Oral History Interview with
In the Truman Administration served as Director of Labor
for the Military Government Group in Germany; general counsel to the National
Labor Relations Board, 1945-46; Assistant Secretary of Labor, 1946-47;
Under Secretary of Labor, 1947-48 (Acting Secretary June 9-August 2, 1948);
and as U.S. Government member, International Labor Office, Geneva, Switzerland,
1946-48. From 1948 to 1970 was Director-General of the International Labor
David A. Morse
July 25, 1977
by James R. Fuchs
[Notices and Restrictions | Interview
Transcript | Additional Morse Oral History Transcripts]
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.
Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. ) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.
Opened October, 1980
Harry S. Truman Library
[Top of the Page | Notices
and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional
Morse Oral History Transcripts]
Oral History Interview with
David A. Morse
July 25, 1977
by James R. Fuchs
FUCHS: To start, would you relate when and where you were
born and something about your education, and how you happened to come
into the Government?
MORSE: Well, I was born May 31, 1907, in New York City and at the age
of one was moved out to Somerville, New Jersey where I was raised in a
small town, went to public school, and then in 1925 went to Rutgers College,
as it was called then, in New Brunswick, New Jersey. I graduated in '29
and went then to the Harvard Law School
from which I graduated in 1932. In 1932, I went to Newark, New Jersey
to work for a law firm as a clerk and was admitted to the bar immediately
thereafter. In 1933, I was recruited by Nathan Margold, who was then the
Solicitor of the Interior Department, to come and work on his staff as
a young lawyer. I was then about 26 years of age. I'd been recommended
to him by one of my former professors at the Harvard Law School, Felix
Frankfurter, and a classmate of mine who was a very close friend, Herbert
Marks, who was, at that point, working in Washington. I worked in the
Interior Department from '33 until '35 when I became the General Counsel
of the Petroleum Labor Policy Board in the Interior Department. This was
rather interesting because the petroleum code of the NRA had been turned
over to Harold Ickes, the then Secretary of the Interior, by Franklin
D. Roosevelt for administration. As part of the petroleum code,
he had to set up a Petroleum Labor Policy Board which was one of the early
efforts at implementing the labor code at the time, later incorporated
in the Wagner Act. I became General Counsel of that outfit working under
the chairmanship of Dr. William Leiserson. As a result of that, I was
asked by Francis Biddle who was the first chairman of the National Labor
Relations Board, and Calvin Magruder, his General Counsel, who'd been
a professor of mine at the Harvard Law School, if I would join the NLRB
and be the first Regional Attorney for that organization in the New York
City, Connecticut and New Jersey area to be among these young lawyers
at the time who would help test the constitutionality of the Wagner Act
or the National Labor Relations Act as it was called. I agreed and moved,
therefore, from Interior to New York to work for the NLRB for that purpose,
and I stayed with the board until 1937. I left in 1937 because it was
in April of that year that the constitutionality
of the Act had been determined by the United States Supreme Court, and
I handled one of those cases which went to the Supreme Court called the
Associated Press case. Charles Fahy was then the General Counsel of the
National Labor Relations Board.
In 1937, when I resigned from the Government, I went back to Newark,
New Jersey and became a partner in my old law firm with which I'd previously
clerked. It was called Coult, Satz, Tomlinson, and Morse. We had an interesting
group of men. One was Walter Sauer, who later came to Washington to become
General Counsel, Chief Executive Officer, Vice President, Vice Chairman
of the Board of the Export-Import Bank. He's still with them in a consulting
capacity although he's now over age. I stayed with the law firm, practiced
law, became one of the first impartial chairmen of the milk industry for
the metropolitan area for New
When Pearl Harbor occurred I enlisted into our Army, went to a training
school in Florida in the Air Force. That was in April '42, and I became
a lieutenant after finishing my course, went into the Air Force. I went
overseas shortly thereafter to North Africa and was soon asked to act
as the Chief of the Manpower Division of the Military Government operation
that was going into Sicily, and was given the responsibility for preparing
the decrees for General Eisenhower which would abolish the Fascist corporative
syndical system. I did that job and went in on the invasion of Sicily,
which was in '42; went up into Palermo, from there continued to Naples,
and always in the same capacity, Chief of the Manpower Division of the
Allied Military Government, the British and the Americans.
