NTL TRI-1
July 14, 1952
MINISTERIAL TALKS IN LONDON, JUNE 1952
SUMMARY MINUTES
10:30 A.M. - 12:30 P.M., Friday, June 27, 1952 British Foreign Office
Present:
United Kingdom France
Mr. Eden M. Schuman Sir William Strang Ambassador Messigli Sir Pierson Dixon M. de Latournelle Mr. Frank Roberts M. Seydover (?) Mr. Dennis Allen M. Laloy Lord Hood (?) M. Labelle M. Mattei
United States
Secretary Acheson Ambassador Gifford Ambassador Dunn Ambassador Jessup Mr. Perkins Mr. Hocker (?) Mr. Nash Miss Kirkpatrick
Contents Page
l. Reply to the Soviet Note 2 2. Berlin 8 3. Tripartite Consultation in Germany 8 4. German Debts 9
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MR. EDEN began by saying that the agenda for the morning's discussion covered the European situation, including the reply to the Soviet note on Germany, the situation in Germany and Berlin and some questions concerning the German debt conference. He added that Mr. Schuman had also suggested that consideration be given to the subject of tripartite consultation by the three ambassadors in Germany after the contractual obligations are in force. MR. EDEN suggested that consideration first be given to the reply to the Soviet note on Germany. He thought it was necessary to take note of the progress made in Washington lending to an agreed text except for certain differences which were formulated in certain bracketed passages and the fact that the three High Commissioners had seen Adenauer two days ago and obtained his views.
MR. ACHESON said that he thought we were pretty well agreed except for paragraph 7. As to the early part of the note he thought we should get the Chancellor's suggestions, then look at the note again and include so far as possible all the points which were of special concern to the Chancellor. As to the end of the note the question was whether to suggest a restricted meeting or a broader meeting which would include the future of Germany. In considering this he thought we should take particularly into account the position of the Chancellor. We all have our problems, but they arise a lot earlier with some of us than with others and the Chancellor's problem particularly concerned him since delays in German ratification might delay the others. The High Commissioners had talked to the Chancellor several times. It seems the Chancellor feels that any meeting would be embarrassing. The Secretary then read the telegram from Mr. McCloy telling about a call from Blankenhorn to express the Chancellor's concern. The Secretary then went on to read also from Mr. McCloy's report of the meeting of the representatives of the three High Commissioners with the Chancellor. He said he thought it almost impossible to meet all the Chancellor's views considering the position taken by Messrs. Eden and Schuman and he felt it therefore all the more necessary to limit the scope of the meeting. He would urge the acceptance of the United States version of paragraph 7 and also approximately a week's delay to get the Chancellor's opinion but he hoped that we could get agreement on the text of the note here and then give the Chancellor time to express his views.
MR. SCHUMAN commented on the necessity of taking Adenauer's difficulties into account and said he was impressed by the change which had taken place in Adenauer's views. He thought that during the week we might get a better idea for the reasons of the change, for those given to the High Commissioner's representatives did not seem to him persuasive. In the view of the French Government, ratification will be very difficult to get from the French Parliament at the present time and under the present circumstances.
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Great efforts have been made and considerable progress. Only yesterday Guy Mollet told him that he was having more and more success, in speeches favoring the EDC, in answering the contrary arguments. One of the principle arguments advanced against the agreement is the fact that we do not really know what the Russians have in mind. If we could have a meeting in which we could force the Russians to answer yes or no to some direct questions, provided the conference were well prepared, and its duration and scope well restricted, we would know better where we are. He would emphasize that this was not a question of concessions of any sort, that the French Government hold to all points in the previous note about the conditions for a peace treaty, freedom of elections and the statute of a unified German Government. This must be said and stressed again in our answer. But he wished to make it clear that our answer should not appear to be attempting to avoid conversations. Therefore we should not insist on any preliminary conditions to be accepted by the Russians before talks start. We can state our views and that we do not depart from them but if we set up any conditions for discussions we will seem to be trying to avoid them altogether. But we must consider carefully how to proceed and what precautions must be taken. We must propose a limited and precise agenda which once it is established must not be open to further discussion. The French would accept an agenda which would deal with the commission of inquiry and its composition but we must take the position that we could not discuss other questions while there was no agreement on the first point. Secondly, and this has not been stressed enough in our notes, is the question of the state of affairs in the whole of Germany and how to assure that satisfactory conditions exist and to guarantee that they will remain satisfactory up to the elections. The third point on the agenda would be the powers of a unified German Government. These three points are separate and distinct and should be dealt with separately. He thought that this degree of clarity and this insistence might in part satisfy the Chancellor.
