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Oral History Interview with
october 31, 1970
Richard D. McKinzie
ANDREWS: What became the Point IV concept started a long time before the Inaugural Address of 1949. It actually started for a different reason than we afterward contended. This was during Mr. Roosevelt's administration when we had the big drive for food and materials for defense - the defense support program. The Japs had overrun the Pacific and the Germans were overrunning Europe, and our raw materials were getting awfully thin. So the United States, in its support of Great Britain and all the rest of them, turned to Latin America--largely for hemp, cotton, oil, seeds, minerals, everything that Latin America produces. Nelson
Rockefeller was named coordinator of that program. That involved the whole business. Well, it was not very long until he discovered that sick people couldn't do very much mining of tin, and all that sort of thing. Uneducated people were even worse to deal with. Then, when the food began to get short, you soon discovered that you had to have food out of those countries too. So they organized what was then called the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (the I.I.A.A.). Nelson Rockefeller was made head of it. He set up the Institute with help--industrial help--as an educational program primarily to assist in this war effort. In the meantime, over in the Department of Agriculture, the State Department, through the Smith-Mundt fund, was asked to take on a bunch of technical assistance programs in Latin America to increase food production. These ran separate from the I.I.A.A. I was never quite pleased with that deal, but anyhow that was done. What actually happened was, the first thing you knew you were running two diametrically opposed, differently operated programs.
MCKINZIE: Even during the war?
ANDREWS: Oh yes. And what happened was that in order to control the money and in order to really keep the stuff under control (I'm not criticizing it as such), we set up what they called the "Servicio." The Servicio implied a Latin American and an American, and an international staff that went right down through to the bottom. But the Americans had the money. Which meant that everything the Servicio did had to have the approval of the Americans. The result was that the Americans pretty well brushed aside anything that the Latins wanted and set up our programs, instead. They were good programs, and they made fine showplaces because you had it absolutely under control. You set up machinery stations, and potato warehouses and all sorts of things, and it looked good. On the other hand, the Department insisted on going a slow route in research and extension. And so we would research a subject and then try to train extension workers. Those two programs ran for about eight years and they
were small. I think around five or ten million dollars was all that went into Latin America.
When Mr. Truman made his inaugural address, all that came about was that he had said that we had to do something for the underdeveloped countries, the countries that were becoming new nations. He told his speechwriting staff to dig something up on that. The speechwriters began to scurry around about what the hell to have. And they come over to Agriculture and they went over to IIAA and everything else. Ben Hardy on the IIAA public affairs staff made a proposal for technical aid that was inserted in the President's address. When he made it, the State Department was caught flatfooted. They didn't have the faintest idea in terms of a program or anything else. So the bureaucracy began to debate on what in the hell this all means, and who would run it.
The rivalry was between USDA and IIAA to take over the show--that's the truth. In the meantime then the State Department turned over $150,000 to Charlie Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, and
Brannan told me to get on a bicycle and go around the world and see what one could work up in terms of a pilot program to give some pattern when the big deal went into operation. So, I took off and the first place I stopped was in Egypt. I called on the Social Welfare Minister and the Agriculture Minister. Education in Egypt was under Social Welfare. My pitch was: "The United States is thinking about a program for the underdeveloped countries and what are the needs in your country that you think the United States might help you on? We had two big ideas. One, the Minister of Agriculture wanted to establish a state dairy farm--state demonstration dairy farm. They wanted to increase the production of milk in the Nile Delta and for good reason. And the other one was the Aswan Dam. They wanted to do something about that. I found out, first, that the Agriculture Minister wanted to make his big 1600 acre Nile Delta farm the dairy demonstration farm. This meant that we'd put the money in that thing to make his farm larger. I didn't buy that. But I
did take it down; we could only make note of the Aswan Dam.
I went on to Thailand, and sat down with the same ministers, agriculture and education. I found some people in Thailand who had been educated in the United States. One, the Minister of Agriculture, was a graduate of Cornell. In those days and still to some extent you've got to go through a ritual. You come into town and make your presence known to the government and you say what you want. Well, they set you up an appointment at say 3 o'clock in the afternoon. You go in and then meet the minister. He claps his hands and a servant brings in tea and you drink tea. And you start to talk. You have a lot of pleasantries, talk about families and the world at large, and the first thing you know the time is gone. He says, "At 10 o'clock tomorrow." So you go back at 10 o'clock the next day. The same routine occurs, and you begin then to get around to maybe what you want to talk about. By the third day they begin to tell you what they want and you get down to the business of your mission.
