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Clark M. Clifford Oral History Interview, March 16, 1972

Oral History Interview with
CLARK M. CLIFFORD

Assistant to White House Naval Aide, 1945-46; Special Counsel to the President, 1946-50.

Washington, D. C.
March 16, 1972
by Jerry N. Hess

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional Clifford Oral History Transcripts | List of Subjects Discussed]


Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened April, 1977
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional Clifford Oral History Transcripts | List of Subjects Discussed | Top of the Page]

 



[344]

HESS: In our coverage of the events of the Truman administration, we are now up to the election of 1948 and President Truman's trip to Key West following the election. He was down there from November 7th to the 21st of 1948. Two of the tasks that were facing the staff at that time were the writing of the State of the Union message and President Truman's inaugural message, of course, both to be delivered the following January. Did work on those messages get underway on that trip to Key West?

CLIFFORD: My recollection would be that there might have been some general discussion with reference to it, but the degree of fatigue that existed in the group was the most pronounced, I think, that I have ever seen. I doubt I've ever been as tired in my life, and I wasn't carrying the

[345]

main brunt; obviously, President Truman was. We used that time to relax and recharge our batteries. We spent a lot of time on the beach there. It was a very valuable period for all of us.

I'd have to say that I'm sure that he and I may have had some conversations because it was my responsibility to get his thoughts and get up a first draft so that he could see it. As far as any writing was concerned, I'd say that we didn't do any down there. We weren't quite up to it. We were almost in a daze. We were so exhausted after that long and arduous campaign, particularly making it by train.

I have some recollection that in one period of something like sixty days, I think we spent something like forty-eight nights on the train; you can see what that would do to you even if you're young.

[346]

But just as soon as we got back, rested and resuscitated, then we really plunged into it.

HESS: Did you write first drafts for both of those speeches: The State of the Union, which was coming early in January, and then the inaugural speech, which was coming on the 20th.

CLIFFORD: Yes, that was my responsibility. Then also, we had to give some attention to the Economic Report which had to be synchronized with the other two messages. That would be my responsibility, after talking with him, to get up the first draft of the State of the Union message. That would have come, I would say, probably in the first week in . . .

HESS: January the 5th, and we have a copy of it here.

CLIFFORD: All right. And then the inaugural address,

[347]

which I assume would be January 20th. I'll take a look at the State of the Union address so that that will refresh my recollection. The inaugural address had as its highlight what became known as point 4. I will stop here and take a quick look at this.

You'll note the State-of the Union address is not a long one. My recollection is that the one back in 1946 was a long and detailed address. It seems to me that this was shorter for two reasons: one, because we had not had the time to give to it, and second, he had ano ther speech coming after this one.

HESS: While you're looking over the State of the Union address, one of the important phrases in it that came to be very well known is on the last page, page seven, and this is the phrase: "Every segment of our population and every individual has a right to expect from our

[348]

Government a fair deal."

Of course, the words "fair deal, " the term, because the motto and the symbol of the Truman administration. Do you recall who contributed that phrase?

CLIFFORD: Yes, I remember it very well, and I can even visualize it in my mind. At one time I had that draft in my possession, and then turned it over to the President for the benefit of the Library.

HESS: It's on display in the Museum, in fact.

CLIFFORD: Oh, is it? Then if you've seen it you will know that it is in his handwriting. In one of the early drafts, President Truman personally wrote in that sentence, "Every segment of our population and every individual has a right to expect from our Government a fair deal." That is in his handwriting; it was his thinking. It wasn't suggested to him by anybody else;

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that is solely and completely the President's idea. I think for that reason it's particularly appropriate that "fair deal" became the slogan and description of the Truman administration, because the phrase actually was coined by President Truman.

HESS: When you're writing messages like the two we're discussing, how do you go about gathering ideas or gathering material for your drafts?

CLIFFORD: It's different with different speeches and messages.

I had long followed in the years I was there the practice of sending a letter to certain departments and bureaus in the Executive branch of Government, about the first of September, asking them for ideas that they might have that could be considered as possible material for the State of the Union message. The State of the Union

[350]

address to some extent, therefore, would be more of an assembly job than any other: State would come in with its memoranda; Agriculture would come in; Treasury would come in with the ideas that they wanted. Every department, of course, would want the State of the Union message devoted practically exclusively to their problems. So quite a selective process was necessary. You might get one idea out of a departmental memorandum, you might get none, or you might get two or three.

I would know generally what was in the President's mind in the first place; we would winnow through all this and get up a draft. Then he would look at it and he would say, "Well, I want to address myself to such and such a point," or he'd say, "I just don't like that; let's not waste our time with that." But at least if you get a draft, you have something to start with. It's like having a skeleton

[351]

and then you begin to pack the flesh onto the skeleton.

My recollection is that we did not intend that the State of the Union message in January of 149 would be a particularly significant document. I think it was an adequate document. Maybe its major claim to fame is that it contained the expression coined by President Truman that did become the slogan of his administration. It also set forth in a general way what his goals were and the direction in which he would direct the administration and the country during his next four years in office.

HESS: Was it mainly slanted toward domestic matters?

CLIFFORD: No, I would say it covered both foreign and domestic, but with more emphasis on domestic matters. I think already we had decided possibly to give emphasis in the inaugural

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address to foreign policy matters.

HESS: Did you notice anything else in the copy of the State of the Union message that I ran off from the Public Papers, that bears mentioning?

