Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. ) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.
Oral History Interview with
Joseph L. Rauh, JR.
June 21, 1989
Niel M. Johnson
JOHNSON: Mr. Rauh, I'm going to start by asking you to
tell us where you were born, when you were born and what your parents'
RAUH: I was born in Cincinnati, Ohio on January 3, 1911,
making me 78 now. My father's name was Joseph Rauh; I'm a junior. My
father was born in Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany; he was an immigrant. My
mother's name was Sarah Weiler. She was born in this country, but her
ancestors came from Germany. We were German Jews; Cincinnati was quite
a home for German Jews and still is.
JOHNSON: That's where you got your education?
RAUH: Yes. Actually my father was an education nut. He
was a small businessman, but he anted to make enough money to give his
kids the best education. Of course,
in those days, and maybe it's still
true, the prestige lay with Harvard, and the happiest thing in my father's
life was that he had enough money to send both my brother and me to
Harvard. So we got the best education possible.
JOHNSON: You had one brother. Did you have any sisters?
RAUH: Yes. My brother's dead. My sister is alive; she
is 87 years old. She's a pediatrician. She doesn't practice anymore,
but she was a very wonderful, successful pediatrician in Cincinnati,
setting up her office in the poor districts. She was a liberal, a Truman
liberal, all the time.
JOHNSON: So there were three children.
RAUH: Three children.
JOHNSON: And you're what, the oldest, youngest?
RAUH: I'm the youngest of the three.
JOHNSON: What was your brother's name?
RAUH: Carl. He went into my father's business, but the
business folded. It was a shirt business and you couldn't make apparel
in the north after a while because of the southern competition in wages.
So my brother sold out. He got out of the business rather
he died rather young. He was just 67 when he died.
JOHNSON: Your father's occupation then was . . .
RAUH: A small shirt manufacturer. He was a died-in-the-wool
Republican who marched in the 1896 gold parade of McKinley in Cincinnati.
He was a died-in-the-wool, conservative Republican, and all three children
JOHNSON: Did he mellow as he got older?
RAUH: Well, the joke in our house always was, and my mother
would tell the joke; he would denounce Roosevelt, and then say to my
mother, "Sarah, go upstairs and get that clipping about Joseph and the
New Deal." I mean he was proud of his kids even if he disagreed with
them. We had a happy family.
JOHNSON: What was your major in college?
RAUH: Economics, although I don't know a damn thing about
it. I don't know why I did that. When I went into college it was before
the Depression; I matriculated in 1928, September of '28. October of
'29 is Black Monday, and that's when people started worrying and that's
when I went into law. So I went into law school rather than anything
else. There was no room in this
little [family] business for anybody
else, so my father said, "Why don't you go to law school?" I was sort
of treading water, going to law school.
JOHNSON: Are you saying now that your father was probably
the most important influence on you in these years?
RAUH: Up to the time I went to college, there's no question,
he was the most important influence. College and law school changed
JOHNSON: Okay, what influences did you come under there?
RAUH: Well, the most important influence, of course, was
Felix Frankfurter. I am what they called back in the thirties one of
the Frankfurter "happy hot dogs." I don't think there were terribly
many influences that I had in college. I did fairly well; I was not
a bad student. But going to law school, the chief influence was Felix
Frankfurter and that's how I came here to Washington.
One day in my third year in law school, he stopped me
and said, "What are you going to do next year?" I said, "Well, I've
been hired by the best Jewish law firm in Cincinnati." And he said,
"Well, you're not going there." I said, "What do you mean, sir?" He
said, "Well, you're going to Washington. You'd just be silly not to."
And he got me a job; he got me the law
clerkship to Justice [Benjamin]
Cardozo, and the law clerkship of himself when he took Cardozo's spot
three years later. So, yes, that was the greatest influence in my career.
JOHNSON: And Frankfurter was a reformist.
RAUH: He was a reformist. Hugh Johnson, the head of NRA
[National Recovery Administration] hated Frankfurter, but he said--and
this wasn't necessarily right--"He is the single most important person
in Washington after the President." There's some truth in that. I mean
that's obviously an overstatement, but it wasn't so ridiculously an
overstatement. He was a tremendous figure down here. Well, there weren't
many people that were closer to Roosevelt than Frankfurter.
