Oral History Interview with
Visited the Balkans to study the postwar situation for the U.S. Dept. of State, 1945; U.S. delegate to the U.N. Commission of Investigation to study the Greek border disputes, 1947; a U.S. representative on the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 1949; and chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, 1948-50.
Mark F. Ethridge
Moncure, North Carolina
June 4, 1974
by Richard D. McKinzie
[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.
Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. ) within the transcript indicate
the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.
Opened January, 1976
Harry S. Truman Library
[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]
Oral History Interview with
Moncure, North Carolina
Mark F. Ethridge
June 4, 1974
by Richard D. McKinzie
MCKINZIE: Mr. Ethridge, I noticed that you had a great deal of affiliation
with the [Franklin D.] Roosevelt administration.
ETHRIDGE: Yes, I did.
MCKINZIE: Presumably through your work as a newspaperman. Is that right?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, and then Roosevelt came to Warm Springs, Georgia when
I was editor of the Macon Telegraph of Macon, Georgia. I got
to know him down there. Then, the Telegraph had
a reputation as a liberal paper and when Roosevelt went in he grabbed
me for a farm tenancy commission first, and then I did fair employment
practice for him during the war and I did a radio study for him.
MCKINZIE: I notice that in some of the writings about you, you are alleged
to have anticipated much of the New Deal; that you proposed some things
which, in fact, later was translated into action when Roosevelt became
ETHRIDGE: Yes, I did. I thought it was inevitable you had to have a New
Deal or something, something had to give. Roosevelt picked up from something
I wrote for one of his speeches, "too much wheat and not enough to
eat, too much cotton and not enough to wear." That phrase was from
something I'd written. And I made a speech, "Capitalism on the Defensive"
in 1931, before the New Deal, which said, "something had
MCKINZIE: You seem to have played a role of arbitrator in a lot of things
during the 1930s for Roosevelt. Was there any particular reason for that?
I noticed that you were involved in that business with the National Association
of Broadcasters and the FCC as a kind of arbitrator.
MCKINZIE: And the work you did for the FEPC was in the nature of arbitration?
ETHRIDGE: The National Association of Broadcasters -- we had a selfish
interest in that. We had a 50,000 watt station and when the musicians
pulled a strike somebody had to get into it, and I got into it and got
hooked as chairman of the National Association of Broadcasters. Then I
was elected unpaid president in 1938 for several months, and then they
selected a paid president and I went into the background. I never was
primarily in radio; we had a station and I had to get interested.
MCKINZIE: I noticed during the war that you were an advisor to the Office
of War Information. I wonder if I could get you to talk a little bit about
that, about the philosophy of the Office of War Information? Did that
seem to present any kind of a problem in your mind about preserving free
information? It is in a sense a domestic propaganda agency.
ETHRIDGE: No, I never was very active in that. As a matter of fact, those
were honorary titles. Elmer Davis was head of it and I think his philosophy
was to let out everything that could possibly be let out. He didn't take
as narrow a view of national security as [Richard M.] Nixon does. His
was a broad view, and I think most newspaper people subscribe to the way
he ran it.
MCKINZIE: Certainly you did?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes.
MCKINZIE: The reason I'm asking you about that is I'm trying to lead
you into how you happened to have your first contacts with the Truman
administration after Mr. Roosevelt's death.
ETHRIDGE: I'll tell you how I think it came about. The contact was really
with [James F.] Byrnes. I didn't know Byrnes except as anybody knew him.
I knew him as a newspaperman around Washington; but he called me and asked
me to come to Washington and I went. This was after the London conference
of October 1945 broke down, and there had been bitter exchange between
Molotov and Bevin in that conference, and he said that the break was complete
and we were further away from the Russians than we had ever been. One
of the charges that Molotov made was that the military and civilian people
us abroad were lying to Byrnes about the extent of Russian domination
of the situation. They were in charge in Eastern Europe and I think that
the Russians claimed that Byrnes wasn't getting correct information about
it and he wanted somebody to do a reportorial job first, a reportorial
MCKINZIE: That would explain then why he had called you.
ETHRIDGE: Yes. I found out from other people that a fellow named Brown
from Spartanburg, which is Jimmy Byrnes' hometown, had recommended me,
and Turner Catledge of the New York Times had seconded it for
me to do a reportorial job. So my contact wasn't with Truman except I
went to the White House as a matter of courtesy before I went on this
mission. That's the only contact I had, and at that time, I don't know
whether you remember it or not, but Byrnes fancied himself President.
