Oral History Interview with
Assistant Secretary of the Interior, 1933-46; Under Secretary
of the Interior, 1946-49; Secretary of the Interior, 1949-53.
Oscar L. Chapman
January 12, 1973
Jerry N. Hess
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Transcript | Additional Chapman Oral History
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry
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but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember
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Harry S. Truman Library
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Oral History Interview with
Oscar L. Chapman
January 12, 1973
Jerry N. Hess
HESS: To begin this morning, Mr. Chapman, Mr. Truman has passed away
since our last interview, his death occurring on December the 26th. And
a week ago today at Washington Cathedral, you and I were both present
at the memorial service held for him. Let's spend a few moments this morning
with reminiscences. What went through your mind during Mr. Truman's last
few days, and when you heard of his death, and perhaps what are your favorite
memories of Mr. Truman?
CHAPMAN: Naturally, when the news came to me of his death I was very
shocked and very grieved, more so than for any public official I ever
had the privilege of being associated with. Mr. Truman, as he has passed
on, and the reminiscence by the news media and the press and the other
publications have all, practically all, have given him a better setting
in his place in history than anyone ever dreamed
that he would have--at
least his enemies certainly thought he would never have it. But there's
never been a man in public life that has gained recognition so fast in
the last couple of years of his life, and has gained such stature in the
minds of the people of America and the people of the world. You combine
the two together. I've never seen a man that had a public career so interlinked
with his foreign policies. That was the continuing growth and strength
of the man's work and his character and everything.
You could see it develop in your mind's eye as you sat there and listened
to that sermon, to the comments by the dean. And I was naturally very
touched by these things, because they brought to my memory many of the
fine things that Mr. Truman did for which he never got credit at
the time of the action that he took on certain subjects. And one particular
one that I have to clarify in my thinking on this, is his help in pushing
through the civil rights program that
was so wide and extensive, so much
greater than--people who were working on it didn't realize how far-reaching
that program carried the whole principle of human rights, and the care
and attention that he had given to that subject, and to which he had given
so much thought. He knew the subject so well. The problems that were encompassed
in this whole subject were so far greater than, really, many of his people
who worked close with him realized. Some who worked close to him never
did catch the significance of the far-reaching effect of what he had done.
Most of them had, but there were a few who didn't quite catch the strong
significance of his efforts, of what he was doing. They got it and they
got it in a fine way; they got it through contact, of visiting with Mr.
Truman, just as we are visiting here this morning, and talking.
Mr. Truman was a man that wasted no words. When he had a conference with
you about something that he wanted to talk about, that he had
on his mind,
like the civil rights issue, of the whole human rights problem as we think
of it today, he had so expanded that and studied it and had it so well
briefed in his mind that he could talk with a man about it in the most
minute detail, of where the injustices had begun, and where they continued,
and where they were still continuing as of today.
To bring that point to a head, he was a man that when he made a decision
he didn't worry about it. He had done the best he could to get the best
information he could on the subject matter before he made his decision.
There's where most people didn't understand him. He did that. He made
a very cautious study of the subject matter before he made a decision
on something that was very vital and important. Something comparable to
the recognition of Israel as a state was so well thought out by him that
he caught the reactions of the different ones of us who talked with him;
he knew those who were brought to the forefront in this fight in many
ways. Some came by way of--
if I were putting it in religious terms, I
would say by expression of faith and a new development of the relationship
between ourselves. Putting it in the phraseology of the man on the street
we would say that we learn to live together, and we had to learn
to live together or we will not survive.
That is true, not only of the Jewish people, it's true in several other
areas of the world; that's still ahead of us to be worked out. Mr. Truman
was working on that phase of his problem, of that kind of a problem arising
from another group of ethnic people, of how they lived, and how they worked
with their fellow man.
The Jewish thing was close at hand to him; he knew the Jewish people
so well, and he had worked closely with them. He had always been sympathetic
to the fact that the Jewish people had been persecuted so many times during
the course of history, that they had taken such a terrific abuse in their
daily living, that he saw what they had gone through, and he had a
deep sympathy for them and the problems that they had faced.
