DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Memorandum of Conversation
Date: February 11, 1949
Subject: Final Visit of Norwegian Foreign Minister
Participants: Mr. Halvard N. Lange, Foreign Minister of Norway Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador of Norway Mr. Torp, Leader of the Norwegian Labor Party in Parliament Mr. Arne Gunneng, Norwegian Foreign Office Mr. Sivert Nielsen, Second Secretary, Norwegian Embassy Mr. Dag Bryn, Norwegian Defense Under Secretary
Copies to: The Secretary Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor John D. Hickerson, Director for European Affairs Ernest Gross Benjamin N. Hulley, Chief, NOE
(The meeting came to order at 2:35 p.m.)
MR. ACHESON: Perhaps you would like me to say a few things first, Mr. Minister.
MR. LANGE: Yes.
MR. ACHESON: We have been giving very careful thought to what you told us in your conversation with me and the conversations that you had with the other officers in the Department. Being a lawyer, I have resorted to the techniques with which lawyers are familiar, of having argument before me, of getting various people to present various views very strongly, so far as the limits of my mind. I can't think of things unless somebody argues. I think we have considered all the matters that you brought before us carefully and sympathetically. I came to some conclusions myself and I have talked those over fully with the President, so that what I say I know reflects his views. We understand the importance of this meeting and of the importance to you of getting as clear a statement of our views as we can give. Now the first thing that I should like to stress is that if it should seem to the Norwegian Government in its interest to join at any time, either during these discussions or at the end of the discussions, after the treaty has been signed, after it has been ratified-if it should feel that it would wish to join, the welcome from the United States would be very warm indeed. And I think that although I have no right to speak for any other country except the United States, it wouldn't be taking much of a risk to say they would share that view. That we are all very clear about. We are also very clear that this is a decision entirely to be made by the Norwegian government, looking at its own interests, without advice or persuasion, and certainly without any pressure whatever from the United States. We don't think that we have been guilty of any pressure, and we stress that because certain writers in our newspapers seem to believe to the contrary. We hope to bring light to their ignorance in due course, but not with public statements. It is perfectly clear that they have been misinformed. So, as I say, we are not persuading, advising, or giving any pressure. We have considered all the situations sympathetically from your point of view. We could see some reasons why you might want to decide to join with us right away. We can see other reasons why you might feel it desirable to postpone that action. I have not been able to think up, and it may be a limitation in my mind, any reason why you would want to decide at this time not to join with us. However, that is not advice at all. I'm telling you exactly the processes of my mind.
We have also thought of the matters that you have brought before us of the questions of the Norwegian security, should Norway decide that at some time it wished to join this pact, in the period between such a decision and the going into effect of the pact. Now I am not authorized, and nobody in the United States could be authorized, to commit the country in advance of its constitutional procedures, but I can say I have no doubt whatever that if there were an aggression against any nation which was considering with us a defense pact against aggression, it would be regarded very gravely and the United States would take the most serious possible view of it. Beyond that I can't say any more. Obviously if I did I wouldn't be an honest man. You know the constitutional procedures of this country and the position we are in.
Now you have talked with us about the question of military supplies. That is a matter on which I want to speak very frankly and I want to be particularly careful that in discussing this matter there is no suggestion in anything I say or in your mind that this is an indirect method of persuasion or pressure, because it isn't. Therefore, the first thing, I think, I want to stress is that under no circumstances will the matter of military assistance to any country be used for political purposes to induce that country to take any attitude which it might not wish to take. That will not be done. It isn't within our policy, the President wouldn't do it, the Congress wouldn't permit us to do it, so we can't do it.
I think the second thing I want to say is that it is perfectly clear that the requests for assistance will outrun our capacity to meet them. Already in the discussions which have been going on it is clear that many of the countries want far more than we can supply. Therefore, a certain selection or priority comes in. It is not an exclusion at all; it is a priority, and just from natural considerations of ordinary common sense priorities will have to be given where we have commitments or interests which we have entered into. Now those would not be determined solely by this treaty at all. For instance, in Greece and Turkey we have interests and commitments which have got to be considered. I think that gives you an idea. And wherever the assistance is given, it will be given from the point of view of the over-all military effectiveness of the assistance. That's what we are thinking of.
Is there anything else that I should cover?