Well, they were very modest. The Minister said, "We're very proud of our rice. Thirty years ago our rice won the blue ribbon at the Calgary Cereals Fair, but we have not infused any new varieties or anything into it. Our production is going down and we want some work on rice. We've got to have an agriculture education system. Our education here is classical, Buddhaism and this. And we want somebody to help us on creating maybe an agricultural college. In the beginning we want them to do some experimentation on fertilizer. We haven't been able to use fertilizer successfully on our rice."
"Well," I said, "that's very modest; have you got any suggestions on the kinds of people you'd like to have?"
He said, "Yes, we do. There are two people in the United States that know us and we know them and we'd sure like to have them."
And I said, "Who are they?"
"Well," he said, "they are Dr. Love and Dr. Pendleton of Cornell." Love was in China on a long assignment with Cornell, and Dr. Pendleton was a
missionary in China and worked with Thailand and he knows our people. "We think they're still at Cornell. They're both elderly people."
In those days one could move. I wired Secretary Brannan that night and I said, "Contact Cornell, get ahold of Dr. Love and Dr. Pendleton and see if they can be jarred loose to come to Thailand immediately."
Mr. Brannan got into action; Ross Moore at OPAR took the ball, got in touch with Cornell, and by golly, within two weeks they were out there. We had a hell of a time getting them by--Dr. Love was 72 years old and Dr. Pendleton was 63--because of their age. But they were very vigorous people. We had to get all kinds of exemptions.
Dr. Love and Pendleton went out there and went to work. They started right now and started at the grassroots with young people, and I'11 not go into that business. Something really fine came out of that.
Then I went up to Burma. And Burma at that time had just become free and sovereign with a new
government. The first cabinet meeting had met without the astrologer's advice; some guy threw a bomb and killed the cabinet. There was practically no cabinet left. U N was the Acting Prime Minister. I talked with them and again they were also very modest. They said, "We're a socialist state, but we do realize that the socialist state cannot do everything. And we're looking for some sort of a compromise between socialism and capitalism. We think the coop idea is good, so what we'd like to have is some people out here who could help us in setting up coops, particularly rural coops. I found in the Ministry of Agriculture a graduate of Wisconsin University; I found also that he had spent a year at Crowley, Louisiana studying rice production and marketing. So I said, "All right, we'll see what we can do and get you somebody."
Next stop was the Philippines. The Philippines at that time had become independent. And I put the same story to them. "Well," they said, "we're new and we've been under the benign rule of you people all these years and we've followed American
methods and adopted many of your ways."
And I said, "Well, what do you think?"
"We believe we need an extension service, something like your extension service. And on top of that we have a very serious mosaic disease that's destroying our henequin fibers. Can you do something about that
I said, "I'll see."
Again I was able to act quickly. I got hold of USDA and a chap by the name of Hapler was sent out there who went to work with them getting an extension law through the legislature. And I got a guy from Cornell who was a world authority on mosaic disease and had him out there pronto. Four pilot programs were in being and were running rather quickly.
At about this time legislation to legalize the Point IV program got through Congress. It just barely did squeak through. It had open opposition from Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. The State Department in theory was supposed to carry the ball on the
legislation. But Willard Thorp, State Department man, didn't have the faintest idea what it was all about. Finally in desperation, Brannan of Agriculture was asked to come before the House Ways and Means Committee and explain what this was all about. And I went along with Brannan and I was able to pick up after Brannan made his pitch. I explained some of the kinds of programs that the Philippines wanted. One Congressman said, "Well, my God," he says, "we've been having hearings here for two weeks and you're the first guy that has ever told us what the hell it is all about."
MCKINZIE: Well, I was going to ask you when you made this pilot study, when you made this tour of Egypt and Burma and Thailand and Philippines, did you tell them at the time that there could be no industrial programs? Was that an issue? Underdeveloped countries, a lot of them, wanted to have steel mills and that sort of thing.
ANDREWS: No, the only place an industry program hit us was in Egypt, the Aswan Dam. The Egyptians hit
us right hard on that. And the Thais wanted Dr. Pendleton to make some investigations on fertilizer with a view of maybe sometime establishing a plant. But that's all it was. And not a thing on any industrialization at this point. Maybe my initial contacts were too narrow.
