July 14, 1952
MINISTERIAL TALKS IN LONDON, JUNE 1952
SUMMARY MINUTES
3:00 - 4:30 P.M., Thursday, June 25, 1952 British Foreign Office
PRESENT:
United Kingdom UNITED STATES
Mr. Eden Secretary Acheson Mr. Selwyn-Lloyd Ambassador Gifford Sir William Strang Ambassador Jessup Sir Pierson Dixon Mr. Nash Sir Roger Makins Mr. Perkins Sir James Bowker Mr. Nitze Mr. Scott Mr. Battle Mr. Lloyd Hood Miss Kirkpatrick Mr. Ross Mr. Ringwalt Mr. Allen Mr. Palmer Mr. Shankirugh
CONTENTS Page 1. MEDO 2 2. Indochina 5 3. Korea 6
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MR. EDEN said that he thought we were pretty much agreed on the general lines which the MEDO should take, but there remained the question of how we should proceed in setting it up. The UK had thought until recently that the Arabs should be invited soon to join the organization. The British Chiefs of Middle Eastern Missions at their recent meeting, however, had reached the conclusion that it was doubtful that the Arabs would reply favorably to an invitation. The Chiefs of Mission thought, therefore, that there might be something to be said for the 7 powers going ahead and setting up the organization. If any of the Arabs then wanted to come in, they would be welcome. The British Chiefs of Mission felt that the thing to avoid was confronting the Arabs with an invitation, which would necessitate their making a decision. This would probably result in a refusal and make later acceptance more difficult. He thought it might be possible that some of the Arab States would be willing to join if they saw a going organization and asked Sir James Bowker whether there was any recent indication of Nuri's attitude.
SIR JAMES BOWKER replied that the British thought that Nuri was anxious to go ahead with plans for the defense of the Middle East, but that he always harked back to his suggestions for making the Arab League Collective Security Pact the nucleus for the area's defense arrangements. Nuri was constantly coming up with new ideas, and it was hard to tell where he stood at the present.
MR. ACHESON said that he felt that the US and the UK were not far apart on MEDO. He thought that the best procedure was to try to work out the remaining differences between the UK and the US, following which the French, Turks and Dominions would be approached. When the lines of the organization had been agreed among these 7, we could then take quiet soundings from the Arab States to see how they stand. If they are not willing to join now, we might then go ahead and set up the organization. He agreed we should not issue formal invitations now. Regarding MEDO itself, the US has in mind a looser organization than the British paper envisages. For example, instead of a steering group, we suggest an ad hoc group outside the organization chart. The group we suggest, an ad hoc would be to coordinate the views of the 4 Western Powers and to provide liaison with NATO. We also envisage a Military Representatives Committee composed of everyone who wants to join the organization. This would probably not meet more than 2 or 3 times a year and would have a rotating chairman. Underneath the MRC, there would be a small Planning Group under a British chairman. We feel that SACME should not be designated until the organization's military capabilities have been developed. At that time, the whole structure might be changed and the chairman of the planning group might become SACME or SACME designate.
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SIR PEARSON DIXON asked whether we felt the organization should still be set up if the results of our soundings with the Arab States were negative. The British Chiefs of Mission had thought that the Arabs might be more attracted if they saw a going concern.
MR. ACHESON said that we were still not entirely clear on this. There were some in the US Government who felt that we should not go ahead if there appeared to be no possibility of persuading the Arabs to join. There was another school, however, with which he intended to agree, which felt that if the attitude of the Arab State was merely shy, it might be best to go ahead. If on the other hand, they showed themselves to be hostile, we might wish to reconsider. He felt that the decision depended largely on the nature of the Arab reply and also on the march of events between not and the time that their reply is elicited.
SIR PIERSON DIXON asked how we envisaged the planning group operating and whether we intended that its chairman would appear to be the head of MEDO.
MR. ACHESON replied that he thought it would be wiser to have the MRC as head of the organization. The real work would be done, however, by a small planning group headed by a Britisher. He noted that the original British paper had set the organization up along staff lines. He thought that was unwise and that it should be set up more as a strategic planning committee. It would be up to the British to decide whom they wished to designate as chairman of the planning group. The chairman would set up his various sections and the recommendations which were worked out by his group would be placed before the MRC.
SIR PEARSON DIXON said that the British had thought that there was on advantage in progressing further at this time toward a more formal command structure. They had therefore deliberately organized it along staff lines. They felt that this would give a greater appearance of strength to the Arab States and might therefore be more attractive to them.
MR. ACHESON indicated that he felt that this was a debatable point. We thought that there was probably more prospect of attracting the Arabs id the organizational structure were not frozen.
MR. NITZE added that we felt it was desirable to maintain flexibility. He stressed the importance which we attached to getting the Arabs into the organization. If we were looking toward a forward defense of the area, we need Arab cooperation. He thought our whole approach to the organization should be such as to maximize the prospects to getting the Arabs in at the beginning and encouraging them to think that they were participating in the erection of the organization rather than giving them an impression they were being faced with a fait accompli.
