DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: August 23, 1950
SUBJECT: French Memoranda on Defense Program, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, German defense potential
PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Bonnet The Secretary O'Shaunessy, WE
COPIES TO: EUR FE RA G
Ambassador Bonnet called today at his request. He said that he wanted to tell me the views of Messrs. Pleven, Schuman and Moch regarding the two French memoranda on retirement. He referred to recent articles appearing in the American press which tended to disparage the French Defense effort as well as that of other European countries and to the fact that these articles had caused some concern in Paris. The first point that he wanted to stress was the seriousness with which the French Government regarded the necessity for increased and mutual effort and their willingness to make the necessary sacrifices. Secondly, he wanted to stress the need for making the NATO a more efficient and workable organism. Certain modifications would help, such as giving the organization a better staff and perhaps creating certain organizations similar to those used during the last war, such as the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Boards (sic) under the direction of a strong executive organ.
I replied that I could only give him my personal estimate of the French proposals at this time but that my first reaction to all of the proposed additional defense programs was that they tended to fall short of the effort necessary successfully to defend Europe and I felt that a greater effort must be made by all than was apparent in the programs if we were to attain our objectives.
With regard to the proposals to strengthen NATO through reorganization, I said that the matter was a complex one and was under active study. It would also require decision at the highest government levels. The French objective to create a more efficient machinery was one to which we naturally subscribed. The French proposals might help to provide a solution and we will examine them sympathetically.
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I said that the maximum effort on the part of all was necessary and that it was very important to get started at once on programs of priority production without waiting for organizational or procedural changes. Also, while the results so far obtained in economic recovery of Europe must not be jeopardized, some sacrifices will have to be made at the expense of continuing and rising rate of recovery.
I pointed out that I expected shortly to appear before Congress to testify in support of the program to make available $4 billion for the defense of Europe and I might be requested by Congress to make certain requirements of the NATO countries a prerequisite for furnishing additional aid to them. I hoped to avoid having to make such requests and any evidence of progress on the part of the NATO countries in implementing their high priority production programs would be very helpful.
The Ambassador requested our views on this possibility of stationing additional British and American military forces in Europe. I replied that this was a question involving military considerations which were being studied by Defense and that our military were not unsympathetic to it.
Mr. Bonnet said that his Government had been somewhat concerned over the visit of General MacArthur to Formosa and that with the Western world as heavily committed in the East as it was he hoped that nothing would be done which might incite Chinese Communists to take any action. I told him that General MacArthur's visit to Formosa was purely a matter of military reconnaissance and nothing else. Mr. Bonnet then touched on Indochina and repeated the French Government's fears that either a Chinese invasion of Tonkin or an assault by Chinese-aided and strengthened Viet Minh might take place when the rainy season was over. He said that he had taken up with Mr. Rusk the matter of possible tactical air assistance on our part in case of a Chinese invasion. I told him that while, of course, one could not overlook the possibility of a Chinese invasion intelligence coming from that area tended to discount such a possibility. I said that in view of our involvement in Korea it was difficult at this time to give him an answer on the question of tactical air support but that of course we were studying the question.
I also took occasion to tell him of our great satisfaction at France's sending ground troops to Korea.
Mr. Bonnet then brought up the subject of utilizing German resources to help strengthen Western Europe. Mr. Schuman hoped that nothing would be done along these lines which would interfere with the successful conclusion of the Franco-German negotiations. I told him that this was a subject which we intended to take up with Mr. Schuman at the forthcoming meeting. Mr. Bonnet said that it would, of course, be much easier to integrate the West German potential into Western Europe once the latter's forces had been strengthened. I agreed that this would be helpful and that we would go into this thoroughly with Mr. Schuman.
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