IPM MIN-4
October 1, 1951
CONVERSATIONS WITH ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER
Minutes of the Fourth Meeting held in Room 5106, New State 9:30 a.m., September 26, 1951
PRESENT Mr. Acheson (U.S.) Mr. De Gasperi (Italy)
ALSO PRESENT
UNITED STATES ITALY
Mr. Harriman Amb. Tarchiani Mr. Perkins Amb. Zoppi Amb. Dunn Minister Janelli Mr. Byington Mr. Luciolli Mr. Barnes Mr. Panza Mr. West Mr. Sensi Mr. White Mr. Venturini Mr. Greene Mr. Christensen Miss Kirkpatrick
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Secretary Acheson and Prime Minister De Gasperi met 9:30 to review the draft communiqué which had been prepared on the results of their discussions over the previous two days.
MR. DE GASPERI opened the discussion by stating that the phrase with respect to Trieste indicating that a settlement "should take into account" legitimate Italian aspirations was impossible from his stand-point. He said that this was a very weak statement and that from the standpoint of his own internal political situation it was impossible for him to accept terminology of this nature as representing the position he had taken in Washington. He asked whether the "should" could not become "must" or the statement changed in some other way.
MR. ACHESON said he was aware of this problem but he could not agree on his part to the change Mr. De Gasperi has proposed. He pointed out that Mr. De Gasperi had urged that the US Government take a more active part in seeking a solution of the Trieste problem. We were quite prepared to do what we could, but it would not be possible to do anything if the matter appeared to have been prejudged at the very beginning through such firm language as that proposed by Mr. De Gasperi. Mr. Acheson said the communiqué obviously had to say something on the Trieste question but that it seemed to him little good would result from anything which we might say.
MR. DE GASPERI said it was largely a tactical problem for him of trying to get language which would be understood by the Italian people. He could not accept anything which indicated that the March 1948 Declaration might not still be Allied policy. After some further discussion Mr. De Gasperi accepted the revised language which appears in the final communiqué. In agreeing to this language he said that he assumed the phrase "Western European unity" in this language referred to unity in general and did not have reference specifically to inclusion of Yugoslavia.
MR. ACHESON then raised the section of the communiqué dealing with the problem of migration, pointing out that we could not accept the language which specifically endorsed the forthcoming meeting at Naples. He said that this meeting under the auspices of the ILO, which included Communist governments. From a domestic standpoint we could not publicly indicate our intention of working with such a group for a solution of this problem. He said that we would continue to support Italy in seeking a solution but perhaps not through the ILO conference. However, we were now working with the ILO in an effort to guide this session into a more useful channel, and if we were successful in this we might be able to use our full support at the Naples meeting.
As a final point MR. DE GASPERI proposed a new concluding sentence for the communiqué which he felt would have a stronger effect on public opinion. This was accepted with only a minor language change and it was agreed that the communiqué would be released as soon as possible with publication scheduled for 12:00 noon the same day.
At 10:20 a.m. the Ministers adjourned their meeting to move to the diplomatic reception room and sign the investment agreement supplementing the 1948 treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation.