Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. Oral History Interview

Oral History Interview with
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.

U.S. Army officer on Gen. Douglas MacArthur's staff, 1942-45; officer of the Americans for Democratic Action

Washington D.C.
June 21, 1989
Niel M. Johnson

[Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]

This is a transcript of a tape-recorded interview conducted for the Harry S. Truman Library. A draft of this transcript was edited by the interviewee but only minor emendations were made; therefore, the reader should remember that this is essentially a transcript of the spoken, rather than the written word.

Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. [45]) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.

This oral history transcript may be read, quoted from, cited, and reproduced for purposes of research. It may not be published in full except by permission of the Harry S. Truman Library.

Opened January, 1992
Harry S. Truman Library
Independence, Missouri

[Top of the Page | Notices and Restrictions | Interview Transcript | List of Subjects Discussed]

Oral History Interview with
Joseph L. Rauh, JR.

Washington D.C.
June 21, 1989
Niel M. Johnson


JOHNSON: Mr. Rauh, I'm going to start by asking you to tell us where you were born, when you were born and what your parents' names were.

RAUH: I was born in Cincinnati, Ohio on January 3, 1911, making me 78 now. My father's name was Joseph Rauh; I'm a junior. My father was born in Bamberg, Bavaria, Germany; he was an immigrant. My mother's name was Sarah Weiler. She was born in this country, but her ancestors came from Germany. We were German Jews; Cincinnati was quite a home for German Jews and still is.

JOHNSON: That's where you got your education?

RAUH: Yes. Actually my father was an education nut. He was a small businessman, but he anted to make enough money to give his kids the best education. Of course,


in those days, and maybe it's still true, the prestige lay with Harvard, and the happiest thing in my father's life was that he had enough money to send both my brother and me to Harvard. So we got the best education possible.

JOHNSON: You had one brother. Did you have any sisters?

RAUH: Yes. My brother's dead. My sister is alive; she is 87 years old. She's a pediatrician. She doesn't practice anymore, but she was a very wonderful, successful pediatrician in Cincinnati, setting up her office in the poor districts. She was a liberal, a Truman liberal, all the time.

JOHNSON: So there were three children.

RAUH: Three children.

JOHNSON: And you're what, the oldest, youngest?

RAUH: I'm the youngest of the three.

JOHNSON: What was your brother's name?

RAUH: Carl. He went into my father's business, but the business folded. It was a shirt business and you couldn't make apparel in the north after a while because of the southern competition in wages. So my brother sold out. He got out of the business rather


young, and he died rather young. He was just 67 when he died.

JOHNSON: Your father's occupation then was . . .

RAUH: A small shirt manufacturer. He was a died-in-the-wool Republican who marched in the 1896 gold parade of McKinley in Cincinnati. He was a died-in-the-wool, conservative Republican, and all three children were Democrats.

JOHNSON: Did he mellow as he got older?

RAUH: Well, the joke in our house always was, and my mother would tell the joke; he would denounce Roosevelt, and then say to my mother, "Sarah, go upstairs and get that clipping about Joseph and the New Deal." I mean he was proud of his kids even if he disagreed with them. We had a happy family.

JOHNSON: What was your major in college?

RAUH: Economics, although I don't know a damn thing about it. I don't know why I did that. When I went into college it was before the Depression; I matriculated in 1928, September of '28. October of '29 is Black Monday, and that's when people started worrying and that's when I went into law. So I went into law school rather than anything else. There was no room in this


little [family] business for anybody else, so my father said, "Why don't you go to law school?" I was sort of treading water, going to law school.

JOHNSON: Are you saying now that your father was probably the most important influence on you in these years?

RAUH: Up to the time I went to college, there's no question, he was the most important influence. College and law school changed all that.

JOHNSON: Okay, what influences did you come under there?

RAUH: Well, the most important influence, of course, was Felix Frankfurter. I am what they called back in the thirties one of the Frankfurter "happy hot dogs." I don't think there were terribly many influences that I had in college. I did fairly well; I was not a bad student. But going to law school, the chief influence was Felix Frankfurter and that's how I came here to Washington.

One day in my third year in law school, he stopped me and said, "What are you going to do next year?" I said, "Well, I've been hired by the best Jewish law firm in Cincinnati." And he said, "Well, you're not going there." I said, "What do you mean, sir?" He said, "Well, you're going to Washington. You'd just be silly not to." And he got me a job; he got me the law


clerkship to Justice [Benjamin] Cardozo, and the law clerkship of himself when he took Cardozo's spot three years later. So, yes, that was the greatest influence in my career.