MR. EDEN reverting to the question of the timetable, thought it would be serious if we did not agree on the text of the note during these meetings. He thought we were not very far apart and was surprised that the Chancellor fears a meeting as much as he now seems to. He agreed that it was necessary to stand by all our views as previously stated and in this connection offered an amendment to paragraph 1 of the draft text which would add the following language:
"Her Majesty's Government stand by all the views and proposals in their note of the 13th May and do not consider it necessary to repeat them here. In the present note they are therefore only dealing with the immediate practical problem of the procedure for setting up, through free elections, an all-German Government with which a peace treaty can be negotiated."
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He suggested that the United States version of paragraph 7 be amended to meet Mr. Schuman's views by striking out the passage beginning "If the Soviet Government agrees" through the words "holding free elections." He pointed out that these conditions were already contained in paragraph 3 of the draft text. He thought that if these two amendments could be agreed, the only question remaining open would be whether the note should propose one meeting or two. Also there was a question as to whether there should be a time limit.
MR. SCHUMAN, speaking of the danger of delay, referred to the precedent of the Disarmament Commission which is required to report by a certain date. He did not suggest that the requirement be put in the form of an ultimatum.
MR. ACHESON said he was not sure he understood as to whether the time limit should be on the length of the Four-Power discussions for the length of the commission's work.
MR. SCHUMAN said he meant the former.
MR. ACHESON thought that we do not need to say this in the note as long as we have it clear in our own minds.
MR. EDEN agreed.
MR. SCHUMAN said that while he had no firm personal opinion, he had doubts as to the reaction of French opinion that the note itself set a time limit.
MR. ACHESON then said that we had attempted to deal with the problem of the wording in Paragraph 7 and he then read the following:
"In order to avoid further delay HMG in concert with the French Government and the United States Government propose that there should be an early meeting of representatives of the four Governments provided that it is understood that the four Governments are in favor of free elections throughout Germany and of the participation of free all-German Government in negotiation of the German peace treaty. The purpose of this meeting would be to reach agreement on the first question which must be settled if further progress is to be made, namely, the composition and functions of the commission of investigation to determine whether conditions necessary for free elections exist. HMG propose that the representatives discuss:
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1. The selection of members of the commission in such a way as to insure its impartiality.
2. The way in which the commission would be authorized to function in order to insure its complete independence to make recommendations to the four powers.
3. The way in which the commission would be authorized to carry out its investigation in full freedom and without interference. As already pointed out HMG also maintain their previous proposal for further meeting after the commission has made its report to discuss the rest of the program for the formation of an all-German Government contained in the final paragraph of HMG's note of May 13.
MR. SCHUMAN said that as there was a brief interval while Mr. Acheson's proposed language was being typed, he would read what the French had drafted earlier in the morning which was quite a bit shorter. The French text proposed an agenda in which the first item would be measures to be taken to constitute a commission of investigation of impartial members not subject to Four-Power veto and able to go freely into the whole of Germany to investigate conditions; and the second item would be, as soon as the governments agree on the proposed measures, to take up the question of a united Germany, notably conditions concerning its freedom of action in the period before the peace treaty.
MR. EDEN then suggested that we try to settle one or two other points and asked whether the British amendment to paragraph one were acceptable. MR. ACHESON and MR. SCHUMAN signified their agreement.
MR. SCHUMAN then pointed out that in this case the United States proposal for the last sentence in paragraph 5 could be dropped, to which Mr. Acheson agreed.
In response to the query from Mr. Eden about the difference of meaning between sub-points 2 and 3 of the new United States suggested text for paragraph 7, MR. ACHESON thought that this question could be left to a working group.
