Walter H. Judd Oral History Interview

Oral History Interview with
Dr. Walter H. Judd

Physician and missionary with experience in China, 1925-31 and 1934-38, member of Congress from Minnesota, 1943-62. United States delegate to the 12th General Assembly of the United Nations, 1957.

April 13, 1970
by Jerry N. Hess

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]

This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

As an electronic publication of the Truman Library, users should note that features of the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview, such as pagination and indexing, could not be replicated for this online version of the Judd transcript.

This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened January, 1975
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]

Oral History Interview with
Dr. Walter H. Judd

Washington, DC
April 13, 1970
by Jerry N. Hess


HESS: Dr. Judd, we're primarily interested in your relationship with former President Truman. Just what was that relationship and when did it begin?

JUDD: I had met Mr. Truman a few times at official functions in Washington when I first came here as a member of Congress in January 1943. I had no personal contacts with him, directly, until he and I traveled together in the summer of 1943 .

A group of us in Congress were concerned that the United States not go back into isolationism after World War II. I had been a young soldier in World War I, and he had been a captain in the field artillery, and when we got to know each other better, we talked about our various military

experiences. He felt, as did I, that we had made



a mistake in 1918 and '19 when we imagined that we could pull back from the world, not recognizing our own situation in the world had changed. We were now a creditor nation instead of a debtor nation. We had to have dealings with other countries if they were to pay their debts to us. We had invented the steamboat and the airplane which had destroyed our physical separation from the rest of the world, the separation that George Washington and others had had earlier, which allowed them to concentrate on domestic problems and to forget pretty much the rest of the world.

So, a group of Republican Senators, [Joseph H.] Ball of Minnesota and [Harold H.] Burton of Ohio, and Democratic Senators, [Lister] Hill of Alabama and [Carl A.] Hatch of New Mexico, introduced a resolution in the Senate in 1943 which was called the Ball-Burton-Hill-Hatch, or B2H2 Resolution. As I recall, it merely declared it to be the sense of the Congress that the United States should cooperate with other nations after World War II to bring into being a world organization through which the peace-loving nations could pool their strength against lawless or aggressive actions by any nation. No one country could now run the whole world. England with her fleet had been able to for about a hundred years, but



that day had gone. England didn't have the strength, she was too exhausted by two wars and there were too many other powers in the world. We either had to have such an international organization that would be effective or the United States would have to try to do it by itself, which the United States couldn't do indefinitely. We didn't have the resources (we're discovering that now), and second, we didn't have the patience. If we could move into a trouble spot quickly and get it over with, okay, but if unrest or threats to the peace were to drag on a long time, Americans by and large don't have the stomach for long, drawn-out struggles, as we're learning in Vietnam.

Well, this was the sentiment of many of us. By the summer of 1943 it was reasonably clear that Hitler was not going to succeed in conquering Europe. He had failed to get Stalingrad in 1941 and Baku oil wells in '42 and '43. He was retreating in Europe. By that time it was also clear that Japan was not going to win control of the Pacific. She had shot her bolt against the United States and been defeated at Midway. In her drive toward Australia she had been defeated in the Coral Sea. We had recovered from Pearl Harbor, rebuilt our fleet, and were beginning our march, island by island, back across the Pacific.



So, it was time then to think about the future. There were six or eight in the Senate and six or eight in the House who were particularly concerned. It was my belief that we had to have some kind of a world organization to get order and peace in our world, the same as we had to have organization in our own country and in our communities if we were going to have order and peace here. This concern had been the major reason why I had given up my profession and gone into political life. So, we gradually worked out, that spring of 1943, a plan to have some bipartisan teams go out through the country talking about this issue--grassroots education if you wish. Naturally, since it was a bipartisan resolution it would be wise to have on each team a Republican and a Democrat. If the Republican was a Senator, the Congressman would be a Democrat and vice versa. I was assigned first with Senator Carl Hatch, one of the authors of the resolution. He was a Democratic Senator from New Mexico, and I was a Republican Congressman from Minnesota.