JOHNSON: And Frankfurter was a reformist.

RAUH: He was a reformist. Hugh Johnson, the head of NRA [National Recovery Administration] hated Frankfurter, but he said--and this wasn't necessarily right--"He is the single most important person in Washington after the President." There's some truth in that. I mean that's obviously an overstatement, but it wasn't so ridiculously an overstatement. He was a tremendous figure down here. Well, there weren't many people that were closer to Roosevelt than Frankfurter.

So, my father's belief in the prestige of Harvard and my going to Harvard Law School affected my life. I mean it changed it completely. I always say if it wasn't for Felix Frankfurter, I'd be an overstuffed corporate lawyer like most everybody else.

JOHNSON: So you came into Washington and became a law clerk . . .

RAUH: To Justice Benjamin Cardozo. There are some pictures there, and there [pointing to the wall]. Then when Cardozo died, Frankfurter got the job. I actually


volunteered for law clerk because it was in the middle of the year that he was appointed to Cardozo's seat, and it's hard to get a law clerk right in the middle of the year, so I just volunteered. Of course, Frankfurter took up the volunteer offer, because he knew me. Also he said, "You've got more experience on the Supreme Court than I do," because I'd been there for two years with Cardozo. So I went back for a few months with Frankfurter, and then I went back into the Government.

JOHNSON: In what year did you start with Cardozo?

RAUH: I came here in '35 and I would have been Cardozo's law clerk that year, starting in the fall of '35, but Cardozo decided for the first time to keep his then-law clerk, a fellow named Alan Stroock. His father was a big Jewish lawyer in New York. Since Alan was staying an extra year, Felix told me, "You go work for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran for the year while you're waiting to be the law clerk to Justice Cardozo." So I worked for Ben Cohen and Tom Corcoran; it's described a little bit in Joe Lash's book on Dealers and Dreamers. I worked there for a year. Then in '36 I went to work for Justice Cardozo, and I was there until '38. Then there were a few months, after Cardozo died, when there were no appointees. Roosevelt then appointed


Frankfurter in December of '38, and he took the seat in January of '39. I was his law clerk for a few months, and then I went back to the New Deal and was there until the war.

JOHNSON: Were you involved in drafting any of the arguments, as in 1937, to defend the New Deal legislation?

RAUH: No. I was working for Cardozo, for example, when he had the Social Security decision to write; that was in 1937, but I was working for the Court, not for the outside. Cardozo wrote the decision upholding Social Security. There was a big attack on Social Security. There was an attack on everything the New Deal was doing, but after the Court packing plan, why the Court made quite a shift.

JOHNSON: Of course, one of those conservative justices retired at a propitious time.

RAUH: Yes, that was in May of 1937.

JOHNSON: Yes, I think they talk about '37 as the time of revolution in the Supreme Court.

RAUH: That's right.

JOHNSON: And Cohen was one of the drafters of the Social Security Act, was he not?


RAUH: Cohen had been drafter of a lot of the legislation: the Securities Act, the Securities and Exchange Act, the Holding Company Act, the Minimum Wage Act, he drafted all those, and he helped with some of the others, including Social Security. But as far as the Court packing plan was concerned, he and Tommy Corcoran were not consulted on the Court packing plan until it went up to Congress. Then they were consulted and they changed the whole strategy, those two. What happened was that Roosevelt had this ridiculous strategy that Homer Cummings the Attorney General had worked out, saying, "The Court's too old, and they can't do their work. We're going to appoint one new judge for every judge on the bench over 70 who doesn't resign."

That was ridiculous because there wasn't anything wrong with these guys' brains, what was wrong was their goddamn views. They were knocking statutes out right and left. Cohen really was the architect of this, but he and Corcoran always worked together. They said, and they persuaded the President, that the age of the Justices was not the way to get the packing plan adopted. What you had to do is just say, "We need minimum wages now. The only way to get them is this way. We need a maximum hours law now. We've got to stop child labor now. We've got to have a labor relations act now." So the emphasis was on the word


"now." If you wanted to have these things that people wanted, you had to change the Court. The Court changed and then, of course, interestingly enough, the Court not only changed but then Roosevelt's plan got defeated. I think that was divine intervention; this was the perfect outcome. The New Deal was saved by the Court changing its views,, but there's no precedent for the future of packing the Court by increasing the numbers. You may say that Reagan packed the Court, but he packed it by the people he put on; he didn't add people. So, I think the result in 1937 was perfect. The New Deal was saved, and Roosevelt's Court packing bill was defeated. See my article in the November, 1990, North Carolina Law Review.