MR. SCHUMAN then said that the French found no difficulties in the proposed United States text until they got to the passage beginning "As already pointed out". This passage, however, means that there would be an interval between the agreement of a commission of inquiry and the second conference
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which would be limited to defining the powers of a unified German Government. He had two objections to this. First, he did not favor a duality of conferences separated by an interval, whether long or short. It would weaken the Western position and there would be many more difficulties in such a second conference than in the first. As to the first, the Russians might make difficulties about free elections, but not we. But when we define the powers of a free German Government and say that it must pursue a policy of integration with the West, the Russians will say that we are setting limits to its freedom of actions and this would be hard to justify in the face of public opinion. If we were not careful we might be held responsible for the failure of the second conference and then it could be said that the Russians would have gone though with the free elections and that we had brought about the failure in order to prevent it. Secondly, under the American text the second conference would meet only after the commission had made its report. If the report were favorable we would be under great pressure from German public opinion which would pay no attention to the risks entailed in the Russian insistence upon going back to the Potsdam Agreement. He wondered whether we or the Chancellor could resist the urge of the German people for unity if events were allowed to take place in this way. But if there were only one meeting including on the agenda both these items, we would not be driven against a wall on the last item without a defense. He therefore suggested that in order to be precise we should agree to one meeting but say that the four Governments must reach agreement about the impartial commission before turning to the powers of an all-German Government. As long as there was no agreement on the first part we should not talk about the second part.
MR. EDEN thought it was safer to discuss the first topic alone and it would be very hard for Adenauer to get ratification while the Four Powers were discussing the future of German. He thought the chances of agreement on the first point were very poor and equally poor that there would be an agreed report on conditions in Germany and therefore did not see why we should embark on discussions of the second point when we were in such a strong position on the first point.
MR. ACHESON said he agreed strongly with Mr. Eden and thought there was grave danger in talking about the later steps at an early moment. As to Mr. Schuman's desire to find out what the Russians have in mind, if they should have made a serious change in their policy it would be very important but we would certainly find that out in a limited first talk. If there were no changes in Russian policy we would also find that out in a limited first talk and sufficiently to be able to reassure public opinion that we had fully explored what they had in mind. He thought that to include both parts
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in one agenda would be very dangerous, first because in all Four-Power meetings hitherto there had been a rule that we could move from one item to the next on the agenda without agreement to the prior. Thus there was great danger that we would be pushed into talking about the future of Germany. If we insisted upon agreement on the first point, the Russians might appear to agree and say that they wanted to refer the matter to Moscow and in the meantime we could discuss the second point or they might make their agreement on the first point contingent on our agreement to discuss the last point. He thought there was a grave risk that no German Government could ratify after a Four-Power discussion on the second point had taken place. He also thought that there should be no discussion on the future of Germany until there was agreement on what the elections would do - whether they would be elections for a constituent assembly, whether it should have greatly centralized powers, etc. He thought that we would have a terrible time with German public opinion if these questions were not settled first. While we know what we mean by freedom of action for the German Government, the Russians will interpret it that Germany should not be bound by any previous commitments and this would raise questions under Article 7 of the contractual agreements. He thought that once we got talking about these points no German parliament would be able to act and they might even want to renegotiate the treaty. He thought, therefore, there was nothing to be gained by a long agenda and much by a short one which would give us all we need to know about Russian intentions and would reassure Western opinions.
MR. SCHUMAN thought we would have these difficulties anyhow if the Russians agree to free German elections. He thought we must face up to whether we will have talks and did not see how we could avoid them. If the first question were settled and there were then an interval and conditions for elections were agreed, then the Germans would no longer be willing to let us discuss the other basic factors. He thought that at that point the question of the interpretation of Article 7 would be raised by both the Russians and the Germans, not only by the SPD in Germany. Thus he thought it would be more dangerous to permit an interval between the discussions of the two parts.
