February 19, 1951
Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
After talking with Mr. Lovett, it was agreed that it would be better for me to discuss the attached memorandum with you rather than to send it on to the White House with possible differences of view to be resolved by the President.
The following points are those which I wish to raise:
1\) The draft message proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggests that "consideration should also be given to attack by naval gun fire". It seems to us that such an operation clearly increases the hazard of an already hazardous attack within seventeen miles of the Soviet boundary. It could be anticipated that a naval force would require a screen to the northward. You will recall that a United Nations air screen in the Yellow Sea shot down a Soviet plane at a point forty miles from the center of the United Nations task force. Further, a naval force would be subject to submarine attack. Lastly, the sinking of a capital ship by Soviet air or submarine action would represent a far more critical incident than the loss of certain aircraft.
2\) The dangers of a bombing raid close to the borders of the Soviet Union were discussed at some length with the President last summer. The attached memorandum of September 11, 1950, contains a summary of that problem. At the time, the President imposed the limitation which General MacArthur now wishes to raise. One question is whether the correspondence with Tokyo today indicates now that the dangers from the supplies in Rashin are significantly greater than last summer when it was decided that the danger was not sufficient to justify continued bombing. Frankly, I do not think that the incoming messages are very persuasive on this point. The bombing might have one or both of two objectives; the destruction of marshaling yards and communications, and the destruction of the supplies themselves. Is it not possible to deal with
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the communications system, as in the past, by striking farther south? So far as Rashin as a depot is concerned, it would seem that, without much inconvenience to the enemy, alternative depots could be established in nearby Soviet or Manchurian territory. Another question would arise if the supplies themselves are irreplaceable, but there is no showing in the correspondence that this is the case.
In short, the question is whether the gain to the United Nations operation in Korea is at all commensurate to the risks to the whole United Nations operation and to our national interests. I do not believe that there is any issue here as between political and military considerations because the risks are to our national security and to the security of the free world and involve major military considerations. Among the latter is the highly exposed situation of Japan which we have discussed before.
I understand that you have to be on Capitol Hill at 9:15 in the morning; I must be there at 11 myself. I am sending this over tonight in order that you and I may discuss it on the telephone early tomorrow. Perhaps you will wish to have Mr. Lovett and General Bradley go over this with Mr. Matthews, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Reinhardt.
I feel confident that we can work out an agreed joint recommendation for the President.
Attachments:
Memorandum to the President, September 11, 1950
Memorandum to the President, February 19, 1951, with attachments
\(above mentioned attachments sent to Gen. Marshall - no copies available for our files\) S:ma