DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
Date: March 15, 1949
Subject: Revised British Attitude on Proposed Statement on Greece, Turkey, and Iran
Participants: The British Ambassador The Secretary
Also Present: John D. Jernegan, Chief, GTI Llewellyn E. Thompson, Deputy Director, EUR
Copies to: EUR, WE, G, C, P, UNA
Ambassador Franks handed me the attached draft extract from a proposed statement by Mr. Bevin in the House of Commons. He also let me read a telegram he had just received from London, the substance of which was as follows:
(1) Mr. Bevin's previously expressed views regarding the necessity for making a special declaration regarding Greece, Turkey, and perhaps Iran, at the time of signing the Atlantic Pact had been his own views. He had now discovered that they did not correspond with those of his colleagues in the Cabinet.
(2) It was therefore the present view of the British Government that the only special statement regarding the three countries in question which should be made by Great Britain should be incorporated in Mr. Bevin's speech on the Atlantic Pact. That is, there should be no separate, more or less formal, declaration issued at the time of signature of the Pact
(3) Furthermore, the Cabinet did not wish to make special reference to Iran even in Mr. Bevin's speech.
(4) Mr. Bevin realized that this change in the proposed course of action might be disappointing, especially to the Greeks and the Turks, but he was inclined to think that it might be less disappointing than the issuance of a separate declaration of the limited nature which we had had under consideration. He believed that what Turkey, in particular, expected and wanted was a formal commitment ratified by the U.S. Senate binding the U.S., and Great Britain, to go to war if Turkey should be attacked. They might well prefer to have nothing rather than a declaration which would not go this far.
(5) Sir Oliver Franks was instructed to obtain my reaction to this new suggested course of action.
The Ambassador went on to say that if we considered it essential to have some direct mention made of Iran, Mr. Bevin might again attempt to persuade the Cabinet to agree. In replying to a question from Mr. Jernegan, the Ambassador said that there was nothing in his instructions to indicate that Mr. Bevin was prepared to reopen the question of whether or not there should be a more or less formal declaration issued subsequent to the speeches Mr. Bevin and I were to make at the time of publication of the Atlantic Pact. In replying to another question, the Ambassador said that he did not interpret his instructions as meaning that he should urge us to omit reference to Iran in the speech or to refrain from making some separate declaration or statement later. He was simply to inform us of the new British position and obtain our reaction.
I said that I had discussed this matter with my immediate staff this morning and that Mr. Webb, Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Rusk had planned to consult with Mr. Satterthwaite with a view to making recommendations to me. I would have to have a further conference with them before I could give the Ambassador any real answer. I read Sir Oliver the short paragraph incorporated in the preliminary draft of the Atlantic Pact speech which I was to make on Friday. I went on to say that if there were to be any sort of formal statement or declaration on the three countries concerned, it would have to be made by the President and not by the Secretary of State. Under our system, pronouncements of major policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine, are made by the President. The Secretary of State merely reported developments in foreign affairs.
I thought it was probable that in due course the President would make some sort of statement on the matter under discussion. This might form a part of the speech he would make to the American people at the time of signature of the Atlantic Pact. It might be that the British Government would feel it desirable at that time to have Mr. Bevin repeat, possibly in different words, what he would say first at the time of publication of the Pact. Anything more which I might say at this time would be pure speculation in view of the necessity for further consultation within the Department. I would try to have some answer for the Ambassador when I saw him again this afternoon.
During the course of the conversation it was brought out that Mr. Bevin's concern regarding the inclusion of a reference to Iran in the speech he proposed to make was at least greatly reinforced by a report he had just received from the British Ambassador in Tehran. Sir John Lerougetal had expressed grave concern at possible Soviet reaction to a declaration mentioning Iran and had especially expressed his fear that the Russians would use such a declaration as a pretext to invoke the Irano-Soviet Treaty of 1921 and reoccupy Azerbaijan. It was also mentioned that the American Ambassador in Tehran had likewise expressed concern if the declaration should be issued before the U.S. had made clear the falsity of the Soviet assertion of rights to intervene in Iran under the Treaty of 1921. Mr. Jernegan mentioned, however, that Mr. Wiley did not seem so disturbed as Sir John Lerougetal. It was also mentioned that Mr. Bevin had asked certain of the British Embassies concerned to report their views and that the Department had requested further clarification from Ambassador Wiley. No replies to these inquiries had yet been received.
In attempting to explain the complete reversal of the position hitherto taken by the British on this whole question, Sir Oliver said that he could only guess that the other members of the Cabinet had been unwilling to undertake anything which appeared to be a new commitment in the area outside the Atlantic Pact. He assumed they were willing to reiterate existing policies with regard to such countries as Greece and Turkey, but did not wish to extend these policies with respect to the countries to which they already applied or to apply them to additional countries such as Iran. When I remarked that I had reason to believe that the Turks in particular would be gravely disappointed if we did not issue a special declaration and that I had in fact myself given them to understand that we would issue such a declaration, Sir Oliver replied that he was sure Mr. Bevin had given similar indications to the Turks and the Greeks. If the new position were maintained, the Foreign Office in London would have "some explaining to do."
Attachment Extract from preliminary draft of Bevin's speech NEA:GTI:JDJernegan:hd 3-15-49
DRAFT EXTRACT FROM PROPOSED STATEMENT BY MR. BEVIN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
"In presenting the North Atlantic Pact to the House I want to make it clear that, while it covers a specific geographical area it must not be taken as weakening or limiting in any way our obligations towards other states which are not included in that geographical area. Thus we have in the first place our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. In the second place we have our obligations towards our partners in the British Commonwealth of Nations, and we have also a direct responsibility for defending our overseas territories in the British Empire. Finally, although a North Atlantic Pact cannot obviously be extended to cover the area from Greece to the Persian Gulf, this area nevertheless includes many countries with whom we maintain special and long-standing relationships. The maintenance of their independence and integrity remains our vital concern, and we believe that the signature of the North Atlantic Pact will re-inforce their general security. Here I should like to make special reference to our relations with our ally Turkey and with Greece, both of whom, with our active assistance, are making the most strenuous efforts to defend their independence and integrity. We have already made known what our attitude would be if either Turkey or Greece were the victim of aggression. That attitude remains the same."