MR. HICKERSON: The Minister asked some specific questions, Mr. Secretary, in his conversations with Mr. Bohlen, and we gave him answers to those questions. Have you had a chance to look over them?
MR. ACHESON: Yes. Do you want to go into those questions?
MR. HICKERSON: If you want to-the Secretary has confirmed in effect what we said.
MR. LANGE: I think it might be useful, if you have no objection, if you would.
MR. ACHESON: One of them was that of participating countries assuming an obligation to raise their defenses to a defined level. Now our answer to that is clearly no. The fundamental purpose both of any North Atlantic treaty or of any military assistance on our part would be its deterrent value. Now to do that you immediately come into the recovery feature of this. It seems to us clear that to require any nation to get to a certain level of defense or to take any arbitrary position at all would undermine the very thing that we are trying to do. Security and recovery have to go so nicely balanced that the military security part of it does not defeat the recovery part, or instead of having a deterrent to aggression you have an invitation to aggression. So there would be no arbitrary fixing of any limits. The idea of military assistance and of the treaty would be that, within its powers, having in mind the essential nature of recovery, a nation would do all it could, and that the military assistance in the pact is supplemental to that.
MR. LANGE: When you say, Mr. Secretary, "do all it could," are you thinking of doing what you can without impairing economic recovery and political stability?
MR. ACHESON: Yes, because without those the military aspect of the matter becomes self-defeating.
MR. LANGE: Yes.
MR. ACHESON: I don't know whether I said to you the other day or not, if you have a soldier who has been through a serious illness, you don't take that soldier and put full battle equipment on him and start him off; he just isn't going to be any good if you do that; he has got to recover his strength and vigor before he can do that.
Now your second question was: Does Article 5 mean that attack on any part of Norwegian territory would be considered an attack on all members and that all would automatically take action against the aggressor? Well, I think the word we wish to stress in this answer is "automatically." Under the pact, an armed attack on any one of the countries is an armed attack on all of them. And although the wording of Article 5 is still a matter of discussion between us, the purpose of the article will be that individually and collectively all the members will take all appropriate action to meet that emergency. Now nothing happens automatically. The will intervenes-the will of the people-and certain actions might be taken by executive action through this government and other governments.
MR. LANGE: Yes.
MR. ACHESON: The great question of whether a nation goes to war would have to be decided by the Congress in the light of its commitment here. The will of the Congress would not be as free as it would be without this treaty. It has an international obligation, and I know it would exercise that. Does that answer that question?
MR. LANGE: Yes.
MR. HICKERSON: Would it cover all Norwegian territories?
MR. LANGE: It is very important to know whether, assuming that we decide to accept invitation and later on join, will that commitment to consider an attack on any part of Norwegian territory cover the whole country-there would be no differentiation as between certain parts which would be more exposed? And would it, for instance, apply to the territory of Spitzbergen, which is under a special international treaty where we as the sovereign power are prevented by that treaty from making any kind of preparation for defense? That is the situation under the Spitzbergen treaty at the moment.
MR. ACHESON: Well, I should believe that any attack on any part of Norwegian territory in Europe-it would be covered by that.
MR. HICKERSON: Mr. Secretary, I explained to the Minister when he raised the question of Spitzbergen that because of its special status, the whole group would probably want to take a look at the treaty commitments and that they anticipated that Norway would probably want to include Spitzbergen.
MR. ACHESON: Your third question was: How long would it take for the defense machinery to come into action? There are two points to this question: (1) How long would it take for the treaty itself to go into effect. We hope that between the middle and latter part of next month we would be able to get it before the Senate. I should hope that they would make it urgent business and would act upon it within the next couple of months. There would have to be hearings before the Senate Committee and debates in the Senate. But it would be an urgent matter. It isn't a matter that would lie over to some other session. Now after the treaty has gone into effect, then I presume that at that time, or perhaps before that time, there would have been discussions between the various staffs, so that they could have working plans as to what to do in particular situations. Depending on what the attack was and where it was, I should think that machinery could operate pretty quickly. If it were a matter which involved war, it might take a little longer, as far as the Congress is concerned, but usually the action of the Congress in regard to war follows a matter which is so clear that there isn't very much question about it. The attack on Pearl Harbor-within 24 hours we were at war. They declared war within a few moments after President Wilson recommended it. It isn't the way people anticipate.
