July 14, 1952
MINISTERIAL TALKS IN LONDON, JUNE , 1952
SUMMARY MINUTES
3:30 P.M. - 4:30 P.M., Tuesday, June 24, 1952 British Foreign Office
PRESENT:
UNITED KINGDOM UNITED STATES
Mr. Eden Secretary Acheson Sir William Strang Ambassador Gifford Ambassador Stevenson Ambassador Jessup Sir Oliver Franks Mr. Perkins Sir Robert Howe Mr. Nitze Sir James Bowker Mr. Battle Sir Pierson Dixon Miss Kirkpatrick Mr. Roger Allen Mr. Palmer
CONTENTS PAGE
1. Egypt 2 2. Iran 6
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Security Information (?)
MR. EDEN reverted to Mr. Nitze's question in the morning session asking what decision the British would like to see emerge from the Sudan Assembly. He felt that when the Assembly met, it should express its opinion regarding the relationship of the Sudan to the Crown of Egypt. The answer which emerged might not be the answer the British want, but at least they would know where they stood.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON was doubtful that the Egyptians would agree to putting the title to the assembly but felt they should be encouraged to cooperate.
MR. EDEN said that he felt that it was necessary to throw the question into the Assembly and to encourage the Sudanese to give as close an approximation as possible of what the Egyptians want.
MR. ACHESON said that our interest in the problem derived from its effect on the peace and stability of the Middle East. We have no mission except to help the UK bring about a settlement. We are very disturbed that if the problem continues and talks break down, there will be serious trouble in Egypt which will spread to North Africa and the rest of the Middle East. We all hope this won't happen, but it might. He felt that a positive approach must be taken to the problem rather than simply encouraging the Sudanese to express their uninhibited views. It is hazardous to leave such an important decision in their inexperienced hands. He felt that anything which could be done should be done to guide them in making a responsible decision. He noted that the British were contemplating encouraging and broadening the consultations between the Egyptians and the Sudanese and also that they were thinking of the possibility of bilateral talks between the UK and Egypt on the question of the constitution. He wondered whether there was not a possibility of merging these two ideas and the discussions would then become three-power talks. He felt that everything possible should be done to bridge over this problem of the interim period. If a positive program could be developed we would be glad to pitch in and help. He wondered if there were not a program which would move more in the direction of a settlement than simply leaving the matter to the decision of the Sudanese.
MR. EDEN asked his advisers whether it would be possible to expand the discussions in this way.
SIR ROBERT HOWE said that he thought it would be difficult to obtain the united Sudanese voice. The only satisfactory way of doing so is through the Sudanese Assembly. Other means have been tried, but they have always been unsuccessful.
MR. EDEN wondered whether it would not be possible to work through the same body of Sudanese with which the Constitution was discussed.
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SIR ROBERT HOWE thought that the Sudan Administration could reconstitute the Constitutional Committee. This had consisted of two members of each of the political parties with a British Chairman and a British Secretary. He doubted however that the Sudanese would agree to discuss the question of the Constitution in a three power forum. They would undoubtedly take the line that they are perfectly satisfied with the Constitution as it stands and that they do not want to see any changes made.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON did not think that the Egyptians would be likely to agree to such a procedure unless there were prior recognition of the King's title through an agreed formula.
SIR ROBERT HOWE asked whether it would not be possible to suggest to Hilali that be put forward the Egyptian views regarding the Constitution for the Sudan and then try to marry the two approaches.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said that the main difficulty is the fundamental one of getting the talks started _____ recognition.
SIR JAMES BOWER pointed out that the Egyptian decree regarding the Constitution for the Sudan was not a detailed Constitution but only a statement of certain basic principles.
MR. EDEN thought that an offer to discern the whole question could be attractive to the Egyptians.
MR. ACHESON said that if it were not for the problem of the title, the British might say to the Egyptians "here is a constitutional proposal for the Sudan which has been submitted to both of us. Now let's discuss it. Afterwards we can discuss it with the body which drew it up. Since the whole question of the title is tied up in this problem, could we not discuss that at the same time?" Meanwhile the British could try to persuade the Sudanese to take a more forthcoming point of view with respect to the Title.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON said that the British had tried before to persuade Hilali to negotiate without a formula, but he continues to insist on one involving recognition.
MR. ACHESON suggested that perhaps it might be well not the mention specifically that the question of the title would be discussed.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON felt that the Egyptians were nevertheless certain to insist on a formula.
MR. ACHESON asked whether, irrespective of the possibility of a blow-up in Egypt, the end of the road is not that the Egyptians lose the Sudan and the British lose their base at Suez.
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SIR RALPH said the he would not go that far. For a long time the Egyptians have not taken an active interest in Sudan. Nevertheless, their officials still continue to occupy their positions and the Egyptian flag still flies side by side with the British. He thought this state of affairs could go on for some time and that there would not be an abrupt break.
MR. ACHESON thought that there was a point beyond which this could not go.
MR. EDEN said that of the three formulae which Hilali had sent him through Amr, the third was not very far away from what the British might be able to accept.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON recalled that the British wanted to add the words "provided the Sudanese agree" to the portion of the formula which referred to Farouk's use of the title.
MR. GIFFORD recalled that the British had insisted on adding this phrase because the Egyptians had made it clear that they would interpret the formula as meaning the British recognition of the title. He seemed to recall that if it had not been for this interpretation, the Foreign Office felt that is could have accepted the wording.
MR. EDEN confirmed that this had been the case. He felt that the British should leave the question of a formula in cold storage as long as possible.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON agreed, pointing out that the Egyptians are almost certain to interpret the formula as meaning recognition. At the same time, they will not agree to consultations with the Sudanese. They take the line that the British pledges to the Sudanese have nothing to do with them and that they were made improperly, since the British had no right to give them such pledges without consent of the Egyptians in view of their position as a co-domimus. He added that the Egyptians have not gone so far as to say that they will not talk unless the British recognize the title, but they have made it clear that recognition must emerge from the negotiations.
