Friday, July 14, 1950 Conf.
Secretary said after discussing Defense paper, that he did not see how it could be incorporated into message in its present form. Secretary thought that what could be said were the following four points:
1. What we do about forces. 2. How much money 3. Production is going to be started in a big way. 4. We are stepping up our assistance to the allies, as they are stepping up their efforts \(if that is true\). That we are going to do our part.
There followed a great deal of discussion of what should be said on fourth point - whether there should be a decidedly encouraging note struck; whether they should be told that the show is partly theirs, that we are not bearing entire brunt; to what extent the message should spell out the effect on MDAP of material now going to Korea.
Secretary summed up what he thought should go in as follows:
In our concern to perform our full part in meeting the crisis which has arisen out of the Korean aggression, we have not lost sight for a moment of the necessity of doing our full part to strengthen the defenses of the free world in other areas.
The matter of the defenses of the North Atlantic Treaty area was considered as a matter of great urgency by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London. Recent events make it even more urgent than it was at that time to build and maintain these defenses. We are fully convinced that our associates are taking and will increasingly take steps to do their full part in the matter, and we assure them that we will do our full part in the material aid picture.
The very steps we are taking here in increasing our production and the amount of our production going into defense will plan a great part in this joint effort. If it becomes necessary for me \(the President\) to come back to Congress to request further funds, I will not hesitate to do so.
The Secretary then elaborated on what the program of aid to allies might consist of: He said there were two parts. At present we have money for commitments to take us through present fiscal year and fiscal year ending 1951. If production could be speeded up with these funds, so that the commitments could be sent over in three months or six months, or a year, rather than dragging on for several years, that would be a splendid result, and is the first part of a possible program. \(He said something along this might be mentioned in message.\)
The second part of the possible program consisted in the possibility of getting further money for two different purposes: \(a\) To give the allies more stuff if this country could turn out more stuff; \(b\) to help them increase their own production. What they would need is money for raw materials; and money to make up for loss of exports which would result from turning more of their production to defense.
Further questions dealt with in re message:
1. Whether to mention in message any specific or general additional amount for MDAP.
Secretary thought this would only prolong discussion of message and raise problems, which would delay the message. He thought this could be dealt with at a later date by the President\'s returning to Congress.
2. Whether the message should clarify aims in Korea. Bohlen, Nitze, \(with Secretary agreeing\) that this could not be done at this point when no one knew what the situation would be when North Koreans were pushed back to 38th parallel.
3. What mention should be made of Formosa. It was thought that probably something along the line that was said about Formosa in message to Bevin could be inserted.