July 14, 1952
MINISTERIAL TALKS IN LONDON, June 1952 Summary Minutes
10:30 A.M. - 12:30 A.M., Tuesday, June 24, 1952 British Foreign Office
Present:
United Kingdom United States Mr. Eden Secretary Acheson Sir William Strang Ambassador Gifford Sir Oliver Franks Ambassador Jessup Sir Pierson Dixon Mr. Perkins Mr. F. K. Roberts Mr. Battle Mr. Denis Allen Mr. Kirkpatrick Mr. Roger Allen Mr. Hooker Sir Roger Makins Mr. Palmer Ambassador Stevenson Sir James Bowler Sir Robert Howe Mr. Harrison Mr. Cheetham
Contents Page
1. Prospects for Ratification of EDC, NATO and German Agreements 2 2. Reply to Soviet Note 3 3. Berlin Situation 4 4. The Saar 5 5. Trieste 5 6. Egypt 8
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MR. EDEN began by suggesting that there be a review of the positions with respect to ratification of the EDC Treaty, the NATO Protocol, and the contractual negotiations. He said that so far as the British position was concerned, he had talked to some members of the Opposition and after having first thought that ratifications should take place quite soon had concluded at the request of Mr. Noel-Baker and some of the more cooperative members of the Labor party that it might be better put off somewhat. They had raised the question of when the German Constitutional Court would give its opinion and were prepared to wait until the end of July, although the deadline for British ratification would be the 8th of August. He commented, however, that it now looks as though the German Constitutional Court will not have acted by that time.
MR. ROBERTS then explained that the Constitutional Court had now before it two questions, that of the advisory opinion, which had been asked before by President Heuss, and also the question raised by the SPD action, calling for determination whether there should be an amendment to the constitution.
MR EDEN then said that the British might have to go ahead before August and that they could if necessary ratify at any time.
MR. ACHESON said that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had approved the contractuals yesterday subject to "an interpretation" by Senator Hickenlooper to the effect that the President's powers were not thereby enlarged. The NATO Protocol was due for discussion today and he supposed that the committee would report to the Senate by next week, and that Senate action should take place before July 6.
MR. EDEN said that it looked to him as though the British would act during the last half of July and asked his assistants to find out more about when action could be expected by the German Constitutional Court.
MR. ROBERTS the read from a report of a conversation with Blankenhorn to the effect that the Bundestag will recess on July 22 and meet again at the end of August or the beginning of September.
MR. EDEN commented that the French position with respect to ratification was not too good. THE SECRETARY said that this was also his understanding.
AMBASSADOR JESSUP said that Adenauer was still hoping to push through ratification before the recess of the Bundestag. MR. ROBERTS added that Adenauer is now convinced that ratification would also have to go before the Bundesrat.
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THE SECRETARY, commenting on the Italian situation, said there was hoped that the Italians might act as early as September if the others acted early.
MR. EDEN pointed out, however, that the situation in Trieste enters into the Italian calculations.
THE SECRETARY then read from Mr. McCloy's telegram of the 21st with respect to the German ratification situation (Bonn's 3461 to the Department June 21, reptd London 952).
MR. EDEN then posed the question of the Western reply to the latest Soviet note on Germany and said that he agreed that we must concentrate on helping Adenauer and that therefore we should not say anything about a meeting which would embarrass him. In this connection he pointed out Blankenhorn had expressed the very strong opinion that the reply should be cast in such terms as to assure that no meeting would take place until after September.
THE SECRETARY said that he understood that Adenauer would not be upset if a meeting were held on the commission alone and would be concerned only if a meeting should also deal with the status of the German Government.
MR. EDEN said that he thought that we were not as far apart as we appeared to be. He noted that we both agreed that the first meeting should be limited to the commission alone and we both agreed not to withdraw our offer in our note of May 13. The difficulty was with the French position and he suspected that when Schuman arrived his hands would be tied pretty tight. He then raised the question whether it would be desirable to have US-UK agreement on the note in the absence of Schuman and queried AMBASSADOR FRANKS on this point. Ambassador Franks said he thought it was good to know each others minds but also good not to settle on any matters of detail.
