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65-01_02 - 1949-01-17

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COMMENT ON MR. GREENVILLE CLARK'S MEMORANDUM OF DECEMBER 1ST, 1948 REGARDING UNITED WORLD FEDERALIST'S POLICY

Mr. Clark believes that a "sound and complete policy" has now been found by UWF with respect to the transformation of the United Nations into an effective Federation and the settlement of the main issues between the Soviet Union and the West.

The solution, he thinks, is one big negotiation with Russia on both these interdependent matters.

This negotiation "might extend over several years since the obstacles are great and the utmost patience will be required."

(Having had some rather extensive negotiating experience with Russia, I can keenly appreciate the force of this statement).

"It has been a necessary thing to make it plain to Russia that her further expansion would be promptly opposed."

Presumably, therefore, the negotiation would proceed on the basis that the vast Central European territory into which Russia has already forcibly expanded since the end of the war is now hers without further question.

It is not clear as to what the situation would be if other states, now free and independent, should fall into the Russian orbit by the usual methods, during the "several years" which the negotiations would require.

I do not advocate going to war with Russia for the restoration of the integrity and independence of Czechoslovakia, and other States which she has forcibly subdued to her will.

But I am opposed to any plan of negotiation with Russia which tacitly recognizes her right to keep her heel on the necks of the millions of people of these Central European States forcibly brought under her dominion since the end of the war.

Any negotiation which recognizes such right, or ignores the question, cannot possibly bring peace to the world, even though agreement were reached on every other point of difference.

There will be no peace in the world until Russia returns to her prewar boundaries.

The obvious question is: How can this be accomplished short of war?

Possibly it may never be accomplished but I believe that it can be; but not under the present policies and procedures of the democracies.

Regardless of the Marshall Plan or similar plan, Western Europe cannot in the foreseeable future return to a position of financial independence with a decent standard of living for its peoples so long as it continues to function as eighteen or twenty separate and independent economic compartments as it does now.

As a practical matter, the United States does not possess sufficient reserves of strength to carry Western Europe on its back, for long, as it is doing now.

The only solution, it seems to me, is Union or Federation of the remaining free States of Europe. And I am inclined to favor the inclusion in such a union of the United States and Canada.

Such a Union would present to Russia an aggregation of political, economic and military power so great that further Russian expansion westward would be impossible, and the probabilities are that the natural pull from the West on Russian Satellite States lying in between would be so much greater than the pull from the East that most, if not all, of these States would in time successfully reassert their independence.

Everything possible should be done to increase trade, travel and cultural intercourse and exchanges between the West and the East.

On the question of trade alone, Russia will have enormous difficulties in holding the Satellite States in her sphere of influence. The Western and Eastern economies are complementary which is not at all true of the Russian and Satellite economies.

The goods and services which the Satellite countries require are for the most part the identical goods and services of which the Russians are themselves buyers; and the goods which the Satellite countries wish to sell are for the most part the same sort of goods which the Russians wish to sell.

There is thus no natural economic basis for inclusion of retention of the Satellite countries in the Russian sphere of influence.

If we go on as we are or if we negotiate as Mr. Clark suggests "for several years," we will wake up one day and find Russia in possession of the atom bomb and then we will face a different situation.

Anyone having any doubt as to the ultimate aims of Stalin ought to read the article by "Historicus" in the January issue of "Foreign Affairs."

Houston, Texas - 17th January, 1949 W. L. CLAYTON