We started in July out in Iowa, Davenport, Fort Dodge, Mason City and so on. Something came up about the third or fourth day that required Senator Hatch to leave, and in the emergency, they sent out Senator Truman.



He hadn't been on one of the regular teams because he wasn't very much of a speaker and he wasn't as well-known as Senator Hatch, but he was interested in this cause and so they sent him to take Carl Hatch's place. He joined me at Des Moines on a Friday, as I recall. spoke in the morning at Simpson College, a Methodist college in Indianola, twenty miles or so south of Des Moines. We spoke at a joint luncheon of the Chamber of Commerce, Rotary and other clubs in Des Moines at noon. The Governor of Iowa was Bourke Hickenlooper, and he introduced us. The next year he was elected to the Senate, where he became a very close associate of President Truman.

Then we spoke somewhere else in the afternoon, Drake University, I believe, and in the evening at Iowa State University at Ames. From there on we were on the circuit together.

HESS: Whit kind of an impression did Senator Truman make as a speaker?

JUDD: Well, this brings up an interesting story. He had a speech all written out--and the first two or three times he pretty much read it. He and I had talked a little over the phone before he



joined me and I told him the pattern that Carl Hatch and I had worked out. Since the resolution was a Senate resolution, and dealt more specifically with treaties which the Senate would have to approve, maybe the best thing would be to have me speak first on why we had to have a world organization, and then the Senator would follow with how to achieve it. President Truman and his staff had prepared his speech along those lines. We usually had about twenty minutes apiece for a forty minute appearance, a little longer when we could expand it in evening meetings, and a little shorter at luncheons. He's not a very dramatic speaker, either when he's reading or when he's speaking ad lib. In private conversation the words just come along, but not so well before an audience. He wasn't trained to be a speaker. He was a businessman.

So, after about the third or fourth occasion, he always started his speech with a story. I'd try to get them steamed up as to why we couldn't go back to the isolationist pattern of the past. Then he'd get up and tell this story. I bet he told it the last fifteen speeches we made together. He said, "For me to make a speech following this stem-winder, Judd, always makes me feel like the man



who went to the funeral of his wife and the undertaker told him he'd have to ride to the

cemetery in the same car with his mother-in-law. He protested, but the undertaker insisted there was no other place for him to ride." And then Mr. Truman would always scratch his head and go on, "Well," the old fellow said, "I can do it, but it sure is going to spoil the whole day for me."

That story always went over with a bang and gave him a good entree. He always had his facts well thought out and assembled, but he had no oratorical gifts. It was straight-forward, declarative sentences, factual. After he got them with this introduction he was very convincing. We enjoyed that trip--I did--very greatly and I have reason to believe he did too.

In several places in those days they weren't as thoughtful about accommodations as they generally are now. For example, I remember in the Cornhusker Hotel in Lincoln, Nebraska, they gave us the nearest they had, I guess, to a Presidential suite. We had twin beds in the same room. Every night on the road he'd call up Bess. I couldn't avoid hearing him talk to her over the telephone because I just happened to be in the same room. He never was embarrassed, and I have the greatest admiration for the obvious devotion and affection and trust that he had for his wife. They were a great pair.



It was certainly a most happy and successful marriage. You find out what a fellow is like down deep, when you hear him talking to his own wife about his family or whatever. He's not a man with inhibitions. If he felt indignant about something he'd let you have it. He'd let her have it too, I suppose, if he felt that way.

We would talk one place in the morning or at noon and talk at another place that evening. We drove, for example, from Topeka, Kansas over to Emporia where we were to be that night; and the next day, in the morning, we drove from Emporia to Wichita where we were to be at noon and then to Salina, Kansas in the afternoon. We visited a prison camp there with a thousand or so Nazi prisoners that we had captured from [Field Marshal Erwin] Rommel in North Africa. Mr. Truman was very interested as was I in seeing those prisoners from across the fence. We couldn't talk to them but the spectacle of them and us, persons of the same race and culture and so on, so bitterly opposed to each other because of their having been taken over by the fellow Hitler, made one think.