Now, I try to bring this together to tell you that is one of the reasons
why Truman was so recognized in his later years, differentiating from
his early years while he was in active duty; and they didn't give him
the recognition, the press, the other media for public communications,
never gave him a proper place in history in their comments and in their
thinking about Mr. Truman. And that is why they missed it. They missed
this phase of Mr. Truman in their thinking about him, because Mr. Truman,
as I said, wasted no words or time, or anything, but he would go straight
to the point in his conference, whatever the subject was, and discuss
the subject immediately from the heart and the core of the subject, and
discuss it with you in a very quick manner like that; he'd do it in a
very quick manner.
Now, he's a man that had a very deep sympathy for people. That was not
known generally to the public as a whole until in the latter years they
began to recognize his greatness. I began to see that they were
recognizing it in his latter years, his last two or three years in office.
He was beginning to be recognized then as a man of great stature, as a
man that made a decision, and that he had made it on such solid grounds.
It was based upon solid information so he didn't have to change his position
or make any changes in his position during the course of that time, because
he had done so much more studying of this subject than people ever dreamed
that he had done.
I know that you know these things, because of your fine relationship
with the President's family, and I appreciate your knowledge of them that
you would easily catch how what I'm saying is connected with the facts,
life as it developed during those eight years, almost eight, that he had
Another thing he did to go through and support
his particular position
that he was taking on a special issue--I'll use the Israel subject as
an example that will bring us closer to the point. In that case there
were many differences among people close to him; they didn't agree entirely
with the question of how the Israel thing was handled. Some didn't think
that we ought to recognize them. Those who didn't want to recognize them
were not motivated by any prejudice against the Jewish people. Their feeling
about it was thought out and based upon other reasons involving their
desire to protect the interests of the United States and the American
HESS: In a recent interview we were discussing Dean Acheson; what was
Mr. Acheson's views on this matter?
CHAPMAN: I'm just coming to that.
CHAPMAN: I'm just coming to that now, because he was so important in
this and being such a thoughtful man in return; he was a brilliant man,
and when he gave you a position on something, a statement on an issue
of this importance, he had given some careful study and thinking about
what and how this ought to be done.
I never had a chance to discuss this very much with Mr. Acheson, for
which I was very sorry. I wanted to and the opportunity just didn't get
around to where we could spend some time on it. Mr. Acheson worked out
in his own mind, and for his own reasons which he supported, why the United
States should not recognize Israel at this time. First, he had an approach
that I think was a little bit unsound. From the long range point of view,
it was a little unsound, where he really believed that we had had the
habit of following the English people so much that we would be following
them in this case instead of leading, and he felt we shouldn't appear
to the world that we were following England
because she was doing this;
and that we ought to steer our own course, map our own course, and state
it to the world as to our position, and not to recognize Israel per
se as a state. And he felt very deeply about it--it wasn't just
a casual passing with him--he felt rather deeply about it, I think, and
I give him credit as being a man of deep sincerity and honesty. He felt
this was wrong for the American people and its future to continue the
course we had been apparently following. According to his thinking at
least, we had been following the British policy trends for a long time.
Certainly he was thinking it out in that direction far more than was actually
true. I don't think it was actually as clear as that, or as factual as
he put it, in those terms, to them. I don't think it ever met that test,
that we followed the English in that sense.
HESS: Do you think that the fact that the oil producing lands in the
area were mostly controlled and owned by the Arabs had any influence on Mr.
Achesons views on the non-recognition of the new State of Israel?
CHAPMAN: Well, now when you mention the oil you bring up another subject,
that is so powerful in its influence of the American position in the Middle
East, and what we did or did not do in that area. Dean felt, based upon
his knowledge, that the supply of the oil to the world was so heavily
bearing in the hands of the Arab people, that it could cause us unnecessary
trouble in the future, and one that would be extremely damaging
to us in our relationship with the rest of the Arab world, all the rest
of it, and their friends.
I did not think that the oil situation had as much influence on the world
picture as our oil boys over here thought, or as a lot of American
people thought. I don't think it had the influence that they thought it
had, because since that time we have made many discoveries that have brought in
new oil fields that will help us for a hundred years or more.
HESS: We still rely quite heavily on the oil producing nations though,
do we not, the Arab nations?
CHAPMAN: We do, but that's a very well thought out plan; let's use their
oil first, as long as we can.
HESS: And then use our own resources.
CHAPMAN: And then use ours when we have to. You see...
HESS: Was that thought articulated during the Truman administration?
CHAPMAN: Not too much, not too much. It was not articulated too much.
