DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
Date: February 14, 1949
Subject: The Atlantic Pact
Participants: Secretary of State Acheson Charles E. Bohlen Sen. Tom Connally Sen. Arthur H. Vandenberg
Copies to: S - The Secretary U - Mr. Webb G - Mr. Rusk EUR - Mr. Hickerson Mr. Gross
Almost the entire conversation centered around the text of Article 5 and the various redrafts that had been suggested.
Both SENATORS CONNALLY and VANDENBERG referred to the unscheduled debate which had arisen in the Senate this afternoon on the subject of the extent of U.S. obligation under the pact. Both Senators were even more strongly than heretofore of the opinion that it must be made clear in Article 5 that there was no obligation, moral or otherwise, to go to war.
SENATOR CONNALLY even questioned the advisability of a statement in Article 5 that an attack on one would be considered as an attack on all. He preferred that this should read "an attack on one would be regarded as a threat to the peace of all."
SENATOR VANDENBERG did not go as far as Senator Connally on this point and felt that since the statement that an attack on one was an attack on all was in the Rio treaty it should be left in. He was most insistent, however, that it should be made plain that the determination of the type of action should be a matter for individual determination and also that the word "military" be omitted.
SENATOR CONNALLY agreed and suggested that the words "as it may deem necessary" be inserted in the draft to make this point plain.
I reviewed our attitude towards this pact again to the Senators, pointing out its value as a deterrent to any future aggressor and its importance in relation to the problem of Germany since it was doubtful that, without some such pact, the French would ever be reconciled to the inevitable diminution of direct allied control over Germany and the progressive reduction of occupation troops; that a pact of this nature would give France a greater sense of security against Germany as well as the Soviet Union and should materially help in the realistic consideration of the problem of Germany.
I also outlined for the Senators my conversations with the Norwegian Foreign Minister and explained to them the connection between the attitude of Norway and Denmark and the problem of Greenland and Iceland.
SENATOR CONNALLY said he had understood that one of the chief values to the United States of this pact was the assurances that it would provide of the use of base facilities in Greenland and Iceland and that if we did not get those we would not be getting very much while we would be giving a great deal.
In reply to MR. BOHLEN'S question as to whether it would be preferable to delay presentation of the pact to the Senate until the so-called stepping- stone countries were in or to present it as soon as an agreed text had been reached with the present participating countries, SENATOR VANDENBERG said he would have to think that over but certainly without the stepping-stone countries it might be more difficult, but of course there was the factor of delay.
I asked the Senators whether they thought it would be advisable for me to appear before the full Foreign Relations Committee in executive session before I talked to the Ambassadors again and they both agreed it would be desirable and a date was tentatively set for Friday. It was, however, agreed that before that time I would meet again with the two Senators to look at some further revisions of Article 5 which we would consider in the light of their observations.
Dean Acheson
C:CEBohlen:scw