MR. NITZE thought that it might be easier to get the Egyptians to change their interpretation on the formula. As an alternative, the British might try to persuade the Egyptians to enter discussions by undertaking to do their best to create the necessary pre-conditions for eventual Sudanese acceptance of the title.
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MR. EDEN said that it was necessary to be very careful about this matter and that the British could not use pressure toward this end. He could not say he would try to persuade the Sudanese to accept Egyptian rule.
SIR JAMES BOWKER said that the use of pressure would have a bad effect both in the United Kingdom and in the Sudan. It might, in fact, have exactly the opposite effect in the Sudan from what it would be hoped to achieve.
SIR ROBERT HOWE said that the Sudan administration had always given the Sudanese a free opportunity to express their views on the King's title. The Sudanese asked, however, why should they accept the title. They have nothing to gain from it and are already well along the path toward deciding their own future. They have great contempt for the Egyptians and do not forget that it was the Mahdi's father who threw the Egyptians out of Sudan. It was a great accomplishment to get the Mahdi to send his representative to Alexandria in view all of this.
MR. EDEN said, and MR.ACHESON agreed, that it was important to get the Egyptians working with the UK in the Sudan.
MR. EDEN indicated he felt that perhaps the draft communication to the Egyptian Government could be improved on. He wondered if it would be well to try to get Mr. Caffery to support it with the Egyptians.
SIR RALPH STEVENSON seemed doubtful and pointed out that it was only intended as an interim reply.
SIR JAMES BOWKER said that what the British want to do is to get the talks going with the Egyptians on the question of the Constitution. He did not have in mind negotiations, but simply talks. The British were encouraged by the conversations which SAR's representatives had had with the Egyptians. He thought they might have opened the eyes of both parties to the fact that the question of the title is not a simple one. Conversations between the British and the Egyptians might, however, lead to a new agreement setting forth anew the relationship between the two powers, and in this way fill the legal void brought about by the Egyptians termination of the 1899 Agreement.
MR. EDEN said that the Foreign Office would re-draft its statement and give it to the Secretary before Thursday's meeting in order that he might examine it and see whether he thought that it was something which the United States Government could support.
MR. ACHESON agreed to the procedure.
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IRAN
MR. EDEN said that the UK was now inclined to favor long-term settlement of the Iranian oil question. He felt that this could best be achieved through a Management Agency under contract to NICC, AIOC, under a changed name, would be the sole purchaser. There remained the question of whether the Management Agency should be composed of oil companies or should assume the UK would like to have British representation in the company. In any event, the UK would like to have British representation in the company, though this might not necessarily be AIOC. If it appears impossible to obtain a long-term settlement, then the British would favor resuming the attempt for an interim management.
SIR ROGER MAKINS said that a plan was now being worked out within the foregoing framework to have in readiness in the event there was a change of government in Iran. The tactical approach would have to be worked out when the nature of this change in Government were known. The details of the arrangement would be the subject of negotiations. The UK has no preconceived ideas on price. It is inclined to feel that it would be unwise to follow the compensation route, since this appears to be a blind alley. The present thinking is that compensation should be regarded as an element in a total settlement and not as a separate item.
MR. ACHESON said that is appeared to him that the main problems would be participation in the management company, price, compensation and technicians.
SIR ROGER MAKINS said that he felt the relationship of the Management Agency to the Iranian Government would be the most difficult problem to solve.
MR. EDEN did not think that great difficulties would be encountered in organizing the Management Agency. On the question of technicians, the UK would not want British nationals to be excluded.
MR. MIDDLETON thought that the Iranians would probably accept some British technicians. There are no great feelings against British technicians who work side by side with Iranians in their shirt sleeves. Most of the Iranian resentment against AIOC employees was directed toward the white collar workers.
MR. NITZE said that we had talked some time ago to American companies about the possibility of their making technicians available in the event that it were necessary for the success of the interim management which was then being considered. From these conversations, he felt that American companies would be willing to cooperate by making technicians available, but that they would prefer to do so through some existing Management Agency rather than by direct participation themselves in such an arrangement.
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SIR ROGER MAKINS said the Agency must have sufficient independence to assure efficiency and to ensure the purchaser for the availability of cargoes. This would seem to necessitate the direct participation of oil companies. There was, moreover, the principle of British participation.
MR. NITZE said that we had thought that the British participation might be financial rather that by the utilization of British personnel.
SIR ROGER MAKINS felt that the problem of the Agency's fee would also present difficulties. MR. NITZE agreed.
MR. EDEN felt that from the standpoint of Anglo-American relations, the Agency should not be an American company. He thought that the composition of the Agency should be "neutral" or "mixed".
MR. ACHESON said he was not clear as to whether the British intended to create a new company to act as the managing agents or to utilize an existing firm in the field.
SIR ROGER MAKINS replied that the thought was that a new one would be created.
MR. NITZE said that we had had in mind that possibility of utilizing an existing specialized firm such as Bechtel or Kellog, rather than oil companies.
MR. MIDDLETON reverted to Mr. Eden's comment that the company should not be American. He felt this would also be dangerous from an Iranian point of view. If it were either British or American, any new Government would be laid open to charges that they had sold out to the imperialists.
THE SECRETARY suggested consideration might be given to the idea that several companies say an American, a British, and a Belgian might form a new group in which each would take a share.
MR. NITZE referred to the Six Companies which had handled the work on Boulder Dam.
It was agreed that SIR ROGER MAKINS and MR. NITZE should pursue the Iranian question further.