MR. ACHESON said that he did not assume that there would in fact be two conferences. He assumed that there would be the only one and that the Russians would not agree to an impartial commission and that if they did the commission would report that changes were required which the Russians would not accept. He thought therefore that we must not assume that we will have to talk about the second part. Why then should we run the risk of agreeing to talk about it now? MR. EDEN said that what troubled him was that under Mr. Shuman's proposal he did not see any way of avoiding discussions of the second part.
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MR. SCHUMAN then said he would like to suggest that paragraph 7 of the proposed note should say in substance, "It is understood that the three Governments maintain their proposal to discuss the rest of the program for the formation of an all-German Government contained in the final paragraph of the HMG's note of May 13, as soon as the four Governments judge that the work of the impartial commission has gone far enough to allow such discussions to take place."
MR. EDEN suggest that paragraph 7, after proposing discussions on the composition and function of the commission should say, "HMG also maintain their previous proposal for the discussion of the rest of the program for the formation of an all-German Government contained in the final paragraph of the French Government's note of May 13."
MR. SCHUMAN said that the disadvantage of this is that when the commission's report is made and the representatives meet to decide the date of elections the Germans will think only of the holding of the elections and the guarantees which must be considered in the second part, as to the status of the future German Government, will be of no interest to them and we will not be able to resist this pressure.
MR. ACHESON said that he would agree to Mr. Eden's proposal to incorporate the last paragraphs of the note of May 13 by reference into paragraph 7 of the proposed text.
MR. EDEN pointed out that his proposal would leave open whether there was to be a continuation of the conference or not.
MR. SCHUMAN said that it seemed to him that considerable progress had been made and he suggested that we consider the proposals which had been put forward and perhaps take them up later or refer them to a working group.
MR. EDEN said that turning to the other items on the morning's agenda there was not much to say about Berlin; the situation was calm. Our firm policy seemed to be successful and he thought that what remained to be done was to make plans ready to put into effect in the event of an emergency to solve the command structure, increase the supplies available and institute an air lift if necessary.
MR. ACHESON and Mr. Schuman agreed.
MR. SCHUMAN then raised the question about tripartite consultation in Germany after the contractuals come into effect.
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He referred to Section 3 of Article 1 of the General Convention providing for joint action by the three Ambassadors and said that there was no intent to create a new body or a commission but that the French wanted some form of understanding between the three Powers to organize their work the best way for common action and where necessary to show a united front, e.g. to the Russians in the event of a crisis in Berlin. He thought it necessary to have some understanding about organizing the joint work of the three Ambassadors. They would have to take positions on some of the reserved questions and there should be arrangements to reach understandings on a low level without calling in the Foreign Ministers.
MR. EDEN agreed that it would be undesirable to have any new machinery. MR. ACHESON said that he agreed with Mr. Eden and thought it would be preferable to issue identical instructions to the three Ambassadors. In this way the wishes of the French Government would be met and joint action would be provided for without entering into any secret agreement which he considered important since had had told the Senate that there were no secret agreements.
MR. SCHUMAN said that he agreed.
MR. EDEN then said that Mr. Schuman had something to say on the question of the German debt.
MR. SCHUMAN said that the Dawes Loan of 1924 and the Young Loan of 1930 considered some conditions relative to payment in gold which were applicable whether the obligations were payable in francs or dollars. Apparently there was a disagreement between certain of the French and American creditors. Apparently some of the American creditors wanted the gold clauses interpreted in a different way according to the currency in which the obligation is payable. According to their proposal the US holder of a thousand dollar bond would get a thousand dollars. The British holder of an equivalent bond would get $576 and the French holder $73.50. He said that of course this was not the view of the US Government but of a certain private group and that the French Government could not agree to it.
MR. EDEN said that Mr. Pierson had been extremely helpful in trying to resolve the difficulties. His own particular concern was partly because so much progress had been made with the Germans after they had earlier made so many difficulties.
MR. ACHESON said that he had talked to Mr. Pierson who had agreed to discuss the problem with the American creditors concerned and to make proposals which might permit agreement along the lines of adjusting periods of maturity, amounts of interest, etc. MR. GIFFORD added that the US creditors have really suggested in effect that they should get more than a hundred cents on the dollar.