DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
Date: February 5, 1949
Subject: The Atlantic Pact
Participants: Secretary of State Acheson Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg Charles E. Bohlen Senator Tom Connally
Copies to: S - The Secretary U - Mr. Webb G - Mr. Rusk EUR - Mr. Hickerson L - Mr. Gross
The second meeting was held with Senators Connally and Vandenberg to examine the revised text of certain articles of the North Atlantic Pact along the lines of the suggestions the Senators had made at the previous meeting.
The discussion was almost entirely concerned with the possible revision of Article 5.
SENATOR VANDENBERG stated his preference for the first revision which followed closely the suggestions he had made at the previous meeting; namely, for the elimination of the words "forthwith," "military" and "as may be necessary." He said the second draft while having the advantage of following the language of the Charter nevertheless left an area of doubt as to who would determine what action was "necessary" in order to restore peace and security in the area and would therefore arouse perhaps unnecessary questions in the Congress.
SENATOR CONNALLY stated that he had talked this matter over with Senator George who is in complete agreement with him that difficulty would be encountered in the Senate if there was the implication of automatic declaration of war in this pact. Senator Connelly requested that he be allowed to take the two new drafts of Article 5 for further study which he promised to keep in complete confidence.
I assured Senator Connally, in reply to his question, that there was no intention on our part to sign this treaty and then present it as a fait accompli to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and that I certainly intended to come down in executive session and have a full discussion with them of the entire draft before any signature or final action was taken.
SENATOR CONNALLY expressed the view that since we were giving so much to the countries involved and were considering taking the obligation inherent in the treaty that in negotiation we should insist upon certain safeguards in connection with the power of Congress to declare war.
MR. BOHLEN pointed out that it was entirely true that the United States was in one sense giving more than it would receive, nevertheless, if the treaty was to accomplish its purpose, it would have to be a joint enterprise in which all parties were willingly associated.
SENATOR CONNALLY did not disagree but was obviously very much concerned at the automatic implications in the treaty.
Dean Acheson
C:CEBohlen:mcw