DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: April, 26, 1950
SUBJECT: Trieste
PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Tarchiani, the Italian Ambassador The Secretary Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, Acting Assistant Secretary
COPIES TO: S/S WE EE American Embassy, Rome U.S. Delegation, American Embassy, London
The Ambassador said that Count Sforza had insisted that he explain personally the circumstances in which he had made a very strong statement in a recent speech. The Ambassador read the statement in which the Italian Foreign Minister had suggested the publicity of Italy\'s breaking the treaty of peace. The Ambassador said Count Sforza wished him to make clear that he was not denouncing the treaty and that much more had been read into his statement than was intended. It was not designed to exert pressure but to preserve the Italian unity. He explained the political situation in Italy in which the communists were allied with certain other groups in opposing the government on the treaty question. The communists argued that Italy would have had a good solution of this problem if they had played ball with Russia. The other group took the stand that Italy had been betrayed by the Allies. It was in these circumstances that Sforza had used a sentence which was stronger than his thought.
I asked if it were not possible to resolve the Trieste problem.
The Ambassador said he thought Russia had played an important role in frustrating any solution and referred to the steps the Soviet Government had taken to stir up trouble, including two recent notes which the Italian government had received, one dealing with reparations and the other with the Trieste problem. He pointed out that the note on Trieste briefly demanded the withdrawal of British and American troops but made no mention of Yugoslav troops. The Ambassador said that Italy was relatively satisfied with the status quo. They had the Declaration of March 20 and they had occupation by Allied troops. Nevertheless, Italy was willing to negotiate.
The Ambassador then inquired whether I would be willing to meet Count Sforza before the meeting of the Pact Council to discuss this question. Count Sforza would like to discuss the matter with Bevin, Schumann and me either separately or together.
I said I had the highest regard for Count Sforza and if he wished to see me I would make every effort to see him, but I pointed out that I had a large number of engagements in London and that in any event I saw no utility in a discussion of the Trieste problem in London. If he had any proposals to make they should be made to me in Washington before I left.
The Ambassador expressed concern that unless Sforza could see the three ministers, it would be necessary to discuss this matter at the Council meeting.
I said we had no intention of raising it and it seemed unlikely to me it would arise unless the Italian Foreign Minister himself brought it up. I said that if Sforza did raise this matter with me in London all I could do would be to refer his remarks to Washington for study and comment and repeated that I thought this would be a waste of time. If he had anything to propose, it should be taken up through diplomatic channels, which was the only way in which careful preparation could be arranged.
EUR: LEThomspon:bb