MR. LANGE: May I put a question to make things quite clear: In the Rio Treaty, I take it that the immediate obligation is for consultation and then you have recommendations-a consultative body-and then it is up to each participant country to decide what action to take. Have I understood it right, that under the proposed Article 5 the obligation would be to consider taking action without awaiting the meeting of a consultative body; that each individual party would have an obligation to consider taking action without waiting hours or days or whatever delay there would be before a consultative body could get together?
MR. ACHESON: It would be my impression that under the proposed North Atlantic Pact the consultative body would be practically in continuous session. The Rio Treaty is somewhat involved because it considers the possibility both of an attack from outside the hemisphere and possible difficulties within. That creates problems which we are not anticipating in this particular treaty.
MR. HICKERSON: I think those are the chief questions. The other things were minor, unless there are some other questions.
MR. LANGE: There is just one question which I'm not sure that I actually have put. There have been rumors and we have understood that there have been some differences of opinion as to the span of years which the proposed Atlantic treaty was to be carried-25 years has been mentioned, 50 years has been mentioned. Have the negotiations got any nearer to a conclusion on that point at all?
MR. ACHESON: As I recall it, the proposal that was made on the European side-was the same period of time as was taken in the Brussels Treaty-50 years. I think we have mentioned the period-20 years-with a provision that half way through that we should take a look at it and see whether it should be revised one way or another.
MR. HICKERSON: That is the answer-there has been no decision. We have thought in terms of 12 to 20 years, and the Brussels Pact countries want to make it as long as possible, but there has been no decision.
MR. LANGE: Has there been any decision so far as to the geographic area to be covered? I have had occasion to say to the American Ambassador in Oslo and to the people here that from the Norwegian point of view it is difficult to handle the question politically in Norway if, as rumored, Italy were to be in.
MR. ACHESON: That is still an open question. I think the countries that have been discussed as possible participants in the treaty are Italy, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Ireland. Are there any more?
MR. HICKERSON: No, sir.
MR. ACHESON: But in all of those cases, except Italy, it is in exactly the same status as it is with you-that they have been informed that these discussions are going on, what their general purpose is, and they have been asked whether if a treaty eventuates they would care to be invited and when they would care to be invited and how they would care to be invited. That's left to them-to express any wishes they have. Now Italy is an open question. The important thing about Italy is that they have taken the initiative in this thing. It is regarded as important that Italy should not be rebuffed; they should not be thrown out of the Western community. So far as we are concerned, we think it is a matter which the European countries should take a very positive attitude and not say, well, it is up to the United States. We think this is primarily a European question.
MR. LANGE: Yes.
MR. ACHESON: And we hope that they will consider it and come up with some wise recommendation. But that is where it rests at the moment.
MR. LANGE: Because there are so many rumors in the papers that you don't know exactly what is rumor and what has substance in it.
MR. ACHESON: Well, have I stated that accurately?
MR. HICKERSON: Yes.
MR. LANGE: Now with regard to the other aspect that we have touched upon-the isolated Scandinavian alternative, I don't know whether you have had occasion to give further thought to that and to formulate a reaction. Or can I take it that your silence on it just means that for a Scandinavian regional pact without any contractual links outside Scandinavia, there would be, first of all, no possibility of any kind of assurance that an attack on such a group would be considered an attack on the members of the North Atlantic Pact, and further that such a group, if it had no contractual dealings, would be in a different position-I wouldn't say excluded, but in a radically different position with regard to the procurement of military supplies as compared with countries which do decide to join the pact.
MR. ACHESON: Well, I think I should want to be very careful in anything that I would say. I think that we have felt that it was undesirable that any nation should bring pressure on any of the Scandinavian countries to join such a group, and we certainly would not want to be in a position of doing it. We think that this is a matter on which they ought to make up their minds. From a military point of view, the problems which you could naturally have in mind is the degree to which any effective military operation could be carried out without prior fairly close staff conversations. I don't need to say any more. That is a problem. I'm not a soldier, but it would seem difficult to correlate things if you had a barrier between two groups. Now on the arms supply question, it would be a matter of priority. If our soldiers were quite ignorant of what was going to happen with military assistance in one case and knew what was going to happen to it in another case, I know they would be more interested in things they know about than things they don't know about, but there would be no intention of excluding. It would be a matter of priority, and such light as we could have on all these matters would be effectively used.