MCKINZIE: He was in the process of getting himself in deep trouble just
then, I think.
ETHRIDGE: Yes, and in one of Truman's books he talks about Byrnes not
giving him my reports.
MCKINZIE: That's true. It's in Truman's memoirs that he mentions this.
When Byrnes called you to Washington and said he wanted a reportorial
job did he give you lots of briefings? Did you have access to the Balkan
situation or were you pretty well up on Balkan affairs at this point?
ETHRIDGE: Well, I was pretty well up for a newspaperman, but he didn't
give me a lot of briefing on it. I was to go to Bulgaria and Rumania,
which were in Communist hands, and I interviewed in Bulgaria everybody
from the extreme right, that is the regent to the King, to the extreme
left. I interviewed, oh, I've forgotten how many, more than a hundred
people, and cabled reports everyday
to the State Department. So they got a great volume of report.
MCKINZIE: Did you have a good deal of help?
ETHRIDGE: No, I had one college professor, Si [Cyril Edwin] Black, who
is now professor of Russian history at Princeton. His mother was a Bulgarian,
and he had been working in the State Department. I don't know whether
on the Bulgarian desk or not, but they attached him to me and I was glad
to have him; and when I went on another mission I asked for him. So, that's
how close we were.
MCKINZIE: Did you feel that you had complete access to all those people
when you got there? Did you ever feel that somebody was trying to keep
you from seeing this person or that person, particularly the people on
ETHRIDGE: No, they followed me. They attached a young lieutenant to me
as aide, so they said.
MCKINZIE: Russian or Bulgarian?
ETHRIDGE: Bulgarian. But he was supposed to spy on me, and after I left,
because he hadn't, they put him in jail. I've seen him since then, and
I hear from him every Christmas. His father went to the University of
Pennsylvania, so he has that American connection and they said that's
the reason they attached him to me, because he had had American connections.
But he was supposed to spy on me. He accompanied me on trips that I made
outside of Sofia; he was very scrupulous. He would say, "I have to
go across town to get gasoline," and that meant I was free to talk
to anybody without surveillance; and I did talk to people without surveillance
and because he wasn't diligent enough about reporting on whom I talked
to, they put him in jail after I left.
MCKINZIE: You talked, I take it, to Maynard Barnes?
ETHRIDGE: Oh, yes, yes.
MCKINZIE: Evidently he was in some kind of trouble within the State Department
for some of his reports. I've seen evidence that maybe some people thought
he was reporting the situation too harshly back to the State Department.
ETHRIDGE: That was what the Russians had claimed. The Russians had claimed
that, but I found that far from exaggerating or overstating the case they
were understating it. The Russians were just ignoring us. We were a joint
occupying power. Theoretically the British, the Russians, and we were
the occupying power. They didn't pay any attention to us at all. Maynard
Barnes got worked up about it, yes; but he was reporting the truth.
MCKINZIE: How long were you there before you began to form some impressions
that those elections they were supposed to hold weren't going to be
very democratic? Was it just sort of immediately apparent or did it take
a while to figure it out?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, within a couple of weeks. They had no intention of holding
any elections. The Rumanians did hold an election I believe. A Rumanian
colonel saw me off when I flew from Sofia to Moscow, and he told me that
morning -- about 5 o'clock I flew -- he told me that morning how the Rumanian
election had come out. Well, the election wasn't held until that day.
He told me 24 hours in advance how the election came out, 99.4 percent.
I pointed it out to him. They knew it was stacked.
MCKINZIE: You said you filed some reports to the State Department everyday,
but did you have any awareness that Secretary Byrnes was getting those
reports as you were doing them?
ETHRIDGE: No, I couldn't swear to it. Every now
and then I wrote one "For Eyes of Byrnes." I did that later
on in the Palestine commission, for the Secretary's eyes. But most of
what I filed were routine interrogation of people. I'm sure the Secretary
got my conclusions. I wrote conclusions from time to time and I'm sure
he got those. But Byrnes, his background came out; he was a compromiser
in the Senate and he thought he could compromise with the Russians on
anything, and he was inclined to discount the harshness, say of Barnes,
or the factual reports of [Burton Yost] Berry or General [Cortlandt Van
R.] Schuyler who later became NATO commander. General Schuyler was in
Rumania at the time. Byrnes felt, I'm sure, that he could compromise with
"Uncle Joe "and my own feeling was he didn't take seriously
enough the situation.