About 1942, some months after the invasion
when I was in Naples, I was ordered to England. I went to Schrivenham,
which was an artillery school outside of London, to become part of a group
that was preparing for the invasion of the continent of France. Again,
because of my previous experience, they asked me to become part of the
unit at the Supreme Allied Headquarters, called SHAEF, to advise on the
labor aspects of what would become the Military Government in the occupied
areas, on the theory that we were going to succeed in our invasion. Bob
Murphy, I remember, Ambassador Murphy, was the political advisor to the
Supreme Commander, Eisenhower. I was labor adviser to the General. We
organized ourselves and some days after D-Day, sometime in 1944, I went
into France, then Paris, and from there moved on up to Versailles; and
from there to Frankfurt where I was the acting head of the Manpower Division
of the Allied Military Government, what they called the Control Council
of Germany; composed of U.S., British, French, and the Russians. We were
grouped into a Control Council, and I was dealing with the labor side
as acting head until they could appoint a general to take over these responsibilities,
which they eventually did when General Clay came over, sometime in '44
or early '45, I don't recall. He (General Frank McSherry) became then
the head of the labor side or manpower side of the Control Council. I
was then a lieutenant colonel and prepared at long last to return to the
FUCHS: Was Leo Werts over there at that time? He was probably in a much
MORSE: Yes. Leo Werts was in the picture and my recollection is that
he was part of my team and then stayed on after I left. A lot of people
came in at that time, very good men for this operation -- a lot of whom
the Government on the civilian side. I had been through the military side.
Joe Keenan came over just about that time to act as a labor adviser in
this particular area. He was a trade union leader sent over by the Government.
But I returned to the U.S. in '45, as I'd received a request from the
Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, to return from Germany to become General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, which was a very sentimental
journey for me due to the fact that I'd previously acted under Charles
Fahy when he was General Counsel.
FUCHS: Who was Chairman at that time?
MORSE: Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board was Paul Herzog,
and he had with him Gerard Reilly, who's now a judge here in the District
of Columbia, and Jim Reynolds. It was interesting, this particular move
on my part, because the day after I agreed to become General Counsel
and return to Germany for that post, I received a communication from Herbert
Lehman, former Governor of New York, later Senator, then the Director
General of UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration],
asking if I would become General Counsel of his organization. But I had
to refuse that since I had, the day before, accepted the NLRB offer.
FUCHS: Were you chagrined about that?
MORSE: Well, I was happy at both opportunities. Of course I loved the
Governor, so I was sorry not to have had the opportunity of working with
him. On the other hand, the NLRB post was something that was very consistent
with my experience. So I was pleased to do that; yet I was very honored
to have had both opportunities, and happy that I was to leave the Army
and return home. As a matter of fact, it was rather interesting when I
came back, I received the Legion of Merit.
I don't mention it because I received the Legion of Merit, but it was
rather nice because I was called over to the Pentagon and I was decorated
there by General McSherry, who came back for that purpose and who had
been the man who actually succeeded me as head of the U.S. Control Council
My work at the NLRB was extremely interesting. It was for me an innovative
period. It was a postwar period. It was still the Wagner Act, before the
Act had been amended to be called the Taft-Hartley law. I made a tremendous
effort with the Chairman to follow out President Truman's wishes, which
were rather clear, and that was to improve the National Labor Relations
Board's services to labor and management. I recall that very vividly because
it was in connection with that objective of the President that I called
the first conference that had ever been held by this agency or any other
agency in Government
of the attorneys that practiced in the labor field and before the NLRB.
This was good because it gave the bar on the management side and on the
labor side and the Government side, a chance to know each other, to exchange
views with each other, become familiar with their respective problems
and interests and the machinery and procedures of the National Labor Relations
Board, and to try to weld that into some cohesive relationship that would
have a positive impact on the public interest that we in the Government
were attempting to serve; and that was, I think, a very good development.
As a matter of fact, we received at the Board a great deal of positive
support for that effort.
FUCHS: Did President Truman deal directly with Chairman Herzog or did
he go through the General Counsel? How did his wishes become known other
than through his speeches?
MORSE: They became known because he worked directly at that time with
the Chairman of our board, Paul Herzog. It was an extremely important
period for the labor side of the administration and as far as the NLRB
was concerned we had to build a legal staff which had been practically
decimated by World War II, and I remember I added more than sixty lawyers
that were selected on a merit basis but with special preference for veterans.
