TEL CONV-1
July 14, 1952
MINISTERIAL MEETINGS IN LONDON, JUNE 1952
Conference of Her Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East Attended by
Secretary Acheson
3:00 P.M. Tuesday, June 24, 1952 Foreign Office, London
Present:
United States:
Secretary Acheson Ambassador Gifford Mr. Palmer
United Kingdom:
Mr. Eden Sir William Strang Sir Ralph Stevenson Lord Reading Sir Robert Howe Sir Roger Maldus Sir John Troutbeck Sir Pierson Dixon Sir Knox Helm Sir James Bowker Sir Rupert Hay Mr. J. Nicholla Sir Francis Evans Mr. Shuckbragh Sir Thomas Rapp Mr. R. Allen Mr. Chapman-Andrews Mr. Ross Mr. Montagu-Pollock Mr. A. Malcolm Mr. Pelham Mr. Gandy Mr. Furlonge Mr. Middleton
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Mr. Eden, in welcoming Mr. Acheson, said that he was pleased to be able to repeat now what had been said earlier on, that British and United States policy in the Middle East must be closely aligned together. He then invited Sir James Bowker to summarize the conclusions of the Conference up- to-date.
2. Sir James Bowker said that, as Mr. Acheson would know, it had been an established practice to call a conference of our Representatives in the Middle East from time to time and the present Conference was the third in the series. We understood that the United States followed a similar practice, though their Conferences were generally held somewhere in the Middle East itself. It had been decided to hold this Conference here in order to give the Secretary of State the opportunity of meeting the Representatives and of presiding at some of their meetings.
3. The area under consideration at the Conference had been more restricted than what the Americans understood by the Near East, and only covered the territory from Egypt to Persia inclusive. The discussions had covered the whole range of Middle Eastern problems, including the main objectives of British policy in the Middle East, nationalism and Communism in the area, relations between Israel and the Arab States, the aspirations of the Arab States to greater unity among themselves and their dissensions. It was, of course, impossible to study these problems exhaustively or reach solutions on them in so short a time. The object had been to give the Secretary of State an up-to-date picture of the situation in each of the countries covered, and to gather the views of Her Majesty's representatives on the problems which were general to the whole area. It had been possible to reach some agreed views and to make recommendations which should prove helpful.
4. Summarizing the Conference's main conclusions, Sir James Bowker said that we should be realistic in our approach to Middle Eastern problems and we should not oppose or appear to oppose the normal and healthy currents of national development in the area. We should, however, try to direct them into constructive channels and be ready to exploit any occasion for improvement. We should be clear about our objectives and resolute in taking the necessary action at the right time. The Conference had stressed the vital necessity of the closest possible co-operation with the United States and other Western Powers in dealing with problems of the Middle East. Sir Ralph Stevenson, speaking on behalf of himself and his colleagues, emphasized that all were convinced of the absolute necessity for the closest co-operation between British and United States representatives in the field. Such co-operation was happily a fact. We could not expect to avoid differences of opinion but these were always in regard to method and did not affect our basic aims. Any such differences should be known to the two governments and, if they could not be solved in the field, referred home for solution at a higher level. It was important, however, that the Middle East Governments themselves should not know these differences existed, for that gave them a wonderful chance to play one
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Western Government off against another. He would like to conclude by saying that the days of exclusive spheres of influence were over, and the Western Powers must stick together if they were to achieve their common objectives.
5. Sir Thomas Rapp spoke of economic affairs in the Middle East and the British interest in them. He had under him a staff of ten Economic Advisers who were always at the disposal of the Middle East governments and had accomplished several hundreds of useful assignments. If the results had not always been what was hoped, it was because nothing in the Middle East could be hurried and because of the general lack of organizational and administrative ability, and the absence of financial resources for capital development. The British Middle East Office had, by this process, accumulated a large body of experience and had reaches several conclusions:
(a) Economic development was necessary for the stability of the area and its orderly political evolution.
(b) The Middle Eastern States could not undertake it by themselves. They needed help and we must carefully consider the best ways of giving it.