MCKINZIE: This must have been rather disillusioning to you, with a reputation
of liberal thought and some commitment to integration of lots of things
in the world as far as that was possible,
and yet here this was just after victory and to go and discover that it's
all falling apart. Were you depressed as a result of this?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, it was very depressing because I had been sympathetic
to Russia but their design was emerging at the time, that is, their pattern
of holding on to Eastern Europe. They were hell-bent on holding on to
Rumania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia. They didn't have Yugoslavia because
Tito didn't let them have it, but they tried to get it.
MCKINZIE: Did you ever hear a Russian argue that that course of action
was justified on grounds of their own national security?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes. And also on this ground. Several Russians argued
with me, that Britain was through, that Great Britain was through and
"why don't we divide up the world into spheres? You take this part,
we'll take that part." That came back in the Balkan commission later
and in the Palestine commission and
the Mideast. That argument was made to me several times. Yes, this was
very disillusioning because I had somewhat shared Byrnes' feeling that
we would get along now the war was won. We'd settle back, and have collective
MCKINZIE: When you were in Rumania and Bulgaria, were there still at
that point some Americans other than diplomatic personnel there? Were
there still some American businessmen there with whom you could speak?
ETHRIDGE: No, there weren't American businessmen there. It was too soon
after the war. There was nobody except American civilian Foreign Service
people and military, and the Foreign Service people were subordinate to
the military at the time because it was a military occupation; and while
we had ministers in both Bulgaria and Rumania they were in fact advisors
to the military.
MCKINZIE: You then left Sofia and went on to Moscow, did you not, where
you had some conversations with [Andrei] Vishinsky?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, Vishinsky.
MCKINZIE: Did you think that anything could happen, positively?
ETHRIDGE: No, when I was sent to Moscow at the suggestion of Barnes and
Harriman, they both joined in and my mission was to tell the Russians
what situation I found in Bulgaria -- I hadn't been to Rumania at the
time -- what the situation was, and Vishinsky was most cynical about it.
In the first five minutes he said, "I don't think we're going to
get together Mr. Ethridge."
And I said, "Well, Mr. Vishinsky, I haven't come 9,000 miles for
my health, shall I leave the room and cable the President that the Russians
don't want to hear our story?"
He said, "By no means, by no means, let's talk."
And we talked. But the result was the same, they wouldn't give in in
anything. I told him about how the minority parties were treated in Bulgaria
-- I mean the democratic parties -- and how they were kicked around. He
said, "A frightened bird is frightened of the bush on which he sits."
That was his reaction to that: "We don't pay any attention to all
the rest of that stuff." Another expression he used was, "When
you're going to make an omelette you have to scramble some eggs."
MCKINZIE: Did he give you any hope that there could be any change?
ETHRIDGE: No, Vishinsky didn't. Stalin later gave Byrnes a false hope.
MCKINZIE: Did you talk to Byrnes? Who else was in Moscow when you were
ETHRIDGE: [Averell] Harriman, Harriman was all. But I cabled Byrnes regularly.
MCKINZIE: Why do you suppose they didn't want to make your final report
ETHRIDGE: I don't know, I don't know. I just have no idea.
MCKINZIE: Did you then talk to Mr. Byrnes after your return?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, oh yes, after I came back.
MCKINZIE: Well, maybe I'm getting ahead of the story a little bit. You
know this was just at the end of the war and this was December, as I recall,
of 1945. Moscow must have been a pretty dreary place by that time?
ETHRIDGE: It was, it was. I stayed at Spaso House where Harriman stayed.
He didn't have any fire, he had little chips of wood. He did have an American
PX where you could get things, a
very ordinary affair, but you could get some the Russians didn't get,
but you couldn't get any fuel or things like that; it was cold as hell.
It wasn't any fun staying at Spaso House.
MCKINZIE: How long did you stay in Moscow, do you recall, after you came
there from Sofia? How long were you in Moscow?
ETHRIDGE: Oh, about 10 days, about 10 days. Yes, just about 10 days.
MCKINZIE: Long enough to convince you that there was really no hope for
a revision of Russian policy toward Bulgaria.
