May 28, 1951
DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
PARTICIPANTS: Wilhelm Munthe de Morgenstierne, Ambassador of Norway Einar H. Gerhardsen, Prime Minister of Norway
Secretary Acheson Mr. Ronhovde, BNA
COPIES TO: S/S G EUR BNA RA American Embassy, Oslo
After the customary exchange of courtesies Mr. Gerhardsen brought up two matters which, he said, were of great interest to him. First, he referred to the fact that the Korean aggression had caught the Western countries unprepared and that consequently the military burden in Korea had fallen mainly on the United States which alone had forces nearby. He thought it highly desirable that plans should be made as soon as possible for an equitable sharing of burdens including proportional contributions of military contingents to meet a possible repetition of such aggression elsewhere.
I replied that the U.S. Government fully understood the reasons for the relative smallness of European military contributions in Korea and that we attached equal importance, for example, to the task of the French forces in Indo-China and the British in Malaya. In answer to his question whether this meant that we were not interested in securing additional forces for Korea from other UN members, I said that I had been speaking of national forces
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in existence at the time of the Korean outbreak and that we are definitely interested in the provision of additional forces from, for example, Australia, New Zealand and also Greece.
Mr. Gerhardsen then referred to the current internationally organized Communist propaganda campaign and proposed that the democratic world should organize a vigorous and positive campaign of its own, possibly through a "general staff" in NATO, which could coordinate national efforts and issue directives for an effective campaign. I told him I liked his suggestion and that we would follow through on it.
The Prime Minister then inquired whether efforts should not be made to secure a measure of real disarmament and stated that savings so achieved might find a useful outlet in, for example, the technical assistance program. I replied that we are in complete sympathy with genuine disarmament efforts but that Soviet terms would leave some of our friends completely disarmed and as long as the Soviets will not agree to effective inspection we cannot have faith in a disarmament treaty. The Prime Minister said he agreed and wondered whether there is any prospect of early Soviet acceptance of international inspection. I said I was not optimistic; that perhaps in time, should we build sufficient strength, the Russians might change their minds. The Prime Minister concluded the interview by saying that the greatest danger of the moment is that the democratic forces relax their rearmament because of any apparent relaxation of international tension. I agreed.
Dean Acheson
EUR:BNA:AGRonhovde:jt