THE SECRETARY said that he thought the main thing was to agree on what we want to accomplish by the note. He was prepared to agree that there was no objection to a meeting with the Russians limited to the question of the commission because he thought that the Russians at such a meeting would disclose that they were not prepared to give up East Germany. But he thought that the meeting should not get into the status of the German Government. If the status of the future German Government were on the agenda, the Germans would not ratify until the meetings were over. Moreover, the Russians might agree on a meeting to discuss an impartial commission but make it contingent on also including the status of the future German Government on the agenda and if we once got talking about the future German Government certain things
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would immediately become clear to the Germans. In the first place Article 7 of the general convention would be revealed to mean that a future all- German Government can accept the obligations of the treaty or not as it chooses and the second sentence of this article will show the Germans that they do not have to ratify the treaties if they do not want to. It would weaken our propaganda position if attention were directed to these provisions and interpreted in a manner which would become public. The foregoing, the Secretary said, was what he would like to argue to Schuman.
MR. EDEN said that he agreed, in particular with the first part of the Secretary's remarks, that the first meeting, if it were limited to an impartial commission alone, would help ratification with the Germans and perhaps also with the French. He said, however, that he was not keen on some of the argumentations in part of the United States text. He then concluded by suggesting that this was about as far as we can carry this discussion at the present time.
MR. EDEN suggested that we now turn to a review of the Berlin situation. On this subject he commented that the first round had not gone badly, that the only thing not settled at the moment was the matter of access by our patrols to the autobahn. He added that the British did not expect a major action in respect to Berlin by the Soviets.
THE SECRETARY said that this was also our view but we thought that over a period of time the situation in Berlin would get more and more difficult. He thought, therefore, that it was important to go ahead with the 12 month stockpile program, in particular with coal and other heavy items. He thought we also should go ahead with plans so that we could put an airlift in effect quickly. We were also advised by our military that we should get a better command structure, which now operates by a committee system with a rotating chairmanship. We should have something which we could put into effect in case of trouble.
MR. EDEN queried whether the Germans could afford a greatly increased stockpile, to which the SECRETARY replied that it was a staggered stockpile in the sense that it would be selective. MR. EDEN said this would be a very good idea if we could do it. THE SECRETARY said that it would involve no added expense to the US or the UK. MR. EDEN said he thought the plans were desirable. He understood the US could resume the airlift and the British believed they could do what had been done in 1939 but it would be bad if the Russians jammed our radar. THE SECRETARY said this was one reason why it was important to increase the stockpile so that we would not have to institute a round the clock airlift and thought we should keep on pushing the High Commissioners on this point. MR. EDEN commented that it was curious that the
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Russians had done nothing to divide their sector of Berlin from ours. THE SECRETARY said he thought we should be prepared in case of a blockage to reopen the UN case and also with retaliatory counter-measures against the Eastern zone to be carried out from the Western zones. He thought the High Commissioners should work out these plans with the Germans.
In response to the Secretary's question, MR. EDEN said that he had not seen CHUIKOV when he was in Berlin and asked the Secretary if he planned to see him. THE SECRETARY said he did not know, and mentioned that in 1949 Chuikov had to everyone's surprise, attended a reception there when invited.
MR. EDEN then suggested taking up the matter of the Saar.
MR. ROBERTS said that Adenauer had revived his former memorandum to raise the question of the Saar at Strasbourg. MR. EDEN said that this means we must act in this matter before the next Strasbourg meeting in mid- September. MR. ACHESON commented that the French may take some action in the meantime and in this connection he read from a telegram of the 23rd from Paris (Paris' 8024 to the Department, reptd London 2216 June 23). He said that in his opinion French action would be disastrous and that we should therefore urge Schuman not to take it. In addition we should be prepared to take joint action along the lines of our own program as soon as it looks as though the French were going to do something and that we should therefore go ahead on a bipartite basis in Washington. MR. EDEN commented that it would be lucky if we got the German ratification before the Strasbourg meeting and suggested that we mention the matter of the Saar privately to Schuman. THE SECRETARY agreed and thought it would be best not to put it on the agenda of our meetings with the French. AMBASSADOR JESSUP suggested that it could be brought into the discussion of German ratification.
