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Livingston Merchant Oral History Interview

 

Oral History Interview with
Livingston Merchant

With U.S. Department of State, 1942-62, assistant chief, Division of Defense Materials, 1942, chief, War Areas Division, 1945; counselor for economic affairs with rank of minister, American Embassy, Paris, 1945-46; chief of Aviation Division, 1946-48; appointed as Foreign Service officer, 1947; counselor of American Embassy, Nanking, China, 1948-49; deputy assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1949-51, deputy for political affairs to United States special representative in Europe and alternate United States permanent representative to North Atlantic Council, Paris, rank of ambassador, 1952-53, assistant secretary of State for European Affairs, 1953-56, 1958-59; Ambassador to Canada, 1956-58, 1961-62; under secretary of State for political affairs, 1959-61; U.S. executive director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1965-68.

Washington, D.C.
May 27, 1975
by Richard D. McKinzie

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]

 


Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened December, 1979
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]

 



Oral History Interview with
Livingston Merchant

 

Washington, D.C.
May 27, 1975
by Richard D. McKinzie

[1]

MCKINZIE: Mr. Ambassador, I think that a lot of historians are interested in the circumstances under which people came into Government service. When you were a young man at Princeton, did you intend a career with the State Department?

MERCHANT: No, I had no thought of it. My primary consideration then was to earn enough money to pay off my debts, support my mother, and get married. I had always had in the back of my mind a desire, if and when I could afford to, to in some capacity enter into public service.

[2]

In any event, I graduated from Princeton and, in 1926, went into business. I was fortunate and was successful. When Pearl Harbor came, I was asked to come down and take a wartime job.

I was called by a friend who asked me if I was interested (the night of Pearl Harbor), and I came down to Washington the following week to the State Department for a wartime job. I took a wartime leave of absence from my partners in New York and never went back to private enterprise.

MCKINZIE: Mr. Ambassador, after you'd had a wartime assignment, you ended up in postwar France as a counselor for economic affairs with the rank of minister. Could you explain how that happened?

MERCHANT: Well, I guess the explanation really is that the old friend of mine, Harry [Henry

[3]

Richardson, Jr.] Labouisse, who was responsible for asking me to come down to Washington in the State Department (he having gone down there about six months earlier, himself, from his law firm in New York), had been sent over to Paris as minister for economic affairs. He came back in the fall of 1946 and suggested my name as his successor. So, I went over there in October, I think it was, of '45.

MCKINZIE: Rather desperate times for the French.

MERCHANT: It was a very, very rough period for them, yes.

MCKINZIE: Until the spring of 1947 when there began to be some planning for the Marshall plan, the French economy had continued to downslide. The reconstruction that everyone anticipated would occur didn't. Do you recall discussions, either in Paris or in Washington, about the

[4]

prospects of French recovery without aid? Was there, in your mind, hope that the French would be able to do it themselves?

MERCHANT: Well, I was only there about a year, when Will Clayton asked me to come back, in the fall of '46, I guess. I came back to Washington, worked for Will Clayton, and of course, was intimately involved then in the economic problems of Western Europe and all aspects of possible assistance. That was after the Marshall plan had been conceived.

MCKINZIE: But so far as your own thinking while you were in Paris, did you believe that the French were somehow going to be able to do it, themselves, without American aid?

MERCHANT: No.

MCKINZIE: There was interim aid, a loan to France, and all of that.

[5]

MERCHANT: Right. No, to me it was inconceivable that the French or the Western Europeans could, with the limited, temporary form of economic assistance that we were authorized to provide for them, achieve their recovery. It required not just a larger amount of assistance, but it required the assurance that for a stated period, extending over years rather than months, assistance would be made available, to give them the self-confidence to put in train the various projects and operations which led to the miraculous recovery which the Marshall plan was responsible for. It wasn't that the Marshall plan was the exclusive force responsible for the recovery. The effort of the Europeans themselves was more important in terms of magnitude, and probably more important in terms of psychology. But it was the Marshall plan that triggered it, gave it its underlying support, and represented a vote of confidence and continuing assistance

[6]

from the United States. The combination resulted, I think, in the extraordinary result.

MCKINZIE: Under Secretary Clayton had a view of what ought to be, if I can put it that way. He had the view that there ought to be, if not free trade, something fairly close to it, and more than that he was a strong proponent of European integration. Did you share his ideas at that time?

MERCHANT: Not totally. I don't think, at any point, I was a proponent of political integration. I was satisfied in my own mind that economical cooperation was essential, but, as best I can recall my attitude then, I was extremely dubious that political integration was achievable or, in terms of the ultimate result, necessarily desirable.

MCKINZIE: I gather, Will Clayton, at every opportunity, did push the idea.

[7]

MERCHANT: He did. And I don't want to imply that I was a rebel, a subverter, or someone who was totally opposed to it, but I had my own interior doubts as to whether this was certainly feasible.

MCKINZIE: Did you think that the French could have been pushed into it? I talked to a Belgian economist once who said that if the United States had been tougher, the United States could have forced at least some kind of economic integration, if not political integration. Did you have the feeling that the French themselves were amenable to some move toward economic integration in order to receive U.S. aid?

