LONDON
April 11, 1950
Dear Dean: \(salutation added by pen to typed text\)
While Jack was in London the day following his speech before the Pilgrims, Field Marshal Montgomery \(Lord Montgomery of Alamein\) suggested that it might be useful if he talked with Jack and me about the military situation in Europe. Accordingly he called on us and gave us briefly the following story:
1. The defence of Europe was a façade.
2. This was largely due to the defects in the French military system which were \(a\) leve en masse for only a 12-months' period \(b\) inadequate pattern of command and \(c\) there was no strong, able and competent man in command of the French Army. \(Joulin was obviously the man whom Montgomery would like to see in the position of supreme authority in France.\)
3. These defects made it improbable that the Military equipment we were sending France could be absorbed.
4, Only the United States could take the necessary steps to persuade the French to correct these defects.
Montgomery was not in any way implying that the French should be written off. Quite the contrary. It was quite clear that the French should not be written off but that these deficiencies and infirmities in their military arrangements should be corrected.
Inasmuch as it seemed to me important to have our own assessment of the French situation in order that we might avoid mistakes and, should Montgomery's estimate find an echo at home we might have accurate and complete information, I took the occasion when spending Easter with Jack and Ellen at Frankfurt to spend an hour or so with General Handy, General Cannon and Jack on the subject. Both Generals Handy and Cannon did not agree entirely with Montgomery's assessment of the French position.
They did of course agree that a 12-months' period was too short, that within the time limit set by the 12-months' period and because so many of the trained French cadres, non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers had been drawn out of France to Indonesia, it was not likely the French Army would be really what we would term to be a first class fighting organization. Handy and Cannon both stated that from their experience French General Officers were a very competent group, that their planning was well done and that they knew their business. At any rate I suggested to Handy that he give the matter some thought and at the next meeting of the E.C.C. \(European Coordinating Committee\) here in London the matter be discussed further and that we consider what steps, if any, we might appropriately and prudently take which would cure such defects in the French Military organization and system, if any exists.
It will be nice to see you here in May.
\(signature by pen \)
P.S. Monty's name, I think, should be protected. I have advised Handy and Cannon and others of this. I am not certain however that Monty himself wants protection.
As I explained to Handy and Cannon it may well be that Montgomery's estimate of the French situation in some measure derives from his incompatibility with de Lattre.
The Honorable Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.