DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: August 31, 1950
PARTICIPANTS: Sir Oliver Frank, British Ambassador The Secretary N. Freeman Matthews (0)
COPIES TO: U - Mr. Webb S/S - Mr. Jessup FE - Mr. Rusk EUR - Mr. Perkins S/S -
The British Ambassador, at his own request called on the Secretary this afternoon and discussed three subjects:
1. Atlee Visit. The Secretary said that owing to recent urgent problems and preparations for his own testimony on the Hill he had not had an opportunity to talk to the President concerning the proposed visit to the United States of Prime Minister Atlee. In going over the question, however, with people in the Department, we had come to the tentative conclusion that it would be advisable to postpone any such visit until November. A visit at this time would necessarily arouse considerable speculation as to the purposes and subjects of the discussions and would inevitably become involved in the American election campaign. He said, however, that he would speak to the President, although he thought the President would agree with his view. It would be a little easier if we knew a little more of what Prime Minister Atlee had in mind in coming over and the nature of the talks he wished to have. Sir Oliver said that he too was inclined to agree that it would be desirable to postpone the visit until November and that he would endeavor to obtain some information as to what Atlee had in mind to discuss. (He later told Matthews he thought that when Mr. Bevin arrived he would probably have a fuller explanation of what was in Mr. Atlee's mind.)
2. Formosa. The Secretary said that frankly he had been so busy in preparation for his hearings that, although he had read the paper left with Matthews and had a very brief discussion with those in the Department concerned with the matter, he had not given adequate thought to this important and complicated subject nor had he discussed it with the President. He said, however, that a paper had been prepared which he would let Sir Oliver read, but did not feel he could let him have. The paper, he said, had been written with paragraph 15 of the British memorandum in mind. It was not designed to be a statement of American views. We felt that paragraph 15 of the British paper did not represent a position with which it would be easy for us to along. The paper which he had let Sir Oliver read was designed to indicate the sort of approach which, if the British made to us, we would feel deserved our careful consideration. If that sort of an approach were made to us, we would see what we could do to meet it and would endeavor to work out an American Government position with respect thereto. The Secretary then covered the principal points in the attached paper and the thinking that went into them.
Sir Oliver said that he thought the suggested approach was a constructive one and that, while London would be disappointed that we have not gone the whole way of their paragraph 15, he thought they would find the approach helpful. He then asked how he could put the question up to London and emphasized that one of the factors which in past correspondence seemed to be troubling Mr. Bevin personally was the belief that the Americans might be trying to build up Chiang for possible return to the Mainland. He said that he himself was convinced that this was not the case, but anything which would reassure Mr. Bevin on this point, in view of all the confusion abroad about American policy concerning Formosa and attitude toward the Chinese Communist Government, would be advantageous. In reply the Secretary indicated he thought Sir Oliver could say that the paper represented thinking in the Department (not the views of the Secretary of State), and that he could honestly and emphatically assure London that there is a growing soberness on the Hill with respect to Formosa and a realization of the complexity of the problem. The Secretary said he had pointed out a number of pertinent factors regarding China and the danger of the war spreading in the area and that during his discussion there had been no interruptions or adverse comments. While a few of the more extreme Republicans may still hold their views, he thought they could not carry with them the more serious minded members of their Party, and that he was much impressed with the developing sober attitude and understanding of the dangers involved. He said he felt that if Sir Oliver could report a similar impression (with which Sir Oliver agreed) it should be reassuring to Mr. Bevin. Sir Oliver said lots of people had hoped that the Formosa problem could be "kept on ice" but this seemed impossible under the circumstances and that therefore the British Government was trying to find the best way to handle the problem with a view to its long-term solution. Matthews
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said he thought the approach in our paper went a long way toward taking the problem "off the ice" and in the proper direction. Sir Oliver agreed.
3. Spofford's Instructions. The Secretary said that there was some feeling in London that Mr. Spofford was taking a position which did not represent the thinking of the American Government and he wanted to assure Sir Oliver that this was not the case. The views which Mr. Spofford was expressing concerning the American attitude toward the British defense effort represented accurately his feeling and the feeling of this Government. He thought this misunderstanding possibly stemmed from the fact that the President had publicly expressed appreciation of the announced British defense effort. Sir Oliver said he would report this fact. Later in Matthew's office (where he came to take notes on the Formosa paper with the Secretary's authorization) Sir Oliver asked if there was any real basis for Mr. Spofford's feeling that the British questioned how representative his views were. Matthews said there had been direct indications to Spofford by British officials that they felt his statements concerning the feeling that British defense efforts were not adequate did not represent American Government thinking. Matthews said this was not the case, and therefore the Secretary had wished to make this fact clear. Sir Oliver asked whether this had reference to British financial effort or to the question of increased military forces. Matthews replied that it applied to both.
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The United States and the United Kingdom are agreed that every effort must be made to prevent the spread of existing hostilities beyond Korea. To this end they desire to secure agreement between themselves on a course of action with respect to Formosa which will minimize the risk of an eruption of hostilities between the Island and the Mainland and which will serve as a basis for a common program with other friendly states and command the support of a firm majority in the United Nations.
With these ends in views the following is submitted as a basis for discussions:
1. A concerted effort should be made in the forthcoming General Assembly of the United Nations to secure the adoption of a Resolution which would in substance
(a) refer to the historic Chinese claim to Formosa and state that no nation other than China asserts a claim to sovereignty over Formosa, that both the Government of the Republic of China and the Chinese People's Government publicly maintain China's claim to Formosa;
(b) confirm that, until a settlement of the case of aggression against the Republic of Korea on a basis satisfactory to the United Nations has been achieved and the peace of the general area has been restored, no party shall attempt to resort to force to alter the present status of Formosa nor shall the Island be used as a base for attack against the Mainland;
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(c) establish a Commission of the United Nations charged with the responsibility of recommending to the General Assembly of the United Nations an appropriate peaceful settlement of the Formosa question. The Commission in arriving at its conclusions shall take into account the considerations set forth in (a) and (b) above as well as the following two points,
(i) the status of Formosa under international law in the presence or absence at that time of a Peace Treaty with Japan:
(ii) the wishes, as they may be expressed under any arrangements which the Commission may provide, of the inhabitants of the island with respect to the future status of Formosa.
2. If agreement is reached by the United States and the United Kingdom on 1. above, consultation with other friendly nations should be instituted promptly with a view to securing the widest possible support for the proposal in the United Nations.