DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE SECRETARY
(hand written notes)
Notes on message from Nehru to Atlee (shown to Sec. by Mr. _______ of visit_____ on Mon. Aug. 21, 1950 1950-08-00
N.K. prob. with USSR aggressor. Limit hostilities - How to do so. West does not understand East Anti colonial Existing conditions Talk of Communism does not frighten. As in China money _____ _____ Must _____ Chin… In Indo China more help to French more _____ West is _____USSR appears on their side It is prob. playing its own game. Let me help it What happens after NK drive _____ Either _____ (_____) or drift to _____ Same time in _____
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May got involved in _____of USSR World war disaster for all - Victory would lead nowhere.
[handwritten note: "attached to Kennan memo of 8/21/50"]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Talk to National Defense Committee, Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1947 by George F. Kennan, Deputy for Foreign Affairs, National War College
Gentlemen:
Your chairman has asked me to say a few words to you about the international commitments and the requirements of national security which should govern the formulation of the defense policy of this country.
I told him that I would be happy to let you have some personal thoughts on this subject, which naturally interests me deeply in my capacity as a deputy to the Commandant of the National War College - but only on condition that it should be thoroughly understood that I am speaking for myself alone and that this is not an ex officio pronouncement of government policy.
I think I may say at the outset that specific international commitments of this country, as they exist today, are in my opinion of relatively minor importance for our national defense policy at this particular juncture. An exception to this statement is of course provided by our commitments with respect to occupation of ex-enemy countries. The maintenance of these occupation forces in adequate strength and in suitable condition with respect to supply, equipment and morale, is an absolutely indispensible prerequisite to successful national policy. And since these forces, as long as they are being employed for this purpose, are unavailable for participation in the normal work of our defense establishment, they should be regarded as something over and above that establishment. In other words, when you think of the number of men and the quantities of equipment we should be maintaining at this time, you should think of them in terms of the normal defense needs of the country and then you should add to it the forces required for occupational purposes.
Now, aside from this obligation to participate in the occupation of enemy territories, I know of no specific international commitment which need play any major role in your thinking on problems of American defense. By this I mean any specific written obligation to other countries besides our own. I do not mean by this that we should ignore or take lightly our obligation to collaborate with other nations on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. I hope, like everyone else in Washington, that the day will
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come when the military forces of the United Nations will play an important and useful role in the maintenance of world security and will help to render unnecessary the great military establishments which are now being maintained.
But in present circumstances, it is too much to expect that the role of the United Nations forces in the near future could be a great and important one. We must face the fact that the veto power in the Security Council makes it extremely unlikely that these forces could ever be used against a major power. And for use against a smaller power, as the world is composed today, they would not need to constitute a fighting unit of major strength, even if the difficulties involved in their organization and employment could be successfully overcome. In these circumstances, the size of any forces which we might find ourselves obliged to maintain at the disposal of the United Nations would be such that it would be easily absorbed into our normal defense effort. And for that reason I do not feel that you need to give it major attention at this time in your reflections on the size and character of America's defense establishment.
What, then, are the factors which oblige this country to maintain military forces at all at this juncture? What are the obligations which such forces must be equipped to meet? In my opinion they are two, and they are intimately connected. The one which is more readily understood by our people is to keep this country in a position to win any conflict into which the American people, against their own will and inclinations, might be forced. But the second, and in my mind the more immediate and important of the two is to make sure that there should be no such conflict. This constitutes indeed any obligation of the United States government not only to the people of the United States but to people everywhere in this world who wish to see standards of decency and tolerance and international security upheld. And it is to this general and unwritten commitment that I think you should give first thought in your study of America's defense requirements.
Now what do I mean by this? I mean that if the United States is going to have any hope of success in its efforts to promote peace and security in this world in present circumstances, it must maintain what we may call an adequate military posture: a posture of quiet strength and alertness combined with patience and dignity, a posture which will make it unmistakeably evident that this nation has the strength to back up its convictions if necessary and which will relieve any would-be aggressors abroad of any hopeful
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delusions that their schemes would be abetted by a lack of preparedness or vigilance on our part. The maintenance of such a posture, I reiterate, is not an imposition or a bit of arrogance on the part of this country; it is an obligation which flows from the feelings we now hold about the world, from the part we are playing in world affairs, from the ideals we profess to defend, and from the confidence in us which still exists, despite our many mistakes, in millions of people beyond our borders. If we are not willing to meet this obligation, we have no business to ask for the things we are asking for in international life or to hope that another world catastrophe can be averted. Our first duty to peace is to see that this nation and this continent presents no temptations to those who would be the first to violate peace.
What, then, does this mean, this military posture of which I speak, in actual terms of an American defense establishment? How can we translate this into terms of mean and weapons and the auxiliary equipment of war?
I should say that first of all we should think about our defense establishment in two principal segments; namely, first, that which is needed for possible immediate action at any time and which should be kept in a state of fighting strength and readiness, and secondly, that which is needed in order that in the event of a long war the vast resources of this country may be mobilized and converted into military power with the greatest possible speed and the least possible dislocation of the country's normal life. I think this simple subdivision of thought will be found applicable to all our services.