MR. EDEN commented that our plan was final and that all it now needs is to work up a joint paper on it. THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Saar question should not be raised with Schuman while the other members of the French delegation were present.
TRIESTE
MR. EDEN asked Mr. Pierson Dixon to describe the Yugoslav attitude towards the resumption of direct Italo-Yugoslav negotiations for a settlement. SIR PIERSON said the Yugoslav attitude was still equivocal but on the basis of a talk he had with Ambassador Brilej on June 23rd it seemed certain that the Yugoslav Government (a) believed that any settlement must be one reached by direct negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia; (b) was not prepared to take the initiative; and (c) was ready and anxious for negotiations with the Italian Government to be resumed.
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THE SECRETARY then referred to the memorandum presented to the Department by Ambassador Terchiani on June 11th, which stated that the Italian Government was ready to resume negotiations with the Yugoslav Government provided that during the course of such discussions the Yugoslavs (a) maintained secrecy and (b) did not change the de facto and de jure situation in Zone B and did not persecute the Italian minority.
MR EDEN said that both the Italians and the Yugoslavs seem genuinely to desire to reach an agreed solution to the Trieste problem and appear to accept the ethnic principle. The Italians have been insistent that the line should be "continuous and contiguous"; the Yugoslavs do not insist on it being "continuous".
MR. EDEN asked whether it would be desirable to have Italy and Yugoslavia begin direct discussions and added that he thought the chances of bilateral agreement were sufficient to justify US-UK action in stimulating negotiation.
THE SECRETARY said that he agreed but that he had some doubt that Italy and Yugoslavia could reach agreement alone. He said he thought that the US and UK would have to take part either in the actual talks or offer assistance on the side. THE SECRETARY said he thought it would be difficult to have the talks started merely on the basis of principles and said he believed the sooner that both sides begin to discuss lines on a map, the better. He said he understood the Italians might be ready to settle on a line south of Pirano.
THE SECRETARY and MR. EDEN agreed that Mr. De Gasperi was eager for a settlement as soon as possible. (MR. EDEN reported parenthetically that he had been invited to visit Tito in Yugoslavia in September apparently with a view to improving relations between the UK and Yugoslavia). MR. EDEN said that he thought the Trieste problem would become more difficult to solve as time when on. He referred to the British desire to withdraw their troops from Trieste.
MR. EDEN asked whether, to get the talks started, there might be any advantage in a joint approach by the Secretary and himself to the Italian and Yugoslav Ambassadors in London. THE SECRETARY observed that it would be extremely difficult to keep secret the fact of such a meeting with the two Ambassadors. MR. EDEN suggested instead that a communication be sent to the Italian and Yugoslav Governments urging them to get on with the talks. MR. PERKINS said that Italy had broken off the talks and should take the initiative in resuming them; he added that in a recent conversation with Ambassador Tarchiani the latter had agreed to the necessity for Italian initiative.
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After further discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a joint approach, MR. EDEN suggested that a US-UK note be sent to the Yugoslav and Italian Governments stating that the US and UK understood both countries were ready to talk, that the US and UK stood ready to help, and if the Italians and Yugoslavs wished to open negotiations in London, U-UK good offices were available.
THE SECRETARY suggested that the note state that the US and UK believe the time has come to settle the Trieste problem and suggest that the Italian and Yugoslav Governments authorize talks wherever they wish. The US and UK could then suggest to the Italian Government that it send a note to the Yugoslav Government proposing discussions be reopened. THE SECRETARY added that the note to both Governments should stress that the talks should be secret and that subsequently no action be taken in Zone A or B which would upset their progress. THE SECRETARY suggested that the note also state that US and UK have discussed the matter and have some ideas which might be helpful. If the talks were held here, THE SECRETARY suggested that Mr. Eden be authorized to talk for both countries; if held elsewhere, an appropriate individual would be authorized to speak.
