed by all contacts, that drastic reforms and changes in key positions of the Government must be made, or the Generalissimo's position as President will become untenable, resulting unquestionably in his downfall.

My Mission unfortunately is considered by the Chinese at large as a panacea of all Chinese ills. We are expected to solve practically overnight, all the major critical and long existing problems of this complex area. This attitude was placed in bold relief by the categorical statement of T. V. Soong to the effect that if our Mission failed to provide timely and realistic assistance, the fall of the Chinese Government would be inevitable. There would be retrogression, warlord domination of regions or provinces and, concomitantly, Communism would spread rapidly and unabated throughout Asia.

Having noted the apathy among many chinese with whom we have come in contact, there are on the other hand, reports which would indicate excellent spirit, almost a funatical fervor, within Chinese Communist ranks. This of course can be partly attributed to their recent military successes and the booty and prizes attained thereby. However, their leaders and perhaps many in the ranks seem to believe in their cause.

I feel that the Nationalist Chinese are spiritually insolvent. They do not understand why they should die or make any sacrifices. They have lost confidence in their leaders, political and military, and they foresee complete collapse. Those in positions of responsibility are therefore corruptly striving to obtain as much as they can before the collapse. Nationalist soldiers reflecting this general attitude, simply do not want to fight and their response is increasingly apathetic and ineffective.

Using Source 3

Sourcing Questions	Why was this source created? How does General Wedemeyer describe his mission in China? What is the overall tone of this report?
Contextualization Questions	What is going on in China in 1947? What world events might explain why Truman was interested in China at this time?
Corroboration Tasks	Does Wedemeyer's description of the Nationalists (Kuomintang) and Communists fit with, or conflict with, what Mao described in 1944? Does Wedemeyer's description of the Nationalists (Kuomintang) and Communists fit with, or conflict with, what Roger Lapham described in 1949?
Close Reading Questions	How does Wedemeyer describe the Nationalists? Communists? Which group does Wedemeyer indicate is doing better at this time? How do you know? What does Wedemeyer predict will happen in China?