MR. MORGENSTIERNE: May I ask a question, Mr. Secretary: You referred to the fact that there would be, no doubt, great demands made on you for military supplies and that naturally you would give priority to signatories of the pact and to countries with which you have previous commitments. Now that priority-is that a priority of time alone or would it also be a priority of conditions on which supplies could be had?
MR. ACHESON: No, I don't think it is-if you mean conditions in some agreement:
MR. MORGENSTIERNE: No, I mean-I understand that under the proposed pact the countries getting supplies-it would be on a mutual basis, and those countries who receive supplies from you would also contribute themselves to whatever degree is possible for them, and that it would not be so much a question of payment. I wonder if I have understood. Heretofore, countries who did not associate with you, they might come to the open market here and buy and they would get export licenses, but I mean it would probably be much more expensive for them to get those supplies.
MR. ACHESON: I don't know whether I can answer your question categorically, but I think I can throw some light on it. Certainly anybody who is cooperating in a general defense area would not be denied export licenses. The problem is this: The United States Government has certain military items of equipment which are now regarded as surplus. That is, surplus to certain levels of mobilization. Those are in existence in certain places. Now those would not be sufficient for any program. Therefore, others would have to be manufactured. So you have two types of things: things which are in existence and things which have to be made. Now in any military assistance program, I think, they would approach the question of payment or non-payment in the same way that they do this recovery business. Payment might be a burden which was going to defeat recovery and defeat our purposes. You said is it a question of time or conditions. It might be both. I don't mean conditions of agreement. There are some weapons which already exist. Now if you have a situation where you immediately want to strengthen a particular country or group of countries with whom you have a commitment, those would be immediately available and something which came up later would be available for others. In the question of types, I don't know enough about the whole business, but I suppose that where you have a highly integrated system it is important to have types which are the same. Those questions would all arise. So it rapidly gets into a field which is quite technical and is quite linked up with whatever strategic plans are being laid down. Now that is what I meant and not that this government would say this country is cooperating, therefore we feel warmly toward it and a different one is not and we won't. But as your plans are worked out and you have this complicated status of some things which are in existence, some have got to be made, are you going to make them on standard types, are you going to make them on different types. The machinery would inevitably work, so that you are trying to carry out a coordinated defense plan which you worked out. Does that help?
MR. MORGENSTIERNE: To some extent.
MR. LANGE: Priority to those who were covered by the common plan, and that people who choose to remain outside such common plan and effort would be in a less favorable position. I don't mean this as indicating any kind of pressure, and I would like to take this occasion to stress that we haven't felt we have been under any kind of pressure in this affair at all. But I want to be able to put the position as clearly as possible to my colleagues in the Norwegian Cabinet and the Norwegian Parliament when I return. Can I take it that if we should choose what we might call the isolated Scandinavia alternative that would imply that we also would remain outside the common plan? And that again would mean that in this program of non- existent military equipment the needs of such a group would not be considered, or hardly be considered for quite a long time to come because you would have to concentrate on the needs of the coordinated whole within the pact?
MR. ACHESON: I think to a very considerable extent that would inevitably follow, not from a requirement but just from the inevitable situation. Do you agree with that, Chip?
MR. BOHLEN: Yes, I think that is a very fair statement of it, and I don't see how it could be otherwise. Because as you evolve, not only from the point of view of the obligations of the pact with other countries but from a practical point of view of planning a coordinated defense, it is obvious that would be worked out in common; that military supplies that were available would be used to try to give effect to the plan which you yourself have evolved. So I would think it would be something of that kind. The situation might be different. You really might have enough to go around for requirements and there might be a balance. But in the initial phases I should think it would be as you said.
MR. HICKERSON: And there won't be enough to go around. It is a supply problem.
MR. LANGE: Yes, it is a problem of scarcity.
MR. ACHESON: Yes, I should think the requests are about three or four times the availability. Is that right, Mr. Gross?
