DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
Date: February 5, 1949
Subject: Rhodes Negotiations on Palestine
Participants: The Secretary - Mr. Acheson Egyptian Ambassador - Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim Egyptian Minister - Anis Azer NEA - Mr. Satterthwaite
Copies to: UNA, NE, S/S, Cairo, London, Jerusalem for U.S. Del.
After introductions and an exchange of amenities, the Ambassador reviewed, from the Egyptian standpoint, the course of the negotiations at Rhodes. He said that the Egyptian Government had accepted and was willing to carry out the Security Council resolutions of November 4, November 16, and December 29. Furthermore, in an effort to break the impasse and to succeed in reaching an armistice agreement with the Israeli Government, they had accepted the last compromise suggested by Mr. Bunche, U.N. Mediator, which involved a recession on their part from the November 4 resolution. Unfortunately the "other side" had consistently refused to accept any compromise and adhered to its original position. Notwithstanding this, the Egyptian Government was very anxious to reach an agreement and had instructed him to request me to "intervene" in the hope that the negotiations might not break down. It would be most unfortunate if the Rhodes negotiations were unsuccessful and hostilities were to break out again.
I told the Ambassador that I could not agree with him more fully. I had discussed this problem with the President and knew that he was most anxious that an agreement be reached. I had also discussed the problem with the Israeli Representative here and was glad to be able to tell the Ambassador that as a result I was somewhat more optimistic and felt that there was still a good possibility of reaching an agreement under the guidance of the Mediator. I could not, of course, go into details, as that was the duty of the Mediator. It was, however important that negotiations not be broken off and that every effort be continued toward reaching an agreement on an armistice. While my government could not "intervene," it would continue to use its good offices toward this end. At this point the Ambassador handed me an Aide-Memoire (copy attached) which I did not read at that time. (It sets forth the latest Bunche proposals and describes the concessions required of the Egyptians.)
After thanking me for my assurances the Ambassador said that he would like to bring up one more point. Once an armistice agreement had been signed, he felt that the time would have come to turn a new leaf in Arab-American relations. The United States had carried out all its commitments to the "other side" and perhaps it could now once more consider what assistance it could give the Arab world which, in spite of whatever might be said, does still exist and cannot be ignored. He mentioned the possibility of rendering financial, economic, cultural and technical assistance. He is, he said, in the process of preparing on his own responsibility a resumé of the possibilities in this field which he would like to discuss with me some time. He felt that if the United States could once more resume its former friendly relations with the Arab world and help to bind its wounds it would have a great moral effect and contribute toward the security of that region. He thought that the first step was already under way in the efforts being made to increase the U.S. quota on Egyptian long staple cotton.
I said that I agreed fully with the Ambassador with regard to the desirability of our getting back on closer and friendlier relations and that I would be glad to go over his resumé with him when he had completed it.
In the course of the conversation I also said that we were aware of the cooperative attitude displayed by the Egyptians at Rhodes and were most appreciative of it.
NEA:JCSatterthwaite/jaw,vn-2/7/49
[Attachment]ROYAL EGYPTIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C.
AIDE-MEMOIRE
Egypt has embarked on the Rhodes negotiations in a hopeful spirit. It made sincere efforts within the framework of the United Nations resolutions to negotiate a just armistice. At the start, the atmosphere promised that satisfactory results might ensue but later, on account of Jewish intransigence, negotiations have encountered a deadlock that threatens a complete break. As a solution to this deadlock, Dr. Bunche, the United Nations Mediator offered the following armistice terms:
1. The following conditions of armistice have been formulated by Dr. Bunche, Acting Mediator:
a. Egyptian Forces in Faluja will be withdrawn the following day of the signature of the Armistice.
b. Both armies will retreat to lines detailed by the Mediator's instructions of November 13th.
c. Birshiba, Birasloug and Alauga will be neutral zones under United Nations control from which military forces will be withdrawn.
d. Birshiba will be the mixed Armistice Commission headquarters, while Alauga and Birasloug will be auxiliary headquarters.
e. Egyptian Forces in Gaza, Rafah and Bethlehem Hebron sectors to be reduced to defensive strength and Egyptian offensive forces will be maintained east of El-Arish.
f. Israel defensive forces will be equal to Egyptian defensive forces in Gaza Rafah area and Arab Legion in Bethlehem Hebron sector.