There's a story here I perhaps ought to put on the record. We were in Omaha one night and the next day a Sunday, we were to be in Grand Island and Hastings, Nebraska. They're cities fifty



and seventy-five miles west of my family home at Rising City, Nebraska, which is seventy-five miles west of Omaha. We spent Saturday night in Omaha and I asked him if he would object to having Sunday dinner, good fried chicken or something of that sort, at my country home where my father was still living. He said he'd be delighted. So, we drove there and had a good home-cooked dinner at noon with homemade ice cream and so on. He just loved it.

Because my father had been born in northwest Missouri, only the second county away from Jackson County where Kansas City is, and lived there until he was a teenager, he and Mr. Truman had some things in common and they talked in a homespun way. I remember at the end of it, my father, who was a strong Republican, and had been a great supporter of George Norris in Republican politics in Nebraska, was very much impressed with Truman and in his direct way he said to me, "Well whatever his views are politically, I would trust him with my pocketbook." That was the finest compliment my father, a pioneer out on the frontier, could pay; he would trust Mr. Truman with his pocketbook.

After Hastings and Grand Island that afternoon and evening, we were to speak in Kansas City the



next noon, Monday. Lo and behold, the Kansas City people objected to Mr. Truman's speaking there: The Chamber of Commerce, the Rotary, Kiwanis and perhaps Lions clubs wouldn't organize a luncheon if Mr. Truman was to speak at it, even though it was his home town--or Independence is, right outside it. The reason was this: it was right after they had had a terrible political fight in Kansas City in which reform forces had rooted out the Pendergast machine. That had been a pretty tough, rough machine, such as city machines were for many, many decades in America; in New York, Boston, Chicago, and so on. Well, Mr. Truman had been appointed judge--it wasn't really a judicial job, it was a kind of county executive for Jackson County--largely at the behest of the Pendergast machine. It had put Harry Truman in to give itself respectability because he was a man who could do it. I don't think anybody ever questioned his integrity. He was, in some sense I suppose, a front for them, not intentionally on his part. But that was, doubtless, their point of view. Well, Kansas City leading citizens had fought so hard for so long and finally got the machine out, they were not willing to honor what they considered a product of the machine by sponsoring a big luncheon at which he spoke. Well, that was the...



HESS: What did he say about that?

JUDD: He didn't know it. I don't think he knows it even yet. I'll tell you how we got around it.

The people of Kansas City protested to the folks in Washington who were setting up these B2H2 tours and they called to ask me what to do. I said, "Well, maybe you could split us for that meeting." So, that is what happened. They sent me to Kansas City for that noon and sent Mr. Truman to Topeka and then they drove me to Topeka in the afternoon and picked him up and we went on to Emporia for the evening, as I said earlier. The case was presented like this, "Senator, you're in Kansas City all the time. That is your home town. We've got a request also from Topeka for that noon. So isn't it better to have Judd go to Kansas City, he's a new voice to them, and you go to Topeka, and thus cover both of these places at one luncheon?" It was smoothed over that way. And to the best of my knowledge, he never knew the reason why.

That same afternoon when we were driving from Topeka to Emporia in a police car with a state trooper we got to talking about Kansas City and Pendergast and so on. He said, "You know, a lot of people jumped on me



when Pendergast died and I went out to his funeral. But Tom Pendergast never asked me to do one dishonorable, or unworthy, or undercover thing, in his life. And I must say he gave me the start by appointing me to that judgeship out of which came my election to the United States Senate and such career as I've had." (And I'm sure neither he nor I at that time ever imagined that he was going to be President of the United States. He had no ambition of that sort. That came out of the fight at the Democratic convention the following year when the problem was how to get rid of Henry Wallace whom they didn't want for another term as their Vice President. Knowing Mr. Roosevelt's health was not good, the responsible Democrats as well as other people didn't want Henry Wallace to succeed FDR as President.) When Tom Pendergast died and Harry Truman went out to his funeral and paid his respects--if you wish, honor--to the man, at least as his personal friend, he knew there would be brickbats, and he got them because of it. But he put his own values first, and loyalty to friends was certainly one of his finest qualities.