However, I had one good discussion on it.
HESS: With whom?
CHAPMAN: With the President.
HESS: With the President. What did he say?
CHAPMAN: He agreed with me part of the way on that. He thought that I
was probably leaning too far on the--putting too much hope, putting too
CHAPMAN: Let's say that I was putting too much stress in my discussions
about their power that they would have in relation to this whole
thing, if they had done this. Otherwise, he didn't agree exactly 100 percent
with my position on what we would do and what would happen if we did it,
you see; and he didn't agree with Dean's position on the precedent, because
Dean was being right out openly opposed to the program of recognizing
Israel, and Dean was a very cautious man. He was a typically trained and
developed State Department man.
HESS: Did he think that if we did recognize Israel that it might shut
off the oil flow from some of the Arab nations?
CHAPMAN: He did; he did very definitely. He felt that could happen in
a very short time after the action was taken. He didn't allow any time
element to evolve there; he thought it would be taken immediately by the
Arab nations and the friends of the Arabs.
HESS: What did Mr. Truman say when Mr. Acheson would give those views?
CHAPMAN: As I told you in the beginning, he never wasted any words in
a conference, and when he had his views made up on an issue that touched
upon human rights and the needs of human beings to have and need certain
things in life, he didn't hesitate to speak very quickly and very frankly,
and he told Dean--I wouldn't say he did this in my presence, because what
he did, he talked to Dean on the telephone out at his farm between 4 and
4:30 in the afternoon, as we got...
HESS: On the day of recognition?
CHAPMAN: Yes, on the day of recognition, and as we had come in on the
train trip, the Western trip, the 10th of May we got in here I think;
at least that date of recognition would give you the day that we got back
into the city from the Western trip.
HESS: From the Western trip in June of '48.
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: But he phoned Mr. Acheson at Mr. Acheson's farm, is that right?
CHAPMAN: He phoned him out at his house and said, "Dean"--now, the President
tells me this...
HESS: Had you also heard the same thing from Mr. Acheson?
CHAPMAN: Not all of it, but parts of it. Parts of it; Dean was very cautious
about ever quoting what he was saying. He was probably more cautious than
I am about quoting the President.
HESS: So, you learned more of this from the President than you did from
CHAPMAN: I did.
HESS: What did the President tell you?
CHAPMAN: Well, he related to me his conversation with Dean that he had
over the telephone, which was more revealing than anything else that I
had had anyplace.
HESS: What did he say?
CHAPMAN: Remember in my last interview--I think it was the last or next
to it--I told you of the conference that Clark Clifford and I had had
with the President on the train, and it was done so quietly and so--nobody
knew a thing about it because we didn't discuss it, neither of us discussed
that to anyone. Now, there was a reception; I think the Democratic Women's
Club was giving a reception for Mrs. Truman and the
President over at
the Mayflower Hotel at 6 o'clock that night, and as I said, we were getting
off of the train at 4 or 4:30 and he drove straight to the White House
and right to the phone and called Dean. When he got over to the reception
all of us were mixing around. So, he walked up to me and with a good big
smile on his face--"Well," he said, "you ought to be happy." He said,
"I signed it within fifteen minutes after they declared the State of Israel.
I have signed the appropriate communications, to the officials of the
State of Israel."
And I said, "You're going to have some problems with my friend, I'm afraid,
"No," he said, "that fellow even works with your friend; he knew we had
an honest difference of opinion about this. Having that honest difference
of opinion he recognized my right to my opinion as he did his, and in
this case I didn't agree with him."
HESS: He had phoned Mr. Acheson, though, before signing the recognition.
CHAPMAN: He phoned him to say to him--Dean says, "I'll come right in."
Now the President tells me all this. He says, "Mr. President, I'll be
right in to prepare the wire right away."
He said, "Oh, don't go to all that trouble." He said, "The boys here
know enough about that to do it." He said, "I'll get some of the boys
to draft it here and we'll send it out." And he had Charlie Murphy and
Clark Clifford in mind to help draft it, I know. From the way he talked
that's what he had in mind. And he said, "No, Dean, don't bother with
coming in; it's a long way in here and it's late," and he said, "You shouldn't
bother about doing it and I don't want you to go to that trouble." And
he said, "You won't like my position on that anyhow, and maybe it's just
as well you don't bother with it, just let it go."