Dr. Bunche's project mentioned above gives Israelites the following concessions:
a. United Nations resolution of November 4th, 1948 gives Egypt the right to reoccupy Birasloug and El-Auga. Bunche's proposal made them neutral and will not be occupied by Egyptian Forces.
b. There will be no Egyptian Civil Administrator at Birshiba as envisaged by the 4th November resolution.
2. In spite of these concessions, the Jews intimated the refusal of Dr. Bunche's proposal. Egypt has always demonstrated the utmost respect to the United Nations and to its resolutions. It has, up to now, accepted and manifested its readiness to implement all cease fire and truces ordered by the United Nations as well as resolutions of November 4th, 16th and December 29th. Moreover, the Egyptian Government hastened to accept the United States Government's good offices which resulted in the actual Rhodes negotiations. Egypt has proved beyond doubt its loyalty to the United Nations, its readiness to further peace and security in this troubled area. To its deep regret, the Jews did not show the same intentions or concern over peace and remained, during the whole period of armistice negotiations, transgressive and unconciliatory.
The Egyptian Government is greatly concerned over the prospects of peace if the Rhodes negotiations should fail. It is quite possible that fighting will be resumed if the Jews continue their intransigent attitude and their defiance to the United Nations authority. The only hope now is in the United States Government taking urgent and effective measures in order that Jewish authorities comply with the United Nations resolutions and the United Nations acting Mediator's armistice proposals.
Should the negotiations succeed, it would avert the resumption of hostilities and it would herald a hopeful beginning for the Conciliation Commission's work towards ultimate peace.
February 4, 1949
February 5, 1949
The Israeli Ambassador called at my request.
After an exchange of courtesies, I said to him that we had received yesterday messages from Mr. Ross and Mr. Jessup in New York and from the United Nations Mediator, Mr. Bunche, which caused us considerable concern. It was reported from New York that the armistice proposals put forward by the Mediator had been accepted practically in full, although with reluctance, by the Egyptians. On the other hand, however, Mr. Eban, the Israeli representative in New York, had told our representatives that the Israeli Government could not accept these proposals. We received the same information from Mr. Bunche who expressed grave fears that the negotiations would break down and that the matter would have to be reported to the Security Council by him. It appeared that in such a situation the responsibility for the collapse of the negotiations would rest on the Israeli Government.
I said that this situation caused the President a deep concern and that I was speaking to the Ambassador with the knowledge and approval of the President. The Ambassador knew that the Israeli Government had no more sympathetic friend than President Truman and that no one had done more to support them in trying days. The President believed that this was the psychological moment where an armistice could be brought about without injury to the vital interests of any of the parties, if the Israeli Government would approach these discussions in a spirit of broad statesmanship and make concessions which were wholly in accord with the moral position of Israel. I hoped therefore that his Government would not reject the proposals but would accept them as a basis for further discussion and work out an armistice along the lines proposed. I did not believe that the attitude of the Egyptian Government was brittle but did believe that there was sufficient flexibility so that with a conciliatory attitude on both sides, a solution could be reached. I said that if this were not done, if the negotiations failed, and if the matter was so reported to the Security Council, the position of Israel, both morally and otherwise, would be prejudiced. I spoke of the importance of reaching an armistice with Egypt as the key decision which would produce similar arrangements with the other Arab States and launch all of them in a favorable atmosphere on the discussions of permanent peace.
The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for what I had said and the spirit in which it was said. He stated that his Government knew that it had no more sympathetic friend than President Truman and that his views would be pondered with the greatest respect. He said that I could assure the President that in the Ambassador's opinion the armistice negotiations would not break down and that as he understood it his Government was not making a flat rejection of the Mediator's proposal but was finding difficulty on security reasons to eliminating its forces from certain places.
We both agreed that we would not go into the details of the matter and he understood that what I had said did not mean that we believed that the proposal as made in all its details ought to be the one finally accepted.
I stressed again that it should not be in our opinion rejected but made the basis for further talks in which every possible effort should be made to bring about an armistice.
The Ambassador then spoke of some of the problems which his Government had as the government of a democratic country in carrying its own people with it. He then spoke at some length about the spiritual and moral forces which had enabled the Jews to survive their hardships and which lie at the basis of the state of Israel. I said to him that I hoped they would approach the proposals for an armistice from the point of view of these considerations and that what he had said assured me that they believed that reliance upon these forces were more effective than military strong points here and there, and that as I saw it the thing that his Government would wish to avoid more than anything else would be impairing in any way its moral position. He agreed that this was so and that considerations of noblesse oblige bore strongly upon the Jewish attitude. He told me again that I could assure the President that in his opinion the negotiations would not break down.
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