So, my father's belief in the prestige of Harvard and
my going to Harvard Law School affected my life. I mean it changed it
completely. I always say if it wasn't for Felix Frankfurter, I'd be
an overstuffed corporate lawyer like most everybody else.
JOHNSON: So you came into Washington and became a law
clerk . . .
RAUH: To Justice Benjamin Cardozo. There are some pictures
there, and there [pointing to the wall]. Then when Cardozo died, Frankfurter
got the job. I actually
volunteered for law clerk because it was in
the middle of the year that he was appointed to Cardozo's seat, and
it's hard to get a law clerk right in the middle of the year, so I just
volunteered. Of course, Frankfurter took up the volunteer offer, because
he knew me. Also he said, "You've got more experience on the Supreme
Court than I do," because I'd been there for two years with Cardozo.
So I went back for a few months with Frankfurter, and then I went back
into the Government.
JOHNSON: In what year did you start with Cardozo?
RAUH: I came here in '35 and I would have been Cardozo's
law clerk that year, starting in the fall of '35, but Cardozo decided
for the first time to keep his then-law clerk, a fellow named Alan Stroock.
His father was a big Jewish lawyer in New York. Since Alan was staying
an extra year, Felix told me, "You go work for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran
for the year while you're waiting to be the law clerk to Justice Cardozo."
So I worked for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran; it's described a little
bit in Joe Lash's book on Dealers and Dreamers. I worked there
for a year. Then in '36 I went to work for Justice Cardozo, and I was
there until '38. Then there were a few months, after Cardozo died, when
there were no appointees. Roosevelt then appointed
Frankfurter in December
of '38, and he took the seat in January of '39. I was his law clerk
for a few months, and then I went back to the New Deal and was there
until the war.
JOHNSON: Were you involved in drafting any of the arguments,
as in 1937, to defend the New Deal legislation?
RAUH: No. I was working for Cardozo, for example, when
he had the Social Security decision to write; that was in 1937, but
I was working for the Court, not for the outside. Cardozo wrote the
decision upholding Social Security. There was a big attack on Social
Security. There was an attack on everything the New Deal was doing,
but after the Court packing plan, why the Court made quite a shift.
JOHNSON: Of course, one of those conservative justices
retired at a propitious time.
RAUH: Yes, that was in May of 1937.
JOHNSON: Yes, I think they talk about '37 as the time
of revolution in the Supreme Court.
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: And Cohen was one of the drafters of the Social
Security Act, was he not?
RAUH: Cohen had been drafter of a lot of the legislation:
the Securities Act, the Securities and Exchange Act, the Holding Company
Act, the Minimum Wage Act, he drafted all those, and he helped with
some of the others, including Social Security. But as far as the Court
packing plan was concerned, he and Tommy Corcoran were not consulted
on the Court packing plan until it went up to Congress. Then they were
consulted and they changed the whole strategy, those two. What happened
was that Roosevelt had this ridiculous strategy that Homer Cummings
the Attorney General had worked out, saying, "The Court's too old, and
they can't do their work. We're going to appoint one new judge for every
judge on the bench over 70 who doesn't resign."
That was ridiculous because there wasn't anything wrong
with these guys' brains, what was wrong was their goddamn views. They
were knocking statutes out right and left. Cohen really was the architect
of this, but he and Corcoran always worked together. They said, and
they persuaded the President, that the age of the Justices was not the
way to get the packing plan adopted. What you had to do is just say,
"We need minimum wages now. The only way to get them is this
way. We need a maximum hours law now. We've got to stop child
labor now. We've got to have a labor relations act now."
So the emphasis was on the word
"now." If you wanted to have
these things that people wanted, you had to change the Court. The Court
changed and then, of course, interestingly enough, the Court not only
changed but then Roosevelt's plan got defeated. I think that was divine
intervention; this was the perfect outcome. The New Deal was saved by
the Court changing its views,, but there's no precedent for the future
of packing the Court by increasing the numbers. You may say that Reagan
packed the Court, but he packed it by the people he put on; he didn't
add people. So, I think the result in 1937 was perfect. The New Deal
was saved, and Roosevelt's Court packing bill was defeated. See my article
in the November, 1990, North Carolina Law Review.
JOHNSON: So, it didn't set a bad precedent.
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: You know, I think that Truman was critical of
that Court packing bill. He was about 98 percent in line with New Deal
legislation, but I think he was a critic of that approach too.
RAUH: Burton Wheeler was the leader of the negative approach.