MR. GROSS: I think that is at least right. I should say three times or so, as closely as one can judge. I would like to add a footnote, if I may. Perhaps at the risk of restating in a sentence, the problem given to us arising from uncoordinated programming is obviously much more difficult than, for example, is the case when we receive a list of indicated deficiencies that reflects a coordinated, consolidated view of a number of countries joined together. That states the obvious. But I think it is that quite as much as a matter of priority.
MR. LANGE: If I may just add one question there: Theoretically the fact of the three Scandinavian countries, even though they are small, entering into a pact and trying to coordinate their resources and to list not their individual deficiencies but their deficiencies taken as a group, would that meet your requirements or is the Scandinavian group too small a unit, and would it be from the over-all common viewpoint to the advantage of everybody that we should plan to get a larger unit than Scandinavia?
MR. GROSS: I think the latter would be clearly true, Mr. Minister.
MR. LANGE: If I may carry on a little from that point. It has been suggested in the press discussion in this country lately that it might be to the advantage of the Western democracies as a group that there should be certain regions in the world which were a kind of cushion region where the front line wasn't so sharply defined as other places; that there might be an advantage in trying to organize a kind of neutral or semi-neutral area between the two possible chief antagonists, and there are a good many people in our countries-not so many in Norway, but I think in the other Scandinavian countries-who seem to think that the function of Scandinavia at the present stage of tension in international affairs might more likely be to constitute such an area which was not a neuralgic point at all; which was more or less left outside. But I take it that that is not the way of looking at things which is yours in the Administration at the moment. To put it quite bluntly, do you agree with Mr. Lippmann?
MR. ACHESON: I think we are indebted to Mr. Lippmann for exercising what he regards as the function of the opposition. He keeps us from going to sleep, but he is continually saying things that sometimes on a basis of fact, are a little shaky, but always in a way which makes you think about what you are doing, and that is all to the good. I should think that one of the difficulties of his thesis is its assumption that it can be done. If that assumption were accepted, then you could go on to quite an interesting discussion. But it seems so improbable that it can be that I think that is the weakness with what he says. I haven't been in Moscow and Mr. Bohlen has, but I don't think he differs with me.
MR. BOHLEN: I certainly don't. I think it is the assumption that is wrong-not only that it can be done, but how it would be regarded if it were attempted at this time. Certainly everything the Soviet Union has done indicates that they believe enemy territory begins at the Soviet border or the area on which they do not exercise complete control. The concept of a cushion or neutral zone I think they would consider as in the nature of a tempting prize with which they would play around without as acute fears of the consequences as they would in a non-neutral area. I think you find the same thing going into internal politics-the communist attitude toward the Socialists is hardly that of a neutral zone between the right and communists.
MR. LANGE: I mentioned it because in the Swedish draft of a Scandinavian pact there is one clause which says that once the three Scandinavian countries have agreed to form their pact they should go to the Security Council and ask the Security Council to see whether this is within the spirit and the letter of the Charter. But not only that. They would put the second question: Will the Security Council as a council guarantee the integrity of such a regional group. Now my reaction to that has been that it is entirely unrealistic. I don't see how it could be done under the Charter. There is a very strong body of opinion both in Sweden and to some extent in Denmark who believe that that might be just the way of creating that kind of cushion area.
MR. ACHESON: Well, I should agree with your analysis. Do you want to add anything to that?
MR. GROSS: I think it might be regarded as in violation of the obligations of the Charter.
MR. LANGE: There is one more point that has been made clear to us in our previous conversations, but I think as we are having a record here it might be valuable that it should be brought up again, and that is the question of bases on Norwegian soil. We have made it quite clear that our policy is that we could not think of according bases to foreign troops in Norway in peacetime unless attacked or threatened by attack, exception always made, of course, for possible bases under the Security Council's military power, if it ever gets to that stage. And I have understood that that attitude on the part of our government would in no way make it difficult for us to be accepted as members of the regional group just now being planned.
MR. ACHESON: That is also our idea. We are quite clear about that.
MR. GROSS: May I make a comment on that, Mr. Secretary, because I certainly would not question about that at all. I wonder, though, whether it would be worthwhile to distinguish between base rights and the implications of common defense arrangements with regard to coordinated disposition of facilities rather than base rights strictly speaking. Now I think there has been some public confusion on that.