As a result of that speaking trip together we were fairly close for the next year or so, really until after the San Francisco conference in 1945 which set up the UN. A couple of times a year the



former team members would have a dinner together or we'd talk things over, meet occasionally. But once the job had been accomplished, there wasn't any reason why I should be in touch with him frequently.

I found in looking through my file, a letter he wrote to me on January 12, 1945. I had sent him a picture taken of us at the head table at the luncheon in Omaha.

He wrote: "I certainly appreciate very much your letter of the second, and am returning the picture signed as you suggested. I wish I could see and talk with you. I think maybe I could make a good Democrat out of you as I helped to do with Joe Ball. I know where both of you belong."? He was suggesting that we belonged in the Democratic Party. Well, I didn't on domestic matters, although I went along with the Democrats on foreign policies more than I did with my own party at that time.

HESS: Why?

JUDD: Because the Republican Party was still substantially dominated by people who thought that to be sound and conservative domestically meant that you had to be isolationist internationally, and I was totally non-isolationist.



I had lived abroad--in Asia--for ten years. I knew that it was an impossible policy for the United States. In fact my first vote in 1920 was for a Democrat. Although I came from a Republican family, I voted for Cox and Roosevelt in 1920, because of my support for the Democrats' effort to get some kind of a world organization. I was sure there would be disaster if we tried to withdraw from the world--and there was.

Then Truman added in the letter, "Please remember me to your father and tell him I still think of him. He has a large portion of what it takes to make America great, and that is good common sense. He has shown he knows how to use it." I told you how he and my father got along, they hit it off very well.

HESS: Now, was your trip mainly in the Midwest?

JUDD: Yes. It was Iowa and Nebraska and Kansas and Missouri and so on. We wound up in--rather he left me--after Salina, Kansas. He had to go down to Texas for some Truman Committee business. This was about the 25th of July 1943, I think, and he had some task having to do with the Truman Committee. He got a telegram or a phone call, so he left and I carried on alone the next two or three days, the rest of our schedule, and wound up in St. Louis.



HESS: While you were with him did he ever say anything about what he thought the importance of the Truman Committee was or…

JUDD: Oh, yes.

HESS: ...did he talk about the committee?

JUDD: Yes, he talked about it a good deal--and it was his work on the Truman Committee which eventually made him President of the United States. He was very, very loyal to the military, but he recognized that in wartime you pull out all the stops no matter what it costs--you've just got to get this, that, and the other thing--and without careful herd-riding on the military there would be extravagance, duplication, overlapping, as well as conflicts and tremendous waste. He was just as determined to have an adequate and effective military machine as anyone could be, but he was opposed to waste and the little internal bickering and quarrellings that were going on. He was very proud of the committee's work. He said, "We're saving the Government"--several times I heard him say, "countless millions, if not billions of dollars, and getting better, greater military strength in the process."

HESS: Regarding the B2 H2 Resolution, in your private conversations did he ever tell you when



he first became interested, or saw the necessity for international cooperation?

JUDD: No. If he did I don't recall it.

HESS: Why do you think that he was interested in this at this time?

JUDD: Well, I think it was in what he said. You must have somewhere a copy of that speech he gave. He had mimeographed copies that he gave out to the press in every city. He varied it, but it was his basic speech. I think it was probably worked out largely by the staff, because it was that kind of a staff speech. It was not so much a sentimental or patriotic appeal, as a hardheaded argument that the United States had grown up. Its position in the world had changed. Look at the threats that had come from the East and the West. Dorothy [Dr. Judd's secretary]--

That isn't the picture I was looking for, but I think those were taken at the same time. We were getting off a plane. Oh, why in the heck, I never put dates on them. I think this was taken out in Salina, Kansas, at that great big air base there. I'm not sure.

HESS: At the door of the hanger it looks like.

JUDD: Yes.