The State Department's high officials decided that they had to make at least four countries in Asia so-called strategic areas and entitled to a greater assistance than the Point IV program visualized. This would to some extent include industrialization, and rebuilding of roads and harbors and war reconstruction.
The Griffin mission involved a newspaper publisher from California who was sent out with Sam Hayes of the State Department, along with a bunch of other people. They went around Asia. They picked Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia as the so-called special treatment countries which would be a Marshall plan type of infusion of capital, rather than the so-called technical assistance.
They took us out of those countries and the other little programs. In Thailand the original
agriculture programs went right ahead though. Old Dr. Love stayed there for, I guess eight or ten years. He created a miracle there; it's just fantastic. And Dr. Pendleton remained six years. Then that left Point IV with about forty countries. We finally got an appropriation through and then began the fight about who was going to run it and how. Willard Thorp normally was a fellow who would be the overseer in State. Les Wheeler, who used to be in OFAR, was his assistant and was in charge of the actual Point IV coordination. Les didn't get anywhere. The war between IIAA, USDA and the Marshall plan brought on a lot of confusions. There was a virtual stalemate.
Finally, President Truman called in an ambassador from Guatamala, I forgot his name, and he tried to develop some agricultural programs. The bureaucratic struggle had him dizzy morning, noon, and night. This ambassador resigned. President Truman appointed Dr. Henry Bennett, of Oklahoma State University, to the job of real administration, to head the Point IV program as an independent unit in State. We'd
gotten the legislation through and had set up the Technical Cooperation Administration. Dr. Bennett was a very simple fellow and a very plain guy. He could handle Congress and he could handle almost anybody. He was to some extent scared of this deal because there was pressure all the time for more and more money. Some of the State Department people wanted to pour in a lot of money as did the Marshall plan people. It was finally then decided to consolidate military, Point IV and Marshall plan under Harriman, as head of the Mutual Security Administration--combining three agencies. In the meantime the struggle over methods continued between the USDA and the IIAA on the concept of how we would operate. Then we had the war on between the Technical Cooperation Administration and the Economic Cooperation Administration or the Marshall plan boys. ECA had set up an organization chart to handle TCA through the Marshall plan administration. That was another battle and Dr. Bennett was having one hell of a time.
I had worked with Dr. Bennett for twenty years and I was head of OFAR at the time. He often came over in the Department of Agriculture, and tried to work out things, and almost every afternoon he'd call me up and say, "Stanley, how'd you like to have some coffee?"
And I said, "Well, I'd like to have some coffee."
He said, "Meet me at the roof of the Washington Hotel."
I'd go over there and we'd sit until sunset really trying to figure out how we could work a program out of all the mess.
MCKINZIE: This was after they had passed the authorization for the TCA, but before they actually had anything going in the field. Had a little bit of money, authorization, but no program.
.ANDREWS: In the meantime we began to send out groups of people, about three or four, to various countries and they would do what I tried to do on my original trip, find out what each country felt it needed.
For instance they sat down with the King of Saudi Arabia, and said, "Now, sir, what do you think that might work out here?" Most of the original Point IV programs were promulgated and were actually developed that way. When the appropriations came through, the ambassadors were given the leeway to make representations that this sort of aid was available to these countries. The ambassadors seeing that maybe this would make some political hay, sometimes oversold Point IV and made us a lot of trouble. They made a lot of promises which we couldn't carry out. Anyhow, that was the way the thing was done.
The organization that was finally put together was made up of castoffs from the other bureaus. Dr. Bennett was about the only new guy in it. The rest of them were the Interior Department, Agriculture Department, the Treasury, the Budget Bureau and Public Health. In some cases the Department dumped their surplus over to us. I was still in the Department of Agriculture, where a portion of the Latin American program was
administered. We finally got a little organization; I think it had less than 300 people set up. And so Doc said, "Well, Stanley, we've got a lot of stuff here on paper, but what have we got in the field?"
"Well," I said, "I don't know."
"This authorization has given us 50 million dollars for India. I don't know how to spend 50 million dollars. I believe you know how to spend it. So, I want you to take a minister's rank and go to India and administer the Indian program."
"Well," I said, "damn it Doc, I have been three years and nine months in Military Government. I've been away from my family and I think I've done my share."
He said, "This is something pretty big."