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SIR JAMES BOWKER said that he agreed that there was a psychological problem involved. We agreed that we all wanted the Arabs in the organization but he felt that there were dangers in putting proposals to them which were too imprecise. This would stimulate the Arabs to come up with impractical ideas and suggestions regarding the organization which it would be difficult to counter.
MR. EDEN said that he agreed with the importance of our maintaining flexibility. In particular, he felt that we should not have all the jobs filled when we approach the Arabs, but that some should be reserved for them.
SIR PIERSON DIXON said that we were both agreed that there should be a Military Representatives Committee. The British felt, however, that from that committee there should grow a standing group of 3 members to provide direction. He understood the American suggestion was that this organization should be informal and operate on an ad hoc basis. He wished to explain that the reason why the British had made their suggestion was that they felt that we should look ahead now to a war-time eventuality of the NATO standing group becoming the over-all directing agency. There is, moreover, the problem of the French who have very strong views on this question. There may be difficulty in getting the French into MEDO at all unless we yield this point. In addition, he was not clear whether the US had in mind that the ad hoc group should consist of the US, UK and France or whether the Turks would be included as well.
MR. ACHESON said that we felt that the Turks would have to be included in this group. The Turks would almost certainly insist on this as a condition of their membership in MEDO. Without the Turkish participation in MEDO, the organization would have no firm foundation. The Turks are willing under certain conditions to contribute 6 divisions for use outside Turkey. This is a more substantial contribution than anything the French can give. He thought we could achieve the necessary coordination among the 4 powers and liaison with NATO through such ad hoc arrangements. If war came, then changes might be necessary.
MR. NITZE pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had strong views on this question of the Standing Group. In particular, they were concerned at the possibility of creating a precedent which would encourage others, such as the Canadians, to press for participation in higher direction.
Mr. EDEN indicated that he thought we were in substantial agreement on most points. He suggested that further conversation should take place between the 2 staffs to see if an agreed paper could be worked out.
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MR. ACHESON agreed and it was decided that Messrs, Nitze, and Nash should carry the conversations further with Sir Pierson Dixon and Sir James Bowker. It was understood that any agreed paper which was worked out would be ad referendum to the US and UK Governments. It was also decided to discuss MEDO with Schuman in the tripartite conversation on June 27.
MR. EDEN opened the conversation on Indo-China by stating that it might be well, during the bilateral discussions, to go over together what could be said to Mr. Schuman in the trilateral discussions. He anticipated that Mr. Schuman might take the by now familiar line that there was little prospect for victory in Indo-China and that, unless a general settlement were reached, the best we could hope for would be a stalemate. This did not accord to the understanding of the British Government, which has the impression that the situation is improving somewhat; certainly there is a better government, there is wider representation in the government, and active Vietnamese participation. MR. EDEN said that he planned to discuss the situation with Mr. Schuman along such lines in the hope of stimulating his morale and divorcing him from his relatively defeatist attitude. THE SECRETARY replied that he had been discussing Indo-China with the French along the lines he and Mr. Eden had taken in the tripartite discussions in Paris. He expressed the opinion that the only avenue to success in Indo- China is the rapid build-up of native armed forces and the assumption by the people of Vietnam of an increasing share of the financial and military burden. THE SECRETARY announced that the French had been informed that the United States was prepared to increase its military assistance program for Indo-China by $150 million. He added that the United States, feeling that the French military training program was badly strained, had offered to assist them in this respect, but that the French, always skittish over what they might regard as undue American interference, had not taken up this offer. Certainly it is not up to the Americans to press on the French assistance along these lines. THE SECRETARY said that it was obvious that Mr. Letourneau was much encouraged as a result of his visit to Washington. He asked Dr. Jessup to read the text of the Department's telegram 2014, June 18, to Saigon, summarizing the discussions with Mr. Letourneau.
THE SECRETARY said that he had warned the French that success in the military field in Indo-China carried with it certain dangers, including the increased possibility of a large-scale Chinese Communist military intervention. He said that this in turn points up the question, "How can we prevent this from happening?" He felt it would be desirable to issue a warning statement of some sort, whether public, private, detailed and specific, or otherwise, but it would be essential to have a general understanding as to the action which we might take if the warning were to go unheeded. To issue a warning and taken no effective action would be calamitous. Perhaps the United States
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and the United Kingdom, preferably in conjunction with France, Australia and New Zealand, can reach a tentative agreement on political policy in this regard which would form a framework for joint military planning. This, in turn, leads to the major question: "What form could retaliation against aggression take?" The American military authorities are of the strong opinion that action only against the approaches to Indo-China would be ineffective. In fact, the first problem which we would likely have to face would be the evacuation of French military and civilians from Tengking. Action confined to the air and naval arms directed against the Chinese Communists in Indo-China would likewise be ineffective and, in the light of world commitments, the United States has no infantry available for operations within Indo-China. The United States thinking is along the lines of a blockade of the coast of China, combined with air action, designed to upset the economy of mainland China and to lessen the will of the Chinese Communists to continue their aggression. Such action would cease when aggression ceased, and this would be made clear to everyone. Every effort should be made to avoid action in areas of acute sensitivity to the Soviet Union. We are of the opinion that the Soviet Union would probably not enter the conflict if it were understood clearly that we had no intention of attempting to overthrow the Chinese Communist regime by force. We must bear in mind that the Chinese Communists have a formidable air force, and we may be forced to attack it wherever it is found. If the Chinese Communists do invade Indo-China in substantial force, it will be a threat to the vital interests of all of us.