Dean said, "Well, I'll be very glad to come in and do it for you the
way you want it, just what you want. I know Mr. President I don't agree
with you; as to the future I'm afraid that we will pay for it during my
The President told him, "I dont agree with you, Dean, that this
will happen. I dont believe it will happen that way you think it will,
and I dont put the same emphasis of power in the hands of the Arab people
because of the oil that you do."
Now, I caught that in my talks with Mr. Truman that Dean didn't quite
put the power in their hands that they thought they had; he didn't presume
they had that much power, or would have, because of the production of
Now, you see, when you open up a big oil field, and you strike a big
field, and you got a fabulous flow of oil, you bring that oil up very
fast; it comes out very fast, and it produces from that field clear out
of proportion to the amount of oil that's being used to the amount of
oil that's being produced. It's out of proportion to it, and if you're
a small country and you hit a pool of oil, before you know it that pool
of oil has sunk to a very low production level. In going through the reviews
of all these fields, you've got the most conservative minds and you've
got very liberal minds among the geologists. Describing the difference
between a liberal point of view in a geologist and a conservative one
may be simply illustrated. Mr. DeGolyer is, I think, one of the greatest
geologists in the world, on oil and gas. I think he was absolutely the
leading man in his field. Mr. DeGolyer was a conservative thinker in making
his reports and in commenting upon his finding of fact on this particular
field that he has surveyed. You will find that he has made a more conservative
evaluation of that field than some people have ever thought that he would
do. But I had
known Mr. DeGolyer almost as long as his son-in-law, George
McGhee, had known him. I had known Mr. DeGolyer for many years, and I
saw his work. I saw how he translated his evaluation of a field, on a
given field; how he gave the evaluation of that field differently from
what another man over here would. For instance, Bob Nathan--he's not a
geologist in that sense that Mr. DeGolyer was at all; he wasn't at all.
Now, Mr. DeGolyer did try to support our Government position on this;
actually I turned his support and his endorsement of the oil companies'
position 180° around, because if he was correct in saying that we would
use up all the oil that we've got, entirely out of proportion to our consumption
and our production, then he was saying that we would be out of oil. That
raises my question of using the foreign oil first.
Now, there are two schools of thought on that question clear across the
board, on using foreign goods whenever you can, where it's a natural product,
and where it's a removable product, and shall I say, a very limited product
that will be destroyed...
HESS: Depletion, I believe is the word they use isn't it?
CHAPMAN: That's a very bad word; I don't use it. I testified once before
the Congress and I used that word, and I created quite a conference on
that word. An entirely new set of questions was raised immediately; they
came up from the source that I would expect, and I was expecting it when
I gave it. I knew that this was raised when I...
HESS: Who raised it?
CHAPMAN: Well, in the first place, a liberal from Texas raised it. [Ralph
W.] Yarborough was quite a liberal from Texas. When you speak of a man
whether he was a liberal or not, you've got to take into consideration
his environment, the atmosphere that he was raised in and so on.
HESS: Did he oppose the oil depletion allowance?
CHAPMAN: No, he supported it.
HESS: He supported it?
CHAPMAN: He supported it. He later changed; he later changed, but at
that time he supported it. That surprised me, because I thought he was
just on the other side.
HESS: The Secretary of State in 1948 at the first recognition of Israel
was not Acheson, but it was Marshall.
HESS: What do you recall about George Marshall's view on the recognition
of Israel as he was the man who was Secretary of State in 1948?
CHAPMAN: That was Dean.
HESS: Well, I believe he was out of Government at that time. He had been
Assistant Secretary a little earlier, but I believe he was out of Government
at this time. He was back in in January of 1949, at the time of the de
CHAPMAN: Yes. Yes, that's right, that's right.
HESS: But I believe that the de facto recognition came first
CHAPMAN: That came...
HESS: In June of '48.
CHAPMAN: ...in June of '48.
HESS: Yes, and I don't think Mr. Acheson was in Government at that time;
he later came in of course, the day after inauguration day of '49, January
the 21st of 1949.
HESS: I believe he had been out of Government for a couple of years.
CHAPMAN: He had been out for awhile. Wasn't he in the Treasury Department
for a while?
HESS: He certainly was.
CHAPMAN: He was in the Treasury for a while.
HESS: I think Assistant Secretary or something like that.
HESS: And then he came back. Do you recall what George Marshall's views
were on the recognition of Israel?
