(This document is an undated handwritten unsigned manuscript of 9 pages - the date supplied is typed in place)
August ?, 1950
Dear Jim,
It looks to me from here as though my appearance in the Military Assistance Bill would develop into a major debate on our foreign policy cast in terms of an indictment for Far Eastern troubles.
In case this is so the Dept. and possibly also the White House might want to line up the principal attack and counter attack.
From Wherry et al. it looks as though we start from China and quickly center on Korea. Our China policy since Jan - and before - gave the Communists a "green light" for aggression. I read Korea out of this defense line, our
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intelligence failed, we did not supply proper arms, we encouraged attack on Formosa and finally by that minute switch we left an army - unprepared by our neglect - to fight a hopeless battle. We continue to be stupid about the Spanish, Germans and Japanese. All in all, a new deal is necessary to begin in November.
I think we need some White House direction to get all lines straight on this. If each Dept. goes for itself we can bring about a general panic and a bad result. Our own record is good. But this is not the time to trot it out. We must all take responsibility and assert our joint charges and defenses.
The case falls into two main
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divisions - closely related- 1.) Our foreign objectives (with our wisdom or unwisdom as to facts and strategy) and 2) our alleged neglect to supply the power to meet the contingency which has arisen.
I will set down my own general ideas and leave their correction and adaptation to the political arena to others.
First: If the charge is that Mr. Truman has not, like Stalin, imposed a dictatorship on the U.S., it is, of course, true. He has worked within the limits and confines of the Constitution which has meant that the framework within which he would work has been determined by the broad temper of the country. It was the people of the U.S. that decided that:
1) Our great military forces should
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be demobilized hastily, without regard to the accomplishment of our true purpose and far beyond the limits of safety.
2) That the insurance of universal military service, repeatedly argued by the President, General Marshal and others should be rejected. 3) That the direction of constructive efforts for peace lay in expanding international agreement first through the U.N., toward control of Atomic Energy, Disarmament, Human Rights, Economic improvement and later towards such ideas as world govt. etc.
4) That taxes must be reduced, the budget balanced, debt paid off, deferred internal improvements carried out, social security advanced, veteran care and benefits extended.
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Against this background our main questions must be considered.
This administration has led the world toward international collaborations, Atomic Energy, U.N. Forces, Economic action, ITO (?) etc. But this was not to be permitted by the USSR.
None of the fire eaters saw this earlier or took more forceful action that H.S.T. In fact, he was almost alone on many actions.
A. Iran in 1945-6 B. The problem of the S….. in 1946 C. Greek Turkish Aid D. The Marshall Plan E. The Italian Crisis F. Berlin
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G. The N.G.T. H. Military Assistance I. Korea.
Korea might be expanded. John Hilldring's letter to me, Barbara has it - gives the story of our plan of 1947, rejected by Vandenberg in 1947. The Republican congressional (..) in 1949 & 1950.
What we have had to do is to construct a defense with inadequate means, trying to guess where each play would come through the line. The result has been amazingly good but no team can win a pennant this way. No team can win a pennant unless the
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If some of those who have been throwing pop bottles want to begin practice on a tough range with live ammunition, we would be better off.
Coming back to Korea, what is the charge. Not that we bore the brunt of supporting UN action against Communist aggression. No one wishes openly to take up Malik's line to this extent, though some come close to it. The Country and the World responded to H.S.T.'s courage and vigor when he acted as he did. No politician will risk making an issue of the June 27 decision.
Nor will any dare make an issue of his action in preparing us and our friends to
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defend ourselves and cause any who continued attacking us to stop, look and listen.
The charge regarding Korea is that we should have known that the attack was coming; that we should have announced that we would meet it and that we should have armed ourselves and the Koreans to meet it.
As to the first the task of our opposition is to oppose and perhaps it is doing it best with a situation which it itself created. In August it is easy to foresee what happened in June. But the problem was not in June to know that Korea held the potential of attack. It was to foretell which of many such potential sources of attack would be the one it developed.
Were any of the present wise men so
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wise that they would have sent the limited number of tanks, cannons, etc., to Korea rather than to Europe, or Greece, or Turkey, Iran, or Indo-China, the Philippines, or to other places that they can name as well as I.