March 2, 1949
Memorandum of Discussion with The President
Subject: North Atlantic Pact
I told the President that it was necessary to raise with him again the question we had discussed on Monday of the relationship of Italy to the North Atlantic Pact. I brought the President up to date on the Tuesday meeting with the Ambassadors and on the two meetings, one on Monday, the other on Tuesday evening with Senators Connally, George and Vandenberg.
I then went over with the President the reasons for and against the inclusion of Italy in the Atlantic Pact as contained in the attached memorandum. The President had and wished to keep the ribbon copy of this memorandum. [see C.F. - Box 34 - "1948-49, Folder 16"]
I then said that it seemed to me that the real issue was not at the present time on the merits of the arguments outlined in the memorandum. The real issue grew out of the position into which we now found ourselves. There had never been a well thought out United States position on the inclusion or exclusion of Italy from the Atlantic Pact which had received the approval of General Marshall or Mr. Lovett and the matter had never been presented for Presidential decision. Nevertheless, in the course of the negotiations, the United States negotiators had drifted into the position that the European nations must take a position upon Italy. This position had now crystallized. France was so emphatically in favor of Italian participation that she had stated, and we believed she meant it, that she would have to reconsider her whole relation to the Pact if Italy was not to be included. Canada now took an affirmative attitude in favor of Italian inclusion. The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, although not as positive as Canada, were now positive rather than merely non-objecting. The British had stated that they would withdraw their objections if the other nations around the table were in favor of Italian inclusion and we thought that at the next meeting the British objection would be withdrawn. Therefore, the United States would find itself in the position of either accepting the European judgment or rejecting it. I believe that if we reject it we would have serious difficulty with France, considerable delay in the conclusion of the treaty and a good deal of publicity about a split among the Western powers. It seemed to me that in the end we would probably accept Italian inclusion. If we did not accept it we might still have a treaty but we would get it in a rather damaged condition.
I explained to the President the attitude of the Senators and the attitude of Senator Lodge. I thought that while the three Senators first mentioned were not in favor of Italian participation Senator Connally did not hold this position very strongly and that the other two might in the light of Senator Lodge's view alter their position. We thought their fundamental view was that the responsibility for a decision rested with the Executive and that they would not undertake to oppose a decision once made. Under these circumstances, I recommended to the President that he authorize me to agree to the inclusion of Italy in the Pact, and that he leave to us the best method of working out that inclusion.
After going over the various factors involved, the President accepted the recommendation and told me to proceed on that basis. He would have preferred, certainly at this time, a pact without Italy, but he felt that under present circumstances we should agree to it.
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