Sept. 25, 1951
Visit of the Yugoslav Ambassador
Mr. Vladimir Popovic, Ambassador of Yugoslavia Dr. Mirko Bruner, First Secretary
Mr. Acheson, Secretary of State Mr. Benbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary
S/A, S/P, C, G, UNA, EUR, WE, EE American Embassies Rome and Belgrade
The Yugoslav Ambassador, Mr. Vladimir Popovic, came to see me this morning at eleven o'clock at his urgent request. He said that he regretted to impose on me at a busy time but hoped that I could outline for the information of his Government some of the important matters which had been discussed at Ottawa and, in particular, the discussions with the Italian Prime Minister, Mr. de Gasperi.
I told the Ambassador that I was happy to see him at any time since I knew that he only asked to come in when he had an important question to raise. I then outlined to him briefly the three main steps taken at Ottawa, namely:
1. The question of admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO. I pointed out the formalities which remained to be completed before Greek and Turkish membership was assured and expressed the view that this might take some time. I also stressed the fact that the admission of these countries would be to the advantage of Yugoslavia since it would result in strengthening the defenses of the whole Southern periphery of Europe.
2. The decision to set up a group of 12 to discuss the relationship between the military requirements of NATO countries and their economic capabilities.
-2-
3. The setting up of a small group to study the non-military functions of NATO with a view to making recommendations which would assist the organization in evolving further along non-military lines.
Turning to the Italian conversations I indicated that there were two subjects of primary interest: (1) Revision of the Italian Peace Treaty; and (2) A permanent solution of the Trieste problem.
With regard to (1) I stressed that the Italians were interested in removing the moral stigma which the existing Treaty placed on them as a defeated nation. This aspect of the question was of growing importance in view of the type of treaty we had just concluded with Japan. We had expressed to Mr. de Gasperi our sympathy with and understanding of the main problem in connection with the Italian position in this regard. I said that the second main problem in connection the Italian Peace Treaty revolved around the military clauses. It was clear that under the present Treaty Italy was not in a position to make its full contribution to its own defenses and that of its NATO Allies. This was true with regard to certain lines of military production as well as to actual military strength. Here again we had recognized the need of change and had discussed with Mr. de Gasperi possible ways of bringing this about.
With regard to (2) I pointed out that this was the last important territorial question which was still outstanding as a result of the war. It was likewise a problem which stood in the way of better relations between Yugoslavia and Italy. I told the Ambassador that I had talked to Mr. de Gasperi the way I had recently talked to him. In other words, it seemed to me a question where no solution was perfect, but that a solution which was broadly based on ethnic considerations seemed to be the fairest and could be made acceptable to both Yugoslavia and Italy. In this connection, I expressed the opinion that the position which Mr. Popovic had set forth to me before did not go far enough. I told him, as I had told Mr. de Gasperi, that we did not underestimate the problem presented by public opinion in both countries.
The Ambassador then stated that his Government was much concerned by the public position being taken by the Italian Government, notably in relation to the Tripartite Declaration of March 20, 1948. He referred to the fact that Mr. de Gasperi had again emphasized the Tripartite Declaration in the course
- 3 -
of his speech to Congress yesterday. The Yugoslavs felt that if this was simply a propaganda position on the part of the Italian Government, that was one thing. But, if it represented the real Italian position the difficulty of negotiating a solution would be greatly increased. He thought that constant harping on the Tripartite Declaration only resulted in giving encouragement to the extremists in both countries. As a matter of fact, Yugoslavia had just as much right to claim the whole of the Free Territory for itself as the Italians did. He wished to give me the strongest assurances of this Government's desire to reach a solution, but this could not be done either on the basis of the Tripartite Declaration or on the basis of an extreme Yugoslav demand but rather if there was a third position in which each side would make concessions. He wished to make it clear that Yugoslavia earnestly desired an improvement of its relations with Italy at the present time and, as he put it, not at some future time. He also wished to stress two related matters which had a bearing on the necessity of settling the Trieste question. The first flowed from the military talks which had begun here between the Yugoslav Chief of Staff, General Koca Popovic, and our military leaders. These talks were not yet completed. They had shown clearly, however, that in case of attack in Southeast Europe, the Yugoslavs would bear the main brunt. In fact, it was envisaged that Yugoslav defenses would have to "spread Westward toward Italy". The second point to be remembered was that a solution of the Trieste problem would involve the eventual withdrawal of British and American troops now in the area. In such a case, it was important that in the event of attack the Slovene population be "happy". It would not do for these people to be nursing political grievances against Italy at a time when there might be a military test in the area.
In reply I explained to the Ambassador Mr. de Gasperi's political problem. My own view was that the less said about the Tripartite Declaration the better. I also said that the United States was not trying to give specific advice to either Italy or Yugoslavia in this matter but was trying to be a real friend to both. I pointed out, however, that while Mr. de Gasperi might be able to reach agreement with Yugoslavia on a Trieste settlement, based on the ethnic principle and get his people to accept it, he, himself, felt that he could not in advance of such negotiations renounce the Tripartite Declaration. To do so would place him in an impossible position with his own people and, in his opinion, make the reaching of a settlement impossible. I expressed the view that this pointed up the necessity for having the
-4-
negotiations conducted with secrecy on both sides until a solution could be found.
I had to interrupt the conversation at this point, but before leaving the Ambassador said that there were two other subjects which he had wished to discuss. The first was to inform us that his Government intended to put forward their Head Delegate as a candidate for Vice President at the forthcoming General Assembly in Paris. Secondly, he wanted me to know that his Government intends to bring to the attention of the United Nations in some form the additional provocations on the part of the satellite countries around the Yugoslav borders.
I suggested that the Ambassador take up these matters in more detail with Mr. Hickerson.
EUR:JCHBonbright:elm