Rather interesting that point, because the President insisted and the
chairman of the Board insisted that the recruitment be a merit recruitment,
and there were absolutely no politics in it at that time. We picked men
on the basis of their professional qualifications. I don't recall one
instance where I had been asked by the White House or by the Chairman
of the Board or by the trade union movement or employers, to place someone
on my board for political purposes. That was
very satisfactory. Paul Herzog did have very close relations with the
FUCHS: What was Mr. Herzog's and your feelings about veteran's preference?
MORSE: Well, you have to look at everything in the light of the circumstances
of the time. We'd just finished a bloody war, a very difficult one. A
lot of men had gone abroad who had high professional skills, been overseas
for a number of years and came back into a situation where they had to
rebuild their careers and I think it was justified that we give preferential
consideration to those men many of whom would come back handicapped and
most of whom had a very difficult time re-orienting themselves. None of
them were brought in, however, simply because they were veterans. We looked
at them first because of the veterans' position, but if they didn't have
the other qualifications, we
didn't take them. That's about it. We had no problem at that time about
it. That was in the spirit of that particular time.
However, one thing that did happen at that time, Mr. Fuchs, that is rather
interesting. You know we didn't have in our Government at that time any
program to deal with international labor problems. I was working on the
domestic side but I recall very vividly, I had been asked to come over
to the Labor Department after I returned, while I was General Counsel
of the Labor Board, to talk with various people about the labor aspects
of Europe, about international labor problems: the politics of it, the
Socialist developments, the Communist, the progressive developments, the
liberal developments, the conservative developments; what this would mean
to the future of Europe and to our relations with Europe. I remember talking
at great length with a fellow called Dan [Daniel W.]
Tracy. Dan had been former president of the International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers. But at this time, when I was General Counsel, he
was an Assistant Secretary of Labor under Lewis Schwellenbach who was
the Secretary of Labor, and who came from the State of Washington. He
had been a Federal judge, a United States Senator, and was very close
to Harry Truman when he was in the Senate. He was one of the Senators
referred to as a "young Turk" and very much in support of the
New Deal and its legislation. I talked with Dan and then had a number
of talks with Mr. Schwellenbach. I talked with the Secretary about the
importance of the labor movement in Europe and especially to the United
States and our future relations with the Western European countries from
an economic and political point of view. I told him that I thought that
it would be necessary and helpful, really vital, for the United States
to have someone in the U.S. Government authorized to be responsible for
monitoring the labor developments in Europe and elsewhere in the world
and if possible to influence those developments. I saw this very clearly
as a result of my work during the war with the new free labor unions that
were developing in Italy, in Germany, and in other parts of Western Europe;
and I could see how important they would be to our future political relations
with Europe and, of course, to the development of democracy in those countries.
Actually, I recall having a long talk with Isador Lubin. He came to Frankfurt
when I was there toward the end of my tour of duty in the Army. He'd been
sent over by our President, Franklin D. Roosevelt. He had an ambassadorial
rank, and he was doing a study there for the President. On that occasion
I talked with him about this particular problem. I asked him if he wouldn't
convey the issues to President Roosevelt,
which he said he would because he agreed very much with my views.
I mention this because, interestingly enough, a year after these conversations,
sometime in 1946, I was in my house on 16th Street in Washington and the
phone rang at night and it was a fellow by the name of Sylvester, who
was the Chief of the Bureau for the Newark Evening News of New
Jersey, in Washington. He said, "Dave, I just saw on the ticker that
you've been appointed by the President of the United States to be the
first Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs. What have
you got to say about it?"
I said, "Well, the first thing I've got to say about it is that
this is the first I've heard about it. I'm really quite surprised and
pleased, of course, because I think it's something which we need. Actually,
I've been talking about that to various people in
He said, "Well, the ticker says that you're going to be asked to
establish a Division for International Affairs by the President."
I said, "Well, I'm delighted." I think I must have been recommended
for that, Mr. Fuchs, by the Secretary of Labor, Schwellenbach, as a result
of the talks I'd had with him before about the general problems. But obviously
the appointment, as I learned later, had been made in consultation with
the president of the American labor movement, William Green.