JOHNSON: So, it didn't set a bad precedent.

RAUH: That's right.

JOHNSON: You know, I think that Truman was critical of that Court packing bill. He was about 98 percent in line with New Deal legislation, but I think he was a critic of that approach too.

RAUH: Burton Wheeler was the leader of the negative approach. I don't know what Truman's relations with Wheeler were.

JOHNSON: Well, he felt favorable towards Wheeler because


Wheeler really helped him take a role in the transportation field, you know. Truman's the one that helped rewrite the rules on railroads and made that famous statement about Jesse James being a "piker" in holding up railroads, in comparison with holding companies that were "looting" them.

RAUH: Yes.

JOHNSON: So you were a clerk on the Supreme Court to these people; and you were very well acquainted with New Deal legislation as a result. Then you take up private practice?

RAUH: At the end of '45, the beginning of '46, I did.

JOHNSON: Not until after the war?

RAUH: Not until after the war did I go into private practice.

JOHNSON: Were you with Frankfurter then when the war came?

RAUH: No, I was at the Lend-Lease Administration and the Office for Emergency Management. Of all the times in the New Deal, that was the most exciting period. You have to realize that there was a lot of anti-Semitism in those days--Pelley's Silver Shirts, and Father Coughlin's Social Justice movement, and all of that. Anti-Semitism resulted in part because many thought the


Jews were trying to get us into the war. I plead guilty. I felt that Hitler was going to try to conquer the world, and the sooner we prepared for war and got into it, the safer this country would be.

So in 1941 I worked in two agencies. I was the Deputy General Counsel of the Lend-Lease Administration under a wonderful man named Oscar Cox, whose papers are at Yale. Then I also was the Deputy General Counsel of the Office for Emergency Management, of which Cox was also the General Counsel. Wayne Coy was the head of that agency. He was assistant to the President, running sort of a holding company for all the war preparation agencies.

Here are some things that may be worth recording, not because they are important as recording my feelings, but I think they happen to be right. In '40 and '41 when we were supposed to be preparing for war against Hitler, and most Americans thought we would ultimately have to fight Hitler, we did a bad job of preparing for war. Big business didn't want to prepare for war. Big business was making so much money with civilian production they didn't want to talk about it. The auto companies, for example, made more cars in 1941 than ever before, when they should have been making airplanes. The interesting thing there, affecting President Truman, was that at that time as a Senator he


was chairman of the committee to oversee war production for Congress.

The committee made a terrible mistake, I think, and I've given a talk on this. I gave a lecture on this at a convocation on the Holocaust at the Harvard Divinity School last year. Here was my point. I was not here during the Holocaust; I was overseas. When they asked me if I'd speak, I said, "No, I really don't know that much about the Holocaust. The only thing I have to offer is that in the two years before Pearl Harbor we didn't get prepared; we lengthened the Holocaust by the fact that victory took much longer to achieve than it otherwise would have."

Well the relevance of Truman to all this, in my judgment, is that they set up this committee for oversight, the so-called Truman Committee; I can't remember its exact name.

JOHNSON: It was the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program.

RAUH: That committee, which we can call the Truman Committee, did a good job on the unimportant things. They did a good job exposing waste and fraud, but they did nothing about why the Armed Services weren't getting any guns and planes and tanks. I really made a study of this. I got every book out of the Georgetown


University Library that dealt with the Truman Committee, and every book shows that the first time they criticized the failure of production was after Pearl Harbor. The Truman Committee had an opportunity there to have hastened preparation for war and didn't do it. When I say the committee dealt with the minor things, I'm not saying it was minor politically, but to me the important event was getting ready to fight Hitler and to get enough planes and tanks and trucks and guns and ammunition and all of the rest of the things that go with the preparation for war, and they didn't. The Truman Committee didn't press business for more military and less civilian production. Truman was not part of the group that was trying to do more about that. He limited the work of his committee--that is until after Pearl Harbor--he limited the work of that committee to waste and fraud and things like that.