MR. EDEN pointed out that it would probably be desirable or necessary to tell the Yugoslavs that the Italians had been prompted to send a note to Belgrade suggesting a reopening of negotiations. THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Italians could not put further conditions in their note without making it impossible for the talks to take place; he suggested that any such conditions be put forward by the US and UK.
THE SECRETARY and MR. EDEN accordingly agreed that a note should be drafted along the following lines: that (a) prompt settlement of the Trieste problem is urgently required; and (b) the US and UK are glad to note that the Italian and Yugoslav Governments appear ready to resume direct negotiations on the basis of an ethnic line and hope that such negotiations can begin immediately; (c) in the interests of reaching agreement these talks should be strictly secret and during their course no action should be taken in Zone A or B which might upset their progress; (d) the talks should take place wherever the Italians and Yugoslavs deemed best; and (e) the US and UK Governments stood ready to offer their good offices if requested. This note when approved would be delivered by the US and UK Ambassadors in Belgrade and Rome. The Ambassadors in Rome would suggest that the Italian Government take the initiative in reopening the talks without putting forward conditions to resumption; the Yugoslav Government would not be informed that the Italians had been so prompted. Mr. Perkins was designated for the US and Mr. Harrison for the UK to prepare a draft of the joint note.
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MR. EDEN asked what should be done if the discussions broke down. He was told that this was being discussed in Washington.
The question of French participation was discussed. MR. EDEN said he gathered that the French were not anxious to take a direct part in the settlement but would wish to be associated in some way with the effort to obtain a resumption of negotiations. It was therefore agreed that Mr. Schuman would be informed privately on Friday of the conclusions reached at this morning's meeting.
EGYPT
MR. EDEN referred to the conversations which recently took place in Alexandria between representatives of the Mahdi and Egyptian Government. He said that these discussions were now in a deadlock over the question of the recognition of the King's title. There had recently been an optimistic account in the London Times of the Sudanese attitude on this question but this optimism was not warranted. The indications are that the Sudanese are not prepared to accept the title and this raises the question of what the British should do next. As long as the Sudanese and Egyptian Governments were talking, the British had wanted to remain quiet. He did not want to say anything definite to the Egyptian Government at this time about the 3 alternative texts which had been presented to him by Amr. He was thinking instead of referring to the draft constitution for the Sudan which the Sudan Government has submitted to the Co-domini and of suggesting that the two Governments discuss the matter to see if they can decide on how the question of the constitution could be handled. The object of the discussions would be to try to reach agreement on the question of the constitution and not to handle the question of the title. He hoped that such talks might help to narrow the gap. He thought that Hilali had done a courageous thing in inviting the Sudanese to Cairo, but he did not think that there had ever been any possibility of the Sudanese accepting the title. The main accomplishment of the conversations has been to bring a note of realism into relations between Egypt and the Sudan. The difficulty is, however, that no Egyptian Government can dare agree to anything which does not settle the question of the title. It is a matter of importance that there should be close and friendly relations between the 2 peoples in view of their proximity and their joint interest in the Nile. They Egyptians appear to want to find some way of regaining their legal rights in the Sudan. Legally they have no leg to stand on as a result of their denunciation of the 1899 Agreement.
MR. ACHESON said that if it is true that some settlement of the problem of the King's title is necessary to solve the Anglo-Egyptian problem, what happens next? We seem to be in a circle.