ETHRIDGE: No, no hope at all. And then I went to Rumania from Moscow,
and while the Rumanians couldn't speak with the authority that Vishinsky
could, the same thing was evident that there was not going to be any change
in policy. I talked with King Michael in Rumania and he told
me about the incident of Vishinsky slamming his door so hard that it busted
the panel. He demanded that Michael install [Petru] Groza, I believe,
as Prime Minister, and Michael refused at first, although he later succumbed
and did name Groza. Vishinsky was so angry that he slammed the door and
busted the panel. I talked in Rumania with everybody from the extreme
left to the extreme right, from the King on down to the lowest Communist,
and as a matter of fact I had sessions with the Communists, several sessions
MCKINZIE: Did they have any explanation for their treatment of minority
parties or democratic parties or did they think they were treating them
all right? What line did they take with you?
ETHRIDGE: Well, they made no apologies for the way they were treating
them. I was trying to think of the name of the woman who -- Anna Pauker.
was the Russian-installed boss; she had a direct line to Stalin, and she
dictated what the Rumanian Government did. There wasn't any question about
it. I had a five-hour session with her, and we wound up drinking B &
B, she loved B & B.
MCKINZIE: But it didn't make any difference?
ETHRIDGE: No, no, no. She was a hard-boiled -- she had denounced her
husband, you know, and had him shot. That's what kind of girl she was.
MCKINZIE: Did you then leave Bucharest and come all the way back to Washington
for conversations with Secretary Byrnes?
ETHRIDGE: Byrnes had arranged the Moscow conference for December, and
he wanted my report before he left. So he cabled me -- I had flown out
of Rumania to Rome, then Rome to North Africa to break the trip, and I
had been in bed an hour in North Africa, Casablanca, when a young
lieutenant woke me up and said, "You're to get on a plane immediately."
So, with less than an hour's sleep I flew the Atlantic, and Wally [Walworth]
Barbour who was later minister of Sweden -- he's among the distinguished
ambassadors now -- met me and took me to the State Department to Byrnes
right away. Byrnes asked me to write my report and I wrote 27 pages and
took it to him and he asked me to condense it. He said he wanted to have
it translated by Chip Bohlen and read to Stalin. So I did. I condensed
it to seven pages and he took it to Moscow with him and read it to Stalin,
and Stalin said it was too late to do anything about Bulgaria. They had
already had their election and he wasn't going to do anything about Bulgaria,
but he would do something about Rumania, and [Amb. Sir Archibald Clark]
Kerr-Harriman-Vishinsky were appointed a commission to go to Rumania and
select a prime minister. Well, the Russians vetoed the first 22 names
that were submitted
and finally accepted the rector of the University of Cluj, who turned
out to have been an underground Communist all his life. So we got royally
hornswoggled on that.
MCKINZIE: Did you ever talk to President Truman about your mission, later?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, later. I talked to him on the basis of the reports I made.
As you see, in there he got very angry with Byrnes because Byrnes hadn't
given him my report.
MCKINZIE: In his memoirs he said he wrote Byrnes a letter on January
5, 1946, and said that he hadn't seen your report until after the Moscow
MCKINZIE: And that Byrnes hadn't even told him the nature of the progress
at the Moscow conference, or if in fact there was any progress. I guess
Truman didn't think that there had been any progress at the Moscow conference.
ETHRIDGE: You remember, Byrnes came back from the Moscow conference and
made a speech before he even saw Truman. I think that's how Truman found
out about the Moscow conference. Yes, I talked with Truman about it later.
The issue had passed, Byrnes was out. But Truman remarked, "I didn't
see your report."
MCKINZIE: Did he ever talk to you of his idea of a Danube confederation?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes.
MCKINZIE: In connection with any of this?
ETHRIDGE: No, it was after the Balkan commission, You see, the Balkan
commission was appointed the next year. How did you know that? Did I make
some reference to his having...
ETHRIDGE: Yes, he talked to me about it. And he said that the dismemberment
of the Austro-Hungarian empire was a political necessity but an economic
disaster. It was a natural economic unit, and in the Danubian confederation
he would have liked to have brought that about; but you couldn't have
gotten the Russians to go along with it for a minute. There wasn't any
possibility of getting it and the problems were entirely different from
what he had envisioned when he talked about the Danubian confederation.
MCKINZIE: How do you mean?
ETHRIDGE: Well, the problem in the Balkan thing was Bulgaria, Albania,
and Yugoslavia were trying to overthrow Greece, and the drive was on the
part of the Russians to overthrow the Greek Government and take possession
of Greece. It never got around to a discussion of the Danubian confederation.
It was entirely an emergency
situation where you were trying to rescue Greece.