FUCHS: Now this was part of the reorganization which took place in the
Labor Department after Mr. Schwellenbach was appointed, and I believe
there were two others appointed Assistant Secretary the same time you
were, "Mr. [Phillip] Hannah and Mr. [John] Gibson. Were you acquainted
with them prior to this?
MORSE: No, that was a whole new team. There was one other chap; there
was Governor Keen Johnson. He was a former Governor of Kentucky. He was
appointed as part of this reorganization by the Secretary of Labor as
Under Secretary of Labor. He was the first Under Secretary of Labor in
the Department of Labor. John Gibson was appointed at the same time. He
was from the CIO and Phil Hannah from Ohio, from the AFL. You recall that
at that time the labor movement was split and I gather this was part of
the effort on the part of the Administration to see to it that both sides
of the labor movement were properly taken into account in the administration
of our affairs. All of us were sworn in at the same time.
FUCHS: Have you reflections about Mr. Schwellenbach?
MORSE: Yes, I can tell you about that. I spent a
lot of time with him privately in his office. You see, I was the neutral,
so-called public member of those chaps who were then made Assistant Secretaries
of Labor. So if he had something that he wanted to discuss that involved
both sides he would talk to me and, of course, talk with the Under Secretary.
Even though my responsibilities were primarily international, I got drawn
into discussions of the domestic scene. I was asked by the Secretary to
deal with many ad hoc matters in areas not related to international
affairs. My impressions of Schwellenbach are very personal. I thought
he was a wonderful human being. I thought that he was a man that was better
one to one than in groups. When you sat down and talked with him quietly
he gave you his great experience. You could tell that this was a man who
had been through a lot in his life as a judge, a Senator, and as a politician.
When you got him before
larger audiences, he clammed up. It was a great effort for him, at this
period of his life that we're talking about. I think it's mainly that
he was very nervous. His hands would tremble. We'd go down to talk to
large groups and it was a terrific effort for him. I began to see that
this was because his health was failing him. I found that from the time
I took office until I left, which was the day when he died -- which we'll
talk about a little bit later -- he was a man in declining health. So
he was not able to go to as many Cabinet meetings as he should. When he
got to Cabinet meetings, I don't think he was as effective as he could
have been. I think he isolated himself a great deal from his staff, even
from the trade union movement, because he was conserving his strength.
He would spend large periods away from the office and it was all a matter
of health and nothing else. So, I think
one must consider him from a very compassionate point of view. He was
a wise man; he was a very good man. He was not a very strong administrator;
he was not even a good administrator. He didn't know how to dialogue with
his top people. He didn't really know how to bring them together as a
group and talk to them and hammer out policies and fix programs and delegate
authority. I think the way you had to deal with Lew Schwellenbach at that
time was to take initiatives yourself. Say, "Well, I've got this
idea and I've got that idea, I think we ought to do this, I think we ought
to do that and then move." If you would do that and if he liked the
idea he'd give you the green light and you'd go ahead. But if you were
the kind of fellow that didn't want to take initiatives, nothing would
happen. The result was that Congress was taking things away from the Labor
Department at that period; it was being
decimated. It was going through a very hard time. The morale of the Department
was not good. Keen Johnson subsequently left as Under Secretary. It was,
I think, 1947 when he left, and I was in Geneva at the time that I was
called back then to take his place as Under Secretary. I became Under
Secretary of Labor in 1947 -- that must have been in June of 1947.
We had very close relations. But then increasingly, his health deteriorated
so that from the time I became Under Secretary, I doubt that he went to
very many Cabinet meetings. I went to the Cabinet meetings on his behalf
and tried to do the best I could to serve the interests of the Department
and country at these meetings. I'd like to, if you don't mind, Mr. Fuchs,
go back a little bit to how we went about creating this international
FUCHS: Who was handling international labor affairs
when you were having these conversations while you were still General
MORSE: Well, that's a very good question because there was a complete
vacuum. The Labor Department was not handling international affairs. When
I was appointed Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs
to create the division, the first thing I did, of course, was to investigate
just that question in the Department: who was handling international affairs?