Let us take for example our ground forces. I think we are all agreed that the security of this country, as well as our obligations to the United Nations which I have mentioned above, make it necessary that we should have in being at all times a certain minimum number and balance of ground force divisions of full fighting strength and with complete and up to date equipment, which would be in a position to be moved anywhere on short notice and to undertake the defense of the interests of this country or of the world community if necessary. Whatever the size of these forces, I think it highly necessary that they be modern, well-trained, well equipped and prepared for action on extremely short notice. I believe that there are certain international situations in which the known existence of a given number of highly mobile and effective divisions of this sort, ready to go anywhere at almost a moment's notice, and to deliver the type of punch that American forces were able to deliver toward the end of this last war, would play a more beneficial part in preventing
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international complications than would the existence of five times that same number of semi-equipped and semi-prepared divisions.
But in addition to this, the army has to maintain the facilities which would permit it in the event of major complications to mobilize again, swiftly and smoothly, a great people's army and to put that army into the field at an early date. This means that it must maintain at all times an adequate skeleton corps of young, vigorous and well-trained officers who can be moved up into higher positions and used to train and command others in time of emergency. It means that it must remain abreast of the times in its study of the production and use of new weapons of war. And it means the maintenance of a skeleton staff for the purpose of industrial mobilization which would be able to harness this country's industrial strength behind its war effort with a minimum of confusion and effectively. This last is absolutely indispensible to the successful conduct of modern war and I cannot over-emphasize its importance. Any one who would sanction policies which would permit our peace-time military establishment to fall to so low a level that it could not maintain such adequate skeleton staffs should be willing to take responsibility for the huge unnecessary expenditures in American lives and American wealth which might some day flow directly from these deficiencies.
The same considerations apply to the navy. We obviously cannot and need not attempt to maintain in peace-time the naval forces we would require in time of war. But we should maintain in fighting condition forces in being which could support in the combat sense and logistically any emergency armed effort this nation might be called upon to put forward, either in its own interests or in the interest of the United Nations, and which could show the flag creditably on the high seas and in the ports of the world. Again, in my opinion, it is more important that these forces be alert and modern and effective than that they be large. But in addition to this, it must be made possible for our navy to preserve its reserve floating strength, to retain an adequate officer's corps for training and command responsibilities in the event of a longer war, and to see to it that the ship-building and naval ordnance industries and the merchant marine of this country are maintained at least in a state where they can be readily expanded and drawn upon in time of war.
With respect to the air forces, these same principles apply, but here the situation is perhaps even more intricate and more delicate than the other services. The weapons of the air arm are ones which are still in a state of particularly
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rapid flux of development. This country must maintain its position of pre- eminence in the air. It is of vital psychological importance that we should maintain at all times effective air combat units which could make their sting felt on very short notice. For this, we require a wide awake and vigorous but relatively narrow basis of current peace-time production. It would be a mistake to over-produce in peacetime on lines of equipment which might be out of date at the time military conflict matured. On the other hand, it is important that we be able, in the event of a longer war, to expand such production immediately, at its most advanced and up-to-date level, with the greatest of speed and precision. The same applies to the training of personnel. Let us not forget that it was deficiencies in the scale and quality of training, rather than output of equipment, which caused the German Air Force to fall so far behind the Allied Air Forces in 1944. We must insist, therefore that our air force be given the facilities to carry out in peacetime such training programs as would make it possible for it in time of war to mobilize great numbers of men and to make use of them at any early date.
Finally, we must not forget the services of civilian defense. In the next war, these may attain an importance which they have never had in the past. But again, they may have an important effect right now as a deterrent of possible aggression. Considering the latent military power of this country, any aggressor would be foolish indeed to launch an air attack on our cities unless he were confident that the resulting confusion and disorganization would be so great that he could promptly and easily take other steps to complete the crippling of our country's capacity to make war. Potential aggressors are just as well aware of this as you and I. For this reason, they will be much less inclined to contemplate aggressive actions of this nature if they know that we have in this country a realistic and effective apparatus for civilian defense than they will be if they feel that we have no such apparatus and that our citizens would be helpless in the event of such contingencies. Now here again, I think we must define our short term requirements; namely the elementary skeleton organization which we feel should be maintained on our territory at all times. Possibly our normal medical, police and fire services might suffice for this purpose with adequate training and guidance. But in addition to this, we should bear in mind the desirability of maintaining such facilities as would enable us to expand this civilian defense organization rapidly and competently in time of crisis. And I think in this connection, that state and local governments might well be encouraged to exploit every natural opportunity for reducing the vulnerability of our cities to air attack by reducing concentrations
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of persons, essential services and industries - particularly since such reduction of concentrations is frequently highly desirable from sociological and other standpoints as well.