CHAPMAN: I don't know it well enough to be certain about it. What I would
give you would have to be purely a guess job and I would be simply guessing
on what he had done. I got the impression; I
had the impression,
and I don't know whether I'm correct or not, because I never sat down
with Marshall and had a chance to talk with him like I did Dean, as I
had with Dean, and as I had with some other members of the group.
HESS: You had a better working relationship with Mr. Acheson, is that
CHAPMAN: Much better. Much better.
HESS: How did Mr. Marshall's relationship stack up with the other members
of the Cabinet. Was he a little distant from them, too?
CHAPMAN: Well, let's put it this way: You first put it in the terms that
he was a little distant to his colleagues, but you soon, after you worked
with him for a while, you soon learned that that bore no inference whatever
towards an issue for or against an issue. He liked the man and trusted
him or he didn't, and he worked pretty much on that level.
HESS: Well, those were my words. I probably should have expressed it
a different way, "What were his relationships with the other members of
the Cabinet," instead of slanting it one way or the other as I did.
CHAPMAN: Well, your slant that I got out of it really supported what
I was somewhat uncertain about, but had the belief, that Marshall at first
was not favorable to this, but he later became--well, it was this way--Marshall
was trained as a military man and he...
HESS: He was a VMI graduate.
CHAPMAN: He was very definitely a VMI graduate, and he had grounded into
him the absolute belief and the idea that you had to support the Chief.
The President's office was entitled to your support and if you couldn't
give it you should quit. And he felt that very keenly, and we had almost
a whole evening's conversation on that subject one night.
HESS: With General Marshall?
HESS: At his house?
CHAPMAN: Yes. Just he and I.
HESS: What did he have to say about it? What was the occasion?
CHAPMAN: Well, the occasion came up because we both were from Virginia,
and he was a little surprised to learn that.
HESS: To hear that you were from Virginia?
CHAPMAN: Yes, he was surprised to hear that I was from Virginia, and
then we got to reminiscing about some of the old-timers where they--passing
of a generation, was passing. I was just coming into this new generation
and Marshall was going out. Time is going in that direction, see.
Now, I said to him, "Well, Virginia is
changing and I believe that the
attitude of the people of Virginia is changing a great deal, and I believe
in another ten years you will have a different Virginia than you have
now in the expressions of their public officials on social issues, particularly
about their expressions on social matters, such as the civil rights issue,
the question of social security, and matters of that kind.
HESS: What did he say?
CHAPMAN: He said, "Well, I think you're partly right, but I don't think
it's going as fast as you think it will. But," he said, "I think the ultimate
end will be--change will be what you are reaching for, and I think you
will get it in time; you will get it."
"Now, of course, it's a question of timing; it will be a question of
how energetic and how successful you are in working your relationships
with Congress, to a degree of successful relationships
and if you do that," he said, "I think you can bring your question to
the front, and get it discussed in an atmosphere that's much more favorable."
HESS: In your opinion, what were General Marshall's views on civil rights,
and here I mean mainly black citizens civil rights.
CHAPMAN: That's right. For Marshall, it was a personal matter with him.
If he didn't like a fellow, he didn't like him; then he just wouldn't
have anything to do with him. But whether he was a Negro or not, he wouldn't
let that influence him as to what he did.
HESS: Did you ever hear him make any comments on civil rights matters
or on the aspirations of the blacks?
CHAPMAN: I never heard him make a derogatory remark about the Negroes
in any respect whatsoever. I've heard him comment upon the rights of the
He said, "The trouble you and I are in--of course, you're just
coming in, I'm going out;" he put it that way. And I said, "The energy
that you show around here betrays your words. You would never make me
or anybody else from Virginia think that you are going out, anyway. You're
going to be right here helping us carry through these programs; and it's
going to be men like you that are going to bring around these other fellows
who are leaning towards the support of the civil rights issue and the
rights of the Negro."
And I said, "I think you are far enough along in your thinking about
the Negro's rights that in the end you are going to be more help than
a lot of these hot liberals that are now shouting, 'We shall learn now,'
and so on."
HESS: We shall overcome.
CHAPMAN: We shall overcome. I said, "You are going to be there; you will
be at the gate right when we come."