Well, I'm not saying that those are unimportant. I'm saying though that compared to the importance of our getting ready to fight, getting the munitions, I consider them unimportant. That was the . . .

JOHNSON: Yes, the committee had actually started, I believe, because of reports of fraud and mismanagement, during the construction of camps like Fort Leonard Wood.


RAUH: Sure, right.

JOHNSON: Truman kind of justified the thing originally on the need to investigate how they were building these new Army camps, training camps, some of the early construction of buildings.

RAUH: What they could do was shown when the war finally came, and Truman held hearings on why General Electric was still making all of this civilian stuff like refrigerators and all of their other wonderful civilian things when they could have been making war materiel. There was tremendous conversion to war production once Pearl Harbor happened, but prior to Pearl Harbor, there's not one line you'll find in any Truman report or statement criticizing the failure to produce for war. Yet everybody knew that industry wasn't producing adequately for war.

JOHNSON: So you went with the lend-lease program as soon as it started?

RAUH: Yes, I was there right at the beginning.

JOHNSON: You left Frankfurter?

RAUH: Well, I had had a year in between at the Wage and Hour Division in the Labor Department, and at the Federal Communications Commission, but my heart was in


getting prepared to fight Hitler. That's why I feel so deeply about the Truman Committee; they did one of their two jobs and they did that one very well. But the other job that I think was so important--speeding up production for war--that was not done at all. At least I tried to make sure before I said that at this meeting in Cambridge, at this convocation on the Holocaust, I tried to make sure I had read everything that had been written on or by the Truman Committee prior to Pearl Harbor. I haven't read everything since then. They exposed a lot of inaction after Pearl Harbor, but if they had done more before Pearl Harbor I think we would have saved a lot of soldiers lives and a lot of Jewish lives.

For example, take something like Walter Reuther's plan to build 500 planes a day in auto factories. That plan was floated in the winter of '40. There's no reference to it anywhere in these books on the Truman Committee. Now, I don't want to say I've done more than I have. I never went through the files of the Truman Committee, so I can't say that there's not something in the files somewhere there, but as far as the books on the subject of the Truman Committee, there's no reference to the Reuther Plan.

I would have thought somebody that supervised war preparation would have wanted to see whether Walter


Reuther was right. If we could have made the Reuther Plan work, we could have won the war sooner and all the American boys' lives, and the Jews' lives, a lot more could have been saved. So, I'm critical of President Truman in that respect, but I'm not able to say what's in their files about why they did and didn't do what.

JOHNSON: After your work with lend-lease, what did you do?

RAUH: I went in the Army.

JOHNSON: What month and year was that?

RAUH: Well, Phil Graham, later the publisher of the Washington Post, and I tried to enlist in the Air Corps the day after Pearl Harbor. I thought the guy was going to die laughing at the two of us. I'll tell you exactly what my motivations were.

We had been trying to get this country into war. We thought we had to go to war ultimately, we had to stop Hitler ultimately, and the sooner you stopped him, the better. I believed you couldn't just let him conquer more and more and more, and then try to beat him. So I felt once war was declared --especially being Jewish--that I couldn't possibly not go into the military. It took a while, but by spring I was on my way to Australia in the Army.

JOHNSON: The spring of '42?


RAUH: By the spring of '42, I was on my way to Australia on a ship. In the war I had different posts. I had no military training, but there were things you could do that were valuable. The most important job I had was planning and assisting the military government operation in the Philippines. You have a military battle plan, and then there are appendices to that battle plan, and there's an appendix on supply and an appendix on this, and an appendix on that. Then the last appendix is on what we called civil affairs, but what they called at the Pentagon, Military Government. Our final plan for civil affairs was completed in Hollandia just before we shoved off for the Philippines.

MacArthur wouldn't take Military Government people from the States. He refused to accept any of them. You know, the military commander in the area can bar people, and he barred any Military Government troops. He wanted to do it out of his own people. Since I was a lawyer, the deputy chief of staff put me in G-1 which was where we had the civil affairs section before we made it into a G-5. I was to draft how you dealt with Military Government problems. Jeez, maybe I was a good lawyer, but I didn't know anything about that.