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MR. EDEN said that there is a time element involved. If the British can get the Egyptians to sit down and discuss the constitutional problem, it will be possible to hold elections in the Sudan by autumn. It has always been the question of the interim period about which the British have differed with the Egyptians. The elections will result in a wholly Sudanese Assembly. To that Assembly could be put the question of whether the Sudanese wish to recognize the King's title. Mr. Eden doubted that Hilali intended to consult with other parties in the Sudan. He seemed to think that if SAR accepted the title, the others would fall in line. The British did not agree that this would be the case. They would like to encourage the Egyptians to consult with other parties and segments of Sudanese opinion and persuade them that the question of the King's title should be put to the new Sudanese Assembly.
MR. ACHESON asked what the limits of the interim period were.
SIR JAMES BOWKER said that the period involved is from now until the Sudanese decide on their own status. This might be an extended period of time.
SIR OLIVER FRANKS explained that what the British want is to see a sovereign representative body taking the decision.
MR. NITZE asked if there was any agreed British view as to what decision they would like to see the Assembly take. Do they hope it would or would not recognize the King's title?
SIR ROBERT HOWE entered the room at this point and was asked by MR. EDEN to explain about the legislature which would be set up in the Sudan under the new constitution. Sir Robert said that it would consist of 2 chambers, a Senate and a House of Representatives. In internal matters, the legislature would have "more or less complete powers". Certain functions are reserved to the Governor General, notably Foreign affairs, the Southern Provinces and the Civil Service. The Governor General is empowered to suspend the constitution if there is a breakdown in constitutional processes, imminent financial bankruptcy or a breakdown in law and order.
MR. ACHESON asked if this were the final constitutional act for the Sudan.
SIR ROBERT HOWE said that it was not. The final act was reserved until later. He recalled that Mr. Eden had stated publicly that HMG looks forward to the Sudanese achieving full self-Government by the end of 1952 and thereafter taking steps looking toward self-determination.
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MR. EDEN asked how long this interim period is going to run. It seemed to him to be stretching longer and longer. Would the representative assembly pronounce on the question of the King's title during the interim period?
SIR ROBERT HOWE said that it was the only body competent to do so.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON expressed the hope that the Egyptians could be persuaded to cooperate in the steps leading toward self-government and self- determination.
MR. ACHESON asked how the Egyptians were likely to react.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON doubted that they would be brave enough to accept an invitation to discuss the constitution. They don't like the constitution and they will undoubtedly take the line that the Egyptian constitution is better. What the British must do is to give the Egyptians a chance to participate and to urge them to assist in bringing the Sudan to self- government.
MR. ACHESON asked whether, assuming that the Egyptians agree to participate in the conversations on the constitution, they would agree to the title being put to the Sudan Assembly.
SIR RALPH thought it would be very hard for them to do so publicly. The present Government cannot identify itself with such consultations. The talks between the Egyptians and the Sudanese have been a big step forward and it is for this reason that the British Government has been encouraging them. The more Sudanese groups which talk to the Egyptians the better.
MR. ACHESON asked what the British thought the probable decision of the Assembly would be.
SIR ROBERT HOWE thought that if the Assembly were composed as the result of free elections, the chances were pretty much against Sudanese acceptance of the title. Almost all the tribes would be opposed, as would the South. The political parties would be divided almost equally.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said that the Sudanese kept asking in Alexandria why the Egyptians attach so much importance to this question of the King's title. They seemed to feel that if it were so important to them, they must have something more in mind than titular sovereignty.
MR. EDEN said that for a long time the British had not known what the outcome of the conversations in Alexandria had been. Since the return of the Sudanese delegation to Khartoum, however, it had become quite apparent that they would not accept the title.
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MR. ACHESON asked if the trend in the Sudan were adverse to the Egyptian aspirations.
MR. EDEN said that he felt that only insofar as the question of the title were concerned.
SIR ROBERT HOWE agreed and said the Sudanese recognized the need for close and friendly relations with Egypt.
MR. ACHESON asked what happens next in Egypt if there is no solution to this problem.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said that he doubted that the government could survive beyond autumn. A caretaker Government would then probably take over, headed perhaps by Sidky or Maraghi. He did not think that this would in itself bring about a deterioration of the situation, since he did not think that any Government would risk a reoccurrence of the January 26 riots merely for the sake of the title. He felt that the situation would remain fairly stable, particularly if the British make constructive suggestions.
