Numbers appearing in square brackets (ex. ) within the transcript indicate the pagination in the original, hardcopy version of the oral history interview.
Opened January, 1976
Oral History Interview with
November 13, 1972
by Richard D. McKinzie
MCKINZIE: Mr. Ambassador, you were, I think, in charge of the Legation in Damascus at the time that President Roosevelt died and when President Truman assumed office. Do you have any recollections about what happened on the occasion of President Roosevelt's death, and how the coming to office of a new President affected your outlook and the outlook of the Middle Easterners with whom you had contact?
SATTERTHWAITE: Well, yes, I remember it very dramatically because I was in charge of our legation in
Damascus. The Minister Plenipotentiary George Wadsworth, lived in Beirut, over two ranges of mountains, and when he wasn't in Damascus I was in charge. President Roosevelt had left tremendous impressions throughout the Near East in his war efforts. I had a [condolence] book and all day long people of an amazing variety came to visit me. The Syrian officials came and signed the book. France was still officially the protecting power, and individuals from General [Paul] Beynet down to a corporal, I remember, came in and signed the book.
Most impressive to me were some of the heads of the great tribes, the still nomadic tribes on the great Syrian desert, who came in in their robes, of course, and their abbas and so on. It lasted all day long with an amazing outpouring of emotion. But they knew very little about President Truman as our Vice Presidents aren't very highly publicized overseas as a rule,
except maybe [Spiro] Agnew now a little more. And so all I could say was that we're never without a President, fortunately, and that our new President is Harry S. Truman.
MCKINZIE: The Middle East seemed to have a particular interest for President Roosevelt. There is some evidence that he wanted to use Iran, perhaps, as a test case for the Atlantic Charter, that here was a place where you could see if it was going to work. Were you aware, at the end of the war, of any expectations on the part of the Syrian Government, or any other Middle Eastern government, about development plans that they might expect the United States to help them with?
SATTERTHWAITE: Well, in connection with Iran let's go back to my days in Baghdad, which were just before World War II, and of course, the problem
we had being close to the border of Iran, and very much in touch with Iranian affairs. After the war, by the time I was in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, the principal Iranian problem was Azerbaijan. The Russians had occupied it, even though they had shared the occupation with the British, but they wouldn't move out of this northern province, and this was one of our greatest problems in '45 and '46. Maybe someone would say it was some other problem, but it seems to me this was the first great success of the United Nations, because in the debates at the Security Council, it was the worldwide publicity that this problem got that in effect forced the Russians finally to pull their troops out of Azerbaijan and leave all of Iran to be governed by the old Shah.
MCKINZIE: May I interject here that President Truman wrote a book, with the help of assistants, after he did his memoirs, in which he contends that he
said to Stalin that he should withdraw the troops from Azerbaijan, or he, Truman, would send the American Mediterranean fleet into the Persian Gulf, and historians have not been able to come up with any document to Premier Stalin, suggesting that that was going to happen. In your own personal recollections...
SATTERTHWAITE: No, I don't have any recollections of that, and it seems to me he would certainly have told Dean Acheson at least, whom he thought so highly of, if it were so. I don't recall it ever having been mentioned in any of our many meetings. But I shouldn't dispute Truman if he said so.
MCKINZIE: But historians have been puzzled that such a document has never been found.
SATTERTHWAITE: Certainly I have no recollection of this. Now, as to sending the fleet into the Persian Gulf, of course, it's still a long way from the Soviet Union. One of our fears always --
and now it can be told -- secretly, was that because of the Russian desire, the Imperial Russian desire, also, to have a warm water port, they might drive down to the Persian Gulf some day. And at one time after World War II we knew they had some airborne divisions poised in the Caucasus. And we were disturbed and took counteraction, to a degree. I don't think there was any real question of our sending ships into the Persian Gulf. We had one old, mother ship there which wouldn't have deterred much of anybody and it would have been almost impossible for us to carry out an action in the Persian Gulf. The kind of action that we would have had to take would have been not of a warlike kind, but, you know, hurting the Russians in all the other ways you could think of economically. I can't imagine how we could have really frightened Stalin, even if we did have a fleet in the Mediterranean.
MCKINZIE: At that time, were you aware of the fact
that very many people in Truman's Cabinet and in the military were seeing the Middle East as an increasingly important area? Secretary [Harold] Ickes, for example, got very excited at the end of the war about the oil potential in the Middle East, as, indeed, did Secretary (Robert P.] Patterson, arguing to President Truman at one point that the United States could fight a major world war for only three years without the oil. This seemed to be a kind of new or recent concern, didn't it?
SATTERTHWAITE: I don't remember that, though it may be true. By the time I was Director of the Near Eastern and African Affairs Ickes was concerned about India in one way. Nehru was to make a trip to the U.S. and I remember Ickes got me on the phone about the details of arranging his visit, but I don't remember if anything came of it. It would have had to have come through the
White House pretty much. Ickes, being Ickes, would have dealt directly with Acheson if he wanted to, I am sure, or with Bob [Robert A.] Lovett probably. Incidentally, I had the greatest admiration for Lovett, as I did for General Marshall, but Lovett was the one that handled the details always. You see Marshall operated like a general with a chief of staff, and Lovett was his chief of staff, and he often used to tell me, "The General and I operate as a team."