So, what happened was this. A friend of mine had gotten a trip back home to work on some supply side


problem in the invasion. He brought a book back with him. It was John Hersey's A Bell for Adano, a story of the invasion of Italy. It had all of the problems in civil affairs like roads being clogged by peasants when soldiers wanted to move to the front and so forth. I've always said I helped write the battle plan on civil affairs for the Leyte invasion out of John Hersey's A Bell for Adano. I read it three times; I read it and read it. A marvelous book; it taught you how to do it. So I was in civil affairs from, say, the summer of '43 until after V-J Day when I left in August of '45.

JOHNSON: What was your rank?

RAUH: I ended up as lieutenant colonel. They offered me the moon to go to Japan, but . . .

JOHNSON: Were you one of these 90-day commissions when you went in?

RAUH: No, I had a regular lieutenant's commission when I went in.

JOHNSON: Was this attached to the headquarters, to MacArthur's headquarters, the civil government section?

RAUH: Oh, yes.

JOHNSON: That's where you met Richard Bolling I suppose.


RAUH: Yes, that's exactly where I met Dick--first at our Hollandia headquarters and then Dick and I were on the same LST from Hollandia to Leyte; that's six days at sea, weaving back and forth. Dick was the adjutant and I was more or less in charge of civil affairs. It was damn nice to have somebody who could write an order when you needed an order fast. Dick and I weren't quite military, you know; we didn't follow routines too much. Anyway, Dick and I were on the same LST together, but we never talked politics or ideology. I guess you're a little scared you're going to die on the beach. Even though I wasn't a shooter, you were on the same beach with the shooting. So we never talked about anything serious.

That's 1944. Three years later, in March in Chicago, I bumped into Dick at an ADA organizational meeting and both of us exploded at each other, "What the hell are you doing here?" We didn't know all we had in common.

JOHNSON: You didn't talk politics.

RAUH: Not on that LST. I have no recollection of any politics on that LST.

JOHNSON: Did you share any of your feelings about MacArthur, the two of you?


RAUH: I don't think so. As a matter of fact, both of us had fared rather well. Dick was the head adjutant for the invasion. Even though only a Captain, he was the Adjutant on the invasion. MacArthur got pissed off, I think, with his regular Adjutant General and he wanted somebody else. Somebody suggested, "Well, that young Bolling is pretty good." So Dick was the Adjutant there, and he fared pretty well. I was in general charge of Civil Affairs, and that's a pretty good job, too. So I don't know that we were really that hostile to MacArthur at the time.

My wife says that I've changed. She says, "Your letters were a lot downer on MacArthur than you are now." I said, "Well, I did get home didn't I?" So, anyway . . .

JOHNSON: And Bolling was rather critical too of what he saw, especially those around MacArthur.

RAUH: Well, we both felt that, Dick and I.

JOHNSON: Sycophants?

RAUH: Yes, sycophants they were.

JOHNSON: And those were the only ones he'd have around him, rubber stampers?

RAUH: I can't think of anybody that wasn't a rubber



JOHNSON: Was [Major General Charles A.] Willoughby then with them?

RAUH: Willoughby was G-2; [Major General Stephen A.] Chamberlain was G-3, that's for operations; [Brigadier General] Bonner Fellers, who later was a public right-winger, one of those Birchers, was G-1. He was my boss, but he gave me pretty much a free hand. And then Courtney Whitney, who was MacArthur's speechwriter, took Fellers' place and was my boss in the Civil Affairs. Courtney just said, "Keep them out of my hair. I don't care what you do, but keep those guys away from me." We were finally in Manila. Courtney had lived in Manila and MacArthur had lived in Manila, so a lot of these Manila businessmen would demand to see us and say something like, "I need three trucks to start my business up." All Whitney would say was, "Goddamn it, Colonel, get that thing settled. I don't want to be bothered; I'm writing speeches for the General;" there was, of course, only one general there--MacArthur.

One of the most interesting things for me from that period, historically, I think, happened when my father died. I had been overseas by that time for more than a year and a half, and I was entitled to a trip


home, to see my wife and children. I got the trip home in December of '43 after my father died. I was on this plane going to the States and so was Phil LaFollette. You know, you're sitting there all night on a plane and going home, and you get kind of emotional and talk to the guy you're sitting next to. I also had some booze which we shared. Phil says, "I've got something here pretty important." I said, "What is it?" He said, "It's a letter from General MacArthur that I'm to deliver to Tom Dewey." I said, "Well, what's it say?" He said, "Well, I don't know," but he said it in a way that I thought he did know. He said, "I think; I think it asks Dewey what he, MacArthur, could do to help in the upcoming election."