I don't know what Truman's relations with Wheeler were.
JOHNSON: Well, he felt favorable towards Wheeler because
Wheeler really helped him take a role in the transportation field, you
know. Truman's the one that helped rewrite the rules on railroads and
made that famous statement about Jesse James being a "piker" in holding
up railroads, in comparison with holding companies that were "looting" them.
JOHNSON: So you were a clerk on the Supreme Court to these
people; and you were very well acquainted with New Deal legislation
as a result. Then you take up private practice?
RAUH: At the end of '45, the beginning of '46, I did.
JOHNSON: Not until after the war?
RAUH: Not until after the war did I go into private practice.
JOHNSON: Were you with Frankfurter then when the war came?
RAUH: No, I was at the Lend-Lease Administration and the
Office for Emergency Management. Of all the times in the New Deal, that
was the most exciting period. You have to realize that there was a lot
of anti-Semitism in those days--Pelley's Silver Shirts, and Father Coughlin's
Social Justice movement, and all of that. Anti-Semitism resulted in
part because many thought the
Jews were trying to get us into the war.
I plead guilty. I felt that Hitler was going to try to conquer the world,
and the sooner we prepared for war and got into it, the safer this country would be.
So in 1941 I worked in two agencies. I was the Deputy
General Counsel of the Lend-Lease Administration under a wonderful man
named Oscar Cox, whose papers are at Yale. Then I also was the Deputy
General Counsel of the Office for Emergency Management, of which Cox
was also the General Counsel. Wayne Coy was the head of that agency.
He was assistant to the President, running sort of a holding company
for all the war preparation agencies.
Here are some things that may be worth recording, not
because they are important as recording my feelings, but I think they
happen to be right. In '40 and '41 when we were supposed to be preparing
for war against Hitler, and most Americans thought we would ultimately
have to fight Hitler, we did a bad job of preparing for war. Big business
didn't want to prepare for war. Big business was making so much money
with civilian production they didn't want to talk about it. The auto
companies, for example, made more cars in 1941 than ever before, when
they should have been making airplanes. The interesting thing there,
affecting President Truman, was that at that time as a Senator he
chairman of the committee to oversee war production for Congress.
The committee made a terrible mistake, I think, and I've
given a talk on this. I gave a lecture on this at a convocation on the
Holocaust at the Harvard Divinity School last year. Here was my point.
I was not here during the Holocaust; I was overseas. When they asked
me if I'd speak, I said, "No, I really don't know that much about the
Holocaust. The only thing I have to offer is that in the two years before
Pearl Harbor we didn't get prepared; we lengthened the Holocaust by
the fact that victory took much longer to achieve than it otherwise
Well the relevance of Truman to all this, in my judgment,
is that they set up this committee for oversight, the so-called Truman
Committee; I can't remember its exact name.
JOHNSON: It was the Senate Special Committee to Investigate
the National Defense Program.
RAUH: That committee, which we can call the Truman Committee,
did a good job on the unimportant things. They did a good job exposing
waste and fraud, but they did nothing about why the Armed Services weren't
getting any guns and planes and tanks. I really made a study of this.
I got every book out of the Georgetown
University Library that dealt
with the Truman Committee, and every book shows that the first time
they criticized the failure of production was after Pearl Harbor. The
Truman Committee had an opportunity there to have hastened preparation
for war and didn't do it. When I say the committee dealt with the minor
things, I'm not saying it was minor politically, but to me the important
event was getting ready to fight Hitler and to get enough planes and
tanks and trucks and guns and ammunition and all of the rest of the
things that go with the preparation for war, and they didn't. The Truman
Committee didn't press business for more military and less civilian
production. Truman was not part of the group that was trying to do more
about that. He limited the work of his committee--that is until after
Pearl Harbor--he limited the work of that committee to waste and fraud
and things like that.
Well, I'm not saying that those are unimportant. I'm saying
though that compared to the importance of our getting ready to fight,
getting the munitions, I consider them unimportant. That was the . . .
JOHNSON: Yes, the committee had actually started, I believe,
because of reports of fraud and mismanagement, during the construction
of camps like Fort Leonard Wood.
RAUH: Sure, right.
JOHNSON: Truman kind of justified the thing originally
on the need to investigate how they were building these new Army camps,
training camps, some of the early construction of buildings.