MERCHANT: No, really quite to the contrary. I think the French were prepared to cooperate within economic limits, as indeed they did, for example, in the Schumann plan, under the

[8]

Marshall plan, under the Common Market. In my judgment at the time, and in retrospect, what destroyed the very highly desirable movement to a closer economic integration was what seemed to me the unwise and abortive effort to create the EDC [European Defense Community]. Control of national armed forces, I felt then and I think now, is the real essence of national sovereignty, and the effort to combine the armed forces was, if not impossible in the first half of the 20th century, certainly grossly premature.

MCKINZIE: But did not the effort to create the EDC serve political rather than military purposes? The creation of the EDC would have been one more step towards the integration that the proponents of Will Clayton's ideas would have wanted.

MERCHANT: Oh, that's certainly true, but it would have involved taking that last and final bite of the cherry before you'd broken the skin on

[9]

your first bite or your second bite, really.

MCKINZIE: In 1945 and 1946 while you were in Paris, the French representation in the United States, that is, the French Ambassador particularly, was trying to present a very dismal picture of life in France and the need for U.S. assistance. The story is told, for example, of the Ambassador's wife who wore the same dress throughout the social season and served at dinner parties that awful gray bread that was made out of some ersatz sort of material, at least not the traditional stuff. The implication was that the whole French system was on the edge of collapse and that if something wasn't done, there was going to be a social upheaval, a revolution of some sort. Were you concerned about this social situation in France, the possibility that the Communists might win at the polls? Or was that a major problem, so far as you were concerned? The Ambassador, at least,

[10]

used that here in the United States.

MERCHANT: Yes. Well, I don't think, from my viewpoint in Paris, that the prospects were quite that alarming or dreary. Certainly, the economic situation and the prospects were dreary, but I never felt that the political risks were as high as what you suggest would indicate. I traveled through France a good deal in those days of '45 and '46. The economy was pretty dreary, that's certainly true, but France, of course, basically has always been and was even then a rich country (I mean economically). It's agriculturally a rich country, enormously rich soil, hard-working, skilled farmers. And when you got out of Paris into the countryside you found there was no shortage of such things as butter, for example, which were in terribly short supply in Paris and in the metropolitan areas of France.

[11]

MCKINZIE: Did you, before you left Paris, think about the future of Europe and Germany's place in it? There was a feeling in '45 that Germany should be pastoralized, but then by '47 there was, for various reasons, the belief that Germany had become an integral part of a Western European system. Did those kinds of considerations come into your mind?

MERCHANT: Oh, yes. Anyone who lived there at the time was giving thought to the problems and was aware of the enormous vitality of the German people. Even though they'd been defeated and devastated and suffered grievous economic blows, the basic underlying strength of the German economy guaranteed that it was going to recover, and I think it recovered more rapidly than most people thought. I don't think any intelligent person that I talked to, French, British, or Belgian -- truly intelligent people

[12]

with a knowledge of a history in economics -- felt that Germany would be held down; it was too powerful, too vital, too industrious. And those people were thinking in terms of how you can best knit Germany into a community where its capacity for dangerous independent action can be blunted; its absorption into a wider, broader community which would be inhibitory to independent action.

MCKINZIE: Ambassador Merchant, did you attend at all the Paris Peace Conference in the summer of 1946?

MERCHANT: Just a very, very few sessions. I was an honorary member, I think, of the delegation, but I didn't serve on any of the committees or the subcommittees.

MCKINZIE: The reason I asked that question was to find whether or not that would have served in

[13]

any instructive way to you about Soviet intentions in Western Europe at the end of the war. I'm interested in the evolution of your own thinking about the Soviets.

MERCHANT: Well, my underlying attitude in that period was one of suspicion as to Soviet intentions and their ultimate purposes. I'd read enough of not just [Karl] Marx but [Nikolai] Lenin to be aware of what their historic ambitions and hopes and intentions were. At the peace conference, this was not too overt; nevertheless, it was apparent what the Soviets were driving toward. I think anyone who had any knowledge of history and Marxism was, in 1945, '46, '47 alert to the quite apparent purposes of the Soviets.

MCKINZIE: Do I understand you correctly that Will Clayton asked you to come back to Washington from Paris?

MERCHANT: Yes.

[14]

MCKINZIE: To what did he assign you?

MERCHANT: Well, it was a combination of two things. One was that I had an ill child, and the Paris climate was the worst thing for him. Will Clayton was aware of this, and he asked me to come back, knowing that I was dubious as to how much longer I could reasonably ask my family to stay there. And he asked me to come back to head the Civil Aviation Division, which was the negotiating arm of Civil Aviation in the United States Government. This was the fall or early winter, November, December of '47, when the United States had all the transport aircraft. Under the Bermuda agreements, we had all the routes and the landing rights on a worldwide basis, theoretically, but we didn't have any intergovernmental agreements as to the terms on which we could use those landing rights. So, he asked me back, really, to take on the

[15]

negotiating job, which was to negotiate the air transport agreements with the countries which had granted us de jure landing rights but had not set or agreed to the terms on which they would be exercised. And I think I calculated once that, in 13 months, the relatively small team of negotiators that I assembled and had under me nego