He chuckled a little bit and said, "Well, I don't know about that;" he
said, "let me put it this way, I'll be at the second gate if I'm not at
Now, what he meant by that in the terms of our conversation, was that
he was leaning that way and if Truman got the thought and wanted to do
it, he was going to support him. He was going to do it on the basis of
two principles. First, you should do it or resign from your office, if
you can't support him. The other was, the time has come for some change,
and how we handle that change will determine how fast we will be able
to accomplish the rights we are trying to obtain for them. He says, "I
don't agree with them on their methods of trying to get what they think
is coming to them; however, if I had waited a hundred and fifty years
for my rights to be recognized, I guess I'd be just as hot about
it as they are."
HESS: He made that statement?
CHAPMAN: Yes, he made that statement to me. Now, it didn't mean to me
that he was out and out for the civil rights issue and its people, and
all they stood for; I didn't get it that he meant all of that. But I got
it to mean to me that here's a man that at the right time, his reputation
is so established, that he can support the civil rights issue with President
Truman without getting hurt. He's not in politics, so he wouldn't be hurt
politically, in that respect; so, he would be one of the first types of
man, the kind of men that would be real valuable to Truman to help put
this program across. He would be worth more to Truman than any man he
had on his Cabinet in regard to the question of civil rights when it got
down to the end, because he never wasted any shots; he always saved his
ammunition until it counted, and that's what he did, and that's the way
he was handling the civil rights thing. He was going to support the
position. I'm convinced that he was going to support the President's position.
Now, I don't know what he has written about it and I don't know what he
said about it or what anybody else has said about him.
I would like to go back to say that Secretary Marshall was not a man
given to a lot of public speeches to attract attention, and to try
to attract attention on that basis; but he did try, on a conversational
basis, to get with a man that was of some importance and to try to talk
with that man. If he was trying to win him over to his side, he would
take the opportunity, that kind of an opportunity, to talk with him about
On the other hand, he'd let that opportunity also be used to convince
himself of the other fellow's position, let him convince him. He was the
type of fellow who'd want you to support your position. If you said so
and so, what do you back it up with? That's a very good, really a very
good policy to follow, to learn the habit of
supporting your statements
that you make that are sometimes shocking to some people, probably not
to others. And he was that kind, and he wanted you to support your position
I had the highest regard for Marshall; I had a very high regard
for him. I felt he never once attempted to use his friendship with Mr.
Truman to promote himself or his interests whatsoever, not in any respect.
Now there are people who will attempt to use their friendship with Truman
, and sometimes they push--when a man is doing that he usually overplays
his hand and...
HESS: Who do you have in mind?
CHAPMAN: Well, a few friends of mine who were in that Cabinet I liked
very much, but they overplayed their hand a little bit in trying to
people of their closeness to the President and their power with the President.
I don't like to use people's name in a way that's not complimentary
when the man has passed away though.
I'll speak freely with you about Louis Johnson who is a very active,
hard working man, tough as a mule, and he'd do anything to gain his point
and win a position. And he'd make you think that he just slept with the
President and that's the reason he was late for breakfast with the Vice
President. He did that to a degree that was revolting to those of us that
really knew the picture, and Johnson and myself had worked together very
closely in the American Legion.
HESS: He had been national commander, had he not?
CHAPMAN: Johnson wanted to be.
HESS: What's that?
CHAPMAN: Wanted to be national commander.
HESS: Wasn't he one year?
CHAPMAN: No, he missed it.
CHAPMAN: I don't think he got it. I know he wanted it; I know he wanted
it, and I'd traded with him. I was in that convention and I traded a little
bit with him, because I was the one who really got the child welfare program
resolution through the convention, to support child welfare, a child welfare
program set up under a format that I had given to him for this resolution.
HESS: At an American Legion convention?
CHAPMAN: At an American Legion convention.
HESS: Roughly what year was that, do you recall?
CHAPMAN: That's back in--should be around, somewhere around between '28
and '32, somewhere within that period.
HESS: You were representing Colorado at that time?
CHAPMAN: Yes, I was a delegate that year.
HESS: Did you hold a state office?
CHAPMAN: No, I never did. I never held a state office politically, or
that way either. I never held a state office.
HESS: And Johnson had come up through West Virginia's
CHAPMAN: That's right.
HESS: ...American Legion.
CHAPMAN: He had, and he had gone quite strong among the Legionaires throughout
the country, and...
HESS: Well, we can check