RAUH: What they could do was shown when the war finally
came, and Truman held hearings on why General Electric was still making
all of this civilian stuff like refrigerators and all of their other
wonderful civilian things when they could have been making war materiel.
There was tremendous conversion to war production once Pearl Harbor
happened, but prior to Pearl Harbor, there's not one line you'll find
in any Truman report or statement criticizing the failure to produce
for war. Yet everybody knew that industry wasn't producing adequately for war.
JOHNSON: So you went with the lend-lease program as soon
as it started?
RAUH: Yes, I was there right at the beginning.
JOHNSON: You left Frankfurter?
RAUH: Well, I had had a year in between at the Wage and
Hour Division in the Labor Department, and at the Federal Communications
Commission, but my heart was in
getting prepared to fight Hitler. That's
why I feel so deeply about the Truman Committee; they did one of their
two jobs and they did that one very well. But the other job that I think
was so important--speeding up production for war--that was not done
at all. At least I tried to make sure before I said that at this meeting
in Cambridge, at this convocation on the Holocaust, I tried to make
sure I had read everything that had been written on or by the Truman
Committee prior to Pearl Harbor. I haven't read everything since then.
They exposed a lot of inaction after Pearl Harbor, but if they had done
more before Pearl Harbor I think we would have saved a lot of soldiers
lives and a lot of Jewish lives.
For example, take something like Walter Reuther's plan
to build 500 planes a day in auto factories. That plan was floated in
the winter of '40. There's no reference to it anywhere in these books
on the Truman Committee. Now, I don't want to say I've done more than
I have. I never went through the files of the Truman Committee, so I
can't say that there's not something in the files somewhere there, but
as far as the books on the subject of the Truman Committee, there's
no reference to the Reuther Plan.
I would have thought somebody that supervised war preparation
would have wanted to see whether Walter
Reuther was right. If we could
have made the Reuther Plan work, we could have won the war sooner and
all the American boys' lives, and the Jews' lives, a lot more could
have been saved. So, I'm critical of President Truman in that respect,
but I'm not able to say what's in their files about why they did and
didn't do what.
JOHNSON: After your work with lend-lease, what did you do?
RAUH: I went in the Army.
JOHNSON: What month and year was that?
RAUH: Well, Phil Graham, later the publisher of the Washington
Post, and I tried to enlist in the Air Corps the day after Pearl
Harbor. I thought the guy was going to die laughing at the two of us.
I'll tell you exactly what my motivations were.
We had been trying to get this country into war. We thought
we had to go to war ultimately, we had to stop Hitler ultimately, and
the sooner you stopped him, the better. I believed you couldn't just
let him conquer more and more and more, and then try to beat him. So
I felt once war was declared --especially being Jewish--that I couldn't
possibly not go into the military. It took a while, but by spring I
was on my way to Australia in the Army.
JOHNSON: The spring of '42?
RAUH: By the spring of '42, I was on my way to Australia
on a ship. In the war I had different posts. I had no military training,
but there were things you could do that were valuable. The most important
job I had was planning and assisting the military government operation
in the Philippines. You have a military battle plan, and then there
are appendices to that battle plan, and there's an appendix on supply
and an appendix on this, and an appendix on that. Then the last appendix
is on what we called civil affairs, but what they called at the Pentagon,
Military Government. Our final plan for civil affairs was completed
in Hollandia just before we shoved off for the Philippines.
MacArthur wouldn't take Military Government people from
the States. He refused to accept any of them. You know, the military
commander in the area can bar people, and he barred any Military Government
troops. He wanted to do it out of his own people. Since I was a lawyer,
the deputy chief of staff put me in G-1 which was where we had the civil
affairs section before we made it into a G-5. I was to draft how you
dealt with Military Government problems. Jeez, maybe I was a good lawyer,
but I didn't know anything about that.
So, what happened was this. A friend of mine had gotten
a trip back home to work on some supply side
problem in the invasion.
He brought a book back with him. It was John Hersey's A Bell for
Adano, a story of the invasion of Italy. It had all of the problems
in civil affairs like roads being clogged by peasants when soldiers
wanted to move to the front and so forth. I've always said I helped
write the battle plan on civil affairs for the Leyte invasion out of
John Hersey's A Bell for Adano. I read it three times; I read
it and read it. A marvelous book; it taught you how to do it. So I was
in civil affairs from, say, the summer of '43 until after V-J Day when
I left in August of '45.