MR. ACHESON asked if the Wafd would be likely to come back in power if elections were held.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said that it depended on how they were rigged. He recalled that at the time of the last elections, Sidky had helped the Wafd return to power. He did not think that Sidky would make the same mistake again.
MR. EDEN reverted to the question of conversations with the Egyptians. If the Egyptians could be persuaded to come in and to cooperate in working out the remaining constitutional steps in the Sudan, then they could talk about the holding of fair elections in the Sudan preparatory to putting the question of the King's title to the Sudanese Assembly. He hoped that the US would find it possible to help in persuading the Egyptians. It seemed only sensible that since the constitution had been sent to both Co-Domini for comment, they should consult regarding their reactions.
MR. ACHESON asked what the situation would be if the Egyptians did not accept the Sudanese constitution.
MR. EDEN said that the present constitution permits the new constitution to be put into effect within 6 months unless both Co-Domini signify their
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disapproval of it. He went on to say that the British had also been thinking of the possibility of a supervisory election body to assure free elections to the Assembly. Such a body might consist of representatives of the UK, Egypt and the Sudan with a neutral chairman. He asked SIR RALPH STEVENSON what he thought the chances were of getting the Egyptians to agree to participate.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON doubted that the Egyptians would accept such a proposal. In many respects, the Egyptians are prisoners of their own tactics. He nevertheless thought it was worth trying.
In reply to MR. EDEN'S question, SIR ROBERT HOWE thought that the Sudanese would agree to participate in an election supervisory body. He went on to say that he understood that in the conversations between the Egyptians and the Sudanese in Alexandria, Hilali had said that he wished to recover Egypt's legal position in the Sudan from which Egypt had barred itself by its termination of the 1899 Agreement.
MR. EDEN said that he wanted to make it clear that the Sudanese feeling against the acceptance of the King's title was not the result of any doing of the UK. The UK had been trying to encourage a meeting of the minds between the Egyptians and the Sudanese and there would have been no conversation in Alexandria unless the UK had urged the Sudanese to go.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said that there was profound distrust on both sides between the Sudanese and the Egyptians.
MR. EDEN said that the Sudanese also look at L22 million surplus which they have in their treasury and ask why they should share this with an Egypt which is on the verge of bankruptcy.
MR. ACHESON asked whether the British thought that the situation would not deteriorate in the fall.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said he did not think it would. The police were being strengthened by the anti-riot equipment which was being furnished by the US. If there were simultaneous risings all over Egypt, it might be beyond the Government's control but he did not think that this was a likely possibility. He thought any caretaker government would probably concentrate heavily on the problem of the redistribution of land, thereby diverting attention from the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
MR. ACHESON said that if the Egyptians could deal with disturbances with their own forces, it would be better than the British doing it.
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SIR RALPH STEVENSON agreed. It was difficult to foresee the end of the use of British forces in such circumstances. There are a quarter of a million foreigners in Egypt. Protection of this large number creates a frightful problem. It would not be possible for the military forces to bob into the Delta and bob right back out again. However, even the mere knowledge that the British were prepared to take such action in the event of necessity is a deterrent to trouble.
MR. ACHESON said that the use of British forces in the Delta would have consequences in the rest of the Middle East which would be incalculable.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said that there was no question of the use of such forces unless the situation were out of control or unless such forces were asked for by the King or Egyptian Government. He did not think that there was much possibility of the latter. The King had told him after the January 26 riots that he would never ask for British troops because it would brand him as a quisling, but that if the situation ever got beyond his control he would let Stevenson know.
MR. EDEN thought that it was not likely that the situation would get out of control and SIR RALPH STEVENSON agreed, adding that he thought that January 26th had taught the Egyptians a lesson.
It was decided to adjourn the meeting and to take up Egypt at the beginning of the afternoon session.