DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
May 2: 1950
Personal and Confidential
To: The Secretary
You may be interested in glancing over the attached memorandum which I made of the talk I had with the President on Friday, April 28th.
J.F.Dulles
Personal and Confidential
April 28, 1950
Memorandum of Conversation with President Truman
I called, pursuant to appointment, at 12:15 p.m., April 28th. I told the President that I was glad to be working again in a bi-partisan approach to foreign policy. He said that he, too, was very happy. I said that I was glad to have the chance to talk with him because I did not feel that I could serve effectively unless I had his complete confidence. The President said that I need have no concern on this point, that I would not have been invited back unless he had had great confidence in me.
I said that I thought it might be useful to review briefly some of the events of the past year as far as I was concerned. I said that I had accepted the appointment to the Senate of Governor Dewey because I felt that my influence in the field of foreign relations needed the addition of some political activity on my part as a member of the Republican Party. In the past my political strength had come from Governor Dewey and Senator Vandenberg. With Governor Dewey out of the Presidential situation, and with Senator Vandenberg\'s declining health, it seemed desirable for me to gain some political stature for myself in my own right. I had not desired to run for a further term in the Senate, and had told Secretary Acheson that if I were appointed to the United Nations prior to the Republican Convention, I would accept the United Nations appointment and not the nomination for the Senate. Secretary Acheson had tried to do this, but circumstances had prevented. Senator Vandenberg in particular had been anxious that I should run for the Senate seat.
Under these circumstances, I had accepted the nomination and, having accepted it, I had made the best fight that I could, subject to the qualification that I did not in any way attack the Administration\'s foreign policy because I had worked in confidence with the Administration in this field. That had been a disadvantage and handicap, but I had accepted it. I had fought on the domestic issues, and I had expressed myself vigorously. Also I said the opposition had said some rather vicious things about me. The President said he was sorry for this, that he himself had not known of it, nor would he have approved it.
I said that as far as the establishment or bi-partisan foreign policy was concerned, I had said to some of my former Republican associates in the Senate, notably Taft, Millikin and Bridges, what I also wanted to say to the President, and which I was sure he would understand, namely that the mere fact that I had a desk in the State Department did not in any way automatically assure bi-partisanship in foreign policy or protect the State Department against Republican criticism.
I said that as I worked on foreign policies, and as there developed foreign policies that I could wholeheartedly support, I had confidence that they would receive sympathetic consideration by Republicans on the Hill, and that in the main Republicans would not attack such policies merely on partisan grounds. A good deal would, of course, depend on whether I was in a position to help to work out policies that I could genuinely endorse.
The President said he fully understood that this would be the course events would have to take.
I then went on to say that I felt that it was important that there should be some early affirmative action in the field of foreign affairs which would restore the confidence of the American people that the Government had a capacity to deal with the Communist menace. My impression was that many Americans had lost confidence as a result of what had happened, particularly in the East. It was this lack of confidence which I felt made it possible for men like McCarthy to make a deep impression upon the situation and to achieve prominence. If we could really get going, the American people would fall in behind that leadership and attacks like McCarthy\'s would be forgotten. I said that I had various ideas which I was discussing with Secretary Acheson and that I hoped to be able to make some contribution along this line.
The President said that he quite agreed with my analysis and that in talking yesterday with Secretary Acheson he had expressed much the same point of view.
The President then referred to Mr. Hoover\'s speech. He said he had listened to it on the radio and had called up Mr. Hoover to congratulate him on the speech, although he did not wholly follow him as regards the United Nations. I said that I, too, had grave doubt with reference to his United Nations proposal. To adopt it would put us in a position in the eyes of the world of seeming to destroy an organization for peace, and communist propaganda would make great use of this to confirm their theses that the United States did not want peace, but war.
The President made a complimentary reference to my book, which he said he had red, and which he described as a "very good book".
J.F.D. -