JOHNSON: What was your rank?
RAUH: I ended up as lieutenant colonel. They offered me
the moon to go to Japan, but . . .
JOHNSON: Were you one of these 90-day commissions when
you went in?
RAUH: No, I had a regular lieutenant's commission when
I went in.
JOHNSON: Was this attached to the headquarters, to MacArthur's
headquarters, the civil government section?
RAUH: Oh, yes.
JOHNSON: That's where you met Richard Bolling I suppose.
RAUH: Yes, that's exactly where I met Dick--first at our
Hollandia headquarters and then Dick and I were on the same LST from
Hollandia to Leyte; that's six days at sea, weaving back and forth.
Dick was the adjutant and I was more or less in charge of civil affairs.
It was damn nice to have somebody who could write an order when you
needed an order fast. Dick and I weren't quite military, you know; we
didn't follow routines too much. Anyway, Dick and I were on the same
LST together, but we never talked politics or ideology. I guess you're
a little scared you're going to die on the beach. Even though I wasn't
a shooter, you were on the same beach with the shooting. So we never
talked about anything serious.
That's 1944. Three years later, in March in Chicago, I
bumped into Dick at an ADA organizational meeting and both of us exploded
at each other, "What the hell are you doing here?" We didn't know all
we had in common.
JOHNSON: You didn't talk politics.
RAUH: Not on that LST. I have no recollection of any politics
on that LST.
JOHNSON: Did you share any of your feelings about MacArthur,
the two of you?
RAUH: I don't think so. As a matter of fact, both of us
had fared rather well. Dick was the head adjutant for the invasion.
Even though only a Captain, he was the Adjutant on the invasion. MacArthur
got pissed off, I think, with his regular Adjutant General and he wanted
somebody else. Somebody suggested, "Well, that young Bolling is pretty
good." So Dick was the Adjutant there, and he fared pretty well. I was
in general charge of Civil Affairs, and that's a pretty good job, too.
So I don't know that we were really that hostile to MacArthur at the time.
My wife says that I've changed. She says, "Your letters
were a lot downer on MacArthur than you are now." I said, "Well, I did
get home didn't I?" So, anyway . . .
JOHNSON: And Bolling was rather critical too of what he
saw, especially those around MacArthur.
RAUH: Well, we both felt that, Dick and I.
RAUH: Yes, sycophants they were.
JOHNSON: And those were the only ones he'd have around
him, rubber stampers?
RAUH: I can't think of anybody that wasn't a rubber
JOHNSON: Was [Major General Charles A.] Willoughby then with them?
RAUH: Willoughby was G-2; [Major General Stephen A.] Chamberlain
was G-3, that's for operations; [Brigadier General] Bonner Fellers,
who later was a public right-winger, one of those Birchers, was G-1.
He was my boss, but he gave me pretty much a free hand. And then Courtney
Whitney, who was MacArthur's speechwriter, took Fellers' place and was
my boss in the Civil Affairs. Courtney just said, "Keep them out of
my hair. I don't care what you do, but keep those guys away from me."
We were finally in Manila. Courtney had lived in Manila and MacArthur
had lived in Manila, so a lot of these Manila businessmen would demand
to see us and say something like, "I need three trucks to start my business
up." All Whitney would say was, "Goddamn it, Colonel, get that thing
settled. I don't want to be bothered; I'm writing speeches for the General;"
there was, of course, only one general there--MacArthur.
One of the most interesting things for me from that period,
historically, I think, happened when my father died. I had been overseas
by that time for more than a year and a half, and I was entitled to a trip
home, to see my wife and children. I got the trip home in December
of '43 after my father died. I was on this plane going to the States
and so was Phil LaFollette. You know, you're sitting there all night
on a plane and going home, and you get kind of emotional and talk to
the guy you're sitting next to. I also had some booze which we shared.
Phil says, "I've got something here pretty important." I said, "What
is it?" He said, "It's a letter from General MacArthur that I'm to deliver
to Tom Dewey." I said, "Well, what's it say?" He said, "Well, I don't
know," but he said it in a way that I thought he did know. He said,
"I think; I think it asks Dewey what he, MacArthur, could do to help
in the upcoming election."
You know, it's funny, that's what, 45 years ago. I don't
know if he read me that. I can't remember; I just remember the clear
feeling that he was telling me something, or he showed me something.
