8th December, 1949
DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
Date: December 8, 1949
Subject: Far East
Participants: Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador The Secretary Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Assistant Secretary, FE
Copies to: S, U G, H, EUR, FE, CA, NA
The British Ambassador called this morning at my request and I explained to him that I wished to discuss with him the questions of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime. He said he was glad that I had sent for him because he also had two or three matters which he wished to raise, particularly, the question of Formosa and the discussions at the Ceylon Conference regarding a possible Japanese Peace Treaty.
By agreement, we began with Formosa. Sir Oliver Franks said there were two aspects of that question of concern to his Government. In the first place, they were concerned about the further shipment of military supplies from this country to Formosa and, in particular, such weapons as medium and heavy tanks and aircraft since it was their considered view that through defections Formosa would sooner rather than later pass into the hands of the Chinese Communists who might well at some stage use such materiel and weapons against Hong Kong. I summarized for the British Ambassador the status of shipment under the $125 million grants as set forth in the attached document and in this connection called his attention to the possibility that Sherman tanks and Staghound armored cars might have been purchased or were in the process of being purchased by the Chinese in the U.K. for repair in this country and onward shipment. I pointed out the implications both foreign and domestic of our arbitrarily cutting off remaining shipments to Formosa which would amount to less than $8 million (as of November 1) of the $125 million. The fact was that through these previous shipments and through shipments from the Mainland to Formosa there was such a wealth of materiel on that Island that any such action on our part would be of insignificant practical value. I did agree, however, to look into the question of medium and heavy tanks since the British Ambassador had represented that the British military in Hong Kong had not now in their possession anti-tank weapons that could deal with other than light tanks and in view of the undesirability of diverting to Hong Kong such weapons. I expressed the view that I thought it would be possible if export licenses had not already been issued to deal with these two categories. Sir Oliver Franks vouchsafed that the figure on aircraft indicated in the memorandum which Mr. Graves presented on December 6 was incorrect and he seemed to agree that so numerous were the aircraft already on Formosa that such additions did not constitute an important aggravation of the problem.
The British Ambassador said that in the second place he wished to inquire whether our attitude toward Formosa had undergone a change since Mr. Bevin's conversations in Washington. I told him that the President had approved the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs that Formosa was not of sufficient strategic importance to make it desirable for the U.S. Government to employ force to prevent the Island falling under the control of the Chinese Communists though we were seeking by political and economic means to do everything feasible to prevent that. To this end, we had recently attempted to disabuse the Generalissimo of any misconception he might have had in this respect and to exhort him to take the necessary action to consolidate the position since all the ingredients for success were available on the Island.
I then brought up the question of possible recognition of the Chinese Communist regime indicating that shortly after the receipt of the British note of November 1, I had gone to Paris and met with Mr. Bevin and we had discussed the matter there. I now understood that the British Cabinet was scheduled to consider the question about mid-December and that I wished to review and reiterate the point of view which this Government held on this matter. In the first place, it seemed desirable to us to act if at all possible in concert with other concerned powers to ascertain whether the Chinese Communists intended to live up to their international obligations. It seemed to us that the inclinations of the Chinese Communists were to follow the Russian example of considering themselves not an evolutionary regime which had sprung from the previous one which, therefore, entailed that they assume both the rights and the obligations of the former regime, but a revolutionary one which would seek to assume all the rights and only those obligations they choose to undertake. It was important to know what the real situation was and, if possible, to prevent such a development. Secondly, it was important to have evidence of how they proposed to conduct themselves with respect to the outer world: whether it would be in conformity with international law and usage as a civilized power, or as an uncivilized or semi-civilized entity. Thirdly, we did not believe that hasty recognition would confer any permanent benefits on those who undertook it. Fourthly, as respects the U.S., it was important for us to bring Congress into our deliberations so that, at any rate, the problem would be fully talked out and the issued clarified. Therefore, regardless of the action taken by other powers, we would not act hastily. I also went on to say that I appreciated that the arrangement had been to consult but that no commitment had been made necessarily to act unitedly, it being recognized that the interests of states differed and that in matters of recognition they would, in the final analysis, be governed by their views of immediate and long term self-interest. I asked Mr. Butterworth if he had anything to add and he called Sir Oliver Franks' attention to the presence in Washington of Mr. Lewisohn* who had been for some twenty years the LONDON TIMES representative in Peiping and had only just arrived here. Mr. Lewisohn had confirmed our own reports that the Communist regime attached great importance to being recognized by some of the Western powers though there were those among the Chinese Communists who were apparently anxious that the U.S. not recognize the regime. Given the fact that Chinese Communists do want __________
*Mr. Lewisohn in a talk in FE had been critical of British policy and in accord with U.S. attitude towards recognition.
recognition by other powers than USSR and its satellites, it would be regrettable that the powers should give up the opportunity of thus bringing pressure to bear for recognition of existing obligations. The British Ambassador said he appreciated these considerations and also the fact that if the powers were not going to act as a unit, it would be undesirable for those who were recognizing to act as a concerted body. He also wanted it understood that the British Cabinet was not merely going to consider the question in mid-December but as he understood it would probably make a decision which might well be to recognize before the year was out. I said that if this decision were taken, I hoped that we would at least be given as much advance notice as possible so as to minimize the effects that misunderstanding might well create and cause repercussions on other Anglo- American concerns. He agreed to ensure that this would happen.
The British Ambassador then referred to the question of the Japanese peace treaty and the message which I sent to Mr. Bevin on December 2. He said it was fully appreciated in London that the State Department had done everything it possibly could to ensure that they would have the benefit of the U.S. Government's views in sufficient time to consider them before the convening of the Ceylon Conference. He understood that difficulties had arisen with respect to the security aspects of any possible treaty and he had information which indicated that Mr. Voorhees had been discussing this matter with General MacArthur. He said he merely wished to point out that if no guide lines of U.S. policy were available, the 1950 Ceylon conference might well act in much the same way as the 1947 Canberra Conference had acted, namely, that the Dominions would insist on Commonwealth provisions which in some respects would be divergent from U.S. views. I merely reiterated what I had said to Mr. Bevin in my telegram and told him that the military aspects of the problem had proved more complicated and troublesome than could have been envisaged.
Sir Oliver Franks also said that before leaving he wished to make mention of the fact that he might have to ask to see me next week on the matter of the Military Assistance Agreement; that there seemed to be developing difficulties about which he had as yet no details which might entail such a visit. I said I would be glad to see him if the situation required it.
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