HESS: The airplane is behind.

JUDD: Let me think who that fellow was. It may be Frank Schupp, he was with the Foreign Affairs Committee. This is the patrolman that probably drove us around. You see it's summer, we had straw hats on, and our bags.

HESS: Approximately how many stops and how many speeches did you make? Do you recall?

JUDD: Oh, I would say altogether there were somewhere between fifteen and twenty times when we spoke on the same platform. He started late because Senator Carl Hatch was with me the first days. Then Mr. Truman had to leave a couple of days before the end of the tour. It was a three week tour, and he was with us as I recall, altogether coming late and leaving early, probably two of the three weeks and we always did two and sometimes four talks a day.

HESS: What do you recall about the origins of B2H2? Now, three of the men served on the Truman Committee. Hill, Lister Hill, was the only man who was not on the Truman Committee.

JUDD: Yes.

HESS: Was there any possible connection between...



JUDD: Well, I think it was largely their association on that committee that they got to know each other very well. Truman's a friendly, informal, chatty sort of person--he's not very sober or solemn or stiff--you get to be very chummy when you work with Harry Truman, in a good sound way. And I think it was their working together, seeing the awful costs in men and materials and money of a war like this, the absolute necessity to find some other way of resolving international difficulties than by having wars every generation. We had had a war a generation earlier in which he and I served personally and now we were having a second in which the following generation was serving. We couldn't go on with this indefinitely. I think it was largely that although I don't recall his ever saying that he had previously had any different opinion and switched, or anything of the sort. We just both agreed that this was necessary; I don't recall our ever discussing how we got where we were in our views.

HESS: In checking over the New York Times last week on the B2H2, I found an article which indicated that Senator Ball's co-authorship spread the belief that the resolution has as its specific objective a world government, and that the reason for this was that he was from Minnesota and then Governor [Harold] Stassen, who had spoken along those lines, was also from Minnesota.



Do you think there is any connection between Governor Stassen's views and Joe Ball's views?

JUDD: Yes. I don't think there's any question but that Governor Stassen had a very great influence on Joe Ball. Joe Ball was a newspaper reporter in Minnesota for the St. Paul papers. He covered Stassen while he was Governor. When Senator Lundeen, Ernest Lundeen, was killed in a plane accident, Harold Stassen appointed Joe Ball to his seat. Everybody was surprised, greatly surprised, because Joe was regarded as a kind of run-of-the-mill newspaper reporter. But Stassen had been close to him. They obviously had had a good many hours of private conversation and he recognized Joe Ball had great ability and insight and so he appointed him--I think that Harold's world views did have a very great influence on the development of those same views by Joe Ball.

I remember my own argument--if you'll wait another minute I'll...

HESS: All right.

JUDD: Here's the speech I made in St. Louis, the very last one, August 11--so it was later than I thought. It was taken down and reprinted by a bank there and I...



HESS: Where was the last stop?

JUDD: In St. Louis, but Truman wasn't with me then, he'd left. So on this one I expanded a bit because I had to cover the arguments of both of us, my first part on why and his on how...

HESS: They didn't send another Senator out?

JUDD: No. There was only two or three days left. So I talked about the reasons why we must have an international organization, how our country now had been in a situation where it wasn't a choice of war or peace, it was war or subjugation--in which case a nation chooses war. I pointed out what our stake was. From the standpoint of our security and our world trade and so on, in the future, we simply had to have a world of peace and security. We had over expanded our productive capacity, both agricultural and industrial, to produce for ourselves and the rest of the world, and if we were now to come back to just the American market we'd have vast unemployment and return of depression and so on.

"How can we preserve the peace after we have won it? How can we prevent these periodic outbreaks of ever more violent and costly and disastrous wars? Historically there have never been but three types of security. The first was by individual armaments. Every man on these plains carried a gun on his hip. But it did not give him adequate security because two or three



others could always gang up against him. Therefore, he went on to the second stage--alliances.

