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David A. Morse Oral History Interview, July 30, 1977

Oral History Interview with
David A. Morse

In the Truman Administration served as Director of Labor for the Military Government Group in Germany; general counsel to the National Labor Relations Board, 1945-46; Assistant Secretary of Labor, 1946-47; Under Secretary of Labor, 1947-48 (Acting Secretary June 9-August 2, 1948); and as U.S. Government member, International Labor Office, Geneva, Switzerland, 1946-48. From 1948 to 1970 was Director-General of the International Labor Organization.

Washington, D.C
July 30, 1977
by James R. Fuchs

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | Additional Morse Oral History Transcripts]


Notice
This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

RESTRICTIONS
This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened October, 1980
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

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Oral History Interview with
David A. Morse

Washington, D.C
July 30, 1977
by James R. Fuchs

[54]

FUCHS: Mr. Morse, if you'd like to pick up the thread, all right; otherwise, I have a lot of questions.

MORSE: Well, I think what we were talking about was that special ad hoc group that was chaired by Clark Clifford.

FUCHS: Whose idea was that?

MORSE: My recollection is that it was the idea of Clark himself. Also, my recollection is that it wasn't so much to give the President a direct view -- actually we'd never had direct access to the President from this committee -- the idea was to give Clark Clifford our views. This committee was to help him help the President. I don't even know if Clark ever told the President directly that this committee was functioning, although I assume he did. It would have been

[55]

very difficult not to, knowing the composition of this committee. But Clark had the responsibility for overseeing the speeches of the President. He was responsible for coordinating the Cabinet's input on programs to the President; he looked at the budget documents that had to be approved by the President; he was responsible for drafting or for final overview of the President's State of the Union message, etc. He wanted to have some way of getting a cross section opinion to educate himself better so that he'd better understand what to give to the President and how to give it to him. So that, broadly speaking, was the idea. To help Clark and through that help the President. So we'd meet once a week and the committee was rather interesting. I may miss one or two people, but my recollection is that Clark sat as the sort of chairman of the committee, although it was very informal. We met at dinner once a week

[56]

or maybe once every two weeks, depending upon whether we were all in town at the same time, at the old Carlton Hotel on 16th Street near the Hay-Adams.

FUCHS: Whose room was that there?

MORSE: That was the room that was, I think, set aside and paid for by the Democratic National Committee. Because I know none of us paid for it, and Ed Flynn of the Bronx was one of the ad hoc participants of this committee. He came in now and again. He was a great political figure, great supporter of the President from New York. Then there was a chap, Frank Stanton, who came from time to time. He was not a permanent member but very useful. He was then President, I think, of CBS. He's more recently resigned from CBS; just recently, actually. A very attractive man, very intelligent.

[57]

FUCHS: Now, if we're talking about the same group, and I believe we are, it's been said that they met, well variously, on Monday and another person said on Wednesday at Oscar Ewing's apartment.

MORSE: Well, we did meet at Oscar Ewing's apartment from time to time; the meetings I'm talking about were held at Oscar Ewing's apartment, that's right, but more regularly at the Carlton.

FUCHS: The same group?

MORSE: Yes, I remember we had steaks and baked potatoes, every time, and that's what makes me remember it. But Oscar was a regular participant and if you would identify anyone as kind of chairman of the group, pulling it together, making sure it was there in attendance on time, etc., it would have been Oscar. That was before the HEW; he was Chairman of the

[58]

Federal agency for welfare of some kind at that time. Of course, very active, very close to the President. In addition there was Leon Keyserling, who was the economic adviser of Chairman of the economic advisory group to the President. Charlie Murphy, who was then with Agriculture. I think Charlie was either Deputy Secretary of Agriculture or maybe he was an Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, I’m not clear. He later went into the White House and after that I think returned to law practice. He’s still living here in Washington. Then there was Jebby Davidson who was I think Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Don Kingsley used to come. Don is dead now. He worked with Oscar Ewing and later went with the IRO [International Relief Organization], that relief organization, after the Second World War. Then there were people that were called in from time to time but that pretty much represents