I can't remember that, but I do know that he was saying, "I got a letter
from the General to next year's Presidential candidate." I've never
seen Phil LaFollette since that night on the plane.
JOHNSON: It seems that MacArthur was sticking his neck
out. He is a general under the Commander-in-Chief and he's offering
to help the future political adversary of his Commander-in-Chief in
the '44 election.
RAUH: Oh, but he hated Roosevelt with a passion, indeed.
JOHNSON: Did you ever hear him talk about Roosevelt?
RAUH: Oh, I wouldn't know big stuff like that. I wouldn't
have heard MacArthur talk about anything important. I would hear Bonner
Fellers talk pretty loosely. There wasn't any question that he, Bonner
Fellers, was interpreting MacArthur's views, that MacArthur hated Roosevelt.
Of course, there was that big argument, I guess it was in Honolulu,
where FDR, [Admiral Chester] Nimitz and MacArthur met, and Nimitz wanted
to go to Formosa.
JOHNSON: In fact, I think that was during the convention in '44.
RAUH: Nimitz wanted to go to Formosa. And MacArthur wanted
to go to the Philippines, and they both argued their case in front of Roosevelt.
RAUH: And MacArthur won the battle. The witness was Fellers.
I don't know what the hell MacArthur took Fellers along for, but he
did take Fellers along . . .
JOHNSON: He was there with the President and the General
and the Admiral?
RAUH: In that meeting, yes. There was terrible ill-feeling
between Washington and MacArthur. Every time a division went to Europe,
to Eisenhower, boy there was grumbling in our headquarters: "Roosevelt
has screwed it up again." "Why do we want to let the Communists win
in Europe and then we lose in Asia. Why don't we win in Asia, and to
hell with the other side."
JOHNSON: But MacArthur did get his way on that one.
RAUH: Yes, he did.
JOHNSON: And he finally did convince Roosevelt that it
would be a betrayal of the Philippines if he didn't return like he said
he was going to.
RAUH: Oh, yes. Oh yes, no question about it, MacArthur
won that battle. You should have seen Feller's face when he walked in
to report to his staff, in G-1, what had happened there. Boy, you would
have thought that he inherited a million bucks. He was so excited that
MacArthur had talked down Nimitz, and Roosevelt had ruled for MacArthur.
JOHNSON: Roosevelt was on his way to this meeting, when
he stopped in Chicago.
RAUH: Is that right?
JOHNSON: During the convention. And they got this letter
from him in which he said that either [William O.] Douglas or Truman
would be fine as Vice-Presidential candidates. Apparently, Truman's
friends included some of the city Bosses, and they influenced Roosevelt.
RAUH: Who was it that was chairman of the party.
JOHNSON: [Robert] Hannegan.
RAUH: I was always told that Hannegan went on that railroad
car and got the letter with a
reverse draft of that.
JOHNSON: With Truman mentioned first.
RAUH: That's right.
JOHNSON: And Douglas second.
RAUH: Then Hannegan leaped on that, that the President's
real preference was the first one--Truman.
JOHNSON: Yes, they worked that pretty smoothly. That was
a very eventful month, there is no question about it, with the convention
and then the meeting with MacArthur and Nimitz. That would have been
July of '44.
RAUH: The Democrats being in, they had their convention
second. The ins always have it second, because they need less time to work.
JOHNSON: Well, you were released from the Army when?
RAUH: Early September. I got home on the first of September
. MacArthur had promised me. You know about the point system?
After V-E Day in Europe, they set up a point system of getting out.
You could go home, depending on the number of months you were overseas,
if you had a family, a good record. I had enough points coming out of
my ears after Europe surrendered, and I wanted to come home. I put in
for my points, and they didn't want me to go. They wanted me to finish
the job of setting up the civil government there. They gave me MacArthur's
word that they'd get me home by the first of September which was also
my tenth wedding anniversary.
JOHNSON: In '45, just before the signing of the surrender terms.
RAUH: So I'm getting ready about August to go home, and
along comes the [atomic] bomb and the surrender. My superiors said,
"Won't you come to Japan," and I said, "No, everybody has promised I
can go home for staying this extra couple of months." They took it to
MacArthur and he signed the order, and gave me an "A" Travel Priority,
which was the earliest plane you could get. I got home on the first
of September, my tenth anniversary. MacArthur lived up to the promises
made to me.