I said, "Unless I'm ordered, I'11 not go. On top of that, I don't want any damned minister's rank."
He said, "Stanley, you need that."
I said, "Hell, I was a lieutenant colonel in Military Government; I could outtalk General Clay and
I can outtalk these ambassadors."
"You know," he said, "I want you to have elbow room. Now you know John Tolbert out in Oklahoma. old John is a great poker player and he chaws a lot of tobacco. I was over at Oklahoma City one morning about sunup and walking along the street and old John came out of the Skirnin Hotel. He just looked like he'd been drug through a sewer--and I said, 'John, what in the hell has happened to you?' He had tobacco spit all over his pants and all over the front of his shirt. He was just a terrible mess. "Well," he says, "You know, Henry, I like to play a little poker. I come in here last night and the boys they kinda laid for me; we played poker all night. This was so damn tough I couldn't turn my head to spit. And," Doc said, "I want you to have a rank where you can turn your head and spit."
At that time I had been assigned as head of the delegation to the FAO meeting in Rome and Doc Bennett said, "I'm going to go out, see what we've got in terms of program."
I said, "Well, let's meet in Rome. I'm going to be in Rome (I had to go over there for a couple of weeks ahead of the PAO meeting) to a World Food Council meeting."
Doc and his top staff, Ben Hardy and the five or six others flew into Rome. We got Doc before the PAO, got him on CBS radio. He knocked them over; he really went to town, with a simple direct statement on what Point IV hoped to accomplish.
We also got Dean Acheson before the session. At that time Acheson made one of these famous off-the-cuff speeches, "There's no politics in food, and I would welcome the Eastern European people to take part in PAO." That was quite sensational at the time.
Dr. Bennett wanted me to go with him on this trip. I told him in the first place I had been sitting here for two weeks listening to people talk and I'm so damned tired of doubletalk that I want to go home to kick a clod, if nothing else. I just don't want to go along."
He said, "Meet me over at the Grand Hotel in the morning for breakfast." He was going to
take off that afternoon. So we went up to breakfast, and he again brought up the trip around the Mideast.
I said, "There are several reasons why I won't go. One is what I told you yesterday; I'm so tired of this sort of business that I just got to get out and kind of get squared out and earthy again. And the other is that you ride on most any damn old plane that will run. And I just don't like to ride the kind of planes you like to ride." He had ridden a plane earlier from Ethiopia over an hour to Jordan, one of these Cessna jobs where the pilot had to put gas in it as they flew in the air. And I said, "I just don't ride that kind of an outfit."
"Well," Doc said, "Stanley, you know when a fellow's time comes you're going to go anyhow."
I said, "Yeah, that's right Doc, but he might call you when I was not ready." We parted on that note. His party took off with their final stop in Beirut, Lebanon. Then over to Jordan and ending up in Iran. He took off in a plane out of Iran, a DC-4 with a pilot who had never been checked out on a night landing. There weren't any instruments
at the Teheran airport; there was equipment there, but there wasn't a man in Iran that could run it. They arrived in a snowstorm and on a turn into the runway it crashed. The whole party died right there. Everything that Doc Bennett had promised or developed, in these countries that he had met up to then, died with him. There wasn't a record or anything. Just some sketchy stuff that some of the fellows had sent in to Washington without any idea of a report.
This happened at Christmastime and I was down in Arkansas hunting ducks; I always go down there every year until recently to hunt ducks. I got a telephone call from Mr. Brannan. He said, "Get in here as quick as you can. The State Department wants to see you. There are some things going on here that I want to check you on."
I said, "I'll drive in just as quick as we can."
On arrival I went in to see Brannan. The State Department wants to borrow you to handle Point IV until they get an administrator. I went
over to State and into the office of James Webb, Under Secretary of State. His pitch was simple. The death of Dr. Bennett and his immediate staff had thrown the whole program out of gear. Not only was there confusion in the field on just what the situation was but State was preparing to go before Congress for its next appropriation and very little was known just what the congressional presentation would involve. Jonathan Bingham had just come in as deputy to Dr. Bennett but he had hardly gotten settled in his chair. Dr. Bennett had left a memo instructing the staff to prepare a budget for a rather simple and slow moving program modestly financed to support the prospective projects that had been set up in some 29 countries. Since I had worked with Dr. Bennett on the development of the overall concept of what Point IV would do I was requested to go out and pick up where he left off and make a general survey of the situation in each of these countries in preparation for the hearings that were to soon begin on the 1953 fiscal budget.