[59]

the group. Each one of us was responsible for certain sectors. My responsibility was to advise Clark on how the labor movement was feeling about things, about programs. What their aspirations were vis-à-vis the President and the Administration. How they felt particularly about the proposed amendments that were coming along then of the Wagner Act, the so-called Taft-Hartley amendments. To tell them how the labor movement was feeling about him politically, and to advise on strategy vis-à-vis the labor movement and industry from the point of view of labor-management relations. I also gave my input on wage questions, cost of living questions -- anything that would touch on inflationary tendencies; and then, of course, anything in the international labor area. But it wasn’t so much that; we were more concerned with the domestic situation, and also advised on the split in the labor movement. How this affected the position

[60]

of the President politically and what could or should be done to bring them together to help the President. It was that kind of an input. Some of these inputs cross-fertilized with Leon Keyserling. But while we each had a sector, we all participated in each other's sector, so that you got a complete integration of thinking, rationalization. It proved, I think, very helpful indeed, and often we would look at drafts later that Clark was preparing for the President, whether it be a speech, whether it be a message, and we'd give our input at that time. But he always reserved the final decision. He did not consult us on getting a consensus with respect to the document. He only consulted us with respect to our political or technical views. He never committed the President; never committed himself. When the whole thing was finished he made his own judgment, gave it to

[61]

the President, gave the President options; the President made his own decision. That's how it worked.

FUCHS: I've heard that Wayne Coy attended some of these meetings.

MORSE: Yes, he came in and out, but was not a regular member.

FUCHS: What about David Bell? Did he attend any of the meetings?

MORSE: He may have, but I don't recall. I didn't know Dave Bell.

FUCHS: I have seen a reference that he was at some of the meetings; that's why I ask.

MORSE: I don't recall that he was at any of those meetings, but that's easily checked and verified.

FUCHS: What about the awareness of the more

[62]

conservative members of the Administration, John Snyder and some of the others from the Cabinet? Did they know of this?

MORSE: Well, none of us ever talked to John Snyder about this or to anyone else. We just kept it all to ourselves. We left it to Clark or to Oscar Ewing to do what they wanted about it. We never talked to the press about it. It may have leaked. I don't recall of any press articles on this subject. I think it's only become known recently. Actually, we had a reunion about a year and a half ago of this old group at Leon Keyserling's house. Oscar came up; Clark was there. One of the things we talked about was the fact that this group worked with complete anonymity. That was, I think, also anonymity as far as John Snyder was concerned, but he may have been told by Clark, he may have been told by Oscar. But I'd be inclined to doubt it.

[63]

I think maybe John Snyder would have been consulted separately by Clark after Clark had our inputs.

FUCHS: Keyserling would have been chairman of the Council by this time.

MORSE: Yes, he was chairman. Avery, very powerful voice and a very powerful personality; very clear thinker and clear articulator.

FUCHS: This was primarily aimed, as I understand it, at influencing the '48 election properly, and you did not get into the foreign affairs in any way.

MORSE: Not really. We were really concerned about domestic questions and we wanted to make sure that the President had the best input on domestic factors. We wanted to make sure that he got elected. Of course, we all were very keen about him and committed to him, and we

[64]

thought that he was what the country needed.

FUCHS: Do you recall Bill Batt being at any of these meetings?

MORSE: Do you mean the old gentleman?

FUCHS: No, Bill Batt, Jr. who organized the Research Division for the Democratic National Committee.

MORSE: Yes, young Bill Batt, the chap who's now dealing with productivity issues and so on. No, I have no recollection of Bill at these meetings. Now, again, there were people who came in and out. I think if Bill had been on the committee he would have been at our reunion last year, unless he was out of town. It would be worth checking with him because he's such a splendid fellow.

FUCHS: I don't think he was there regularly. But

[65]

some people came there occasionally.

MORSE: Some did, like Flynn, like Stanton, like one or two others whose names I don't remember right now. If there was a special problem we'd call them in. But I tell you, we tried to keep that very, very much to the minimum because we didn't want to expose this committee and have it become a public thing. We wanted to keep a low profile so we could do a good job for Clark and the President. So we kept participants to a minimum. That I'm very clear about, but it doesn't mean that some of these chaps were not invited. I just don't remember.

FUCHS: Do you recall the turnip "session" or call back of Congress being discussed? This was not actually revealed until the President made his acceptance speech.

MORSE: No, I don't.

[66]

FUCHS: Are you familiar with the long memorandum that was written about how the '48 election should be conducted?

MORSE: Yes, I am familiar with that.

