DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
Date: March 22, 1949
Subject:
Participants: S - The Secretary Mr. Moshe Sharett, Foreign Minister of Israel NEA - Mr. Satterthwaite Mr. Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador- Designate NE - Mr. Rockwell
Copies to: BC, UNA, USUN, NEA, S/S By stamp to Tel Aviv, London, Amman, Baghdad, Jerusalem, Moscow
After an exchange of amenities, the Israeli Foreign Minister stated that one of the purposes of his trip to this country was to address a meeting held in connection with the opening of the United Jewish Appeal fund- raising drive. The Minister stated that Israel expected no assistance from Jews outside of the State as regards the type of political system in the country or the manner in which the foreign relations of Israel were conducted, but that if Jews in other countries desired Israel to be a haven for Jews all over the world, Israel expected them to make financial contributions to assist in the absorption of these immigrants, since it was utterly impossible for Israel to take on such a task alone.
Mr. Sharett then discussed the foreign policy of Israel. He stated that it had been necessary for Israel "formally" to adopt a neutral position between the Soviet Union and its Satellites and the Western democracies. Although Israel desired to align itself with the West and would prefer to proclaim this fact publicly, the above described attitude had been adopted because Israel in its formative stage was not yet ready to become directly involved in major international issues, because Israel still felt the need of the support of the Soviet Union in the United Nations and elsewhere in the international field, and because Israel very much desired to arrange for the immigration to Israel of Jews from the Soviet Union and the Soviet Satellite states. For these reasons, said Mr. Sharett, Israel publicly proclaimed its neutrality, but its real sympathies lay with the West. He added that with its entry into the United Nations Israel would be faced with the difficult problem of publicly taking a stand on various issues over which the two groups of nations were in controversy.
The Foreign Minister then entered upon a discussion of the political and social system in Israel. He said that Israel was a democracy in the true sense of the word - i.e., in his country the people really ruled. There had been a tendency to confuse the collectivist nature of the Israeli social system with the doctrine of Communism, but nothing could be further from the truth. By their nature and heritage the Jews were individualists and the theory of Communism was abhorrent to them. For this reason, the majority of Jews in Communist states were regarded with suspicion by the local authorities. Jews arriving in Israel could either start out to earn their livelihood by themselves or join any one of the various kinds of collectivist communities. The one thing that was necessary, Mr. Sharett added, was that incoming Jews learn to work with their hands. One of the main problems facing the new State was to remove the traditional Jewish prejudice against manual labor, since the State would have to be built by manual labor.
Mr. Sharett said that in his opinion things were going pretty well as regards the international position of Israel. An armistice with Lebanon would be signed on March 23. The situation with Iraq was not so good, since the Iraqis have decided not to be "contaminated" by any contact with the Jews and desire to be the only Arab State which has not entered into negotiations with Israel. A further complication was the fact that Transjordan planned to take over the Iraqi position. This would be a major troop replacement which would be contrary to the terms of the Palestine truce. In addition, there was the difficulty of the raids into Israeli territory from the Iraqi area. In Mr. Sharett's opinion, Israel had shown remarkable forbearance in not taking retaliatory action, with one exception.
At this point, I informed Mr. Sharett that I had discussed the situation on the Iraqi front with the President on March 21. The President had expressed to me his great concern lest by some mishap a military flareup occur in this area. He and I were of the opinion that the withdrawal of the Iraqi Army and its replacement by a lesser number of Transjordanian troops was a move in favor of peace. The President was firmly convinced that a renewal of hostilities must not be allowed to occur because of the situation on the Iraqi front.
Mr. Sharett replied that he could give the President and myself his complete assurance that Israel had no intention of commencing hostilities on the Iraqi front. It was not the policy of Israel to seek further conflict in Palestine. He said that he could not, of course, assure me that there would not be military action in this area, because one could never tell what might happen when two armies opposed each other, but that I could inform the President that the policy of Israel was to seek to avoid hostilities.
I then inquired as to the progress of the armistice negotiations with Transjordan. Mr. Sharett said that things were not going too smoothly there, and that the main trouble was that Transjordan was not a free agent. He was certain that if Israel and Transjordan were left to negotiate together there would be no difficulty, but that the British were interfering. In the first place, it was not true that Israeli forces had crossed the Transjordan frontier. He could categorically assure me that, based on the border as shown on maps available in Tel Aviv, no one in the Israeli capital knew of any Israeli incursion across the frontier.
Mr. Sharett stated that Israel was very much disturbed by the report that Transjordan had requested the assistance of British troops at Aqaba in patrolling the Palestine-Transjordan frontier. In Tel Aviv it was suspected that the purpose behind this request was to enable Transjordan to withdraw forces from that area to send to the Iraqi front, thus strengthening its position in that area contrary to the terms of the truce. In Mr. Sharett's opinion the British had violated the truce in the first place by sending forces to Aqaba and had done so again by reinforcing the garrison later. He stated that Israel would be "very much obliged" if the United States would seek to persuade the British to desist from patrolling the Palestine-Transjordan frontier. It was pointed out that the Department had received no information that the British had decided to accede to Transjordan's request.
I suggested that if the British did not patrol the frontier and British forces remained within the town of Aqaba area, Israel surely would not imagine that Great Britain had hostile intentions against the Negev, and the presence of British troops in Aqaba should not be allowed to affect the Israeli-Transjordan negotiations. Mr. Sharett demurred, stating that Israel would have to take into consideration, when it came time to discuss the reduction of forces, the British troops at Aqaba, since to all intents and purposes they were part of military forces of Transjordan. He added that Israel hoped to arrange demilitarized strips on both sides of the Palestine-Transjordan frontier in the same manner that similar strips had been arranged on both sides of the Palestine-Egyptian frontier through the Israeli-Egyptian armistice. The presence of the British troops at Aqaba, however, was a factor which complicated the situation considerably.
I then brought up the question of the Palestinian refugees. Mr. Ethridge had hoped it might be found possible for Israel to issue some kind of conciliatory statement concerning the refugees before the conference called by the Palestine Conciliation Commission at Beirut, but apparently it had not been possible to arrange this before Mr. Sharett's departure. The United States Government was, I said, very much interested in a solution of the refugee problem and felt that Israel had an important role to play. Mr. Sharett declared that Israel was fully cognizant of the implications of the problem as they would affect the future relations of Israel with the Arab states. The matter of a possible statement had been discussed in a Cabinet meeting and it had been decided that Israel could not possibly make such a commitment before the matter was discussed in connection with the final peace settlement. In the opinion of the Israeli Government it was out of the question to consider the possibility of repatriation of any substantial number of the refugees. The most logical solution was resettlement in the Arab countries, where so much land was available. Israel was quite prepared to make financial contributions to this resettlement, and also, if it were desired, to give technical assistance. Mr. Sharett did not mean to say that there would be no repatriation at all. He thought that it might be possible for Israel to accept a "limited" number of refugees, such as might be necessary to reunite families which had become separated. He reiterated his conviction that the matter was one which had to be discussed at the peace conference and stated that it was impossible for Israel to make any kind of public commitment before that time.
Dean Acheson
NEA:NE:SWRockwell:em 3-23-49