MR. LANGE: There has been a good deal of public confusion, but I don't think there is any confusion in the minds of the Norwegian Government on that point. The whole Scandinavian discussion really is founded on that question, because we said that there is no question of accepting bases, but it is evident that if there is to be any chance of effective coordinated defense action then someone must have thought about that beforehand. Certain material things must be on the spot and people who are going to use those things must know that they are on the spot.
MR. ACHESON: I think that is the obvious answer.
MR. MORGENSTIERNE: Mr. Secretary, would it be possible at all to get somewhat closer to the question as to supplies which Norway might receive in the near future and for the next few years in case we stay outside the Atlantic Pact? Don't you think, Mr. Minister (to Mr. Lange) that will be a question that will be asked very insistently?
MR. LANGE: It will certainly be asked very insistently at home because our situation at the moment is this: that we are now at the end of a preliminary period of trying to lay the foundations of our national defense organization and we have been planning now-the commission has been sitting for a year and a half planning the further development of our navy, our air force for a six-year period, to start in 1949-the summer of 1949-and to carry on for six years from then. And that whole plan of the commission is built on the assumption that we must manage ourselves to train the people to build the necessary buildings and the necessary installations on Norwegian soil, but that it would break our neck economically speaking if we were on top of that to pay in full for all the necessary equipment that we must buy abroad. So for the whole handling of our further planning it is essential for us to know the alternative positions we shall be in inside or outside the pact, and it would be extremely valuable to us if it were possible-I understand it must necessarily be very difficult for you to say anything definite because Congress hasn't looked at anything so far and you are more or less in the hands of Congress-but for us it would certainly be of very great interest if Mr. Bryn, in the talks that he is going to have following this meeting with Mr. Gross and others-could have certain indications as to possibilities under the two alternatives-within the pact or outside the pact. I don't know whether it is possible.
MR. ACHESON: I have no idea because I don't know how far the planning has gone.
MR. GROSS: I think, Mr. Secretary, that it would be very difficult, and I think we will be prepared to indicate to Mr. Bryn why it would be difficult, to be specific at this point. But I think a discussion of some of the general factors involved may be of some assistance, even though I am afraid it would be impossible for us to talk in quantity or dollar terms at this time. Now we will be prepared to have a discussion of the sort you mentioned with General Lemnitzer, who will be here and available after this meeting. I am afraid I can't give you any more specific answer than that at this point.
MR. MORGENSTIERNE: Would there be much of a chance at all within the next few years to get supplies if we stay outside the pact? Would it be possible to intimate that at all? Don't you think that question is sure to play a very great part in the discussions at home?
MR. LANGE: There are two alternatives. Theoretically, you can remain outside the pact as an isolated unit, and there is the other alternative which has been discussed during these last few months of an integrated Scandinavia staying outside and asking for whatever it may need, and I think it needs a good deal to supplement its own efforts in the way of production of military material. I could imagine under the terms of the Vandenberg resolution that an integrated Scandinavia would come somewhat nearer to acceptability within the terms of the Vandenberg resolution than would an isolated Norway. But I take it an integrated Scandinavia is too small a unit to be considered effective from the preventive point of view and to be considered to stand much of a chance of resisting on its own if attacked by a major power. Is that a correct understanding of it?
MR. ACHESON: Well, as the soldier would say, if you are looking at this thing from a strategic point of view what would happen in Western Europe would have a very profound effect on anything that happened in Scandinavia. I think they would worry quite a lot about what would happen to material that went to an area which had neutrality and other preclusive provisions. How would it be used? How tough would this neutrality be? Might this material wind up being used against them? All of those problems would enter their minds and bother them a great deal.
MR. BOHLEN: There is one other point. Not being a military man I can speak with complete liberty, but I think there is one other element of a completely military viewpoint, and that is that unquestionably the ability of Scandinavia if united…would be greater to defend itself if attacked. From a strategic point of view, however, the object of the operation would be to hold as much of Scandinavia-to hold back the aggressor long enough until more powerful assistance could come from the West, which as I would gather, would be to the southwestern coast of Norway. The two aspects are very much linked, I think, from the point of view of supply of arms. From a purely military point of view the purpose of supplying arms would be to permit the countries of an area to hold such an attack until major assistance came. There would be something very much lacking if prior arrangements hadn't been made whereby that major assistance could come. The end result would be, unless preparations had been made for western assistance, that the arms would have taken longer to expend themselves and perhaps kill more of the enemy, but would obviously not be geared into the interrelationship to achieve the purpose for which they were given. So that the link is, I think one of the things that would be lacking.