MCKINZIE: Mr. Ambassador, what about the theory that the United States didn't fill the power vacuum in the Middle East as fast as it might have with the decline of the French influence, and, indeed, British influence in the Middle East, that were leaving a kind of political turmoil.
SATTERTHWAITE: If you will remember -- you may be too young to -- but the first few months after the war we were demobilizing just as rapidly as we
could, and I remember Larry [Lauris] Norstad, as a young major general, lecturing to the political officers of the State Department saying how fortunate it was that there were great new problems while we were almost completely disarmed, and so we could build up a new army.
MCKINZIE: You mentioned that when you came back to the State Department in September of 1945 there were a lot of ambassadors coming back from the Middle East, and they found President Truman relatively accessible.
SATTERTHWAITE: That's right.
MCKINZIE: What kind of things were they telling him about the Middle East?
SATTERTHWAITE: Well, he was interested in the Middle East. As I said, we were rather surprised how easy it was to make appointments for them. Actually, with one or two exceptions, they were still ministers
plenipotentiary. The posts were raised to the rank of ambassador maybe in '47 or 48. But anyway, they were our representatives there, and, of course, he was interested in Palestine. But remember that didn't become a real political problem until '47 and I'm talking about the fall of '45 now. And he was interested in that area, what to do about it, and what would happen there and what they were like even though a lot of people didn't know the difference between Iraq and Iran, for instance. That was certainly true of this famous general who made so much trouble in China later on -- Patrick Hurley, this picturesque general, who came to the Near East during the last days of the war, and when he was in Baghdad he was talking as if he was in Iran, and I suspect in Teheran about Iraq, but I'm not sure. But we know the Iraqis weren't especially amused that he didn't even know the name of their country.
MCKINZIE: Later, in 1948 and certainly by 1949 there
was a lot of talk about "the revolution of rising expectations" on the part of the people. Were you involved in that discussion and how to go about fulfilling these expectations that the peoples of the area had?
SATTERTHWAITE: I'm not sure that that problem wasn't written about subsequently, although we were thinking about it at the time. Certainly we had the problem for getting aid. Now the one country that needed it only briefly, of course, was Saudi Arabia. They felt very poor at the end of the war because, of course, they couldn't develop their oil in wartime. But, I still recall -- maybe in the fall of '45 -- being invited to a reception at which champagne was flowing out of a fountain, the sort of thing that you put your cup under. Ibn Saud learned about this later; you know the Saudis were not supposed to drink liquor, and so later on their parties were dry, but this was nice while it lasted.
Saudi Arabia, of course, is potentially, except for Kuwait I suppose, one of the countries with the highest gross national product per capita in the world. Kuwait, of course, is way ahead of everybody else. I visited Kuwait from my legation in Baghdad in 1937 when the first oil well was going down, before any oil had been discovered. I went out and visited the rig on the desert.
MCKINZIE: It's changed considerably since then.
SATTERTHWATTE: It seems to me rising expectations were certainly a part of the developing world, but it certainly wasn't up on the "front burner," as I recall. And of course, it may be that it was being dealt with elsewhere. I am sure that the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs didn't spend a great deal of time thinking about the Near East, because we had all the problems of getting Europe started, and then we
had the Far East; but no doubt they were thinking about this, very much.
MCKINZIE: When the large aid programs began in Europe, some of the developing countries, away from Europe, and I'm thinking specifically of Latin America, did voice some resentment at this "Europe first policy." Did you have to deal with that to any large degree?
SATTERTHWAITE: No, but of course, you see, at first it was Turkey and Greece to begin with, the first great aid program under the Truman Doctrine and then, of course, the Marshall Plan did come out of that. And later on the appropriations for '48 and '49 even, certainly '49-'50, aid for Greece and Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan appropriations. I don't remember being troubled by that in the Near East. Of course, you see, '47 was the year in which India and Pakistan got their independence, and then next year you had Burma and Ceylon and some other
countries; so the first aid programs in other words, had to come from the British Empire and did, to the countries they were giving up. I don't recall that we gave any aid to Ceylon for years. I may be wrong in that.
MCKINZIE: No, we didn't.
SATTERTHWAITE: Certainly not when I was there, from '49 to '53.
MCKINZIE: What then did you conceive to be the greatest problem in maintaining stability of the area? Since it had strategic and economic importance to the United States it would be in the national interest to maintain the stability of the area,
SATTERTHWAITE: Well, are we talking about the immediate postwar period now?
MCKINZIE: Yes, from '45, let's say, through '47.
SATTERTHWAITE: Well, one of the things that disturbed
us was the expiration of a law permitting us to give military assistance outside of Latin America. We've long had a basic law by which we could send military missions and give military assistance to Latin America, and I accompanied General Marshall soon after he became Secretary of State to an appearance before the House Military Affairs Committee -- probably the only time, almost, that a Secretary of State has appeared before that committee, trying to persuade Congress to extend this legislation. And the House was willing, but the Senate blocked it; Harry Byrd, I think, principally.
General Marshall didn't go to the Senate hearing as perhaps he should have, but anyway this was fascinating because it was like old home week in the House. This committee was so glad to see General Marshall again that it made it very interesting, and, of course, the House Committee under Vinson would give him anything he wanted nearly. The Senate was more stubborn, as it often is.
MCKINZIE: There was a gap in there between lend-lease and the creation of ECA