The cattle thieves and horse rustlers and highwaymen were allied in gangs. Therefore, the law-abiding citizens had to form alliances also. They were not ideal, they led at times to perversions of justice, to vigilante groups, to lynch law. But on the whole they gave a greater degree of security than just individual arms. It was the balance of power system.

Then our forefathers, as this country became more thickly settled and society became more complex, were wise enough to proceed to the third stage, that of organized security. If a man wanted to be sure that his wife and children had a maximum of security with a minimum cost of his time and money, the way to do it was to join with his neighbors in organizing the community to make sure there would be clean water for all, good sewage disposal, good schools, good highways, good public health and good police force. It was not because he was more interested in his neighbor's wife than his own that he recognized it was part of his business to see that the neighbor's wife was safe and secure: it was because he was not sure of his own wife's safety unless he helped to build a community of orderliness which would make every law-abiding person in the area reasonably secure. Only when that had been achieved could he give up carrying his gun.

America tried for twenty years to get along without any of the three types of security. She wouldn't go into alliances with the nations whose interests were nearest to ours, she would not join with other countries in an attempt to get organized security, and then she gave up her own gun. No wonder we are fighting for our lives..."

And so on. This was my basic argument. Then I got down to his part. I said:



"Thoughtful Americans are working on this problem in every part of our land and of our government. More than twenty resolutions have been introduced into the two houses of Congress seeking to achieve this end. I believe the one that has been introduced by Senator Ball in conjunction with another Republican, Senator Burton of Ohio and two Democrats, Senator Hatch of New Mexico and Hill of Alabama, is by far the best one, because it is definite and specific and bipartisan. It sets forth what seems to me to be the minimum on which we must achieve cooperation and agreement if we are to have any hope of avoiding future war.

I want to discuss its chief provisions briefly, not because I'm interested in it for itself, but because it helps point up our thinking and focus our attention on what the real essentials of the problem are. Talk of international collaboration that includes less than these essentials is idle daydreaming..."

and so on.

"First it (the resolution) recognizes that the machinery set up in our Constitution for making treaties and binding commitments with other nations is a partnership--the executive and the United States Senate--and that we operate under a two party system.

and so on."

HESS: What do you recall of President Roosevelt and the administration's views regarding B2H2?

JUDD: Oh, they supported it wholeheartedly. I think they were wise enough though, Mr. Roosevelt was very shrewd, not to grab it as just a Democratic measure because if they did, politics being what it is, some Republicans would say, "Well, we aren't going to support it



because it's a Democratic proposal." Very much in our mind when we developed this crusade; was whether our President after the next election was to be a Republican or a Democrat. The fact was, as I put it, we had to have an American foreign policy. We've had four great basic foreign policies, until recently. And they were all bipartisan, all American. On our north, settle any disputes with Canada by mediation, negotiation, arbitration and so on. On our south, the Monroe Doctrine--a determination not to let any European or foreign systems or sovereignties get control of substantial sections or even a good foothold in this hemisphere. The world knew that this was an American policy. They knew that if there was a change in administrations here it would not change that basic policy, therefore it was dependable and credible.

In the Far East--on our west--our policy was "Maintaining the Open Door in China." If China was free and independent, neither Japan nor Russia, the only two countries that might threaten us, could move against us because China was behind Japan and on Russia's southern flank. It was worked out by a Republican administration, [William] McKinley and John Hay, his Secretary of State. It was supported one hundred percent by President [Woodrow] Wilson when



the Japanese tried to wreck it in 1915. Then again it was supported by the Republicans in 1921-22 at the Washington Nine Power Conference; and again by Democrats Roosevelt and [Cordell] Hull in 1940-41. They went to war with Japan rather than let Japan get control of the manpower, territory and resources of China because that would be too dangerous to ourselves.

Likewise we had a foreign policy toward Europe on our east. However, we hadn't been so united on that one. It was a policy (from Washington's day), of no permanent entangling alliances with Europe. It's often called just, "No entangling alliances." But the word "permanent" was used by both Jefferson and Washington. That is, let our alliances be determined in each instance on the basis of our national interests at the time.