FUCHS: Generally, it's been attributed to Mr. Clifford, but there is considerable evidence that it was done by James Rowe. Do you know James Rowe?

MORSE: I know him very well and he, of course, was doing a lot of heavy thinking at that time and has great talent. Jim was in the picture. I would have thought that it was Clark that did it with probably some help from Jim. But that could be turned around very easily. Jim could have done it with Clark having done the final editing. It's too far back, I don't know.

FUCHS: I was just wondering if you might have

[67]

some insight into that?

MORSE: No, sorry, I can't help you.

FUCHS: What are some of the major things you recall being ironed out, if you can at this late date, in this policy committee?

MORSE: Well, I remember that we decided to recommend to the President that he oppose the amendment of the Wagner Act, the Taft-Hartley amendment, the National Labor Relations Board amendment which was one of the big issues at that time. We had a very long and difficult session on that more than once, two or three. We finally came to an agreed view and position on it, and this committee made a recommendation to Clark, actually, who then, as I know, did recommend to the President that he oppose it, which he did. Actually, on that point, it's rather interesting because I remember that after the

[68]

proposal was put to the President by Clark, the President wanted some more input and I was called over, then I think as Under Secretary of Labor, to the White House with Paul Herzog who was still Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, and Bill Foster, who was then Under Secretary of Commerce and who, as you know, is a Republican. The three of us were constituted by Clark at the request of the President to take a look at the final part of the message that he was going to deliver on the Taft-Hartley amendment, and it was very interesting because Bill Foster, being a great public official and a Republican, had to address himself very objectively to this aspect. He was called in because he was so-to-speak "the spokesman for industry," coming from Commerce. I was so-to-speak the "spokesman for labor," coming from the Labor Department. Paul Herzog was a fellow who was the trustee of the National Labor

[69]

Relations Act. The three of us finally agreed that it would be a mistake for the President to do anything other than to oppose the Taft-Hartley Act. I remember that because here we were three different kinds of people coming to this final view and I think it's because all of us felt that this would help the President politically, as well as the fact that we thought it was the right thing in terms of development of labor relations in our country, But there were always those two factors. If we had thought that it would have been a wrong thing for the country, even though it would have helped the President politically, we would have put it to him that way so that he would have known clearly that he had those nuances in his option. But I remember we did feel that it was the right thing for him to do as far as the country was concerned and from the political point of view.

[70]

FUCHS: I'm sure you know that it's been written that all the Cabinet members, with the exception of the Secretary of Labor, were urging the President to sign the act.

MORSE: That's right, that's right. Events subsequently proved that we were right and they were wrong. He would have lost a lot from the labor movement in the '48 election even though at that time they were less than happy with him. His political fortunes were very low as far as polls were concerned. I think this decision helped him very much. After all the same thing happened when it came to his recognition of Israel. His Cabinet, as you know, gave him a bad time and he again was very lonely. He had [Jim] Forrestal against him; I think he had Marshall against him. These were powerful members. I talked with Jim Forrestal about this a lot myself, and with

[71]

Marshall, and the President had to make his decision really against the advice of those in his Cabinet who were responsible for that portfolio. This was also a question we discussed in our Clifford committee and our view was that he should not only recognize Israel but he ought to be the first to do it. We felt that we were voices in the wilderness because we didn't know what the President was going to do. After all we were giving this view to Clark -- but a very interesting coincidence: my wife -- Mildred -- and I were with the President the night he decided to recognize Israel. There was a dinner being given by the Democratic National Committee at the Mayflower. I was there as Acting Secretary of Labor. Schwellenbach,as I've told you recently, was ill. All the members of the Cabinet were there and we assembled in an anteroom to await our marching on to the dais. Mildred and I were talking with the President and Mrs. Truman about

[72]

Margaret. I think he was telling my wife how much he approved of Margaret's using some sort of a system for doing her own hair.

MRS. MORSE: It was a Toni.

MORSE: It was a Toni system, and he liked that. He said, "That Margaret, she's a fine girl. That's an economical thing to do, and she looks nice doesn't she Dave, doesn't she Mildred?"

