February 5, 1949
The Israeli Ambassador called at my request.
After an exchange of courtesies, I said to him that we had received yesterday messages from Mr. Ross and Mr. Jessup in New York and from the United Nations Mediator, Mr. Bunche, which caused us considerable concern. It was reported from New York that the armistice proposals put forward by the Mediator had been accepted practically in full, although with reluctance, by the Egyptians. On the other hand, however, Mr. Eban, the Israeli representative in New York, had told our representatives that the Israeli Government could not accept these proposals. We received the same information from Mr. Bunche who expressed grave fears that the negotiations would break down and that the matter would have to be reported to the Security Council by him. It appeared that in such a situation the responsibility for the collapse of the negotiations would rest on the Israeli Government.
I said that this situation caused the President a deep concern and that I was speaking to the Ambassador with the knowledge and approval of the President. The Ambassador knew that the Israeli Government had no more sympathetic friend than President Truman and that no one had done more to support them in trying days. The President believed that this was the psychological moment where an armistice could be brought about without injury to the vital interests of any of the parties, if the Israeli Government would approach these discussions in a spirit of broad statesmanship and make concessions which were wholly in accord with the moral position of Israel. I hoped therefore that his Government would not reject the proposals but would accept them as a basis for further discussion and work out an armistice along the lines proposed. I did not believe that the attitude of the Egyptian Government was brittle but did believe that there was sufficient flexibility so that with a conciliatory attitude on both sides, a solution could be reached. I said that if this were not done, if the negotiations failed, and if the matter was so reported to the Security Council, the position of Israel, both morally and otherwise, would be prejudiced. I spoke of the importance of reaching an armistice with Egypt as the key decision which would produce similar arrangements with the other Arab States and launch all of them in a favorable atmosphere on the discussions of permanent peace.
The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for what I had said and the spirit in which it was said. He stated that his Government knew that it had no more sympathetic friend than President Truman and that his views would be pondered with the greatest respect. He said that I could assure the President that in the Ambassador's opinion the armistice negotiations would not break down and that as he understood it his Government was not making a flat rejection of the Mediator's proposal but was finding difficulty on security reasons to eliminating its forces from certain places.
We both agreed that we would not go into the details of the matter and he understood that what I had said did not mean that we believed that the proposal as made in all its details ought to be the one finally accepted.
I stressed again that it should not be in our opinion rejected but made the basis for further talks in which every possible effort should be made to bring about an armistice.
The Ambassador then spoke of some of the problems which his Government had as the government of a democratic country in carrying its own people with it. He then spoke at some length about the spiritual and moral forces which had enabled the Jews to survive their hardships and which lie at the basis of the state of Israel. I said to him that I hoped they would approach the proposals for an armistice from the point of view of these considerations and that what he had said assured me that they believed that reliance upon these forces were more effective than military strong points here and there, and that as I saw it the thing that his Government would wish to avoid more than anything else would be impairing in any way its moral position. He agreed that this was so and that considerations of noblesse oblige bore strongly upon the Jewish attitude. He told me again that I could assure the President that in his opinion the negotiations would not break down.
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