As Washington said, "Europeans have a set of historic interests or conflicts" (some words like that) "that we don't have." If we were to be tied up permanently with a given country, then we'd be called upon to defend its policies which we had had no hand in helping develop. Therefore, in the first war we were allied with the French against the British. In another one we might be with the British against the Germans. No permanent alliances. And we never did have any until



establishment of the NATO treaty in 1948, with a group of European countries. But from Woodrow Wilson's time on there hadn't been as great cooperation on European matters, or as much unity of thinking between the two parties and their various leaders as previously. Our desire was to restore that unity so we'd have on our east as well as on our north, south and west, an American foreign policy that would be dependable and the world would know that no matter which party was in power, this would be the consistent policy of the United States.

I think history has proved that it was an extremely wise step to make our effort bipartisan, and to include both executive and legislative branches, and both House and Senate. This made it impossible for the San Francisco conference, for example, to be thrust into partisan politics, as the Versailles conference had been, partly because of intransigence on the part of President Wilson, and on the other hand, of Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. and others. Men got their backs up. Each was going to run it his own way. One was the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, as [J. William] Fulbright is now, and the other was President and they got into a tangle. It wasn't so much, I think, because Democrat and Republican in the beginning, as it was a personality clash. Each was



a number one man not willing to be number two. B2 H2 supporters were determined that that wasn't going to happen again and I'm glad to say that on matters of foreign policy, there's been very great unity in our country these last decades.

Yes, some of the Democrats are off the reservation on this issue but some Republicans are off on that. So it hasn't been a Republican-Democrat clash all these postwar years, even when there was so much opposition to Mr. Truman's withdrawal of MacArthur (which was a disaster, regarding which I can give you some notes because I went to town on that). Nevertheless, it wasn't made a Republican or Democratic thing. There were Democrats in 1951 who opposed President Truman on that just as strongly as the Republicans did.

HESS: You thought he was wrong in that?

JUDD: Sure. It was a disaster, we would never have been in Vietnam if he hadn't done that.

HESS: Why?

JUDD: Because he pulled out MacArthur on the basis of an earlier decision not to win in Korea. That made it possible for the Communists to get out of Korea where they



couldn't win to shift to Southeast Asia where they could.

I made a statement in Congress the very day he pulled MacArthur out. I had called President Truman and he had said to me, "Walter, I'm trying to stop the war, not expand it."

I said, "I know that, Mr. President, but what you're doing, I predict, will expand the war and not contain it," which is, of course, what it did.

There couldn't have been a war in South Vietnam if we had kept them tied up in Korea and defeated them there. Just as the war in Korea was the unfinished China war, so the war in Vietnam is merely the unfinished Korean war. The biggest mistake Truman made was his failure to finish up the Korean war after sending our forces in and when he had the Communists on the ropes there.

HESS: What should have been done?

JUDD: Just say to the Communists, "Call off this aggression or else we're not going to respect any of your privileged sanctuaries beyond the Yalu River." This is the way Ike got the fighting stopped about two years later. He tried at first, like Truman, to get it stopped by talking at Panmunjom. The Commies talked, talked, talked. He assumed that they came to negotiate to end the war.



No, they came to talk, not to negotiate. For them such talk is a substitute for negotiation, an evasion of negotiation. They came just to talk, talk, talk, and wear us down, hoping thereby to win the war.

Mr. Truman tried to negotiate for a year and a half--from the summer of '51 until he went out in January '53. Ike then tried for five or six months, the same as Kennedy later tried for a while to negotiate on Vietnam until he practically had to give up, and Johnson tried at Paris, and Nixon is trying now. They don't succeed and they won't succeed that way in getting a real peace.

So, Ike, when he found out that they were just trying to win the war by stalling, sent word to them indirectly and without any public notice, that if they didn't come and negotiate at Panmunjom meaningfully, he would have, as I recall, seven words, "no inhibitions as to territory and weapons." Well, that meant in very plain language that if they didn't negotiate meaningfully and stop this fighting and