Of course, we thought she did anyway, so we did say yes; and at that point someone came up to him and I don't recall just who it was. He turned to us and he said, "Well, you know, Dave, I've just decided finally to confirm my decision on Israel." Of course, you may get other versions of this, because this is a very interesting thing to look into. But that's why I'm glad my wife is sitting here while I'm taping these because if I'm wrong about this, she can refresh my recollection. But it was

[73]

then that he said that he had confirmed his views and made his decision. Of course, it was announced and he did come in just before the Russians, who I think came in just before midnight or something and this was -- I think we were gathered there about 8 at night just before going to dinner. I'd be fascinated myself, to get further illumination on this point, but actually this is what did happen. But there again, it was a problem that we had hammered out.

Now, of course we had had a great number of debates we'd hammered out in this Clifford committee. We also had a number of debates in the committee on the implementation of the full employment side of the Full Employment Act which Keyserling had the responsibility for; and there, of course, we were rather strong in support of whatever needed to be done to implement in a positive manner that

[74]

legislation. Keyserling, of course, was a very strong advocate of it. These were the kinds of things that we did.

One other thing that I told the committee about -- just comes into my mind when we're talking -- which has a certain national significance. David Lilienthal, as you recall, was one of the first directors and General Counsel of the Tennessee Valley Authority and then later became Chairman of it. He succeeded Norris, and was asked by the President to set up the Atomic Energy Commission. He became the first head of the Atomic Energy Commission. One of the things that disturbed Dave when he came in was what do you do with something like an Atomic Energy Commission from the point of view of labor relations. It's a public agency; it's a kind of agency that one would have been more comfortable with in a socialistic country. It was a public agency. It was not, properly

[75]

speaking, a private sector employer. You're dealing with a very volatile, sensitive subject. What kind of a labor policy should you have for such an agency so as to avoid strikes and at the same time insure that the workers and the management had their just rights protected? He came to me and asked me, since we were old friends, if I could give him a proposal on the kind of regulations that he could promulgate that would be acceptable to the nation, to the President, to himself, and to labor and management meaning the NAM, the Chamber of Commerce, and the split labor movement. I said, "Yes, Dave. I'll do that for you." It's rather interesting. I got together a committee, which I chaired, to help me on this. I remember Lloyd Garrison; I appointed him and George Taylor, who was a prominent professor at the University of Pennsylvania and a great expert in labor matters, and we addressed ourselves to this issue. We

[76]

proposed to Dave Lilienthal how this should be done. I don't have these documents before me, of course. This was a very long time ago, '46-'47. But suffice it to say he accepted these proposals and, of course, they did not have any strikes. They've gotten along just fine, within the framework of that labor policy that we had proposed to Lilienthal. The interesting thing is, a fellow named Oscar Smith, who had been in charge of administration at the National Labor Relations Board when I was General Counsel, was the fellow that I recommended to Lilienthal to be moved from the NLRB over to the Atomic Energy Commission to be responsible for the implementation of this policy. They called him Labor Management Director or something of that kind. That I think helped very much because he was a very good man. Now, this policy was discussed a great deal amongst ourselves, this group, because it was in the forefront of our thinking

[77]

at that time. This could have been very explosive. But I consulted the labor movement. I consulted employer organizations. I explained to them what it was. I finally got their agreement in principle, so that when it was promulgated there would be no quarrel about it. I got the trade unions to agree that they would act with restraint in something as important as this and educate their membership to that. They did a very responsible thing. Now, I was fortunate in this. I was with the Government in the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration back in the early thirties and I was General Counsel of the Petroleum Labor Policies Board. Billy Leiserson was Chairman of that, and Billy Leiserson who had been a professor at Antioch and Norris was then the head of TVA and Norris called him to TVA. He said, "Could you give me a policy to help me deal with labor relations matters

[78]

in the Tennessee Valley Authority, because this is a new animal. This is a kind of a specialist thing." Billy Leiserson said, "Certainly I'll do that." He did it by himself, with me as an assistant, and I dug back, when the atomic energy challenge was put to me years later by Dave Lilienthal, to that TVA experience and used a lot of it with adaptations in the proposal that we finally made to Lilienthal for the Atomic Energy agency. Rather interesting, that connection. There again, I learned from Billy Leiserson that you don't do these things just like that; you've got to consult, and we did, all the partners of industry in the private sector before we promulgated it. That, I think, is an interesting flashback. I don't suppose there are five people who know about this. I'd even forgotten about it.