In a matter of hours I was on the way with Dale Clark, one of the assistants in the Middle East division of the then Point IV organization set-up. Since none of the promises or comments of Dr. Bennett's visit to the first three countries in the Middle East had been sent to Washington, I started with his first stop out of Rome--Lebanon. On arrival in Lebanon I was greeted with quite a display of protocol. Our Ambassador was out with greetings and transportation--several Lebanese officials were at the red carpet greeting at the airport. We were whisked to the Embassy where we were briefed on the situation and given our itinerary for meeting the various ministers and officials in Lebanon. This turned out to be a rat race. From about 4 in the afternoon until 10 o'clock at night we met variously with the President of Lebanon, the speaker of the house of representatives, the Vice President, the Minister of Reconstruction, the Minister of Agriculture, the Prime Ministers and a host of others, it seemed, in never ending rounds of fleeting contacts.
In each meeting the Mideast protocol was followed. After greeting and sitting down at a table, that black syrupy Arabian coffee was served--sometimes with a lemon rind tea as a chaser. Before the evening was over I was literally groggy and thankful that the Arabs as a rule do not serve or drink alcoholic beverages. On the following day we began serious discussions with the technical ministers on what they felt Point IV might do in Lebanon and particularly what Dr. Bennett had promised or told them. There was something of a different version of what Dr. Bennett had said among the various groups, but when asked what Dr. Bennett promised, we got the reply, "He told us that he was going to try to help us on the Litani."
I said, "What is the Litani?"
South of Beirut, the Litani River rises in Mt. Hermon, a snow-capped mountain section. For 5,000 years it has flowed down through a limestone gorge very much like the Grand Canyon except not as large, onto the Balbec Plain, where the Romans used to have the great bread basket. "We want to build a
dam to hold the water for irrigation," they said.
I said, "What's this dam going to cost?"
They said, "It's estimated it will cost 30 million dollars."
I took that one under note and then I said, "Anything else?"
"We want to pipe water up to a residential and a tourist section up on the side of Mount Hermon. It's fine ski slopes. We want to build a road and install a water system up there."
I said, "What's that going to cost?"
"'It will cost 6 million."
Finally when we got around to the final conference, I had to tell them, "In the first place, we don't have that kind of money. We only got less than a hundred million for all of the Mideast and Asia."
I advised the Lebanese group, the Minister of Construction, the Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Social Welfare, that our program didn't visualize financing development projects of a resort nature at that time, and we didn't have 30 million dollars
to put into Litani. What I could do, I could allocate on the spot the necessary money to make a study of this gorge and to conduct borings to find out whether a dam would hold if it was put here. We might also develop the necessary economic and engineering studies to see whether the development were feasible.
They said, "How quick can you do that?"
I said, "I'll have people out here in two weeks."
I allocated on the spot 800 thousand dollars and wired the Department of Interior to send their water, irrigation and dam construction engineers out there. It was a good psychological thing. When the U.S. engineer and survey group arrived we put them in tents right on that gorge. The people could see that. The group developed three things. One, what is the nature of the base? Will it hold water or will it break out into limestone caverns? Second, where should it be located? Third, the flow. How much water flows in it and what, how much will it irrigate? Finally the
economic feasibility of using the water that flows out of the dam for electric power was studied. It took this group two years to do it, but when you had that done you had a complete picture to lay before any banker or finance agency for credit. It was placed before the International Bank.
The International Bank informally estimated they could loan around 35 million dollars on that deal. I made a U.S. commitment, "We will try to put in the sweetener if you have to have a little more money, but we want you people to put in some money."
They didn't know whether they could do that or not. There was opposition from the French. The French owned the power monopoly. And they controlled the power into Lebanon and all the cities. They were afraid this dam producing power would knock them out of business. It got into the Parliament--quite a fight about it.
This project was moving forward in a very effective way when the Eisenhower administration came in. And Mr. Stassen fired the country
directors in all of the Middle East countries. The project floundered for years and years. We didn't put anymore money into it. It was finally picked up by the World Bank and in the meantime the Lebanese got excited about it and put 20 million of their own money in it.
To make a long story short, just five years ago the first water went through the dam and down to the Balbec Plain. The water flows through a conduit under the mountain and over into another part of Lebanon. The Litani project is a showplace as well as a great economic resource.
