December 15, 1949
Subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
Participants: Mr. Tracy S. Voorhees, Dept. of Defense, The Secretary, The Under Secretary, Mr. Jessup, S/A, Mr. Butterworth, FE, Mr. Humelsine, S/S, Mr. Metzger, L/E, Mr. Howard, S.
Copies to: FE - Mr. Butterworth L - Mr. Fisher S/S - Mr. Humelsine
The purpose of the meeting was for Mr. Voorhees to report on the results of his trip to Tokyo to consult with General MacArthur on the security aspects of a possible Japanese peace treaty. The meeting was a follow-up on a meeting between the Secretary and Mr. Voorhees on this subject prior to Mr. Voorhees' departure for Japan.
Mr. Voorhees first complained about leaks concerning the nature of his trip to Japan which he believed could have come only from the State Department. He also expressed his concern over a speech by Mr. Allison which was given publicity in the Nippon Times. He repeated his earlier request to Mr. Webb that all possible measures be taken to prevent leaks and that public statements of policy be given him in advance to clear with General MacArthur. The Secretary indicated that he is asked several times every week by newsmen whether he still regards the Japanese peace treaty as an urgent matter, that he always replies in the same affirmative manner, and that Mr. Allison's speech (which preceded the date of Mr. Voorhees understanding with Mr. Webb concerning public statements) merely followed along this general policy line.
Mr. Voorhees also complained that the State Department had communicated directly with Mr. Sebald requesting the views of General MacArthur concerning the non-security clauses of the treaty and requested that in the future any communication to Mr. Sebald, seeking not his own personal views, but the views of General MacArthur, should be sent to the Department of Defense for transmission to General MacArthur. In this way Mr. Voorhees may be aware of all such communications and the replies given by General MacArthur. Mr. Webb stated that any procedure on such communications should be worked out between Mr. Butterworth and Mr. Voorhees.
Mr. Voorhees announced that the Bureau of the Budget had cut from some $300,000,000 to $140,000,000 the requested GARIOA budget for Japan for fiscal 1951. He said that it would be impossible for the Department of Defense to operate in Japan with such a budget and gave Mr. Butterworth a copy of a lengthy cable from General MacArthur to the effect that General MacArthur could not accept any such drastic cut unless it came directly from the President because he could not take responsibility for the consequences. Mr. Voorhees asked the Department to support him in his appearance before the Bureau of the Budget, the Secretary replied that the Department would support him, and Mr. Webb said that Mr. Voorhees and Mr. Butterworth could work this out.
Mr. Voorhees then proceeded to deal with the results of his trip to Japan. He said that General MacArthur gave his military views to Mr. Voorhees in his military capacity as CINCFE. Mr. Voorhees said that General MacArthur had requested that he not discuss with the Department of State his views of a non-military nature since he did not want to appear to volunteer such views, but that he would be pleased to express such views if the Department of State should request them. Mr. Voorhees indicated briefly the views of General MacArthur concerning U.S. military requirements in Japan, a matter which General Gruenther was primarily exploring.
Mr. Voorhees wished to assure the Secretary that there had been no delay in deliberations in the Department of Defense for the purpose of complying with the Secretary's request and meeting his deadline with Mr. Bevin, beyond the delays which were caused by the very serious nature of the military problems presented. Mr. Voorhees briefly explained the nature of some of these problems, the details of which are omitted from this memorandum.
Mr. Voorhees said that he had presented the results of his trip to the JSSC the preceding afternoon and that General Gruenther would do the same this afternoon. A top priority had been given to this subject by the JCS but the sickness of General Collins and the absence of General Bradley prevented their meeting on this important subject until the following Tuesday. Mr. Voorhees said that he expected the JCS to reach a decision on the matter next week. He repeated his inquiry of the day before concerning the legal opinion of the State Department on the questions which he had raised in his prior meeting with the Secretary. He said that the security implications of these legal problems were regarded as very troublesome by many officials in the Department of Defense. The Secretary replied that the Department was preparing such an opinion but that he regarded the legal question as separable from the prior question in which he was primarily interested, namely the determination of U.S. military requirements in Japan. Mr. Voorhees said that he did not regard these questions as separable and that he believed the JCS would decide both types of questions. The Secretary replied that he meant to say that the security risks arising from possible legal contentions by the Soviets were not the determinative factor and that he thought the JCS would have to consider U.S. security requirements in Japan in terms of the power relationship between the United States and Japan regardless of possible Soviet legal claims, whether valid or fictitious. Even if the Soviets signed the peace treaty they might subsequently declare that Japan had violated the treaty if it were in their interests to do so.
Mr. Voorhees at the conclusion of the meeting said that he believed the procedure which would be followed if it were decided not to have a peace treaty would be very different from the procedure to be followed if there were to be a peace treaty. However, he indicated that even in the former case it might be necessary to enter into public negotiations for a peace treaty because of the present state of Japanese public opinion on the subject.
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