(c) Only in the context of economic development could certain political problems be solved, especially that of the Palestine refugees. These could be properly resettled only in one country � Syria � and if we failed, their whole future would be in jeopardy and also the peaceful evolution of the Middle East. Even a high price paid to Syria for this purpose would be a commercial proposition
6. Sir Thomas Rapp suggested that Middle Eastern countries could be divided into two categories:
(1) Those whose resources were sufficient for their development. We should not wish to see assistance diverted to those countries unless lit was paid for.
(2) Those without resources of their own, such as Syria, Jordan and the Lebanon. We hoped that the International Bank would do the most it could for them in accordance with its principles. We were glad to hear that the Bank was starting up in Syria and Iraq.
7. He added that we regarded the establishment of Development Boards as a solution which provided the best framework for equality in partnership between the Middle Eastern governments and outside agencies who were giving them assistance. These Boards, on which outside agencies could be, and were, represented, prevented overlapping and competition between different agencies. These boards had already shown themselves a success in Iraq and Jordan. The B.M.E.O., he went on, had always had as one of its principal aims co-operation with United States Agencies, as witness the B.M.E.O.'s recent move to Beirut to be near the headquarters of the United States Technical Co-operation Administration and the United Nations Agencies. All the B.M.E.O.'s experience was unreservedly at United States disposal, and he had had the most friendly response from Mr. Locke and his American colleagues.
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8. He concluded by saying that co-operation between the United States and the United Kingdom in this field was now an established fact, and it was only by such co-operation that we could achieve our common objectives in the economic field.
9. Speaking in his capacity as a member of the British Division of the Co- ordination Committee for the Middle East, he stated that the British Commanders-in-Chief for the Middle East had heard with pleasure of the proposal for the early establishment of a Middle East defense organization, which they regarded as the only means of solving the area's defense problems.
10. Mr. Acheson said it was a pleasure and an honor for him to meet Her Majesty's Representatives. He felt, he said, great sympathy with the Representatives, for nowhere in the world did problems seem so insoluble as in the Middle East. These problems were common to the United States and the United Kingdom, and included the corruption and inefficiency of government, the ignorance of the masses, the fervid nationalism which could so easily be used to divert attention from social problems at home, and the plight of the intellectuals frustrated of an outlet for their ability. Insofar as the West had helped to form these intellectuals it had contributed the creation of this problem. The Middle East, Mr. Acheson said, was a vital area whose breakdown would have a world-wide effect, and it presented a direct challenge to our imagination and ingenuity. The United States were political newcomers there, though they did have some long-standing experience of this area in other fields, such as missionary and educational work. The Middle East also presented the United States with some peculiar domestic difficulties. He remarked with a smile that the United States public habitually believed that everything done by the United States government in the Middle East was wrong: United States opinion tended to believe that any country aspiring to independence and claiming to be oppressed by another must be in the right. The United States public also believed that such countries approached their problems with a self-reliance and good sense which they often did not, in fact, possess. He instanced the difficulties he and the President had in their backing of the French Government over Tunisia. They had received no support at all in the United States for this attitude. The French, he went on, admittedly had their difficulties in North Africa, but this was not a problem which would be met by pretending it did not exist, or refusing to discuss it with the United Nations. A positive programme by the French was required, and a bad positive programme would be better than nothing; it would make possible United States support for the French, and help the United States government to overcome opposition from the United States public: and United States press and publicity media had a great influence in the countries concerned. He stressed the importance of Joint appraisals by British and United States Missions abroad, such as those made recently in Persia and Egypt. It was most important that facts should be stated frankly and in identical terms to both Governments. Mr. Acheson concluded by once more expressing his sympathy with those who represented their country in what he described as "the world's worst spot."
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11. Mr. Eden, in thanking Mr. Acheson for his words, said that in the long view he was not too depressed about the Middle East. We were going through a period of difficult adjustment difficult for us because we had to adapt ourselves to a basis of full equality with Middle Eastern countries to whom we had been, in the past, in a tutelary position, and difficult for them because they, on their side, must produce honest and efficient government. He instanced the progress made by Iraq since the Mandate. We must hope that similar progress would be achieved elsewhere. We could not expect gratitude from the Middle East, but we could hope that our efforts would produce some effect.
FOREIGN OFFICE S.W.1
1st July, 1952