September 26, 1951
Secretary of Defense Lovett telephoned Secretary Acheson this afternoon with reference to the Iranian situation.
In the first telephone call he said he wanted to report that he had just had a visit from Sir William Elliott (Air Marshal). The latter had obviously had some sort of alert or warning from his General Staff or from British military quarters, in connection with the ejection note which the British are expecting from the Iranians. Sir William, in his conversation with Mr. Lovett, indicated concern that the situation was headed for real trouble. Sir William said that the question was a very important part of their whole strategic set-up in the Middle East. The British are faced with two alternatives - if they allow the British technicians to be thrown out, the British public will be infuriated; on the other hand if they ignore the eviction note and land troops that will cause great trouble and danger.
Mr. Lovett said his opinion is that, as previously in the Arabian-Palestine matter, the British are operating on bad intelligence, and think they can handle the situation, when in fact the danger is that they cannot do so any more successfully than they were able to handle the Arabian-Palestine situation.
Mr. Lovett said he asked Sir William why the British considered they had any grounds to land troops to keep their people in the country, unless the Iranians make real trouble. Mr. Lovett did not see that the British had any extra-territorial rights in this matter if the Iranians maintain order and simply ask the British technicians to hand in their passports. Sir William's only answer to this was that the British attached tremendous importance to the Middle East; to which Mr. Lovett said he replied that we attached the greatest importance to keeping one of the richest oil fields from falling into Soviet hands by some reckless act.
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Mr. Lovett asked Sir William why it would not be a good idea to try to work out a trusteeship, not as a mission, but as an operator during further negotiations, and with the British technicians staying on. Sir William said he thought the British had gotten so "dug in" that there was very little elasticity left. Mr. Lovett had made it clear that this idea came from him as an individual and that the matter had to be handled by Secretary Acheson and Sir Oliver Franks.
Mr. Lovett said he asked Sir William what better tool could be put into the hands of the Kremlin than for the British to put troops in; that this could give the Kremlin the excuse for moving in to Azerbaijan with the Tudeh party and other disaffected parties.
Mr. Acheson said that when Mr. Morrison was here he had been strongly urged to have a joint intelligence appreciation of the Iranian situation but he had adamantly refused.
The first conversation ended with Mr. Lovett asking Secretary Acheson to let him know if there was anything he could help with.
Later he called and pursued the idea of the trusteeship as a sort of good offices proposition, bringing in a third party. He thought the trusteeship could sign contracts with the Iranians, thereby saving their face. It could hire the British, and could keep funds in escrow. He thought something like this might break the deadlock and save the British and Iranian face. Mr. Acheson said he and Mr. Harriman had been talking about something like this.
Mr. Lovett said he thought the need for a little "give" on the contract question was what was needed. He did not think the British would be willing to "give" on this question with the Iranians, but might be willing to with a trustee, pending negotiation of settlement. Mr. Lovett suggested the trusteeship might be a three-man board, with possibly an American, a Swede or a Swiss; or it might be a board with a Dutchman, an American, an Iranian, and an Englishman - so long as the English were not dominant.
The Secretary said he would consider the idea further with Mr. Harriman.
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