January 26, 1949
MEMORANDUM Subject: Germany
After luncheon in Mr. Royall's office, he asked Secretary Snyder, Secretary Forrestal, Assistant Secretary Voorhees, Under Secretary Draper, Mr. Saltzman and me to remain to discuss Germany.
Secretary Royall then asked that the committee to which he referred in his letter to the President be established at once and that it meet on Friday morning to consider some urgent problems. He went on to say that he hoped the committee through the principal members or through their deputies would continue to meet until most of the German problems were settled.
I said that I was not prepared to enter the committee as proposed by Secretary Royall except on express direction of the President, that I had talked with the President about it, and that I believed I had his approval in saying that the proper procedure was to act through the National Security Council. The effect of this change was more than procedural. It brought into the deliberations of the Cabinet group as the secretariat a staff service of the President, that is, the secretariat of the National Security Council. In this way, the President could be kept continuously advised of the deliberations of the group, have his wishes made known at all stages and have its final recommendations go to him in an orderly way under established procedure. I said that I was quite prepared to have the National Security Council designate as a working subcommittee the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Army, Mr. Hoffman and anyone else whom the President desired. The recommendations of this subcommittee would undoubtedly be accepted for forwarding to the President by the full Council.
I said also that I thought this committee should undertake as its task a restatement of our policy toward Germany in the light of our obligations and policy in Western Europe. The statement need not be wordy but should be complete. I thought that it was unwise to try and compromise differences where real differences existed. In these cases alternative statements should be forwarded so that the President might be free to accept, modify or rewrite any or all the proposals. I added that if there were pressing problems which required solution prior to a completion of this work, those could be dealt with in the same way by the same group. I added that as presently advised, I would ask the President after he had issued a statement of his policy toward Germany to authorize the Secretary of State to issue interpretations and policy directions to the Commander in Germany in order to carry it out. These, of course, would be discussed with the Army authorities but I thought that the matter of responsibility and authority should be made clear.
All but the last of these suggestions were immediately accepted by all present.
Secretary Royal asked me to move in the Security Council tomorrow for the establishment of this subcommittee, the authorization of the project and the staffing of the committee by Admiral Souers. I said that I would do this. As to my last suggestion, Secretary Royall said that the Army had never questioned the ultimate authority of the Secretary of State in this field, but that the matter was not as simple as I had stated it, and that they would have to clarify what we meant by interpretations and directions. I did not comment upon this statement.
After the meeting Secretary Royall handed me a top secret paper on Germany which he had prepared for Secretary Forrestal. He said that he wished this very closely held although he understood its subject matter would have to be discussed at sometime in the subcommittee. I am attaching this paper and ask that it be not circulated except after specific discussion with me.
S:DAcheson