CLIFFORD: I would say not. I repeat again, I do not think it was one of his more significant documents for the reasons that I have given.

HESS: All right, now moving onto the inaugural address and that became very famous, of course, because of the fourth point, point 4 about technical aid. Could you give me the background of the inclusion of that fourth point?

CLIFFORD: Yes, in conversations . . .

HESS: With whom?

CLIFFORD: . . . with President Truman regarding the

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inaugural address, he indicated that he would hope that we might be able to agree on the submission of a concept that would make the inaugural unique and outstanding. We hadn't really begun to think what it might be. I do recall that we discussed the fact that there were a few famous inaugural addresses, such as Lincoln's second inaugural, and George Washington's second inaugural, which is perhaps not as famous as George Washington's farewell address. But throughout American history there have been very few inaugural addresses that have stood for much and which have been remembered. He just commented generally that he would hope that this might be that kind.

So those of us who were working on the inaugural address thought about what we might come up with at that time. I recall that certainly more than six months before, and maybe

[354]

as much as a year before, a man in the State Department had sent over to me an idea. I'm not sure I even remember the man's name...

HESS: How about Benjamin Hardy?

CLIFFORD: Well, that could well be it, but it's so long ago I just don't remember. In any event, he had sent over a memo which had been an intelligent memo and I hadn't any place to use it at the time. I put it in the file, probably the file that would be called "Future Idea File," or something of that kind.

This was not a rare instance. Persons working in the different departments would get ideas, and I knew a great many of those individuals who would send ideas over. Sometimes we'd use them and sometimes we wouldn't; sometimes I'd just discard them and sometimes I'd just put them in a file possibly for future reference.

[355]

And during that time when we were searching for the idea that would make this a strong inaugural address and one that would be remembered, I thought about this memo that had been sent over to me by, you say it's Mr. Hardy.

HESS: Benjamin Hardy, according to Eric Goldman in The Crucial Decade.

CLIFFORD: All right, for lack of better information, we'll accept his word for it. I got the memorandum out; it was about the way I had remembered it. I remember discussing it with George Elsey, who I think was still working with me at the time, and we got pretty excited about it. I went into President Truman with it and we discussed it and he got pretty excited about it.

It seemed to be what we were looking for,

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for it did offer something that was new and innovative and I remember'that we used the language in describing it where it said, "Our country must embark on a bold new program," for making the benefits of our scientific advances available for the improvement and growth of what we called "underdeveloped areas."

The concept was a sound one; it was exciting; it was bold; it was new; and I think President Truman showed excellent judgment in deciding to make it the highlight of his State of the Union message. And rather than starting with it as the first point, we all agreed that it should be the last point, so that you build up to it. You go through the dog acts and the acrobats on up to the headline, and that's the last act of the evening. That's why it was made point 4.

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I might say that it was exceedingly gratifying to him and to the rest of us that it had the impact that it did. It caused enormous reaction throughout the world. It was the subject of editorial comment and caused study groups to be formed. We received a great deal of reaction from foreign countries. The time was ripe for it, and this country in that message asserted its role of enlightened leadership in the world. It was everything that he and the rest of us hoped that it would be.

HESS: We should probably mention the other points: The first point was support for the United Nations; the second point was the Marshall plan; and the third point was NATO. Pretty important things.

CLIFFORD: They were, and as you have already pointed

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out, that whereas the State of the Union message dealt mainly with domestic matters, the inaugural address dealt mainly with foreign policy matters.

HESS: On page 254 of Dean Acheson's book, Present at the Creation, Mr. Acheson states that Robert Lovett and you gave him broad instructions in a few secret meetings in your homes just before he was sworn in as Secretary of State. Of course, he was sworn in on January 21st of '49, the day after the inauguration. But he said the first time he knew anything about point 4 was while he was on the platform in front of the Capitol listening to the President's inaugural address. It seems a little bit odd to me, the man who was--now, point 4 was placed under the State Department. The man who was going to run the' State Department didn't know anything about point 4. Why?

CLIFFORD: Well, I'd think there would be two reasons:

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One, the idea of using point 4 in the inaugural address originated within the White House. The idea originated maybe a year before with Mr. Hardy, but I believe that the inaugural address is peculiarly a presidential and a White House matter. It's different from the State of the Union in which he's reporting to the people. It is a personal message from the President of the United States in his personal words to the people of this country and to the world describing what he hopes to accomplish in his four-year term. We all agreed that this was very much a personal matter that belonged within the White House, and I believe we just didn't go out asking other people their opinions or informing them as to what was to take place.

HESS: Not even the man who was going to head the State Department?

[360]

CLIFFORD: Not even the man who was to head the State Department.

HESS: Now, that brings up a very important subject. In his book Mr. Acheson says that you and Robert Lovett had him out to your homes for secret meetings, or meetings that he called secret. What was discussed, what did you discuss with him on those occasions?

CLIFFORD: Was this prior to the President delivering the message?

HESS: That's right.

CLIFFORD: Well, obviously we were going over questions that were to go into the message, but it seems to me that we must have kept this one to ourselves.

HESS: Would you have been talking with him on broader things about the State Department

[361]

broad policies and plans about the State Department? He said Robert Lovett and yourself "gave me broad instruction in a few secret evening meetings in their homes ... " Do you recall those meetings?

CLIFFORD: I don't have an independent recollecti