MR. LANGE: The Swedish military seem to place very much emphasis on the fact that a coordinated Scandinavia would have so much more depth than would just Norway with its very, very narrow coastline, for more than two- thirds of its entire length, and that therefore even at the price of having to cut out effective preparation of cooperation from the west there might be balance gained from the greater depth from a united Scandinavia, but I understand from what you are saying that that is not the evaluation.
MR. BOHLEN: I am not attempting to give a military evaluation. But I think generally that the time necessary to improvise the type of assistance that would be effective to the southwest coast of Norway would be quite extensive, would have to be done in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.
MR. GROSS: I don't know whether this would be helpful, Mr. Secretary. I assume it would be well understood in any event that the deficiencies transmitted by the Western Union mechanism, of course, were based upon estimates of supply requirements reflecting the decisions of the military chiefs of staff so that the supply board of the Western Union machinery was simply given a task to, in terms of estimating supply requirements and deficiencies in terms of a given strategic and tactical plan-of a military establishment plan-that, of course, is the essence of the coordinated program with which the screening can take place here. That is one of the factors we would want to discuss with Mr. Bryn, which would be absent in the case of non-participation and which would pose that kind of a problem-the problems of what are you screening the requirements against, and I think that is to the point that Mr. Bohlen is making.
MR. LANGE: I take it that if Norway and maybe Denmark-if Norway should decide to enter the discussions that would necessitate at the very early stage coordination of Norwegian defense plans at least with British and perhaps with the plans of-the whole Brussels group-to see whether after such coordination our deficiencies would remain the same as they seem to us at the moment.
MR. GROSS: I should suppose that would be the case, but I think a definitive answer to that would have to be supplied by our military staff planners, of course.
MR. ACHESON: It seems very reasonable.
MR. LANGE: Well, Mr. Secretary, I think we have had clear answers to our questions, and we certainly do feel much clearer in our own minds as to what the position is and what the choice before us is, and I want to thank you for giving such careful thought to the problems that we have laid before you and to thank you for having helped us to make up our mind. It is not for this delegation to decide what is to be Norway's course. We have to report back to the Cabinet and to Parliament and it is for them to decide in the light of whatever information we have been able to get for them.
MR. ACHESON: I understand that, Mr. Minister. We have tried to consider these things as deeply and sympathetically as we can and to be as frank with you as we possibly can. In those cases where we haven't been able to throw as much light as we would like to, it is because the answers don't exist, not because we are not willing to tell you all we know.
(Joint Press Statement Agreed On)
MR. MORGENSTIERNE: May I add one thing to what the Foreign Minister said about pressure? I want to say that in all the discussions I have had with the State Department officials since I came back here last September there has never once been any intimation, directly or indirectly, of bringing pressure to bear. We have been told exactly what the situation was, and when the time came we have been asked whether we were interested in receiving an invitation and it was said that you don't have to accept an invitation; you can set your own time. And I have been rather annoyed at seeing these repeated references in the press to the fact that we have been under pressure. It isn't so. And I made the point of telling all the newspapermen I have been seeing, and who have been coming to see me, that that is the fact. And I was glad to see this morning that Mr. Reston emphasizes that point.
MR. ACHESON: I am very grateful to you for saying that, because I was sure that was the case, and I was told yesterday you expressed yourself vigorously on that point, which gave me great comfort. I think we can straighten that out.
MR. MORGENSTIERNE: I told Mr. Lippmann, whom I have known for a great many years, after his first article early in January-I told him, "well, I can only speak for Norway, but it is a fact that there has never been such pressure." But then it has been in the Herald Tribune and in other places, and I don't think it is right.
MR. LANGE: I want to associate myself fully with all these generous words, and I think it is most unfortunate that this should be consistently in the press, because it is really playing the game of the communists.
MR. ACHESON: Yes, it is. Well, we shall devote a good deal of time and attention to it.
(Meeting adjourned at 4:15 p.m.)
Reporter: Goodwin Shapiro, C/S NOE:tv:hbh