DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
Date: December 8, 1949
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador The Secretary Mr. W. Walton Butterworth Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
Copies to: S, U, G, EUR, FE, NA
There was apparently received at the British Embassy the attached message from Mr. Bevin to me while the British Ambassador was talking with me this morning and he sent it over by hand upon his return to the Embassy. We met at my house before dinner and I pointed out to him that Mr. Bevin's message dealt with two matters. In the first place, it addressed itself to the desirability of Mr. Bevin's having the United States views before the convening of the Ceylon Conference and, in the second place, to having consultations before U.S. policy was finally settled. As regards point one, the reason that I had sent my message to Mr. Bevin was to warn him as far in advance as possible of the fact, regrettable though it was, that it seemed unlikely that due to the developing complexities with which the military authorities of this Government found themselves faced, that the tentative time schedule could be met. I simply could not give Mr. Bevin a U.S. Government position on these matters when the U.S. Government position had not yet been able to be evolved and I greatly regretted that this was the fact. As regards point two, there was no question of the U.S. Government reaching a hard and fast decision which was not subject to discussion and possible modification. The purpose of formulating a U.S. Government position well before the Ceylon Conference was in order to have an exchange of views in the first instance with the British Government and in the second instance with the Commonwealth and other Governments interested. Sir Oliver Franks indicated his accord with this and said that he would explain away any seeming apprehensions which Mr. Bevin might have harbored.
I told the British Ambassador that I was sorry that I could not at this stage explain to him what the contentious problems were which had made for delay; that Mr. Voorhees, who was acting for Mr. Johnson in this matter, was away as was the President. I expressed the hope that before the convening of the Ceylon Conference, if I were not able to give him the guide lines of the U.S. position on a possible peace treaty, I would be able to give him information as to the nature of the problems which we thought were not susceptible to ready solution. I pointed out that I was making no commitment about this matter but merely telling him of a personal intention on my part which I hoped to implement with the concurrence of the National Military Establishment and the President.
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