This brings up, of course, the general question of the development by this country of weapons of mass destruction, including the atom bomb. I should like to say that as one who has had a considerable experience with Russian matters I am not discouraged about the possibility of eventually reaching an acceptable understanding with the Russians concerning the outlawing of such weapons and the provision of safeguards against their production and use. I regard the recent acceptance of the Baruch plan by most of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission as an important step in that direction. But there is no question in my mind that until such time as a complete and workable international understanding is arrived at and put into operation, this Government has the sad duty of retaining its pre- eminence in the production and maintenance of such weapons and of the auxiliary equipment which serves them. I say this with full confidence that the people of this country will never sanction the unprovoked and aggressive use of such weapons against the other peoples of the world. But I know that until such time as an understanding is in effect there can be no greater protection for our own people against such attacks than the deterrent effect of overwhelming retaliatory power in the hands of this country.
Some of you may wonder why I feel that we are obliged to maintain small mobile forces in being in all branches of the combat services. You may argue that after all such small forces are not going to frighten any other great power and that in case of serious conflict with another great power this country could take no effective action anyway until it had mobilized its manpower and industrial resources on a great scale.
I do not think that this argument holds water. We must remember that the first line of American defense might be many thousands of miles from American shores. We already hold a number of outlying bases which it is essential for us to staff, and it might be necessary for us on very short notice to seize and hold other outlying island bases or peninsular bases on other continents, if only for the purpose of denying the use of them to others during the period required for further military preparations here. In such contingency it is essential that we should be able to beat the other fellow to the trigger. But here, again, I say the greatest value of our forces lies in their quality as a deterrent. If we do not maintain such forces, there will always be an incentive to unruly people elsewhere to seize
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isolated and limited objectives on the theory that we would be able to do nothing about it at the moment and that they could count on making the seizures with impunity and talking about it afterward until public opinion quieted down. I think there could be no more sobering and restraining influence on the minds of such people than the knowledge that this country had in being at all times a compact mobile and hard-hitting task force which could make American power felt rapidly and effectively on limited fronts almost anywhere in the world within the reach of the seven seas.
With respect to these forces which we must maintain available for a large scale mobilization, we must always bear in mind that the tempo of future conflict may be far faster than anything the world has seen before. Time may prove to be the greatest single component of our national security. The scope and thoroughness of our measures of mobilization may be to no avail if they are not accompanied by a speed unprecedented in the experience of the past. I feel that this factor alone, aside from all the other factors which bear on the subject, obliges us to set up a system of universal training. I see nothing in such a system to conflict with American ideals or traditions. My own observations of other countries, which run over a period of two decades, give me no grounds to believe that universal training need promote militaristic or aggressive tendencies. The world is replete with striking evidence to the contrary. In this country, where the sense of individual responsibility to the body politic is felt by many of us to have fallen dangerously low, I can think of no better influence than to have every young American become conscious of his duty to the country and give expression to that consciousness by undergoing a short term of training in its armed forces. I sincerely regret that my generation did not have such an obligation and such a privilege. But aside from this moral effect, it is my conviction that we can no longer count on sufficient time in the event of world conflict to try to train great armed force from scratch. This universal peacetime training is a dictate of the technique and the methods of the age in which we live. And I am sure that if this is stated clearly and authoritatively to our people they will understand it and support it.
There is one more thing I would like to mention. That is the vital necessity of the maintenance by this country of adequate facilities for research and intelligence. The concept of intelligence should not be confused with that of international espionage and intrigue along the lines of E. Philips Oppenheim. Intelligence has far outgrown the "cloak and dagger" age of false beards and beautiful ladies. When we
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speak of intelligence today we mean the sum-total of the knowledge of this Government about the world outside our borders: the product of curiosity which is as friendly as it is precautionary and which contains no sinister implications. The role of intelligence may be so great in a future war, or in enabling us to avoid a future war, that I think it fair to say that it is probably the cheapest form of national defense. It would be a sorry conception of economy to hamper our Government in the conduct of this work, the significance of which runs into many fields besides those of mere military effort.
Now there you have a rough picture of the defense problem of this country, as I see it. You yourselves will have to break it down further into terms of men and weapons and plants and ships and machines.
In conclusion, I would only ask you to note that this concept of our defense needs contains no note which any other country in the world could reasonably interpret as one of threat or aggression. The facilities which I have indicated for maintenance in being at full fighting strength are only such as to enable this country to meet its possible obligations to the United Nations, to deal a sharp and effective blow on a highly limited front within a very short time and in practically any area of the world, and to mobilize its strength rapidly if a clear threat of major conflict develops. They are not such as to enable this nation to undertake the aggressive assault and conquest of any other great power. For that reason, no one need be shamefaced or apologetic about their maintenance. On the other hand, they constitute a minimum of what in my opinion this country requires today. They will continue to constitute that minimum until the situation is changed by the achievement of a general over-all understanding and peace settlement between the great nations of the world, by the establishment of an adequate and smoothly working atomic energy authority along the lines of the American proposal, and by effective agreements with other nations for the reduction and regulation of armaments other than those envisaged in the atomic energy negotiations.
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