It's now a big deal. It was started with nothing except the feasibility idea. Getting back now to where we were with these surveys. The purpose of these surveys was to fix up a program we could justify the appropriations upon. Still nobody was settled on what we were trying to do. There was still the fight with IIAA on the Servicio technique. There was still the fight with Marshall plan people. They wanted to take over. When the Mutual Security Act was originally introduced in
Congress, it made a broad sweep about foreign aid, but did not even mention Point IV. And so Dr. Bennett came to me and said, "My God, Stanley, we're out. Without a title designating the Technical Cooperation Administration as a part of this bill, we haven't got anything; we're gone and the Marshall plan takes over. The boys made a pretty shrewd move there on the bill." [Mutual Security Act set up three separate programs--TCA, Marshall plan and Military Aid under a director of Mutual Security--Mr. Harriman became the director. It was non-administrative but with authority to shift funds between the various agencies on proper justification.]
I said, "What do you want Doc?"
He said, "We've got to have a title in that bill,"
I said, "Well, will you fix up the title you want and I'11 go over to Senator Fulbright and talk to him about it." We fixed up a title to be inserted in the bill and I went over to Senator Fulbright and told him the same. "I don't know if you know it or not, but this bill that's before your committee doesn't even have Dr. Bennett's organization or program in it at all. It's completely out."
He said, "I didn't know that." He asked that we fix up a title to be inserted.
"I took my piece of paper out of my pocket, and handed it to him. He put it in his pocket,
and went over that afternoon to the Foreign Relations Committee and inserted this new language, and Point IV was born. That's just how close we came to getting left out."
After that was done we did have a title, and a right to exist and a mission to perform. How are you going to perform it? Lot of people in the State Department and the people almost to a man, in the Marshall plan, felt that the only way to do this was to infuse massive amounts of capital. Dr. Bennett argued that you couldn't, that the countries couldn't spend the money even if they had it and do it wisely. And so it eventually worked down with the 100 million dollar appropriation, and our program was going to be on the basis of an attack at the grass-root level on the three basic needs of mankind; food, health and education. In the industrial area we could put up capital for demonstration processing plants and not major development. We did put a lot of small demonstration plants in. So that's where we started and we were looking for a name all the time.
And finally Delia Kuhn, who was our public affairs girl in Dr. Bennett's office said, "let's call it Point IV because this is Mr. Truman's deal."
That's where the Point IV business came in. Technical Cooperation Administration was the legal name, but it went by Point IV. Still the issue wasn't settled. You had people in the State Department that were pressing all the time for more and more money and for more and more of what I call building shit houses that you can see instead of slow educational patient work.
It got so bad the whole State Department and the Marshall plan and Point IV were so mixed up, we had to make some resolution, so we went to Mr. Truman at the White House and asked him to give us some guidance.
MCKINZIE: Who's we?
ANDREWS: Well, Dr. Bennett was the real boss. I had known and worked with him on rural problems when he was at Oklahoma State and I was a farm editor in Arkansas for twenty years. Since the major
agricultural programs in Latin America were being handled by USDA through the OFAR which I headed I sat in with him on many sessions trying to work out some sort of a program which could be carried out with our resources and which would meet the approval of the American people. As in all bureaucratic wrangles, and Point IV was no exception, save possibly it went on longer than some of the others, somebody, some time has to crack the whip. Mr. Truman had directed the State Department to call in representatives of other relevant agencies, Agriculture, Public Health, Interior, Commerce and bureaus in Commerce to work out a program. It was quite a conglomeration and most management people argued that any system based on such a wide variety of interests was bound to fail. Since nobody seemed to know just what was involved in the final hammering out of what we were to do, it was mutually agreed that we should go to the White House and present the various views. This was done before Mr. Truman in the Cabinet Room. State Department, Marshall plan and others all had
their say on what kind of a program we should undertake in this new venture. Dr. Bennett made his presentation last. Armed with a sheaf of telegrams and letters from church organizations, country bankers, educational groups and farm organizations, he turned to the globe which Mr. Truman always had around his office and the Cabinet Room and briefly sketched out what he thought were the greatest needs of the new nations at that time emerging in the world as the outcome of World War II. He had been to Ethiopia in the summer before he was appointed administrator and had looked over the marvelous natural resources of that African nation, steeped in poverty, disease and hunger. He argued quite persuasively what a down-to-earth pr