FUCHS: How were relations conducted with the ILO into which we had entered
MORSE: Well, I went over to the Labor Department and, interestingly enough,
I brought with me a fellow who had been my legal assistant at the National
Labor Relations Board, Millard Cass. He stayed with me right on through
period at the Labor Department. There were six people that I surrounded
myself with professionally in order to get this division started and Millard
Cass was one of them. The ILO, that you refer to, I couldn't find anybody
that was handling that until I finished a couple of weeks of exhaustive
study. We found that the representation was in the hands of an official
by the name of John Gambs who was down the line in the Bureau of Labor
Statistics and the Women's Bureau (he worked with both of them). He had
been going to ILO conferences. So when questionnaires and requests to
go to meetings came into the Labor Department, they got routed to this
chap. He'd answer the questionnaires and he would go to the meetings,
or he would tell people there was a meeting and maybe he ought to go to
it. It was hit or miss.
FUCHS: Did he attend the conferences?
MORSE: He went to them or he would suggest people to go. And then they
would pick people ad hoc to go. But there was no system, no bureau,
no real procedure. It was handled ad hoc. Just one man. So we had
not a very great impact in the work at that time. Of course, before the
war we may have had. But I'm talking now about the postwar period. As
far as that period is concerned that I'm talking about, there was nobody.
Now, actually it was just at that point that the Government began to
have a labor attaché program. I recall that the first labor attaché
had been appointed previously. It was Dan Horowitz. He's still in the
Labor Department as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Labor for International
Affairs. He was appointed in 1943. He was proposed by Isador Lubin. I
often wonder if maybe that wasn't some kind of a direct result of the
talk that I had
with Lubin when we were in Europe at that time; but it may have been before.
FUCHS: Was Lubin head of Labor Statistics at that time?
MORSE: Lubin then was still head of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
acting as the adviser to the President in the White House. This was under
Francis Perkins. The program of labor attaché, which now is a very
important program, was actually started as an experiment in Chile back
in 1943 with this fellow Horowitz. It was developed as a program in the
Truman administration. It was never developed as a program in FDR's administration.
They put a fellow here and they put a fellow there, but as a program it
was not until Harry Truman came in. This program was actually resisted
by all the Ambassadors except Claude Bowers who was our Ambassador in
Chile. He accepted the program. It later developed that when I came into
the Labor Department and began emphasizing the importance of this program
that the State Department agreed that they would beef the program up.
It was agreed by myself and State -- it was then Dean Acheson -- that
appointments would be made by State for this program after consultations
with myself as the Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs.
It was actually in 1945 that Sam Berger, who later became one of our Ambassadors
in Vietnam, became a labor attaché in London. He was actually with
Averell Harriman who headed the coal-steel mission in England. That's
the way this labor attaché program began and it is now a going
program administered by the State Department in consultation with the
FUCHS: You considered this one of your more significant
enterprises while you were Assistant Secretary?
MORSE: I think a significant thing was the creation of a proper unit
to effectively service the International Labor Organization. Another was
the strengthening and development of the program of labor attachés.
The next development, I think, that was significant was becoming the first
member from the Labor Department of the Foreign Service Board in the State
Department, where I tried to play a significant role in formulating policies
for our Foreign Service officers -- recruitment and selection of people.
Another, I think, significant activity had to do with the Marshall plan.
The Marshall plan came along in the postwar period and Paul Hoffman,
you remember, was appointed the administrator of it. And the President
himself, and Dean Acheson, who was
Under Secretary of State, asked me if I would use my good offices to help
Paul Hoffman become fully accepted by the American labor movement, so
that we could have the support of the American labor movement for the
Marshall plan. I arranged for Paul to be invited to most of the large
AF of L and CIO meetings throughout the country, the executive committee
meetings, where he addressed these people, got acquainted with them, and
talked with them about the Marshall plan. Through that I think I did make
some contribution to the work and the political support in this country
of the Marshall plan. I think otherwise the labor movement support would
not have been quite that great, and it was one of the key elements in
the support of the Marshall plan.