MCKINZIE: Then you came back from your travels to the Balkans in late
1945 to get almost immediately into the investigation of sabotage in Greece,
did you not? In 1945 and early 1947 I know you were back in Greece checking
ETHRIDGE: Yes. There was an interlude there, I've forgotten how many
months, but when the Balkan thing came up they called me again.
MCKINZIE: This is Byrnes again?
ETHRIDGE: Byrnes, yes, asked me to go.
MCKINZIE: Now, that was with the U.N. investigation?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, it was the first U.N. commission, Greece appealed to the
U.N. on the basis that these other countries were trying to overthrow
her, and the U.N. set up this commission with a member from each of the
11 regular members
of the U.N.; I was made the American delegate.
MCKINZIE: Did you still have faith in the ability of the U.N. to resolve
those kinds of problems?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, because it was untested, it was untried at the time. The
Russians were not enthusiastic about the formation of the U.N., as you
know. With that reservation, I had faith. I felt they might go along with
the U.N. I didn't have unbounded faith, but up to a point I had faith
that it could accomplish something.
MCKINZIE: The reason I asked that question was at the same time that
U.N. commission was appointed, just about the same time, Paul [A.] Porter
was sent to Greece to head an economic commission.
MCKINZIE: Let's see, [Lincoln] MacVeagh, I guess, was the U.S. ambassador
at that time.
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes.
MCKINZIE: I've read that when you got to Greece and you and Porter and
MacVeagh sort of got together and made an assessment of the situation;
and I guess the question would be, why feedback through them, why not
feedback through the U.N.?
ETHRIDGE: Well, I fed back through the U.N. too, but I did talk with
Porter and MacVeagh regularly. After all, I was the U.S. representative
on the U.N. commission, so I did operate through the Commission, but I
kept them up with what was going on.
MCKINZIE: How did they handle that commission in Greece? How did the
Greek Government handle the U.N. commission? Did they keep you in Athens
or did they get you out and take you to...
ETHRIDGE: No, it was the Russians who were trying to keep us in Athens,
because they said here is the center of the trouble. They resisted our
moving at all; they resisted very strongly our moving even to Salonika.
They said that is the seat of the trouble. This monarchical-Fascist government
of Greece is the trouble. And they resisted our moving around. But we
moved to assert our right to do it if nothing else. They resisted very
strongly our going into Yugoslavia or into Bulgaria, and we sent a team
into Albania. Albania didn't amount to much. We sent a team of -- I sent
a young fellow who was later ambassador to Egypt as our representative
on that team. We insisted on going since it was a U.N. commission. The
Russians and the Poles were teamed together. They jointly resisted everything
we proposed almost.
MCKINZIE: What kind of hard evidence could the U.N. team come up with,
that there had been supplies and hospitalization services, and all the
rest of it, coming from Yugoslavia and from Bulgaria?
ETHRIDGE: We had a good deal of direct evidence. We had witness after
MCKINZIE: You were there for quite some number of weeks?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes. I think we were there four months and then we went
to Geneva to write our reports in Geneva for two or three months. I think
the Commission covered seven months.
MCKINZIE: I noticed that by February of 1947, just about a month before
the British announced that they were going to pull out, that you had sent
a dispatch back in which you said that it appeared to you that there was
going to be an all-out Communist push to take over the government. You
know that's a fairly courageous act to say that you think that's going
to happen and to send it back to the State Department. What occurred --
just accumulative evidence, or was it more...
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes. Well, they were having demonstrations in Athens the
whole time, and they broke up a couple of meetings of the Commission with
their demonstrations outside. And I walked out of a Commission meeting,
saying, "If you people can't keep order there's no use in us going
on." I did that twice. I did it up in Yugoslavia once when -- they
organized these demonstrations. They'd have a cheerleader. Yes, you could
sense it, you could sense it. They were going to try an all-out push and
the Truman Doctrine prevented it.
MCKINZIE: Yes. You, I take it, did talk to Paul Porter and to MacVeagh
about sending back such a report as that?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes.
MCKINZIE: That brings up all sorts of difficult questions. If Greece
were going to be in serious trouble and it was going to take massive
aid to save Greece, it was almost a corollary to that that there was going
to have to be some changes in the Greek Government; that it wasn't just
going to be a matter of giving them money, because money wasn't going
to do it.
MCKINZIE: Now, I guess the delicate question there is, how do you do
that without intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation,
or do you just do it?
