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67-3_26 - 1950-07-14

Transcript Date

July 14, 1950

At the Cabinet meeting this morning the Secretary made the following statement on the Korean crisis and related possible development:

The Secretary was asked what the State Department\'s judgment was on the probable danger spots were with reference to possible further communist or Soviet moves. The Secretary said that he did not think that it was profitable for him to go over specific spots again, since General Bradley had reviewed these military danger spots, and the next crisis might arise at any one of a dozen places. The main point was that the State Department and the Pentagon were agreed on the following general points:

1. The Soviet Union has the military capability at the present time of taking, or inspiring through satellites, military action ranging from local aggression on one or more points along the periphery of the Soviet world to all-out general war.

2. While estimates of probabilities of Soviet action vary it is completely agreed that there is not sufficient evidence to justify a firm opinion that the Soviet Union will not take any one or all of the actions which lie within its military capabilities.

3. There is unanimous agreement, therefore, that the present world situation is one of extreme danger and tension which, either by Soviet desire or by the momentum of events arising from the Korean situation in which actual warfare is in progress, could present the United States with new outbreaks of aggression possibly up to and including general hostilities.

That is the situation we face, and it is one of gravest danger. It is becoming apparent to the world that we do not have the capabilities to face the threat, and the feeling in Europe is changing from one of elation that the United States has come into the Korean crisis to petrified fright. People are questioning whether NAT really means anything, since it means only what we are able to do. Our intentions are not doubted, but are capabilities are doubted.

In Asia the fear is manifested in two places - Japan and India. In Japan the Socialist Party has adopted officially the principle that there must be a treaty with the Soviet Union as well as with the other belligerents; that Japan should be neutralized and that American troops should be withdrawn. This is evidence that they believe association with the U. S. is dangerous to them. In this situation the question is what the United States can do to affect these trends. Obviously it must do all possible to deal with Korean situation and other present dangers, but it must do more now. Prompt action is worth more than perfect action. In the very early days of next week some action must be announced. Whether that action is the best possible action is less important than that some effective action be taken and announced.

The Secretary listed the actions and announcements which must be made: The President\'s action regarding increased forces must be announced. He must ask for money, and if it is a question of asking for too little or too much, he should ask for too much. He should stress production and ask for powers of allocation and limitation. This last the Secretary thought most important; for what we announce as to military steps will be of some reassurance to our friends, but will not deter our enemies; whereas what we do in the line of stepping up production will strike fear into our enemies, since it is in this field that our great capabilities and effectiveness lie. Finally, the President should state that what we are doing in production - one of the great reasons for increased production - is to help our allies speed up their own capabilities, so that the free world can deal with obvious dangers.

The President said he agreed.

Defense and State are agreed on these recommendations, which had been made by State, and action will be taken on Tuesday.

Notes taken by BE on Secretary\'s report of meeting.

Content last reviewed: Jun 24, 2019