I also created something called the Trade Union Advisory Committee on
International Affairs. I found that with the labor movement being split
between the CIO and AF of L, it was
extremely difficult for me to function in international programs or to
help the President. I hit on the idea of setting up an advisory committee
and I consulted with Phil Murray, who was then the head of the CIO and
Bill Green, who was head of the AF of L, on the concept. They agreed this
was a good thing and they put their top people in this committee which
I chaired; and we would meet regularly to discuss problems together with
the CIO and the AF of L. This may not seem like a very significant step
to you now, but it was a great step forward then when they were hardly
talking to each other. They came, their top people, people like Jim Carey
on the CIO side, Matty Wohl on the AF of L side. I would ask what position
we should take on issues in the ILO, what position should we take on the
Marshall plan, what position should we take on the development of free
throughout the world, what position should we take on labor attaché
programs, what position should we take on the Truman Doctrine in Greece
and so on. Through this mechanism we always got a unified labor movement
position on the international side of President Truman's efforts. It was
very interesting. At this time I brought in with me more and more good
people. A fellow by the name of Thacher Winslow became one of my assistants
with Millard Cass. Philip Kaiser was one of my assistants; I brought him
in. You know Philip, he's now our Ambassador to Hungary and so on. I'll
talk a little bit more about him later. So I began to build up a good
staff to help me on these matters. At that time the CIO was not the representative
at any of the ILO meetings. It was the AF of L. There was a big fight
going on constantly about representation. Through this advisory committee
I got them to understand the procedural and legal aspects of this and
the problems, even to the extent that they would send some CIO people
over along with the AF of L people to various ILO meetings. That went
a long way toward creating a better atmosphere in the Labor Department
and in the labor movement of our country.
Another thing that happened during this period was interesting. I got
the agreement of the Secretary of Labor and the President that I should
invite periodically the labor commissioners from all the different states
of the United States to come to Washington to discuss their problems.
Now, again, that doesn't seem like much to you now, although I'm not sure
how much of that is being done now. But at that time it was considered
quite a revolutionary step to get these chaps together. They all came,
and we discussed their problems. They learned from each other; they got
to know each other; they got to know the
differences in their techniques of administration. They examined whether
certain ILO conventions should be ratified or shouldn't be ratified. Very
much to their surprise they found that the minimum standards of the ILO
reflected in conventions or recommendations were in most instances much
higher than the legislation in the respective sates of our own country.
So they went back stimulated to try to improve their own legislative position.
This was particularly true in the areas of occupational health and safety.
Which was a problem then as it is today.
I mentioned before the question of the Truman Doctrine. Would you like
me to say something about that?
FUCHS: Yes, I would.
MORSE: It comes to my mind as something rather interesting. You know,
again, with the split labor movement -- and the CIO at that time was
supposed to be very, very radical. They were members of the WFTU, which
was headed by Louis Saillant, a French Socialist who was oriented toward
the Communists, and the Russians were in it. Of course, the AF of L wouldn't
have anything to do with that body and they would have liked very much
to see the CIO get out of it, which the CIO eventually did, of course.
Now, at the time, Mr. Truman was thinking of launching his doctrine which
concerned the vacuum created by the British withdrawal from Greece. Dean
Acheson asked me to see him. He was then Under Secretary of State and
he said, "Dave, I've got this problem. The President is going to
launch this doctrine and it's absolutely vital that we have the support
from the day it's launched of the American labor movement, and that means
the CIO and the AF of L. You have to get this done for the President."
I said, "Well, Dean, that's not easy.
You'll have to help me."
He said, "What do you want?"
I said, "Well, I'll get them together at the Labor Department but
I want you to come secretly to this meeting so the press doesn't learn
about it and explain to them as Americans the significance of the doctrine
to the American public and to the world and to our foreign policy. See
if you can get them to agree that they will endorse it."
"Well," he said, "you've got yourself a deal."
I fixed the date and I got the Trade Union Advisory Committee together.
I told them this was an emergency meeting, very secret, I remember Dean
Acheson coming over and coming in through the back door of the Labor Department
so the press wouldn't see him. He addressed them, talked with them, explained
the President's "Truman Doctrine," briefed all of them, and
got their support. I think that was an interesting example of a technique
in Government that worked. I considered that a major achievement. Another
important achievement at that time -- you've got to remember we're talking
about a period when Europe was in a shambles -- was the reconstruction
of Europe with the Marshall plan. We were people who reckoned that we
knew about all there was to know at that time in the free world about
productivity and productivity techniques. So we got the Europeans, through
the Marshall plan, to develop productivity councils and committees --
the French, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Italians, the devastated countries,
the British -- so that workers and employers would organize teams to improve
the production in their countries, latch on to the Marshall plan, and
help it to accomplish its objectives. As part of that we got them to come
to the United States on a systematic basis to meet with our
labor and industry people, to take advantage of our technology and see
if we could learn from them and