MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
[Handwritten: September 2] September 3, 1951
SUBJECT: Call by Prime Minister Yoshida
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary Ambassador John Foster Dulles Mr. Dean Rusk Ambassador Sebald Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida Kumao Nishimura Akira Matsui Ryuji Takeuchi
COPIES TO: The Secretary Ambassador Dulles Mr. Rusk Mr. U. A. Johnson Mr. Sebald Mr. O'Sullivan
After the usual preliminaries, the Secretary said that he had several matters to which he wished to invite the attention of Mr. Yoshida, in order that the latter might have a clear understanding of our thinking regarding the essential nature of the conference. The underlying concept of the conference will be in accordance with the terms of the invitation which is for the conclusion and signature of the Treaty of Peace. In consequence, it would be fatal to allow any changes whatsoever to be made in the text of the August 13 draft, as to do so would reopen all the issues previously settled by lengthy negotiations. The result would be that no treaty would become possible.
The Secretary stressed the need for the Japanese to assist in their approaches to other delegations which might be wavering regarding the signature and specifically mentioned Indonesia, Philippines, Associated States, and Pakistan. He hoped that in arranging for meetings between the Japanese delegation and other delegations, particularly Asiatic, the Prime Minister would overlook protocol and make the approaches. The
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Secretary suggested that Mr. Dulles might wish to expand on some of the topics that might be covered in discussions between the Japanese and other Asiatic delegations.
Mr. Dulles explained at considerable length the necessity that the Japanese be responsive in discussing the reparations question. He said the wording of Article 14 is such that some of the interested Asiatic Governments are concerned whether Japan, after the signing of the treaty, might fail to enter into negotiations in a spirit of good faith. He ventured the opinion that the reparations formula would in fact be of benefit to the Japanese economy in that it would enable Japan to employ its excess industrial capacity, give employment to its people, re-establish trade channels and in general have a salutary effect, if properly carried out, towards establishing good relations with the countries concerned. On the other hand, it would not be desirable at this time to make any firm commitments regarding amounts or even procedures to be followed; the conversations should be positive and along lines of broad principles. Ambassador Sebald said that it would also be desirable for the Prime Minister in such discussions to leave the impression that Japan is prepared at the earliest possible time after the treaty is signed to enter into negotiations.
The Secretary explained the necessity for keeping the substance and terms of the Security Treaty secret in view of the desirability of keeping all discussion of this treaty out of the principal conference. The tentative thinking is that at some time after the treaty signature the United States and Japan will concert to arrange the actual publication and signing of the Security Treaty. Mr. Dulles pointed out that once the Security Treaty creeps into discussions in the conference it would be most embarrassing because all the discussion would tend to center upon the Security Treaty instead of the Treaty of Peace. Mr. Yoshida said that he agrees.
In response to a question by Mr. Yoshida regarding relations with China, the Secretary said that he felt sure that Mr. Yoshida would be asked regarding the attitude of Japan towards the formulation of its policy vis-Ã - vis Nationalist China and Red China. He felt that Mr. Yoshida should say something to the effect that this problem, being of such great importance to Japan, is still under study and that no decision has as yet been reached but that it is hoped to arrive at some conclusion after the treaty had been signed. Mr. Dulles hoped that Mr. Kawada could proceed to Formosa shortly and that the Overseas Agency could be established there soon after the treaty is signed.
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Reverting to the nature of the conference, Mr. Dulles pointed out that some countries probably are not prepared to sign and perhaps will not sign. He felt that in these instances nothing essential would be lost as it would be possible for such countries to enter into bilateral arrangements with Japan. Mr. Rusk said that we naturally wish all countries to sign and that every effort must be made to convince wavering countries of the desirability of joining into one document at this time, as naturally it is a more practical solution to have the Treaty of Peace in one document rather than in several. He also added the thought that aside from the negative aspects of criticizing certain articles of the treaty, the tone of the conference is of the greatest importance. He hoped that in their approaches to other delegations the Japanese would adopt a positive attitude in order that the conference attitude might be one of constructive effort rather than one of bickering and ill-feeling among the many countries involved.
On the question of a press release concerning the nature of the Prime Minister's call, it was agreed that the wording should be general in nature and that emphasis should be placed upon the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom are co-sponsors.
Mr. Yoshida and his assistants departed at 7:10 p.m.
USDEL:WSebald:evc