FUCHS: I have one more questions, at least, about the

[79]

policy committee. You indicated that you did, at least in the case of Israel, advise on foreign affairs to a degree. Do you recall Oscar Ewing speaking to the point that he had conducted an individual private study about Israel to enlighten the President about the background of the international law applicable to the problem.

MORSE: Yes, he did do that. I do remember. He did do that. He was very concerned about this problem and, of course, it was a big issue for the President and his Cabinet. He was very concerned. He did make it. He did polls on other things, too. But certainly on that one he did.

FUCHS: Going back a little ways, the President called a Labor-Management Conference right after the war, either '45 or early '46, which was when you were still in the NLRB. Do you have reflections about that? Of course, it was rather abortive, I guess.

[80]

MORSE: It was abortive; I do recall it. My recollection is very dim. One of those things that I don't recall produced very much. In my time it was the beginning of an effort to bring labor-management together. But I think one of the problems there, too, was the split in the labor movement. But it didn't take hold. Of course, I just want to say this, Mr. Fuchs, you've got to remember also that during this whole period despite everything I'm telling you, the fact is that Harry S. Truman was having a hard time with the labor movement. It's funny, but it's true. Here this man was fighting their battles but he was having a hard time. I don't know if I told you this last time, but I used to go to speak on behalf of the Secretary of Labor since he was ill. I went in my capacity of Acting Secretary of Labor, to national conventions of great international trade unions in this country. Let's take the Amalgamated

[81]

Clothing Workers, for example. I remember going to speak there on behalf of the Administration and that was in Atlantic City. I made a talk to the ACWA; that was the communications workers, I think. There were others. On these occasions, I was actually advised by friends of mine in the labor movement, "Well, talk about what you're doing but don't mention the President's name because you may get booed."

Now that stuck in my mind and I never forgot that. Of course, I did mention him and didn't get booed, but didn't get any applause either. So he was at a very low political ebb with these chaps at that time, but not with the members, as the '48 election showed. This is something I can't comment on more than that at the present moment, but I think it's historically important to look into.

[82]

FUCHS: There were strange situations which developed. He had the support of the railroad unions so strongly when he was running for Senator and they thought he would lose in '40, but by '46 actually, because of the draft of strikers and so forth, they were swearing they'd get him.

MORSE: They'd get him. Yes, he had all of these things. So it was very interesting. But he was the best friend they ever had.

FUCHS: Do you have any knowledge of the rapproachment, so to speak, in '48 with Whitney and Johnson, the principal railway union leaders?

MORSE: No, because I was then on my way to Europe.

FUCHS: What about the President's view on fact-finding boards; how did you look at that?

MORSE: Well, I thought he was right. We discussed that also in our group. I was very much in

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favor of it. As a matter of fact, I think it's been proved since that this whole fact finding apparatus is very useful and now, of course, an acceptable formula.

FUCHS: You mentioned the labor attaché program and that the Ambassadors resisted that program. Just why would they? Because of vested interest or what?

MORSE: Well, in the first place labor was always, at that time, the lowest thing on the totem pole. Domestically, in terms of national public opinion, certainly the Labor Department was always at the low rung of the totem pole. Internationally, the Foreign Service just thought it was a lot of nonsense, and they looked at the entrance of the labor attaché as an incursion on some kind of normal function of theirs. They thought it would be just an unnecessary duplication of something that they were very

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sophisticated in themselves. They figured that if there were political implications in the labor movement they would be the chaps who could evaluate that; and after all, these labor fellows who were coming in were not properly speaking Foreign Service people. They didn't seem to fit into the establishment. They also feared the fact that it would kind of create problems by having split authority between State and Labor. It would involve unnecessarily the labor movement, things of that kind. So they didn't like it. It was new; they didn't like change, except for this Ambassador I referred to the other day in Chile. Well, now, of course, it's accepted. It's become a very potent part of the Foreign Service in terms of information gathering and intelligence, as you know. But at that time it was not appreciated at all.

FUCHS: I have read that you found that in Italy

[85]

you couldn't foist American principles of labor upon them. That you needed to preserve some of the finest points of the syndical system.

