DEPARTMENT OF STATE Memorandum of Conversation
DATE: April 30, 1952
SUBJECT: Anglo-Egyptian Question: Sudan Formula
PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary The British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks NEA - Mr. Berry NE - Mr. Stabler
COPIES TO: American Embassy, Cairo American Embassy, London S/S (2) G EUR S/P NEA S/A - Dr. Jessup NE
The British Ambassador called upon me today at his request and under instructions from the Foreign Office to continue the discussion of April 25.
He said that he had received from Mr. Eden a redraft of the formula on the Sudan to be presented to the Egyptian Government. This formula reads as follows:
"Proposed Text To Be Given to The Egyptians.
"The Egyptian Government having declared that His Majesty King Farouk holds the title of King of Egypt and the Sudan, Her Majesty's Government reaffirm that they would accept either the unity of Egypt and the Sudan under the Egyptian Crown or any other status for the Sudan, provided that it resulted from the exercise of the right of the Sudanese people freely to decide their future status, which right is recognized and accepted by both Governments.
"H.M.G. realizes that there are differences of opinion between the two Governments as to the question of the King's title during the interim period before self determination. They therefore also declare that they are ready to enter into immediate consultation with the Sudanese in regard to this matter, in order to ascertain whether any solution is possible, agreeable to the Sudanese and consistent with the pledges given by H.M.G to them."
The British Ambassador then turned to some of the points which I raised on April 25. He said he thought that the ambiguity with respect to the words "present status of the Sudanese people" contained in the second paragraph of the original formula had been removed in the redraft. He thought it was quite clear that the paragraph as now drafted removed the ambiguity and referred to the status of the Sudanese people during the entire interim period prior to self determination.
With respect to my suggestion that it might be desirable to hold consultations with the Sudanese prior to the presentation of the formula or discussion with the Egyptians regarding the desired guarantees, the British Ambassador said that Mr. Eden believed that it would be useless to consult the Sudanese unless the UK already had the guarantees from the Egyptians in the form of a conditional promise. He said that it was intended that it be made quite clear to the Egyptians and the Sudanese that the guarantees would not become operative in any sense in any sense until Sudanese assent to recognition had been obtained. I pointed out that the second paragraph of the redraft formula did not, however, mention guarantees although the formula declared British willingness to enter into "immediate consultation with the Sudanese". I wonder what effect this would have upon the Egyptians.
Turning to my third point as to whether there might be a delay in constitutional development of the Sudan if such delay would assist toward a settlement the British Ambassador said that Mr. Eden had indicated that it would not be possible for him to make a public statement on this at present. However, Sir Ralph Stevenson, the British Ambassador in Cairo, would be instructed to make clear to the Egyptian Government that it would be the hope of the UK that in the course of any negotiations over the Sudan it would be possible to find means (a) of associating Egypt closely with the United Kingdom in working out the constitutional development of the Sudan; (b) of facilitating arrangements between Egypt and the Sudan for the control of the Nile Waters; and (c) furthering the closest possible cooperation between Egypt and the Sudan in such a way to contribute to the best interests of the two countries. Sir Oliver added that Mr. Eden thought it would be most helpful, if Mr. Caffery could put forward to the King that he knows that the British Government approaches the Sudan problem from this point of view. Sir Oliver said he felt if Mr. Eden had to answer a question publicly about a delay in the constitutional development he would have to say it was not possible. Mr. Eden, therefore, was trying to approach the matter from a slightly different angle in order to indicate that through Egyptian association with the British in the constitutional development of the Sudan Egypt could influence the trend of events. In other words, while the UK would not delay developments merely for the sake of delay, a factual situation could arise in which a certain delay or slowing down might be entirely natural.
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Sir Oliver then said that he would like us to know that the British Government is sincerely desirous of finding a solution to the Egyptian problem, including that of the Sudan. He hoped that the United States in no way believed that the pledges to which the UK often referred are an excuse for not taking action to settle the Sudan question. The British Ambassador said there was strong feeling in the UK with respect to the Sudan and he mentioned the fact that Prime Minister Churchill had participated in the Battle of Omdurman. In addition the UK took considerable pride in success of its administration and its development of that country. In other words living people are associated with the whole span of the Sudan's development and it is only natural that there should be strong feeling with respect to the future of that country. The pledges of successive British Governments had a real meaning. Sir Oliver said he was not under instructions to say this but that he believed it would be useful in order to present this whole question in its true perspective.
Sir Oliver then read from his instructions from Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden had asked him to see me personally and to say that he attached greatest importance to full US support of the efforts which Mr. Eden and his colleagues had made on the Sudan formula. Mr. Eden believed that unless Mr. Caffery is prepared to approach the King with full conviction and to point out that the formula represents the limit to which the British can go towards finding a formula in advance of negotiations an approach would be useless. The UK could not consider taking any action which would conflict with its pledges.
Mr. Eden expressed gratitude for the assistance Mr. Caffery had given but added that half-hearted assistance with respect to Sudan in this juncture would be worse than none. If the US could not find it possible to support the formula the UK would be obliged nonetheless to go ahead with it.
Sir Oliver said that Mr. Eden had stated that it would be most useful if Mr. Caffery could be instructed to make clear to the King, provided that we are willing to support the formula, that if Egypt rejects the formula, then the only solution would be for the UK to open negotiations without a formula in advance and to bring in the Sudanese at some point to consider matters of concern to them, such as the Nile Waters, constitutional development, and the Governor-General's position. Mr. Eden's view is that these are practical questions which concern Egypt and the Sudan and that it should be possible to draw up an agenda.
Sir Oliver said that in Mr. Eden's view the UK had no particular interest in a formula but were only trying to develop it to help the Egyptians. It was also Mr. Eden's view that if an agreement could not be reached on the formula then the best way was to get down to the hard realities of negotiations on defense and Sudan without a formula. Finally Mr. Eden had said while he was sorry to press the US for an answer, a reply to the Egyptians could not be delayed and he felt that this was the time when US support could be
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most decisive. According to Sir Oliver, Mr. Eden had in mind that Sir Ralph Stevenson would return to Cairo on May 1. It was hoped that Mr. Caffery could receive his instructions by then so that the two Ambassadors could consult on May 2. Then on May 3, Mr. Caffery might be able to go to the King and later that same day Sir Ralph could see the Prime Minister.
I thanked Sir Oliver for his presentation and asked him to tell Mr. Eden that we appreciated these views. I said I thought there might be some difficulty on the timing which had been set forth as we should wish to consult Mr. Caffery. There was also some question in our minds as to the chances of the success of this formula. Mr. Caffery had grave doubts about the acceptability of the original formula to the Egyptians. We would certainly wish to get his views on the redraft. I said that in any event we would give the matter our most careful consideration and that we would try to get something to Mr. Eden perhaps over the weekend. It seemed to me that it was a good idea that Sir Ralph Stevenson was returning to Cairo as no doubt he and Mr. Caffery would wish to confer on this matter. It would be most helpful for Mr. Caffery to have Sir Ralph's account of latest thinking in London.
Sir Oliver said he entirely understood our desire to consult Mr. Caffery and that he would report to Mr. Eden that we were giving the matter urgent attention and would give a reply as soon as possible.
NEA:NE:WStabler:drj 4/30/52