ETHRIDGE: You had to get into the internal affairs in this case, and
Paul Porter and I organized a "[Constantin] Tsaldaris must go,"
clique. He did go. I've forgotten who succeeded him. Anyway we did get
rid of Tsaldaris. Tsaldaris was a stupid fool. The day I got to Greece
he gave a luncheon, and MacVeagh was there and Paul Porter, and I; and
Tsaldaris backed me in to a
corner and said, "Now the first thing we must do is get back the
Rhodope Mountain territory that Bulgaria had lost, we must recapture Epirus."
I said, "My God, you don't even hold Athens, how are you talking
that way? You just hold a part of Athens, and you don't hold anything
except garrison cities. How the hell are you going to get back anything?"
He was a stupid fool.
MCKINZIE: So, in the interest of saving democratic capitalism it was
necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of Greece?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, yes.
MCKINZIE: I've read that the request for U.S. assistance did talk about
aid in administration, aid in setting up economic institutions, and that
that had pretty much been drafted in the State Department for Greek signature.
Do you think that this feeling about Tsaldaris was
shared pretty much by all the American diplomatic people there, or did
he have his supporters?
ETHRIDGE: No, I think it was shared by all the diplomatic people there.
MCKINZIE: Before you got there, and before Paul Porter got there, did
you have any sense of this emerging crisis? Before you were appointed
to go to Greece, did you have an awareness that Greece was a terribly
dangerous, volatile area?
ETHRIDGE: Yes, because I followed the U.N. debates and so forth.
MCKINZIE: But not so much through U.S. channels, then, but more through
the U.N.? What I'm trying to get at is what kind of reports the State
Department might have been getting about the situation in Greece prior
to your arrival and prior to the arrival of Paul Porter.
ETHRIDGE: I don't know what reports they were getting.
I believe the United States introduced a resolution for the U.N, to get
into Greece, so they obviously kept up with the situation.
MCKINZIE: When you went back to Geneva to draft the report, what did
the Poles and the Russians do there when you got down to the terrible
problem of having to do that?
ETHRIDGE: They took the position that they would like for the report
to be unanimous, but in closing they had reservations, so we framed the
report that was unanimously signed but contained the reservations of the
Poles and the Russians.
MCKINZIE: By the time you finished that work Byrnes was no longer Secretary
of State and I believe General Marshall was.
MCKINZIE: What kind of a relationship did you have
with him? Was it any different from that with Secretary Byrnes?
ETHRIDGE: No, I didn't have much contact with Marshall. I reported to
him. Yes, I reported to him and he wasn't very much up on the situation.
When he came back we had to sit around the U.N. for a couple of months
while this case was under debate, and so forth.
MCKINZIE: How did you view that kind of public service at that time?
It had taken a lot of time during those two years, and you were after
all right at the peak of a journalist's career and here you were snatched
away from it.
ETHRIDGE: Yes. Well, I thought it was something I had to do and we had
an arrangement on the Courier where Barry Bingham, who owned
it, was publisher when I was away, and I was editor when he was away,
so we had a swap. We both came up on the editorial side of the newspaper,
so, we kept it running from the editorial end.
MCKINZIE: Well then, after this business on Greece, which, as you say,
was resolved finally by the Truman Doctrine, you for a short time were
going to get involved in the Palestine thing. There's one other question
I wanted to ask about the business in Greece, when you came back and you
had seen the situation -- of course, there was no way for you to know
that the Truman Doctrine was going to be announced -- what was your assessment
of the probabilities of the fate of Greece when you left there in February?
ETHRIDGE: Oh, the Truman Doctrine was announced before I left Greece.
It was announced on March 10.
MCKINZIE: That's right, yes.
ETHRIDGE: It was announced before I left Greece, and, my God, it was
greeted with the wildest demonstration on the part of the Greeks. They'd
just got their guts up and all evidence of the Russian takeover disappeared.
My Russian opposite number said to me, "What does this mean, Mr.
I said, "It means you can't do it."
He said, "I understand that kind of language."
Paul Porter and I wrote the cable with the concurrence of MacVeagh that
produced the Truman Doctrine.
MCKINZIE: Where did you do that?
ETHRIDGE: In Athens.
MCKINZIE: In your hotel room?
ETHRIDGE: No, over at the Embassy.
MCKINZIE: At someone's instigation?
ETHRIDGE: No, we just felt the situation was desperate enough; felt that
Greece would go down the drain if the United States didn't do something.
It was desperate. In our own minds, we gave Greece about five weeks, no
more. And Truman reacted within 10 days of two weeks. Loy Henderson was
in charge of the Middle East desk