You know, it's funny, that's what, 45 years ago. I don't know if he read me that. I can't remember; I just remember the clear feeling that he was telling me something, or he showed me something. I can't remember that, but I do know that he was saying, "I got a letter from the General to next year's Presidential candidate." I've never seen Phil LaFollette since that night on the plane.

JOHNSON: It seems that MacArthur was sticking his neck out. He is a general under the Commander-in-Chief and he's offering to help the future political adversary of his Commander-in-Chief in the '44 election.


RAUH: Oh, but he hated Roosevelt with a passion, indeed.

JOHNSON: Did you ever hear him talk about Roosevelt?

RAUH: Oh, I wouldn't know big stuff like that. I wouldn't have heard MacArthur talk about anything important. I would hear Bonner Fellers talk pretty loosely. There wasn't any question that he, Bonner Fellers, was interpreting MacArthur's views, that MacArthur hated Roosevelt. Of course, there was that big argument, I guess it was in Honolulu, where FDR, [Admiral Chester] Nimitz and MacArthur met, and Nimitz wanted to go to Formosa.

JOHNSON: In fact, I think that was during the convention in '44.

RAUH: Nimitz wanted to go to Formosa. And MacArthur wanted to go to the Philippines, and they both argued their case in front of Roosevelt.


RAUH: And MacArthur won the battle. The witness was Fellers. I don't know what the hell MacArthur took Fellers along for, but he did take Fellers along . . .

JOHNSON: He was there with the President and the General and the Admiral?


RAUH: In that meeting, yes. There was terrible ill-feeling between Washington and MacArthur. Every time a division went to Europe, to Eisenhower, boy there was grumbling in our headquarters: "Roosevelt has screwed it up again." "Why do we want to let the Communists win in Europe and then we lose in Asia. Why don't we win in Asia, and to hell with the other side."

JOHNSON: But MacArthur did get his way on that one.

RAUH: Yes, he did.

JOHNSON: And he finally did convince Roosevelt that it would be a betrayal of the Philippines if he didn't return like he said he was going to.

RAUH: Oh, yes. Oh yes, no question about it, MacArthur won that battle. You should have seen Feller's face when he walked in to report to his staff, in G-1, what had happened there. Boy, you would have thought that he inherited a million bucks. He was so excited that MacArthur had talked down Nimitz, and Roosevelt had ruled for MacArthur.

JOHNSON: Roosevelt was on his way to this meeting, when he stopped in Chicago.

RAUH: Is that right?

JOHNSON: During the convention. And they got this letter


from him in which he said that either [William O.] Douglas or Truman would be fine as Vice-Presidential candidates. Apparently, Truman's friends included some of the city Bosses, and they influenced Roosevelt.

RAUH: Who was it that was chairman of the party.

JOHNSON: [Robert] Hannegan.

RAUH: I was always told that Hannegan went on that railroad car and got the letter with a

reverse draft of that.

JOHNSON: With Truman mentioned first.

RAUH: That's right.

JOHNSON: And Douglas second.

RAUH: Then Hannegan leaped on that, that the President's real preference was the first one--Truman.

JOHNSON: Yes, they worked that pretty smoothly. That was a very eventful month, there is no question about it, with the convention and then the meeting with MacArthur and Nimitz. That would have been July of '44.

RAUH: The Democrats being in, they had their convention second. The ins always have it second, because they need less time to work.

JOHNSON: Well, you were released from the Army when?


RAUH: Early September. I got home on the first of September [1945]. MacArthur had promised me. You know about the point system? After V-E Day in Europe, they set up a point system of getting out. You could go home, depending on the number of months you were overseas, if you had a family, a good record. I had enough points coming out of my ears after Europe surrendered, and I wanted to come home. I put in for my points, and they didn't want me to go. They wanted me to finish the job of setting up the civil government there. They gave me MacArthur's word that they'd get me home by the first of September which was also my tenth wedding anniversary.

JOHNSON: In '45, just before the signing of the surrender terms.

RAUH: So I'm getting ready about August to go home, and along comes the [atomic] bomb and the surrender. My superiors said, "Won't you come to Japan," and I said, "No, everybody has promised I can go home for staying this extra couple of months." They took it to MacArthur and he signed the order, and gave me an "A" Travel Priority, which was the earliest plane you could get. I got home on the first of September, my tenth anniversary. MacArthur lived up to the promises made to me.