MORSE: In Italy I proposed that the Fascist corporative syndical system be abolished entirely. That was my own personal view, my political view, and my technical view; and it was my policy view, which I made clear to my superiors. This view in Italy was accepted. I said that what we ought to do is abolish them, give the labor movement the opportunity to come back on a free basis. I remember right after the liberation of Naples -- up that far -- that we had the first meeting of the free Italian Labor Movement in Bari, Italy. What we did do, however, was examine what the implications of this were and we found that there were certain things of a technical nature which had nothing to do with the ideological aspect of the labor movement which would be good to retain from an

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institutional point of view. For example, social security, unemployment benefits, the administration in those areas. There we made a great effort to try to retain those institutions, keep the best people we could, and work them into the new national institutional setup rather than the trade union movement. So we had the job of sorting these things out -- what belonged to the free labor movement, what belonged to administration, what was purely political. But the trade union movement was completely liberated and the Fascist corporative syndicalist system was completely abolished, except for these certain technical aspects. I think it was like President Carter today saying that he is going to start with zero budgeting. We were starting with a zero situation. In Germany -- and I was called over there to be the Director of the Manpower Division and the Control Council because of the experience I had had in Italy --

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what they wanted me to do there was exactly what I'd done in Italy except for certain changes. But there I had more trouble because General Lucius Clay was the head of the Military Government. I had more problems there. There again I had recommended a complete liquidation of the Nazi-German labor front. I found it an aberration and an abomination, and I also felt that people who had been leaders of that movement should have been moved out of it entirely, and so on. But I had great difficulty with Clay who at that time felt that this would be a mistake, it would weaken the occupation forces, and it might play into the hands of the Communists; that what we ought to do is keep the structure and modify it rather than liquidating most of it and starting all over. But my views actually finally prevailed and I think that's why we have today in West Germany a free and strong labor movement. I think if it had gone some other

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way we wouldn't. That's a point that scholars one day will want to look at.

FUCHS: One of the other Labor Department people we interviewed offered the opinion that he thought John R. Steelman was too eager to get into the labor disputes. Do you concur in that?

MORSE: Yes. Well, you recall the other day when we met, I said that one of the big problems about Steelman -- whom I liked very much, a very good man -- being in the White House dealing with labor matters, was that he was a conciliator. So he wanted to get into everything. He did get into everything. And he would say to the President, "You know, let's anticipate steel. Let's bring the parties into the White House," and the first thing you know he was in the middle of everything; the President had no buffer. I think it was wrong, a mistake. It created a lot of problems and dissatisfaction in the

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country with the labor movement. I think that's one reason why some of the labor people were unhappy about the President, because: "Look here, Mr. President, I'm here, what are you going to do for me?"

Rather than having to say that to the Secretary of Labor, if you will, or the Director of the Conciliation Service and the Secretary of Labor, who could then say, "Well, I think this," so they could then have an appeal to the President who would have a more objective perspective for settling the matter. So I think there it was a mistake, and of course that whole trend has been reversed; no longer exists.

FUCHS: They had no place else to go once they went to the President unless to God.

MORSE: Yes, let's go there. Why bother with the Secretary of Labor or the Conciliation Service,

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if we have access to the President. Especially since he needs our votes they thought.

FUCHS: Did you have knowledge of what Schwellenbach called his "Secret Six" that he brought in to sort of overview the reorganization of the Labor Department when he took over? John Carson headed the group, I believe.

MORSE: Yes, I know about that.

FUCHS: Were there bad repercussions from that?

MORSE: Well, I tell you, that was an exercise in futility in my opinion. Carson's a good man. All the chaps were. But I don't think that reorganization proposals mean very much unless you've got the political will and stamina to implement it. I think the problem, and there was a problem with the administration of the Labor Department, was not in these reorganizations but in the latter thing. That was due

[91]

to the fact that Lew Schwellenbach was a sick man. He had an Under Secretary at that time, Governor Keen Johnson, who was, again, a very good fellow, but not really interested in the labor business. In the reorganization he had to bring in chaps who could help keep the labor movement together, Phil Hanna, John Gibson. There was myself on the international thing, but that was not, I don't think, part of the Carson report. They were looking at other things. So the report I suppose was all right but the implementation wasn't there. A fellow like Leo Werts, maybe, who looked at this later, and there was another chap before him who was in charge of administration and dealt with the budget and personnel, might give you some views on that. I didn't go into that very much but I don't think it amounted to much either.

FUCHS: When you took over as Under Sec