MR. EDEN said that he saw no serious objection to the issuance of a warning; he recalled that he had already issued a public warning in his speech at Columbia University. He felt that, whether or not a warning is issued, it would be important to have the Chinese Communists know that retaliation against further Chinese aggression is being urgently considered.
THE SECRETARY reiterated that there was an urgent need for basic political guidance on the basis of which military talks could proceed. MR. EDEN said that he would wish to consult the Cabinet on basic policy, noting that a naval blockade involving Hong Kong was a serious question.
There was general agreement that the Secretary and Mr. Eden would conduct their discussions with Mr. Schuman along the above lines.
In connection with the Korean Armistice talks MR. EDEN reviewed the various proposals for solving the prisoners of war impasse, mentioning the Australian proposal, a proposal being developed by General Harrison, and one advanced by the Australians. THE SECRETARY indicated that he thought that the proposal advanced by Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Peiping, had considerable merit. MR. SCOTT concurred but said that it presented difficulties; it would be hard to persuade 100,000 prisoners of war to agree to
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proceed to Panmunjom for rescreening. They might consider this move a trick to deliver them into the hands of the Communists. He wondered whether the rescreening could be held elsewhere. After an inconclusive change of views, MR. NITZE suggested that the rescreening might be undertaken initially at a slow pace, perhaps a few at a time, and when it became apparent that nobody was forced to return to Communist controlled areas against his will, the general reluctance to proceed to Panmunjom could be overcome. The British representatives, on the other hand, were inclined to prefer the plan explained privately to them in Korea by General Harrison involving a new list of prisoners of war from which the names of those opposing repatriation would be deleted; the Chinese might agree to an armistice on this basis while making the propaganda point that they were continuing their effort to recover prisoners of war illegally retained by the United Nations Command.
Regarding the United Kingdom contract with the United Nations Command, MR. EDEN stated that he was fully aware of the difficulties involved in establishing additional machinery for consultation among those nations contributing forces to Korea, but he added that it was most important from the point of view of United States-United Kingdom relations, however small the United Kingdom stake in the operations might be, to avoid having two or three more instances of the magnitude of the Yalu River bombing without the British Government at least having been given prior notification. He acknowledged that there are facilities for briefing in Washington of ambassadors of the nations concerned and that also the United States can hardly be expected to discuss fully military plans with all participating nations. He said that various proposals had been discussed during Lord Alexander's visit to the Far East. He emphasized, however, that Clark had no political advisers. He suggested that the American and British ambassadors in Tokyo might be helpful along these lines, and that the United Nations Command would stand to gain by competent political assistance. THE SECRETARY then announced that President Truman had agreed to the appointment of a British Deputy Chief of Staff under General Clark with the understanding that the United Kingdom could assure us that the other Commonwealths agreed that this appointment covered them as well. He said that the question of political advisers was more complicated. He pointed out that the joint chiefs got their political advice from the Department; if General Clark received advice from political advisers in Tokyo, it might conflict with that given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after consultation with the Department. He said, however, that the problem of political advisers was being currently considered in Washington. MR. LLOYD argued that General Clark had many responsibilities, including recommendations and decisions to make which had political connotations. If there were political advisers in Tokyo they might help General Clark on matters of political significance. He admitted, however,
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that ambassadors in Tokyo have no jurisdiction over Korean affairs. THE SECRETARY outlined at some length the history of difficulties experienced during the last war in connection with assignment of political advisers to military commands; he said that the main problem was the existence or absence of an independent line of communication. DIXON mentioned that what he had in mind was a setup like that existing in Trieste, which seemed to function fairly well. THE SECRETARY said that General Van Fleet does discuss his problems from time to time with the American ambassador in Pusan. MR. SCOTT pointed out that General Van Fleet was faced with tremendous problems of both military and political nature and that he had his headquarters at Seoul. He suggested that it might be advisable to implement a plan which General Clark is now considering for the division into front and rear area commands. If this were done the problem of rendering advice to General Van Fleet by our ambassadors at Pusan would be simplified.
The meeting adjourned with a general agreement that these problems needed further study.